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BULGARIA SELF-REVEALED

DOCUMENTS COLLECTED BY
VICTOR KUHNE

WITH A PREFACE BY
AUGUSTE GAUVAIN
FORMERLY MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY OF FRANCE

And an Appendix by
Z. D. FERRIMAN

LONDON
CONSTABLE & CO. LTD.

1919

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By exchange
Leland Stanford Junior University
(Prof. E. D. Adams)
1819

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NOTES

1. The author begs to tender his thanks to friends who have aided him in researches for documents as in the translation of the texts, and whose modesty is content with anonymous collaboration.

2. All quotations have been translated literally, sometimes even word for word, the author preferring to sacrifice style to the most precise possible rendering of the Bulgarian expressions and tone.

3. The greater part of the quotations are from Bulgarian journals :

(a) Semi-official (*officieux*) Journals :

L'Echo de Bulgarie (in French), organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Court.

Narodni Prava (The Rights of the People), organ of the Liberal Party, whose leader is the President of the Council, Radoslavoff.

(b) Independent Journals, more or less *Governmental* :

Dnevnik (The Journal).

Outro (The Morning).

Zariä (The Dawn).

Kambana (The Bell), the most Germanophil of Bulgarian newspapers.

Balkanska Pochta (The Courier of the Balkans).

(c) Opposition Journals :

Mir (The World), organ of Gueshoff's party, the Popular Party (National).

Preporetz (The Flag), organ of Malinoff's party, the Democratic.

Narod (The People), organ of the Broad Socialists (reformists).

Rabotnitcheski Vestnik (Workmen's Journal), organ of the Narrow Socialists (doctrinaires or extremists).

Certain quotations are from German, Austrian, Hungarian, Turkish, and other journals. All journals are designated by their original names.

4. The author has been careful to give to all localities the geographical name they bear in the countries wherein they are situated. He has adopted the phonetic system of orthography. His state of health having hindered him from personally superintending the printing of the volume, he begs the reader to excuse such oversights as may have remained uncorrected.

5. Dates are given according to the New Style (Gregorian). For the Bulgarian journals issued before its adoption in Bulgaria (April 1st, 1916) the dates are adapted to the new calendar.

PREFACE

THANKS to M. Victor Kuhne there are no longer any grounds for anyone taking up the cudgels on behalf of Bulgaria. Prior to the autumn of 1914 those not fully informed might still have been uncertain as to the character of Bulgarian aims. Hostilities between Turkey and the Allies once begun, however, it was inevitable that any such hesitation should disappear in view of the Sofia Cabinet's refusal to oppose, for the sake of a dazzlingly rich bribe, its former oppressors. It was evident, in short, to every shrewd observer, that if the Czar Ferdinand and his Ministers were unwilling to seize the opportunity of recapturing Adrianople and the Enos-Midia line, it was because they had already, directly or indirectly, made a bargain with the Turks, which is to say, with Germany. It was hardly necessary to see and handle the papers recording the agreement in order to be convinced of this. From the moment that the Bulgars declined the Thracian capital, at the siege of which they fought tooth and nail during the winter of 1912-1913, it was certain that they had found elsewhere a guarantee for the enjoyment of something more vastly coveted and nearer to their heart's desire. This elsewhere was, before all else, Serbia, that is to say, the Ally of the Triple Entente. Everything alike proclaimed it, words and acts; the words of the newspapers of Sofia, which demanded the immediate occupation of Macedonia, the acts of the "comitajis," who, using Bulgarian territory as a base for their

operations, launched out on raids and pillaging of Serbian territory.

The diplomatists of the Triple Entente were blind and deaf. Infatuated by the prospect of restoring the Balkan League of 1912, they looked on Bulgaria as a future ally. They did all in their power, first of all, to win over the King, and thereafter to influence the King through his people. Both attempts were doomed to failure. King and people, after mature reflection, chose to throw in their lot with the Austro-German plan. Westerners were loth to believe it, since it was imagined that the country set free by Russia in 1876-1878 still cherished some filial regards towards her liberator. This was a childish conclusion to draw, and showed that those who held it had no grasp whatever of political psychology. In point of fact, nearly all Bulgarian politicians had anti-Russian aims. In this respect there was but one thing differentiating them. Some openly advocated reliance on Austria-Hungary for support against Serbia, in order both to ensure the expansion of Macedonia and to prevent the hemming in of the young kingdom which must result from the Russian occupation of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. Others would first of all have sought Russia's aid against Turkey, in order to be thereafter in a better position for bringing the Serbs and the Greeks to heel. The unlimited forbearance shown by the Russians towards the men of Sofia, and the ill-humour of their dealings with the Serbs and the Greeks, were a couple of mad blunders. The Byzantine mirage haunted the minds of the Imperialists, both of the Right and of the Left. The events of to-day show how artificial were the "mystic" aspirations towards Constantinople, which MM. Sazonov and Miliukoff declared to be irresistible.

One of the chief merits of M. Kuhne's book is in laying bare the fundamental error of the Miliukoff party in this

matter. This party was held in high esteem by the very few in France and England who denounced the danger of Bulgaria's political aims. It reproached these aims with compromising the bond between the Allies and Bulgaria, while encouraging the resistance of Serbia and Greece to the territorial concessions in Macedonia. Now, it is this very party, it is MM. Sazonov and Miliukoff themselves, who have the most contributed to Bulgaria's unfriendly attitude, by their conduct of negotiations in 1915, in setting forth the claims, the rights of Russia over Constantinople and the Straits. This is the conclusion to be drawn from the numerous quotations given by M. Kuhne. For M. Kuhne has not written a controversial work. He has merely put together a packetful of Bulgarian cuttings. He tells us what the best-qualified Bulgarians have themselves said ; he gives us a peep at what they have themselves written. He neither argues, nor qualifies, nor judges. It is MM. Radoslavoff, Tontcheff, Ghenadieff, Malinoff, Daneff who do that for us ; it is Generalissimo Jékoff ; it is the representatives of Ferdinand abroad, and the organs of his government. It is even the Socialists, whom we fondly regarded as the irreconcilable adversaries of King Ferdinand. Here, for example, is what the deputy Blagoïeff, leader of the Orthodox Socialists, writes :

“ Domination of Constantinople and the Straits involves with it domination of Bulgaria. . . . There are, none the less, certain parties in Bulgaria who are convinced that if Russian policy has been unfriendly to Bulgaria, it was merely because it was controlled by reactionaries such as Sazonov. They believed that this policy would cease to be dangerous if Professor Miliukoff, the well-known friend of the Bulgars and the leader of the Russian Liberals, took over the reins of office. These notions have recently been exploded in the *Mir* and the *Pre-poretz*. Such an idealistic theory is as dangerous as it is baseless. *A Liberal and middle-class Russia, with Miliukoff at the helm, is even a greater menace to the Balkans and to Bulgaria than a reactionary Russia.*”

On April 11th, 1916, the *Narodni Prava*, M. Radoslavoff's press organ, commented as follows on M. Miliukoff's speech before the Duma on March 24th preceding :

"The pious wishes of Miliukoff in regard to reparation for the injustices suffered by Bulgaria remain merely hollow phrases which will never cause a break in the mainspring of Russia's Balkan policy, which is to reach, through Roumania and Bulgaria, to the Dardanelles and the Ægean Sea. Miliukoff himself, did he hold the reins of Russian policy, would ride rough-shod over Bulgaria, so that Russia might reach to that open sea for which Miliukoff clamours as loudly as any of them. The only difference is, perhaps, that Miliukoff would go to work more warily. He would taunt Bulgaria with having annexed Macedonia, so that he might lay hands on Constantinople ; and afterwards, by the force of natural evolution whereby the stronger batten upon the weak, Miliukoff would find it quite right that Russia should in turn lay hold of Bulgaria and Macedonia."

It is fear of Russia which has reconciled Bulgaria to Turkey. At Sofia, since the failure of the Tchataldja *coup* in 1912, they have wanted the Turks to remain at Constantinople. The moment they found they could not get there themselves, they wanted no one else to do so. In the liberator of 1878 they do not recognise a friend ; they see only a protector who aims at becoming master. Now, they are not willing to serve as a tool. They desire to become masters on their own account. They want to lord it over the Balkans. Russian diplomacy has been completely hoodwinked. To gain her object she ought to have held Bulgaria in check along with Serbia, Roumania, and Greece. Instead of which she has bent her energies to thwarting these three latter powers. As to Miliukoff's party, they imagined that they would divert Bulgaria from the sea of Marmora by delivering Macedonia into her maw. The more sensible they were of uneasiness at Sofia in regard to the Straits, the more pressure they brought to bear on Serbia and Greece in order to urge on

these two powers to greater sacrifices. In what is now befalling them a father of the Church would discern the hand of Providence.

The mistake of the Allies in regard to the Russian expedition in Dobrudja arises from the same misconception. In contriving Roumania's intervention in the summer of 1916 the Allies believed that the arrival of some thousands of Russian soldiers in the Dobrudja would induce the Bulgarian soldiery to make common cause with them, and set them marching shoulder to shoulder to a chorus of Slavic hymns. It was a fantastic delusion. We now know what sort of welcome the Russians got from the Bulgarians ! M. Radoslavoff put the case to the American Colonel Emerson quite bluntly. " If Russia," he said in substance, " should succeed in reaching Constantinople across the Dobrudja, we should have to resign ourselves to becoming either an entirely Russian region, or else a buffer state. An independent Bulgaria will never consent to the seizure of Constantinople by the Russians."

But it is not merely the question of Constantinople which divides Bulgaria from the Allies, it is the Serbian question, the Jugo-Slav question, the Balkan question, the European question. M. Kuhne brings to bear the most overwhelming testimony on all this. Diplomats and military men, politicians and journalists are at one in proclaiming the common interests that bind Bulgaria to the Central Empires. The Bulgarians contemptuously disclaim the Slav kinship which is attributed to them. They claim to be of Turanian stock. They regard themselves as blood-brothers of the Magyars. In a toast at Budapesth, M. Momtchiloff cried, " The Bulgars would die to the last man rather than renounce the closeness of their neighbourhood to Hungary." The *Az Ujsag*, Count Tisza's press organ, affirms, " The Hamburg-Bagdad railway will weld together the Turanian peoples in a

geographical unity." At a lecture given in the Palace of the Reichstag at Berlin, Professor Panoff explained that the Bulgar was not of Slavic race, since the Slav was lost in the pursuit of fantastic ideas, whereas the Bulgar gave all his mind to grasping the reality of affairs. He defined the matter thus: "The Bulgars are descended from the Huns; the Hungarians and the Finns are their European co-nationals." The *Alkotmany* concludes: "By its marvellous grasp of reality, which clearly marks it off from the passionate fantasy of the Serbian people, this race of Finno-Tartar nomads, thrown back from the Volga to the slopes of the Black Sea, has chosen the means of carving out a way to independence and hegemony in the Balkans."

This realism, on all fours with that of Prussia, has, like Bismarck's, only succeeded thanks to the blindness of those States which have been called to suffer it. Its "marvellousness" will cease soon enough if we draw inspiration from the edifying avowals here collected by M. Victor Kuhne.

AUGUSTE GAUVAIN.

1917.

BULGARIA SELF-REVEALED

CHAPTER I

MISTAKES AND DECEPTIONS

ONLY under the repeated shock of deceptions dearly paid for are the bubble illusions which the Quadruple Entente cherished in regard to Bulgaria blown into air. The cynical confession of the Bulgarians themselves, whose mischievous bent could never resist the pleasure of jeering at those whom they had hoodwinked, render these deceptions the more glaring.

Already in the months of August and September, 1915, the Germanophil press of Sofia took a pleasure in proving how persistent were the hopes that the Entente placed on Bulgaria, despite the conclusion of a Bulgarian loan in Germany and notwithstanding the arrival of German officers at Sofia. The *Kambana* could not finish off a single leader without a cynical laugh at the simple credulity of the Russians, the French, and the English; the official *Narodni Prava* took good care to print not a single word which might brighten the outlook for the Entente. The *Mir*, the *Preporetz*, the *Bulgaria*, along with sundry opposition journals of minor importance, made a show, certainly, of their reliance on the Entente; but the means they employed for getting others to share their ideas and follow them out were the most ridiculous and ineffectual. Lacking the courage of its opinion, or, perhaps, falling short of sufficient conviction to act, the opposition was constantly intimidated by the Macedonian infatuation of the Governmental newspapers; it outbid its rivals in jingoistic tub-thumping, and merely made still more exacting demands on Serbia and the Quadruple Entente. The only form under which the Gueshoff, Malinoff and Daneff parties could pluck up enough courage to advocate an agreement

with the Entente was a compromise soothing to the patriotic swelled head of the Bulgarians. The only effect of this concession was to render Radoslavoff implacable. Elsewhere in the very opposition journals which ventured from time to time a diffident article in support of the Entente, there would appear, at the bidding of the Press Bureau of Sofia, any number of communiqués running down the Entente aims, which these newspapers claimed to be defending. Especially during the last three months preceding the Bulgarian attack, the Press Bureau bombarded the newspapers with communiqués about “the reign of terror in Macedonia,” quoting names, dates and facts, all *invented along with the documents to prove them*. It was stated that such and such a person had fallen to the Serbian knife or met with a horrible death in a Serbian prison. It was in vain that Serbia showed by the most unanswerable evidence that the alleged crimes were either utterly fictitious or had taken place under bygone Turkish rule, and that the Bulgarians had merely post-dated them by a few years, in order that they might accuse the poor Serbians whose disclaimers were drowned in the hubbub set up at Sofia. In spite of the denials, the object had been achieved. In exciting hatred against the Serbs, the Bulgarian Press Bureau succeeded in thwarting the conciliatory action of the Entente.

“Down with Serbia!” was the universal slogan. So popular did hatred of the neighbouring kingdom become, that it served as the strongest of pleas for the accused in political trials. In a country of primitive types, such as Bulgaria is, mistrust and mutual recrimination, political intrigue and appeal to mob passion are matters of daily occurrence in public life. The members of a cabinet, when dismissed by the King, pass almost always to the dock as prisoners sent for trial. The three sections of the Liberal party had done their utmost to see that the courts should condemn as high treason the advocacy and pursuit of any policy favourable to Russia and Serbia—such a policy as had brought about disaster in 1913. And yet it should be remembered that the accusers comprised the same men as had then led Bulgaria on to catastrophe. A year later Radoslavoff, Tontcheff and Petkoff had brought to book, on a charge of high treason, their colleague Ghena-dieff, leader of the Stamboulovists, in the Déclosières affair. In order to clear himself of any shadow of suspicion on the

score of his patriotism, this former upholder of the Entente, now converted, could hit on nothing better than an attack on Serbia, while avowing himself an apologist of the Quadruple Entente. But this alone was enough to earn his acquittal.

When the moment came for striking the long-premeditated blow, the cabinet of Radoslavoff held within its grasp everything that stands for public opinion in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government could therefore permit itself the audacity of shamming ignorance of any evidence as to the real state of things, and notwithstanding Serbia's submission to cruel sacrifices of which the answer to the Quadruple Entente gave proof, Radoslavoff had the effrontery to maintain that no compromise was possible, since Serbia refused to yield to Entente pressure. This impudent assertion was also repeated by King Ferdinand in the manifesto to his people announcing war. The impudence of the impostors on the one hand, and the timidity of the defenders of the truth on the other, combined with the lack of conviction and sincerity which branded all alike, set up an atmosphere of hypocrisy and equivocation. Everybody grew more and more passive under the whip-hand of audacity.

Bulgarian claims grew with their chances of being granted. They began by demanding territory from Serbia. Finding that Serbia would end by conceding the demand, the Bulgarians thereupon imposed a more onerous condition, viz., *its occupation forthwith*. It was the opposition which launched a whole-hearted propaganda urging the necessity of an effectual guarantee in a preliminary and immediate occupation by the *allied armies*. The government merely made its claim more grasping, by insisting on an immediate occupation of the territory in question by the *Bulgarian* army. They dared to maintain that the Entente would not deal firmly enough with Serbia, and that even the occupation of the territory by the armies of the Entente would not of itself provide sufficient guarantee of its being ceded to Bulgaria. As to the Entente and Serbia, how were they to be indemnified against the consequences of their yielding to Bulgaria's terms? Did they take into full account what was implied by the occupation of Serbia's only remaining free outlet by an army raised on a German subsidy, equipped by Germany, and under the dominance of German officers?

It is obvious that if the promises of the four Great Powers were merely put forward as a bait, poor little Bulgaria would have found it impossible to secure an adequate guarantee even by the immediate occupation of Macedonia—supposing the Entente to be victorious. But Bulgaria never for one moment believed in a win for the Allies. Hence, feeling sure that the Central Powers were to win, she wanted to be on the right side when the time should come for asking her help in adding her weight to pin down the Entente when the time came for counting it out. She thus laid all her plans to insure at a minimum cost the acquisition of the spoil she coveted.

It was as plain as possible to everybody that in ever-increasing claims, in asserting that “the legitimate aspirations of Bulgaria are not satisfied,” King Ferdinand had not in view, in the least, their realisation with the help of the Entente. But what was obvious to everybody else seemed hidden from the accredited diplomatists at Sofia, who did not grasp the situation, and failed to realise how much the opposition itself, though professedly favouring the Entente, by its very compliance, served only to give greater force to the current which swept Bulgaria into the war.

* * *

The persistence of these illusions, which linger on in some minds even to this day, induced the press organ of Gueshoff—representing the same opposition group on whom so many hopes were centred in the autumn of 1915—to express its astonishment at the obstinate naïveté of the Entente. Some months after Bulgaria's entry into the war, the *Mir* of March 23rd, 1916, wrote as follows:

“Entente statesmen believed that the Bulgarian people would find it difficult to range themselves in arms beside Germany and Turkey, with whom they were but yesterday at war. They were convinced that the worst to be expected of Bulgaria was that she would remain neutral until the conclusion of hostilities. That is why they did their utmost to induce the Serbians and the Greeks to give up to Bulgaria what they had taken from her, and that they set themselves to win over Bulgaria to their side. When Bulgaria announced her mobilisation, it was sincerely believed in Entente circles that there would be a revolution in the country. Even to-day there are some who still labour under this delusion. Their newspapers still talk of riots and rebellions. They are talking about them at this very moment when the men on leave are returning to the

front with eagerness and enthusiasm. *The Entente paid too dearly for its mistake*, since it is Bulgarian intervention which brought about the downfall of the Serbian Army and opened up for Germany its route to the East."

A month earlier, the *Echo de Bulgarie*, in its issue of February 11th (in an article entitled "The Campaign of Lies"), expressed still more clearly the same idea :

"Bulgaria herself bears a good share of the expenses of this amusing campaign ; she continues to attract the lively interest of her adversaries, and with good reason. Her intervention in the war, on account of the important and fortunate results which it has brought about, has completely upset the calculations of the Entente diplomats ; to speak quite to the point, it must be said that she has *cruelly disappointed their bland and self-righteous lack of foresight*, and that it is an offence which the Entente embassies, full of self-important people, will not find it easy to forgive."

On the same day (February 11th) the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency published in the *Neue Freie Presse* a denial in regard to a statement made by the Agence Havas as to the ill-feeling of the Bulgarian populace towards the Germans. The denial concluded thus :

"All statements to this effect can only be received by the Bulgarians with the noisiest hilarity. It is amusing for them to observe the pig-headedness of the Entente press in persisting to spread news, entirely concocted, in regard to Bulgaria and her attitude to her allies."

The Bulgarian press elsewhere gave unfailing contradiction to the statements circulated by the Entente press as to the state of feeling in Bulgaria. The *Narodni Prava* of January 17th, 1916, commenting on the news published in the *Novoïé Vremia* and the *Riétch* regarding the Névrokop risings and the so-called unrest among the intellectual democracy in Bulgaria, said :

"Derided Russian opinion will one day learn the truth, and will certainly not leave unpunished those who are to blame for the terrible defeats suffered right from the beginning of the war down to the present moment, and who still persist in feeding it on baseless and fantastic hopes."

The *Dnevnik* of January 26th, 1916, entered its protest against the statements of the *Daily Telegraph* regarding the ill-will said to exist between King Ferdinand and his middle-class subjects, and against those made current in the *Daily News* regarding the supposed grudges which the

Bulgarians nourished against their allies, and the reported mutiny among the officers of the 18th regiment. It asserted that "the interview between Wilhelm and Ferdinand at Nish is a demonstration not merely of the cordial understanding which exists between Bulgaria and Germany, but also of the determination and the enthusiasm which binds King Ferdinand to his nation in arms. . . ." "All this false news is circulated," writes the *Mir* of January 26th, 1916, "to order, and is paid for by the Entente. Its only effect will be to intensify the hatred of our brave soldiers for the enemies of their country."

* *

In spite of having been bluntly denied by hard facts no less than by articles in the Bulgarian press, these delusions still thrive in certain quarters. From time to time, instead of dying out, they take on a new lease of life. They showed renewed vigour, especially at the moment of Roumania's intervention, which synchronised with the announcement of more energetic action at Salonica. But these delusive hopes promptly faded out when once Roumania was involved.

The statement which M. Keremektchieff made to the Berne newspaper *Der Bund* (September 8th, 1916) is highly instructive from this point of view. The Bulgarian chargé d'affaires at Berne declared openly as follows :

"The Entente were hoping to impose on Bulgaria a separate peace, which would undoubtedly have had a decisive effect in determining peace terms with the Central Powers. That explains why they were prepared to offer us so valuable a prize, consisting (as I am informed on the most reliable authority) of the Enos-Midia-Cavalla frontier, the ceding of Greco-Serbian Macedonia, and the Dobrudja, taken from us in 1913. . . . The link uniting the Central Powers to the East having once been snapped, the Entente would have held the winning hand in the rubber. . . . It is here that the Entente was completely out in its reckoning. The whole of its Balkan policy, moreover, seethes with blunders and miscalculations. The Entente had completely lost sight of the fact that *Bulgaria was fighting, not for a temporary advantage, but for the full realisation of her national ambition*. If Bulgaria cannot now, once and for all time, thrust aside her hereditary enemies, her lofty aims will be brought to nothing, and she will let slip the flood which would have borne her onward to the haven of her ambition. The Entente forgot that Bulgaria's choice lay between triumph or death.

What should we gain by a separate peace? The maintenance of Roumanian imperialism, of Serbian jingoism, the sinister neighbourhood of two powerful enemies, and the extinction of our prestige. We should thus be baulked of the whole fruit of our struggles, which would have to be buried with all our hopes. Bulgaria is not treacherous, and she sees somewhat farther than her nose. Her fate is tightly bound up with that of the Central Powers."

This declaration made by one holding rank among Bulgarian diplomatists provides an apt illustration of Bulgarian mentality. What inordinate ambition! Even on the amazing assumption of the grant of Serbo-Greek Macedonia, of the Dobrudja, and almost the whole of Thrace, she will still be dissatisfied; on the contrary, she will deem herself to have been cheated out of the "whole fruit of her struggles"; she will consider that she must "bury all her hopes," and suffer "the extinction of her prestige"! What then does she want? What does she regard as the whole of these fruits, of these hopes, of this prestige? Obviously the swallowing up of two-thirds of Serbian territory, the expectation that Serbia, having been put out of action, will cease to exist as an independent state, and that Bulgaria will thereupon be able to hold undisputed sway over the Balkan peninsula.

Professor Paul Miliukoff, a Bulgarophil of long standing and chief of the Russian Cadets, is one of those who refused to be influenced by the logic of events. Moreover Miliukoff personally was not at fault. His is a very complicated case. For its proper understanding two elements in it must first be recognised: the personal factor, and following thereon a misunderstanding between him and those who modelled their ideas on his. Miliukoff's sympathy for Bulgaria is strong and sincere. He is as much attached to her as to his own country. He loves it as a man will love the land to which he has devoted all his energy throughout a long term of years, during that period of life when he is most active, most fertile, and most impressionable. Miliukoff is attached to Bulgaria by intimate personal memories, and equally by a feeling of gratitude for the kind reception and protection he found there during the period of his exile when the ways of life were for him most hard.

A man of action, imbued with democratic ideas, Miliukoff found in this new sphere a promising field for his activity.

Touched by the sight of a country which had been the cause of so many emotions to the Russians of his generation, and of which the soil was sodden with Russian blood, he conceived a passionate attachment for young Bulgaria hardly yet free, and full of the fever of growth, whose savage strength, though ill-curbed, opened up so vast a field for all his hopes.

From the very first day Miliukoff identified himself with the life of his new country, shared to the full both in what she loved and what she loathed. Bulgaria, without doubt, at that time was pursuing an anti-Russian policy, but Miliukoff, himself having been driven out by the reactionary régime, interpreted Bulgaria's attitude rather as a valiant resistance to this reaction. This interpretation was, to his mind, not in the least invalidated by the fact that in Bulgaria itself the régime setting itself up against that of Russia was also in the highest degree reactionary. From the apostles of a single idea one cannot but get inconsistency and inconsequence in respect to all other ideas.

In order to explain his want of interest in Serbia, Miliukoff, as well as a large number of his political friends, asserted then that Serbia had constantly based her policy on official and reactionary Russia. They forgot that an immense majority of Serbs were attached to the great Slav Empire without troubling themselves about the particular colour of the interior political régime. They forgot as well the whole democratic and perhaps revolutionary history of Serbia for the last twenty years. This reserve is to be explained also by the bad impressions Miliukoff brought away from Belgrade, where the reactionary police of the last Obrenovitch forbade him to reside. Neither could he forgive Serbia for the Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885, which was, however, the fault of the personal régime of King Milan. Influenced by these events, he could no longer regard Serbia as she really is, nor comprehend her constant democratic evolution.

Imbued with these prejudices, picturing Serbia as a reactionary and ambitious State, Miliukoff ended, unconsciously, by falling into line with his colleagues of the Sofia University on all Balkan questions, except that of Constantinople and the Straits. This divergence of views as to the south-eastern limits of Bulgaria, in itself drove Miliukoff to claim for her all the territory possible in the west.

Such were the personal and psychological reasons for the attitude of Miliukoff.

The other reason, the misunderstanding between Miliukoff and those in Western Europe who thought to follow his ideas, is not less important. Miliukoff does not share the illusion of the Quadruple Entente, which imagined that all Bulgaria, apart from Ferdinand and his Germanophil clique, would be content with the rôle assigned to it by the Entente. It was quite another rôle that Miliukoff planned for Bulgaria. He was not mistaken; the part he destined Bulgaria to play was not that assigned by the Entente, which was justified by the ethnic extent of the race.

Miliukoff fell in with the notion of those who sought to strain a fact so absolute and material as statistics; on the avowal of the best Bulgarian authorities, statistics prove that the Bulgarian race is the smallest in the Balkans, with the exception of the Albanian.*

In tracing the frontiers of a Great Bulgaria, Miliukoff does not trouble much about what that Bulgaria ought to be legitimately; he is concerned chiefly with creating a Bulgaria corresponding to the expansion of the future Yugo-slav nation, although a Yugo-slavia must inevitably be constituted by the union of a race three times more numerous than the Bulgarian. This method and these ideas are very similar to those which assign to the Serbian tribe, as an ethnical focus, Shoumadia, the western basin of the Morava, the Rashka, the Ibar, and the Drina, and press back the Serbians as far as possible to the west, to make room for the development of a Great Bulgaria in the eastern and largest part of the Balkan Peninsula. These ideas are reflected in a lecture given at Zurich in February, 1916, by one of his best friends, a creature of his party in Balkan politics, the writer, Vladimir Victorof Toporoff. The orator explained the tendency to create a "strong Balkan Bulgaria" and a "strong European Serbia." The object is to relegate Serbia to the north-west corner of the Balkan Peninsula and to leave all the centre, the principal artery of the peninsula, to the least numerous nation after the Albanians. Indeed, this was the only means of

* "Among Balkan peoples, the Bulgars are, next to the Albanians, the least numerous; their country is the smallest; they are obliged to hold on grimly to every inch of land on which their ancestors established themselves, either by peaceful penetration or conquest." A. Ichirkoff. *The Western Confines of Bulgarian Lands*. Lausanne, 1906, p. 5.

assuring Bulgarian prestige so well formulated by M. Keremektchieff, and of winning Bulgaria to the Entente.

In the course of the debate on foreign policy at the sitting of the Duma on March 24th, 1916, Miliukoff explained the check of the Quadruple Entente by the coincidence of three causes—the want of harmony among the allies, the obstinacy of Serbia, and the personal policy of King Ferdinand. He essayed to demonstrate the weakness and indecision of Entente diplomacy. Instead of exercising pressure on Bulgaria, Miliukoff advocated concessions at the opportune moment, and pressure on Serbia. Speaking of King Ferdinand, he emphasised the too well-known cleverness of the Bulgarian sovereign in giving to the acts of his ministers a direction favourable to his personal aims. The adversaries of the King, themselves, he added, had to hold their tongues when Ferdinand's policy established ethnographical (?) Bulgaria in the old limits assigned to it by Russia at San Stefano. Miliukoff ended by declaring that when the mistaken calculations of the Bulgars had been proved by the victory of the Entente, *the moment would have come for Bulgaria to change her policy*. "It is then we shall be rid of King Ferdinand, and the last word will be with the Bulgarian people, 'our friends.'" Miliukoff reproached the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs with having allowed himself to be too much influenced by national irritation, by the resentment of Bulgarian insult and ingratitude. In the absence of sentiment, in the will to realise at all costs, and by any means, insensate Chauvinist aims, Miliukoff thinks to perceive the realism of a tough and practical people. In the stupid denial of Slavism—a manifestation of hereditary servility—Miliukoff sees only the democratic emancipation of the mind. Through the prism of his warm sympathy and abstract idealism, Bulgarian defects change their aspect. It would seem that cupidity and treason are virtues—Russia and her allies have only to wait patiently for the moment when they can open their arms generously to a people repentant and disillusioned as to the alliance with the Central Empires. When will that moment come? When the Bulgars, practical and pliant, having nothing more to hope from defeated Germany, will seek for the recognition of their exorbitant pretensions in a compromise with the Entente.

During his tour in June, 1916, Miliukoff professed the same opinions. He made a stay in Switzerland, not only

to discuss the Polish question but also to renew contact with his friends of Bulgaria. He asked M. Todor Todoroff to meet him there, but his invitation was declined. Miliukoff, overlooking this, continued to express his faith in the Bulgars. To a writer on the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (September 7th, 1916) he said he doubted the possibility of a separate peace with Bulgaria, on account of the Roumanian intervention. He always makes a distinction, however, between King Ferdinand and his people*, for the *Journal* of September 8th, 1916, expressed anew his hope of seeing Bulgaria change her policy. He still maintained, against the evidence of facts and Bulgarian denials, that Ferdinand's policy was not upheld by the people. He even mentions popular excitement, meetings against war, etc.

Miliukoff's organ *Rietch* wrote on September 4th, 1916:

"There remains Bulgaria. We said, immediately after Roumania entered the war, that *according to all probability* a change in Bulgarian policy might be counted on, but *it must not be expected before a turn in the military situation in the Balkans*. . . . Bulgaria was not eager to fight against Roumania, and did not yield to the inevitable with a light heart. But the men at the head of the Bulgarian Government could not act otherwise. They are bound to Germany for life and death, in the true sense of the word. A change in Bulgarian policy is not possible until they have disappeared. They must be effaced from the Balkan political arena, together with the Germanophiles who support them."

This argument may be resumed as follows: The change in the direction of Bulgarian policy is quite probable, as soon as the military situation in the Balkans has become favourable to the Entente.

The actual heads of the Government in Bulgaria cannot act otherwise than they are doing, and the change of policy presupposes their disappearance beforehand, together with that of the Germanic elements supporting them.

This is tantamount to saying that Bulgaria will change her policy when the Entente, victorious, will have provoked

* The efforts of Miliukoff to separate King Ferdinand from his people, and to have it believed that Bulgarian public opinion is in perpetual opposition to the actual régime, were cruelly denied in the *Mir* of September 26th, 1916. The *Mir*, the organ of Gueshoff and Todoroff—upon whom, precisely, Miliukoff had always counted as Russophiles and personal friends—characterised his assertions as imaginary. Ferdinand's policy, according to the *Mir*, is approved of by all, and there has never been any dispute on the point.

the fall of the Coburg régime. Under these conditions, we agree, the conversion of Bulgaria is really quite probable, because it will take place not through persuasion, but through absolute necessity.

* * *

Was the badly handled Russian intervention in the Dobrudja influenced by these illusions and errors? We dare not affirm it, but it will not be without interest to reproduce here certain passages in Bulgarian and German journals of that period which tend to show that the Russians entertained many illusions on the resistance the Bulgars would offer in the Dobrudja.

According to the *Outro* (September 9th, 1916) a Russian lieutenant-colonel made prisoner near Dobritch replied thus to questions put to him :

"Before entering the Dobrudja we were persuaded that the Bulgarian soldiers would not fight against us, and would lay down their arms. On our first encounter with the Bulgarian army we perceived the erroneous character of our information on its unity and spirit."

According to the *Dnevnik* of September 16th, a Russian colonel, wounded and a prisoner, said that the Russian soldiers had been assured that the Bulgars would not fight against them. The *Dnevnik* of September 18th published a declaration in the same sense emanating from a Russian functionary, a prisoner.* But the *Echo de Bulgarie* (September 9th) explains best this strange aberration :

"There is in Russia, wrote the *Voenni Izvestia* yesterday, a diplomacy which has always been hindered by its traditional bureaucratism from understanding the springs that move the Bulgarian people. Official Russia was systematically led into error by its own ministers. *They were persuaded at Petrograd that the Bulgarian people would be hypnotised by Russia dressed up in the mantle of Liberator ; they were certain that on the apparition only of a Russian army in Dobrudja the Bulgarian soldiers would lay down their arms.* Far from throwing down their arms, the Bulgarian battalions rushed to the attack with a dash that defies imagination."

In the article entitled "Lying Inventions" the *Mir* (September 13th, 1916) so describes some news in the *Daily Telegraph* announcing that "the Russophil party displays

* The *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* of September 21st received the same information from Sofia, dated September 19th.

great activity in Bulgaria," and that "Radoslavoff would seem to have invited Ghenadieff to enter the Cabinet, and it appears that the Russophil deputy Stamboliski is about to be set at liberty."

Bulgarian journals continually rally the Russian optimists on their delusions. Optimism must have been really exaggerated in certain circles in Russia, if we are to judge from this passage in the *Rietch* from an article by its military critic, Colonel P. P., reproduced in the *Narodni Prava* of September 18th, 1916 :

"We must not expect a tenacious resistance on the part of the Bulgars to the advance of the Roumanian forces; a powerful movement is spreading everywhere in Bulgaria directed against the Government and the Head of the State. Profiting by this situation, the Russophil parties are taking all necessary measures to prepare the ground for an understanding with Russia. The first Bulgarian checks before the advancing Roumanian troops will produce a revolution in Bulgaria."

The *Narodni Prava* comments : "They have been greatly mistaken, the too competent military experts of Russia."

The *Kambana* of September 27th, 1916, writes :

"In Russia they expected that the Bulgarian Russophils would raise a revolution or at least prevent the Bulgarian soldiers from firing on the Russians. In this way the Russians hoped to penetrate, without hindrance, as far as Adrianople. . . . Public opinion in Russia was convinced that the Bulgarian army was filled with Ratko Dimitrieffs, and that the soldiers would put up their hands and throw themselves into the arms of the Russians as soon as the latter appeared to the sound of the Bulgarian hymn. The deception was all the greater when they were obliged to yield to the evidence of fact."

Lastly, the *Voenni Izvestia* of October 15th wrote :

"The legend of the magic power of Russia over the Bulgarian people is dissipated. The Russian armies fighting in the Dobrudja have freed Russian diplomacy from an illusion, the Entente from a miscalculation, and the Bulgarian heart from the last vestiges of a love unmerited."*

* The *Neue Freie Presse* of September 13th, in a letter from Sofia entitled "The Russian Miscalculation," writes that many incidents which took place at the first encounter of Russians and Bulgars show how fondly the Russians hoped to lead the Bulgars to cease fighting. Near Dobritch a Russian colonel advanced and essayed to harangue the Bulgarian troops in the name of Slav brotherhood. He was answered by volleys from their rifles. In other places the Russian troops tried to influence the Bulgars by singing the Bulgarian National Anthem. All these attempts received "the response they deserved."

In the same number of the *Neue Freie Presse* a colonel of the Bulgarian

This illusion, which had a hold on the Russians in 1916, notwithstanding the deceptions and lessons of the autumn of 1915—had at least some ground serving to attenuate its naïveté? Are we to believe that the Russians were fooled in 1916 as the Entente had been in 1915? We cannot be positive, but it will not be uninteresting to read a communication on the subject in the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* of September 7th. This communiqué asserts in the first place that the Quadruple Entente Powers kept a mass of agents at Sofia. These sought to make capital out of the intervention of Roumania by intriguing to bring about a defection of Bulgaria to the detriment of her actual allies. However, knowing well that they would have had no success with King Ferdinand and his ministers, and perceiving that the small number of Bulgarian Russophiles was exasperated by the Roumanian "second treason," the Entente agents, in order to make it appear that they were successful, resolved to deceive their employers and sent manufactured news to London and Paris.

If we can trust the information of the Munich journal, these agents maintained that King Ferdinand was quite convinced of the approaching defeat of the Central Alliance which he had joined, but, like an intelligent man, it was his intention to abdicate in favour of his son Boris, who would not hesitate to play the part of liberator of his country, but only on the condition that the greater part of Serbian Macedonia should remain to Bulgaria and that the south-eastern Bulgarian frontier should be the Enos-Midia line. In this theatrical coup, Ghenadieff, as a Russophil, was destined to take charge of the Foreign Affairs of the country. The deputy Stamboliski, now in prison, would take an active part in the projected turning, by the side of Ghenadieff. King Ferdinand, with the object of preserving the throne of Bulgaria for his dynasty, would agree to adhere to all these manœuvres, and his last journey to Hungary was closely connected with this new political gamble. Nevertheless, adds the communiqué, things turned out otherwise than as predicted by the agents of the Entente, causing rude awakenings in the political circles of Paris and London.

Let us end by the declaration of the Bulgarian deputy,

Staff, Nikiforoff, demonstrates, in an article, the historical importance of the combats between Russians and Bulgars. He emphasises the martial ardour with which the Bulgars assaulted the Russian trenches, an ardour which many people thought impossible in a fight between "liberated and liberators."

Peter Daskaloff, who affirms, under his signature in the *Reichspost* (September 12th, 1916), that the Roumanian Minister at Sofia, Derussi, had taken official steps for a separate peace with Bulgaria :

" M. Derussi went to the Chief of the Civil Cabinet of H.M. the King and declared that Roumania was fighting only against Austria, and had no hostile intentions towards Bulgaria ; on the contrary, said the good M. Derussi, Roumania is animated by friendly feelings to Bulgaria. She does not contest the new Bulgarian acquisitions in Macedonia, and is even disposed to execute a rectification of frontiers in the Dobrudja, on condition that Bulgaria breaks off her alliance with the Central Empires and rallies to the Entente. He added a further condition, the dismissal of the actual Cabinet. The Entente again miscalculated concerning us. The joy is indescribable throughout the country, and it is greater to-day, because we have proved that the Bulgarian soldier is capable of defending his home and fatherland against all comers, even against the Russians."*

All these declarations of Bulgarian personages and all the articles of the Sofia press, even allowing for the exaggeration of facts, prove in every way that the naïve illusions of 1915 subsisted in spite of the Bulgarian coup in that year, and had increased in 1916, to the great astonishment of the people of Sofia, whose practical minds did not comprehend this political romanticism.

* The *Neue Freie Presse* (November 30th, 1916) wrote : " At the sitting of the Sobranié of November 29th Radoslavoff declared that the Roumanian Minister at Sofia, Derussi, had spread the rumour of a possible entente between Roumania and Bulgaria. According to Derussi, the Roumanian Government was ready to cede the Dobrudja, annexed in 1913, to Bulgaria, on condition that the latter adopted a passive attitude in the event of a military action against Austria-Hungary on the part of Roumania. Derussi had asked to be received in audience by Radoslavoff, but the latter had not accorded him the interview he demanded.

CHAPTER II

WHY DID THE BULGARS GO TO WAR ?

THERE are errors in politics which can be explained, and even excused : the data on which plans must be based are often so slight and so complex that it is almost impossible to disentangle them. The mistakes of diplomacy in Balkan politics have not this excuse : they arise, for the most part, from ignorance of the facts themselves.

Much ink has been poured out over the Balkan question, above all during the second half of the last century ; nevertheless, among all the innumerable reports and opinions on the Peninsula, few documents of value are to be found. They consist chiefly of notes of travel by Slavists and Russian Slavophiles, French writers and travellers, German geographers and English humanitarians. All these writers had for their object, above all, the exposure of the lamentable state of Christians under the Ottoman yoke, and this special aim necessarily restricted their observations and deductions, even when they possessed political interest.

Their notions on the history of the Balkan Peninsula were rather vague, and their study of the temperaments and characters of the peoples who inhabit it were only superficial. On this account all combinations relating to the Eastern Question sinned through a mistaken conception of the facts. Every manifestation having to do with the Balkans found expression in pity for the Christians subjected to the Turks, and this compassion was interwoven with the special tendencies of each power. Being the last remaining under the Turkish yoke, the Bulgars were the last among Balkan Christians to attract the interest which Europe felt for the slaves of the Ottomans. By their sufferings they personified the sufferings of all the subjugated. And as the Bulgarian question was the most acute and the most pressing at the moment when it was thought to solve the Balkan question generally (1877-78), this

coincidence of facts raised and generalised the Bulgarian rôle in Balkan affairs. Only by these circumstances, and by the particular tendencies of Russian policy, can we explain the Treaty of San Stefano, the most fantastic act in history. And consequent on its persistent ignorance of Balkan matters, European diplomacy has not yet been able to free itself from the suggestion which possessed it forty years ago. All Bulgarian megalomania is based on that suggestion.

After obtaining quasi-independence, the Bulgarians continued to identify their question with the question of the oppressed Christians in general. They cleverly made the most of their two first successes; on the interest which Europe took in them through humanity, they grafted their own political interests; afterwards, they tried to provide the San Stefano conception, devoid of a real foundation, with an ethnographic basis. To attain this end, they chose any means, however unscrupulous.

Bulgarian aims, quite arbitrary, are not fixed, and often go beyond the limits of the Great Bulgaria as it was conceived at San Stefano. Bulgarian pretensions oscillate according to circumstances and the necessities of the moment. They go so far as to include the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula between the Black Sea, the Ægean and the Adriatic, between Mount Olympus and the Delta of the Danube, from the Morava, and even Belgrade, through Krugievatz, Kossovo, Dibra, to the Albanian coast. They extend even over Thrace to the vicinity of Constantinople, sometimes taking in Constantinople itself. . . . The field of Bulgarian combinations is vast; these are based sometimes on Bulgarian historic rights, sometimes on the old administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire, or on ethnographic, strategic and political reasons. Every one of these arguments, or all of them together at need, leave an open field for the most varied schemes.

On this account it would be inexact to speak of a Bulgarian national policy, in the sense of a matured and definite conception, attesting, on the part of a people, knowledge of its proportions, its rôle, and the surest way of accomplishing it. Tardily liberated from the yoke, by the aid of others, Bulgaria has not yet been able to seek inspiration for her political ideas in an awakened national consciousness. The people, who have as little influence on foreign policy as on home questions, are led either by

authority or by a small number of professional politicians, or, on the rare occasions when they are allowed a little freedom, by their still barbarous instincts.

The policy of this nation, practical and, as its friends say, devoid of sentiment and prejudices of race, of religion, is dominated by calculations rather than by ideals. It would be vain to seek in it consistent notions. Nevertheless, if we attempt to discover in the long series of adventures and deviations which make up past and present Bulgarian policy, a system or a leading idea, it would be this: Bulgaria desires all she thinks it possible to obtain at a given moment.

* *

Why did Bulgaria go to war in September, 1915, and what are the aims of her policy?

The reply of the Bulgars themselves has varied in the course of the year which has elapsed. In September, 1915, they began by invoking the necessity of incorporating Macedonia. Intoxicated by success, they abandoned this initial reason, little by little, and conceived hopes far more vast. They saw themselves already playing a part in the world of *Mittel-Europa*. But success not proving continuous, the future remaining obscure, deceived in their hopes, they set themselves to abate their demands. Having almost forgotten Macedonia for a time, they came back to it anew, as the Germany of Bernhardt returned to the notions of humanity and pacificism.

Hardly had tens of thousands of pamphlets been distributed throughout Bulgaria concerned with the liberation of Macedonia "reduced to slavery," than the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of October 15th, 1915, assigned two other objects to the Bulgarian adventure:

*The annihilation of Serbia,
A common frontier with Austria-Hungary.*

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote:

"With its accustomed habit of decision, Bulgaria, in this war, has united its cause, and the future of the nation, with the cause of Austria-Hungary and Germany, whose victories are a sure guarantee of a better future for Bulgaria. Its object is not only to conquer Macedonia, a conquest which the King of Bulgaria emphasises very particularly in his manifesto, but also to extend its boundaries to Central Europe, and thus obtain free passage for its agricultural produce to the markets of the Central Empires."

A Sofia lawyer, Ivan Dimitroff, was at this time at Geneva on a special mission. Charged with a Bulgarophil propaganda, he published articles signed with his name or the pseudonym Ivan Strogoff.* Questioned by a Serbian personage, who was astonished that Bulgaria exercised pressure on Serbia at the very moment when the latter yielded on all points, Dimitroff replied :

“ Even in the absence of all other motives, Bulgaria is bound to make war and take her place by the side of the Central Empires, first *because Russia intends to occupy the Dardanelles, and afterwards because Serbia is going to expand and become powerful*. The Bulgars must prevent these two events at all costs.”

Made arrogant by military success, the Bulgarian press expressed these opinions openly and repeatedly a little later. But this little detail must be borne in mind, among others, precisely on account of its date (autumn, 1915), because it shows that these ideas predominated at Sofia at a time when the Entente still nursed the illusion that Bulgaria could be won over by concessions in Macedonia. The fact that the real intentions of the Sofia Government were so widely known shows that they were already an open secret.†

It is of interest to note another early indication of the Bulgarian alliance with the Central Empires. It is an article on the rôle of Bulgaria in the European war in the *Neue Freie Presse* of May 5th, 1915. Radoslavoff declared then that the Bulgarian nation had gone to the extreme limit of patience and concessions with respect to Macedonia. “ We are actually succouring and nourishing three hundred thousand Macedonians escaped from the tyranny and abuses of the Serbs. We shall be obliged at last to go to their aid.” This occurred seven months before Bulgarian mobilisation. The Bulgarians were unanimous on the question of Macedonia. Radoslavoff said, in the course of the same interview, that he wanted a policy tending to reparation for the injustice inflicted by the treaty of Bucharest. “ Moreover, it

* The author of this book had occasion to enter into argument with M. Strogoff. (See *Tribune de Genève*, September 16th, 1915.)

† The *Vorwärts* of November 21st, 1915, publishes an interview with the Bulgarian Minister, Kolucheff, by a member of the staff of the Turkish journal, *Tasfir-i-Efkhar*. Kolucheff declared that Bulgaria extends her aspirations beyond Macedonia to the Morava Valley and the cities of Nish and Vrania. The Minister Tontcheff, on his part, spoke in several interviews of the liberation of the Bulgars in Macedonia and Serbia.

seemed to him evident that *the existence of Bulgaria would be menaced by a Serbia enlarged by the provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Banat, Slavonia, and all the territories generously promised by the Entente.*" And the President of the Council of Bulgaria was not alone in saying this. A superior officer of the General Staff told the same journalist: "*A Serbia stronger than the present Bulgaria would be a danger for us. It is a question of our existence, and we must take measures to secure our future.*"

In the beginning of September, 1915, the same journalist passed through Sofia on his way from Turkey. On his return to Vienna he was able to write, with a knowledge of the facts, the following :

"Bulgaria, in taking part in the European war, apropos of Macedonia, has rendered a great service to the Central Empires. I spent nearly seven months at Constantinople, and with the Turkish troops at the Dardanelles, and I can assert that the conquest of territory joining on to Central Europe had become an absolute necessity. The free passage of the Danube, the Belgrade-Nish railway, and transit through Bulgaria, have furnished Turkey with the precise means she needed to obtain success at Gallipoli and in Irak. *It would be hard to find a Bulgar in disagreement with the policy of the present Government.* At the last session of the Sobranié the Government met with next to no opposition."

The Central Empires, for that matter, must have been sure of the sentiments of the Bulgars and of their real intentions, for some considerable time. The article in *Az Ujsag* (Count Tisza's organ) of October 17th, 1916, shows this clearly :

"With admirable endurance and ability, King Ferdinand and his councillor Radoslavoff, have observed the neutrality of Bulgaria for fourteen months. Never have a king and a statesman been burdened with a task greater and more delicate, and heavier with responsibility, than during these last three months, in which the heart has been forced to contain itself whilst the idea of rallying to the Central Empires was ripening. *It was necessary to conceal and keep secret the true intentions of Bulgarian policy. The diplomats of the Entente must not know anything until the moment came for the German and Austro-Hungarian troops to advance along the Danube and the Save, thus allowing Bulgaria to avow her aims openly.*"

* * *

Two ideas dominate all the Bulgarian declarations : the danger of a Russia established on the Dardanelles,

and the menace of an extended Serbia. The liberal parties (Stamboulovists, Radoslavists, Tontchevists) were always opposed to Russia laying her hands on the Dardanelles. We find their arguments again in the Memorandum, of which 50,000 copies were distributed by the Bulgarian Government. The greater part of it was reproduced in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* (October 8th, 1915). Tontcheff hastens to declare in the *Az Est* of October 26th :

"What a childish notion it is, that we should not raise our voice against the annexation of Constantinople by the Russians, an annexation that would have meant a menace to our independence! Russia has exaggerated the value and force of the panslavist idea. How could she have believed that we should remain quiet?"

We meet with the same Russophobe tendency in a declaration made by the Bulgarian Minister at Bucharest, M. Simon Radeff, to the correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt* (April 20th, 1916). Radeff said :

"The chief motive which has led Bulgaria to an alliance with the Central Powers is the need of keeping Russia away from the Straits."

Radeff repeated this ten days afterwards to the correspondent of the *Az Est* (April 30th, 1916).

The Bulgars are not less concerned about the danger of an extended Serbia. Alexander Kiproff (former Deputy and Secretary of the Sobranié) says in a pamphlet* :

"It has been observed with justice, that if Bulgaria had taken part in the war by the side of the Quadruple Entente, the latter being victorious, Serbia would, none the less, have expanded in an exclusive and inordinate way; she would have acquired Bosnia, Herzegovina, the Banat, Croatia, Slavonia, Srem (Syrmia), and Dalmatia to the Adriatic. Under these conditions, what would have been left for Bulgaria? There may be differences of opinion as to the decision Bulgaria ought to have taken, but it is certain that no power in the world could have constrained her to fight for the greatness and prosperity of Serbia."

Under the title, "The Part of Bulgaria in the Great World War," Gheorgoff, a Professor in the University, published in the *Europäische Staats und Wirtschafts Zeitung* a careful study of the politics of the Balkan States, especially of Bulgaria :

"Bulgaria, alone of all the Balkan countries, had no interests

* "The Truth about Bulgaria," p. 27. Berne, 1916.

opposed to the Triple Alliance. For this reason, after the first Balkan war, the policy of the Central Powers sought to gain Bulgaria. . . . So Count Berchtold devoted himself to the task. And since the recent Balkan events the best Bulgarian politicians, having at their head King Ferdinand himself, have been convinced that Bulgarian national interests required Bulgaria to put herself in the future by the side of the Central Powers. *For, by so doing, alone could Bulgaria hinder a too great extension of Serbia.* . . . It is not so much the necessity of being with the probable victor in this war, which has prevailed with us, as a cool and reasoned calculation of the real interests of the country. Even if the Entente appeared to have the better chance of coming out of the struggle victorious, *Bulgaria would not have decided with a light heart to contribute to the victory of the Entente, which would have as a result in the Balkans the expansion of countries hostile to ours.* On this account also all the solicitations of the Entente addressed to Bulgaria were bound to fail. *Nevertheless, Bulgaria had to be prudent.* There was a moment when, if the Entente States had known that Bulgaria was lost to their cause, they could have incited against her the other Balkan countries, as they did in 1913.” *

But, concludes Gheorgoff, after having explained this point, “when the victories of the Allies made it possible at last to settle accounts with the immediate instigators of the European war, *the time came also for Bulgaria to attain with small risk the object which she and the Central Powers had to pursue in the Balkans. And Bulgaria threw off the reserve which short-sighted politicians could not understand, and took her place at the side of the Central Powers.*” (*Echo de Bulgarie*, June 16th, 1916.)

The quite recent declarations made by Radoslavoff to the American, Colonel Emerson, a military writer, throw a very full light on the motives which decided the Bulgarian line of action (*Vossische Zeitung*, January 25th, 1917):

“If Russia succeeded in reaching Constantinople through the Dobrudja, she would be forced later to take its Balkan fortifications, from which the Bulgarians should never be able to drive her. Then we should have to content ourselves either to become entirely Russian or a buffer State. These are the reasons which will never allow Bulgaria to consent to the Russians laying hands on Constantinople and the Dardanelles, if she wishes to remain independent. When Sazonov uttered for the first time in public the words ‘conquest of Constantinople,’ long before Bulgaria was compelled by the Russian menace to enter the lists, *I communicated confidentially with M. Sazonov,*

through the Russian Minister at Sofia, M. Savinsky, that it was impossible for Bulgaria to adhere to his plans, seeing that an eventual advance of Russia across Bulgaria would gravely imperil our vital interests. He would not listen to our just objections. Notwithstanding our categorical refusal, M. Savinsky asked me, some days later, if Bulgaria would be disposed to shut her eyes in case Russia were to disembark in our Black Sea ports, Varna or Burgas, troops so-called 'pacific,' as England and France did afterwards at Salonica. This disembarkation would have had for its object a rapid advance on Constantinople, through our territory—an attack which nothing would have hindered. I then explained to the Russian Minister that the waters of Varna and Burgas were mined, and that our maritime and land forces would oppose any attempt at military disembarkation. Savinsky, very much disappointed, then declared that the placing of mines in our waters was a breach of neutrality and an unfriendly act towards Russia. *The Russians, in spite of the very clear warnings I had given to M. Savinsky, remained blind right up to our definite intervention in the world war. They refused obstinately to believe that we should defend, even against them, the vital interests of Bulgaria. There were, even until the overthrow of Roumania, Russians and Roumanians, supposed to be intelligent, who persisted in believing that we Bulgarians could, in spite of all, throw in our lot with them.*"

These declarations are clear enough.

The journalist Roda, in the *Vossische Zeitung* of April 9th, 1916, cites the words of General Jekoff, who told him that "Bulgarian war aims were identical with those of the Central Powers" and "Serbia has become nothing more than a geographical expression."

The *Narodni Prava* (August 26th, 1916) wrote in the same sense :

"The European group, in which are our mortal enemies, wished and wishes still to lay hands on the Balkans, the Black Sea, Constantinople, and the Dardanelles, and to form artificially a Great Serbia at the expense of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people. Our future, the vital interests of Bulgaria, its existence, and its development could not and never can be reconciled to the tendencies of Anglo-French and Russian politics which would bring evil on her. The question of the future of Bulgaria was clearly put : perish, or unite and secure the place in the Balkans belonging to her."

An article by Professor H. S. Ghéorgieff, former Secretary of Rizoff in Rome, which appeared in the *Neue Freie Presse* of September 6th, 1916, is edifying :

"The majority of Bulgarian statesmen felt already in 1913

that *the policy of the Balkan Alliance was only a transitory episode, and that when the time arrived for the great European settlement, Bulgaria must take her place by the side of the Central Empires.*

"Her geographical situation imposed on Bulgaria her part in the world war. She was bound to fight by the side of the Central Empires and Turkey, because the integrity of Bulgarian territory does not allow her to become a Russian bridge to Constantinople, whilst *for us Bulgars it is perhaps of greater importance than for the Turks themselves that Constantinople remains Turkish*, and that Russia does not fortify herself on the Dardanelles. The intervention of Bulgaria on the side of the Central Empires will contribute naturally to victory, but even if the victory of the Central Empires had not been evident, Bulgaria was bound to rally to the Central Empires and Turkey. . . . This is not only because of the reasons of which we have spoken, but on account of the following :

"1. Bulgaria, from the moment of her creation, has taken thought for her national unity which cannot be realised if she is on the side of Russia ;

"2. *Serbia could not be so extensive as Russian plans contemplated.*

"The blood shed in common with the Central Empires and Turkey will transform this political alliance into an alliance of sentiment. *Constantinople must remain Turkish*, the Bulgarian people feels it. . . .

"Bulgaria, free, independent, nationally united, *cannot exist otherwise than in alliance with the Central Empires and Turkey.*"

Rizoff's secretary affirms, therefore :

"That the Balkan Alliance was only a *transitory episode* in Bulgarian eyes, and that at the moment of the great European settlement Bulgaria was bound to side with the Central Powers ;

"That the role of Bulgaria in the world war has been dictated by her geographical position, and that this alliance is a question of interests as much as of inclination ;

"That Bulgaria would have been obliged to march with the Central Powers, even if their victory had not appeared probable, because, in any case, *Bulgaria could not have accepted a Serbia extended to the proportions promised, nor Russian domination of Constantinople.*"

The views of M. Ghéorgieff are completed by the declarations of M. Tontcheff, Minister of Finance, to a correspondent of the *Az Est* (September 15th, 1916) :

"Little Bulgaria is allied with the Central Empires. She has done this, not from commercial motives, not because this alliance offered more to her than others, not because she was convinced that it would triumph, *but she has bound up her*

destinies with those of the Central Empires because she wished the latter to be victorious. I beg of you particularly to emphasise this, because it affords the greatest moral satisfaction, and because it will serve as a basis for our liberty."

Therefore two things are insisted on as principal motives : (1) opposition to the expansion of Serbia, (2) opposition to the establishment of Russia on the Dardanelles.

* *

The anniversaries of Bulgarian mobilisation (September 23rd) and the entrance of Bulgaria into the war (October 14th) were made the occasion of numerous articles and declarations.

Let us begin by quoting the declarations of official personages. First, the President of the Council, M. Radoslavoff, in the *Vossische Zeitung* of October 10th, 1916, wrote :

"We end this year well satisfied with the results obtained, and persuaded that, according to the tenor of the treaties concluded with our allies, *we shall keep irrevocably all the territory conquered.* The object Bulgaria had in view is, in general, attained, but much remains to be done in order to assure what we have obtained. . . ."

The German and Turkish Ministers at Sofia were also interviewed by the correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung*. The German Minister, after lavishing praise on the Bulgarian king and people, observing that "the Bulgars had proved friends in whom one could place one's trust" (*Vertraute-freunde*), declared that the desire of Germany was to see *the Bulgars strong and well prepared, in order that they might remain the guardians of the Gates of the East, and protect the normal activity of German merchants, scholars and artists.*"

The Turkish Minister, on his side, declared :

"A Russian victory would have meant the loss of Turkish independence. Bulgaria had passed through the same peril. *An Entente victory would have created a great Serbia and a great Roumania, and would have brought the Russians to Constantinople.* Hence springs the community of interests between us and the Bulgars. . . ."

The Vice-President of the Bulgarian Parliament, Dr. Momtchiloff, published his interview in the *Pester Lloyd* of October 15th :

"Soon a year will have elapsed since the allied troops raised

their hands *to crush the country of Serbian brigands*; notwithstanding a desperate defence, victory remained on our side."

The semi-official *Echo de Bulgarie* of October 23rd, 1916, wrote :

"*Bulgaria was promised that her claims should be taken into consideration, in as large a measure as possible. But Bulgaria could not admit a new discussion of problems settled by a series of treaties and international acts, and she declined all bargaining over an object sacred for all the race. Her belief was inveterate in a day of reparations.*"

The Bulgarian press celebrated the anniversary of the intervention of Bulgaria in the same emphatic tone.

The *Echo de Bulgarie* of October 14th, 1916, reminded its readers that "Bulgaria has contributed powerfully towards a victorious peace for the Alliance of Central Europe and Turkey."

The *Narodni Prava* wrote :

"In the course of this year of victories, Bulgaria has effected her unification. To-day *she is complete, from the Black Sea to the Albanian Alps, from the Danube to the Ægean.*"

And in its issue of October 16th, 1916, the *Narodni Prava* said :

"The fundamental idea of Russian policy in the Balkans has been forgotten: through the Balkans to Constantinople; and in consequence it has also been forgotten that those who want Constantinople and the Balkans do not want a strong and independent Bulgaria. *Bulgaria entered the war as an ally of the Central Powers, because it had become evident that Russia would never alter her policy of conquest and abandon her vital interests to please Bulgarian statesmen.* A year has passed away since the beginning of war. The Bulgarian armies have fulfilled their duty, *the Bulgarian nation has reached its natural boundaries, ethnical and political.* At length we see the end of the numerous errors, incertitudes, and legends which for forty years hindered the quiet consolidation of Bulgarian independence."

The journals we have quoted are official, or organs of Government parties. One might have hoped, perhaps, that the others—those which express the opinions of parties, so-called friends of the Entente in 1916—would write rather differently. Not at all. They are not to be distinguished from the organs of Radoslavoff.

Thus the *Mir*, Gueshoff's organ, writes :

"*Two months have sufficed for the crushing of Serbia.* We cannot fail to be satisfied with the results obtained in the course

of this year. *In two months we have attained our object*, whilst the Entente, after a noisy preparation, began its offensive against us in the month of August, and is now in the same positions as at starting."

And we read in the *Preporetz*, the organ of Malinoff:

"*The first year is the year of glorious deeds and actions.* The coming year we shall have to defend and keep what we have gained. The defence demands new efforts and new sacrifices. *Our gains are very dear, we must preserve them at all costs.*"

The *Narod* (Socialist) of October 16th thus expresses itself:

"*At the end of the first year of war the Bulgarian people in arms possesses precious acquisitions.* The costly sacrifices Bulgaria has made in Macedonia and the Dobrudja are justified by the well-being and gratitude of hundreds and hundreds of thousands of liberated souls."

* *

Lastly, two characteristic facts:

Nobody is ignorant of the fact that Serbia was treacherously attacked by the Bulgars in October, 1915. That did not hinder the *Narodni Prava* (organ of Radoslavoff) from asserting on October 14th, 1916, that

"The enemy personified in treacherous Serbia should receive exemplary chastisement, because he had attacked our country also."

And the *Voenni Izvestia*, the organ of the Ministry of War, wrote on October 15th, 1916:

"To our good faith, Serbia responded by provocation, and then, after assembling troops on our frontier, *attacked us just a year ago.* . . ."

The absurd lie is repeated that Bulgaria made war because she was attacked by Serbia.*

* To form an idea of the method resorted to by the Bulgars in their documents, it will suffice to read once more their explanations on the manner in which Bulgaria "was attacked by Serbia" in the war of 1913 also. In a review of the book by Gantcho Tzenoff ("Russia and Serbian Tendencies to Conquest") the *Narodni Prava* of August 30th, 1916, gives the following explanations:

"General Savoff has been accused of having committed the greatest crime in the world, because he gave orders secretly to attack the Serbs. *It appears, indeed, that he may have done something in this sense*, but it was a preventive measure, a piece of good strategy, to forestall a blow, an attack on the part of the Serbs. Here, for that matter, is the text of his order of the day: 'To prevent our inactivity in face of Serbian provocations from depressing the spirit of the army, and, on the other hand, that our silence may not encourage the enemy still more, I order you to attack on all the line, and with the greatest energy, but not to

To this false reason for Bulgarian intervention, the *Narodni Prava*, in the same number of October 14th, 1916, adds a new pretext as false as the preceding ones, namely, the stubborn obstinacy of Serbia, never disposed to compromise or concession. This grievance the Bulgars begin to repeat more and more. A year after the war they try to justify their intervention by a still more absurd falsehood: that Bulgaria was dragged into the war by the refusal of Serbia to accord compensations to her, in conformity with the demands of her allies.*

discover your forces completely, and to cease fighting directly you have succeeded in establishing yourselves firmly at Krivolak, on the right bank of the Bregalnitz, on ridge 350 . . etc. You must open fire in the evening and continue all night, and at dawn deliver a powerful attack on the whole line. This operation will be carried out to-morrow, the 16th of this month (June)."

"This passage shows clearly," says the *Narodni Prava*, "that it was not the aim of Savoff to declare war on Serbia, but to encourage our soldiers to occupy certain strategic points, and to make a political demonstration."

"... The Serbians, who had already decided to fight us, profited by our demonstrative and strategic attack, commenced the war, and threw the responsibility on us."

The *Narodni Prava* acknowledges that the Bulgars attacked first. But it considers that the Serbs were the true assailants notwithstanding, because they took the Bulgarian attack seriously, an attack purely preventive, made to occupy strategic points and to reconnoitre the terrain. . . . This is the singular logic which they continually use to prop up their impudent assertions.

The *Narodni Prava* of June 21st must also be quoted by way of a curiosity. "It was Sazonov who made it possible for the Serbs to reject the ultimatum of Austria, and to invade Austro-Hungarian territory two days before the declaration of war, just as France entered German territory a day before official notification of hostilities."

When we read such enormities in the Bulgarian semi-official journal we can form an idea of the mentality and the political morality reigning at Sofia.

* To this lie M. Pachitch replied in an interview with the correspondent of the *Petit Parisien* (Serbian Press Bureau, Corfu, February 17th, 1917).

M. Pachitch said: "At the beginning of the war Serbia proposed to Roumania and Greece to make a joint declaration to Bulgaria that they were ready to proceed to a revision of the treaty of Bucharest in her favour. In her own name, Serbia declared to Russia that, without waiting for the answer of the other signatories to the treaty of Bucharest, she was prepared to make territorial concessions to Bulgaria to the east of the Vardar. When Turkey entered the war Serbia invited Bulgaria to discharge her debt to Russia, her deliverer, and promised territorial concessions, if she would do so. Bulgaria refused to enter into negotiations, invoking as a pretext the neutrality she would violate in taking the side of Russia. At length, some time before the Bulgarian mobilisation, when the Entente approached the Serbian Government with the view of obtaining territorial concessions in favour of Bulgaria, Serbia consented to make territorial concessions in the interests of Balkan concord and the prompt cessation of the war. The sacrifices which she

Why were these two falsehoods revived after so long a silence? Because, since the shattering of German hopes at Verdun, and the Austro-German defeat in Galicia and Bukovina, Bulgaria began to return slowly from her world ambitions to her Balkan policy. After noisy manifestations of union with *Mittel-Europa*, after a succession of pretensions each loftier than the last, based not on rights but conquests, Bulgaria, beginning to doubt her invincibility and that of her allies, called to mind justice and arguments other than that of force. This climbing down found expression in the semi-official journals by a new use of the same falsehoods which Ferdinand of Coburg had employed exactly a year before in his manifesto to his people.

The clearest contradiction to these fantastic inventions was given by the Entente and Serbia in 1915, when they offered large territorial compensations to Bulgaria, an offer proposed by the Entente, accepted by Serbia, and known to all the world. During the year which has elapsed, this contradiction has been supplemented by that given by the Bulgars themselves, who have declared and demonstrated repeatedly that they did not take part in the war to obtain Macedonia. Macedonia? They had almost ceased to speak of it. What the real motives of Bulgaria were the Bulgars have shown clearly on numerous occasions.

promised were enormous. She was ready to cede territory also west of the Vardar, and almost all the famous line of the treaty of 1912, including Monastir, excepting only Prilep, and under the reserve of a common frontier with Greece. We know how Bulgaria responded. She treacherously attacked Serbia, and declared war against the Entente. It was after entering the war that Bulgaria explained her repeated refusals. The Government exposed its game through an article in the *Narodni Prava*. It stated clearly that the pretext Bulgaria had put forward was not true, that if she had wished she might have accepted the Serbian concessions as fully satisfying all her pretensions in Macedonia. If, notwithstanding, she had engaged in war against the Entente, it was because she could not permit the installation of Russia at Constantinople, and the expansion of Serbia."

CHAPTER III

TO ANNIHILATE SERBIA

ETHNICALLY the smallest (after the Albanians) of the Balkan nationalities, Bulgaria desired nevertheless to conquer the first place in the Peninsula. To succeed in this, she had, naturally, to eliminate Serbia, ethnically the largest.

For this reason the question of the existence of a Serbia dominates all Bulgarian discussions of the situation, all declarations and plans concerning the condition of affairs to be established after the war. The reconstitution of a sovereign Serbia under any form is excluded from Bulgarian schemes. Satisfied, beyond all expectation, with the complete overthrow of Serbia, the Bulgars have become so accustomed to the situation created by that catastrophe that they think only of rendering it permanent, and they no longer comprehend that there may have been among themselves some people who judged that the co-existence of a Bulgaria and a Serbia or a united Yugo-slavia was a possibility. This implacable Serbophobia has become so general during the first year of Bulgarian intervention that even the authors of the Serbo-Bulgar entente of 1912 are obliged to declare publicly that in reality they never desired a lasting accord with Serbia.

One of the principal participants in the Serbo-Bulgar negotiations of 1912, Dimitri Rizoff, says openly that the agreement of 1912 was already considered at Sofia as a transitory episode within a year of its conclusion.* The signatories of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance are obliged to avow that they themselves never counted seriously on it.

The Bulgars entered into the Serbian agreement of 1912 solely to further purely Bulgarian aims, and Gueshoff's organ, *Mir* (April 23rd, 1916), says so openly, in defending the policy of the national party in 1913 :

" . . . *We made use of the Serbs to attain our object :* the

* See the article of Ghéorgieff in the *Neue Freie Presse* already quoted.

defeat of our common enemy, and the realisation of our own ideal, the reconstitution of the Bulgaria of San Stefano. Nobody doubted, the Ministers not more than others, that the Serbs would be jealous. . . . But was it possible to make war without the help of the Serbs? No; the military leaders said it positively, and things would have turned out very badly for the Ministers then in power, and for Bulgaria also, if men, incompetent in military questions, had succeeded in imposing their will. It was not our alliance with Serbia which brought about our catastrophe. On the contrary, *thanks to that alliance, we were able to liberate Macedonia*. No other State would have aided us to rescue it from its masters (Turkey), and we could not do it alone. *And if Macedonia had not been taken by the Serbs it would not have been possible for us to free it*. We repeat that it was not the Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance, but the Serbo-Greek Alliance, which brought on us the catastrophe of 1913. We (the national party) should have prevented that alliance, if our adversaries (the other Bulgarian parties) had not united, all of them without exception, to render impossible the only policy which could have saved us: arbitration with Greece."

Those who had been regarded formerly as Serbophiles had no longer the courage to defend, even theoretically and retrospectively, an understanding among the Balkan nations, the basis of the policy they had followed towards Serbia in 1912 and 1913. They tried to demonstrate, on the contrary, that the Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance had been only a momentary necessity.

In January, 1913, Gueshoff wanted, before everything, to come to an understanding with the Greeks, an understanding which would have obliged isolated Serbia to capitulate before the Bulgarian will.* And he regrets that the obstinacy of his political adversaries made the combination impossible. It is evident that to-day he is unable to prove the incontestable utility of the understanding with Serbia, since he has been prevented from carrying into effect the action which should have followed it.

This timid apology for a policy of understanding with

* At the Conference of London, 1912-13, Daneff began by hatching an intrigue with the Greeks against the Serbs. Afterwards trying the same game with the Serbs against the Greeks. Venizelos and Novakovich succeeded in unmasking Bulgarian intentions and reducing their intrigues to nullity. Daneff's ability in weaving plots, moreover, was paralysed by an indomitable rapacity. The Bulgars wanted to secure Salonica in one direction and Dibra in the other. The *Mir* of March 4th, 1916, openly acknowledges that the pretension to Salonica brought failure to the negotiations intended to cement an understanding with Greece.

Serbia is the most moderate of all the opinions which, in the spring of 1916, were pronounced on the subject.

When the Austrians, after their defeat at Tzer (August, 1914) were reinforced by new and imposing units, the Bulgarian press hailed with joy the retreat of the Serbian Army to Rudnik. They were already preparing at Sofia to divide the booty. On the reports of Tchaprachikoff, Bulgarian Minister at Nish, who described the despair of the Serbs, Bulgaria made ready "to protect her interests in Macedonia." The catastrophe which seemed imminent for the Serbs was a cause of rejoicing, so that when the first news favourable to Serbia arrived, in December, 1914, the disappointment was great at Sofia. And the tidings of the rout of the Austro-Hungarian armies provoked far greater consternation there than at Vienna and Budapest.

It is known only too well with what easy indifference Bulgarian covetousness was displayed in autumn, 1915. The blow perfidiously dealt in the back whilst the armies of the two great European Empires attacked Serbia in front, was celebrated by the Bulgarian press as the most glorious event in history. As for Serbia, the plan for deciding her fate was quite ready at Sofia. She must be strangled once for all.

The *Voenni Izvestia* of December 26th assured its readers that :

"The war will not cease until the day when we (the Bulgars) have convinced the friends of Serbia that their cause is irretrievably lost, and that *Serbia*, guilty of having provoked the war, is indeed dead."

The *Berliner Tageblatt* (December 28th, 1915) described in a long despatch from its Sofia correspondent the opening of the Sobranié :

"On his way to Sofia King Ferdinand was greeted with endless acclamations. . . . The King himself read the speech from the throne, in clear and confident tones. He raised his voice in speaking of Serbian tyranny and treachery. Even without understanding Bulgarian, one could perceive, from the severe and vibrating notes, that the King represented the Serbs as *the dead of this war*. . . . The words in which the King denounced the crime of Serbia reflect the general feeling."

The next day the same journal was informed that M. Radoslavoff had declared, before the majority of the deputies, that the Bulgarian frontiers would extend as far as the Bulgarian soldiers had penetrated.

The Vice-President of the Sobranié, Momtchiloff, said to one of the staff of the *Az Est* of Budapest (the interview was reproduced in the *Vossische Zeitung* of January 7th, 1916), "*Caeterum censeo Serbiam esse delendam*," adding "*Bulgaria, according to certain treaties, has the right to keep all Serbian territory occupied.*"

The *Narodni Prava* of January 25th, 1916, wrote :

" . . . With the aid of the Central Powers, Bulgaria has obtained great successes : the liberation of Macedonia, the *annihilation of Serbia*, the focus of the troubles, and the consolidation of an order acceptable in the Balkans."

In its issue of January 16th, 1916, the same journal derided the English and French who " dreamed of restoring the kingdom of a lunatic (King Peter) and a criminal (Pachitch)."

At the news of the capitulation of Montenegro, the Minister of Finance, Tontcheff, declared to the *Balkanska Pochta* of Sofia :

" The capitulation of Montenegro is especially important from the Balkan point of view, because it makes any new statement of the Serbo-Montenegrin problem impossible." (Dispatch of the *Berliner Tageblatt* from Sofia, January 20th, 1916.)

The semi-official *Echo de Bulgarie* enounces the same idea, as well as the opposition journal, *Preporetz*. The *Berliner Tageblatt* is informed from Sofia that, according to generally received opinion, *Montenegro will obtain for the cession of Lovtchen rich compensation taken from former Serbian territory*, and that the Montenegrin dynasty will preserve its throne with considerably augmented territory.

Lastly, let us mention a statement said to have been made by the President of the Council to the correspondent of a Berlin journal. Radoslavoff is reported to have declared that a treaty between Bulgaria and the Central Powers on the subject of a partition of Serbia had existed for some time. According to this treaty, Austria would retain Northern Serbia, with Belgrade and both banks of the Morava. Bulgaria would annex the eastern part of Serbia, with Nish and a large portion of Macedonia. The rest would be given to Montenegro (*Journal de Genève*, November 20th, 1915). These plans coincided with ugly rumours, insufficiently explained even to-day, of a separate peace with Montenegro. The question was stated still more brutally afterwards. Radoslavoff repeated the same

opinions to a correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt* (January 30th, 1916) :

"The handing over of certain parts of Serbia to Montenegro would simplify the Balkan situation from several points of view. *The rôle of Serbia, for that matter, is finished for ever.* Austria-Hungary will keep definitely those provinces necessary to guarantee her against future perils. As for the intellectual class, that turbulent and dangerous element, *it exists no longer.* The men who have remained in Serbia feel themselves to be Bulgars, or at least will take into consideration the chance of beginning to live in a tranquil country."

The *Outro* of April 22nd published a German intrigue, imputing to Caillaux's secretary declarations against Russian aspirations towards the Straits and against the restoration of Serbia. It was given out that he maintained the necessity of creating a strong Bulgaria to take the place of Serbia. This Germano-Bulgarian calumny is only important through its coincidence with a series of other similar rumours.

During its triumphant tour through the allied capitals, the delegation of Bulgarian deputies always spoke of Serbia as a dead State. The importance of the fact that Bulgaria and Austro-Hungary would henceforth be immediate neighbours was emphasised on both sides. In a toast at Budapest M. Momtchiloff said :

"We have solved another important question, and realised a great ideal of our past ; we have become neighbours of Hungary—the last Bulgar would die rather than renounce the contact with Hungary."

To the *Az Est* (May 2nd, 1916) Momtchiloff said :

"*The Entente makes a great mistake if it thinks of restoring Serbia.*"

The Hungarian journals made use of similar expressions. The *Pesti Naplo* wrote on April 30th, 1916 :

"The most important result of the world war for us lies, perhaps, in the fact that our States are in contact with each other. Henceforward we *must not tolerate being separated by a hostile country ; Serbian territory should be divided among our peasantry.*"

According to the *Alkotmany* of May 2nd, Hungary and Bulgaria ought to rule the Balkans. Many Bulgarian statesmen asserted that the chief motive for the adhesion of Bulgaria to Central Europe was the necessity of contact with Hungary.

The *Pester Lloyd* (April 30th, 1916) also asserted the necessity of a common Bulgaro-Hungarian frontier. And an official personage, the Hungarian Minister *a latere* Erwin Rossner, declared that one of the acquisitions of this war would be that Bulgarian and Hungarian territories touched each other. (*Neue Freie Presse*, May 3rd, 1916.)

When the Bulgarian deputies arrived in Germany, the German press reiterated the same notions respecting the definite character and the consequences of the disappearance of Serbia. The *Vossische Zeitung* (May 7th, 1916) wrote that the Bulgars would keep, not only Macedonia, but also a good part of the *former territory of the kingdom of Serbia*. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of May 8th, 1916, asserts that Serbia is crushed. On the return of the Bulgarian deputies from Hamburg, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of May 18th puts forth the same idea. The *Kölnische Zeitung* (May 18th) acclaims the alliance of the States between Berlin and Bagdad, a block which would seal the fate of the two chief arteries of the British Empire, India and Egypt. The *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* compliments Bulgaria as ruler on this new world route. At the reception of the Bulgarians by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Munich, the Councillor of State, Lössel, and at the official reception at the Hotel de Ville, the President, Borscht, felicitated Bulgaria on having crushed an hereditary enemy, Serbia. (*Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, May 23rd.) This barbarous note is heard even in the organ of the most advanced Hungarian democrats, *Vilag*, which, in its issue of May 25th, criticising an article of Pierre de Lanux, wrote :

“The title of Lanux’s article is *Resurrection* ; why the author believes in a resurrection the article does not tell us. *It is only over the gates of cemeteries that it is the custom to inscribe the words, ‘We shall rise again.’*”

The finishing touch is given by the organ of Tisza, *Az Ujsag*, of May 27th, 1916 :

“*The Hamburg-Bagdad railway will join together the Turanian peoples in geographical unity.*”*

The journey of the Prince Regent of Serbia to Paris and London suggested to the *Mir* of April 12th, 1916, a flood of stupid insults.

“Prince Alexander and Pachitch will have enough good

* Three days later the same journal protested against the declaration of President Wilson claiming the sovereignty and integrity of the smaller States. The *Oesterreichische Rundschau* of July 1st, 1916, also attacks Wilson in an article dealing with Serbia.

sense to understand that it would have been easier to cure a sick man than to *bring to life, now, a dead one.*"

A Bulgarian personage, "of high intelligence and perfect urbanity," of the stock so called "ententist," from Sofia, expressed to Professor Rossier of Lausanne, the same noble opinion (*Gazette de Lausanne*, May 7th, 1916):

"Politics are made up of realities. *The power of Serbia is broken. The nation does not even exist*; half of it perished from hunger when it regained its hearths and devastated fields, after having followed the retreat of the soldiers too far. That being so, WHY PERSIST IN TRYING TO BRING TO LIFE A CORPSE?"

The *Echo de Bulgarie* of May 16th says, "the Serbian Army, in quitting the country, left its soul there," and it is this "soul-less multitude . . . this broken instrument," which is to "renew the greatness of Serbia." The article preaches the extinction of Serbia, but under the form of a retort to the Serbian President of the Council, Pachitch, who, during his tour in Russia, is asserted to have preached the extinction of Bulgaria. The *Echo de Bulgarie* says, "the *Serbo-Bulgarian dispute is settled once for all.*"

* * *

It was, above all, in May and June, 1916, that the desire for the definite overthrow of Serbia manifested itself in the Bulgarian press. Verdun would bring about peace. Radoslavoff declared that everything depended on Verdun. The taking of Verdun, which would convince neutral States of the inevitable defeat of the Entente, would be of decisive importance.* And in the expectation of the fall of Verdun, and peace, the Bulgars hastened to define their claims.

The *Narodni Prava* wrote on May 19th, 1916:

"Bulgarian diplomats may soon have to express their opinions before the great peace conference which will settle the war. They will have to state the theoretical reasons which are the basis of Bulgarian claims already sufficiently fortified by force of arms. They will discuss and draw up the formulas dealing with the future of Serbia and our relations with neighbouring States. On these questions, *above all on that of the fate of Serbia, our real enemy*, OUR DIPLOMATS MUST BE WARY, BUT ABOVE ALL SEVERE AND INEXORABLE. THEY MUST PUT ASIDE ALL SENTIMENT, ALL HUMANE CONSIDERATIONS, ALL TENDER-HEARTEDNESS. The existence of a Serbian State, under any form, means the continuance of trouble in the Balkans. . . .

* Declaration of a Bulgarian statesman to the *Lokal Anzeiger* of Berlin. (*Neue Freie Presse*, July 11th, 1916.)

This State, which, from the beginning of its independent existence, has not ceased to be a focus of disorders and dissensions, ought to be expunged from the surface of the earth, if it is intended to lay the foundation needed for the calm and civilising work of the European and Balkan peoples. . . . It is a prime necessity for the future of humanity, and, above all, for us and our neighbours. The words of the wise German statesman, Bismarck, pronounced on the night of September 1st-2nd, 1870, apropos of the capitulation of Sedan and the French Army are appropriate to this question.

"Only the obduracy of the iron Chancellor in face of the solicitations of the French secured to Germany a forty-three years' peace. *The relations of Germany to her neighbour were almost the same as are those of Bulgaria and Serbia.* That is why it is incumbent on our diplomacy to apply the maxim of Bismarck: NO GENEROSITY IN THE CONCLUDING OF PEACE."

The same state of mind animates the editors of the *Dnevnik* of June 5th, 1916:

"Political organisations whose existence up to the present has only been manifested by provocations, and which consequently are in need of the influence of a higher culture, should be suppressed."

The *Echo de Bulgarie* of June 7th describes the misery of self-slain Serbia and of the Serbian refugees to whom "there remains only submission under the tutelage of Bulgarian laws." The *Narodni Prava* of June 9th, 1916, protests against those who "without regard to the actual conditions wish to bring back the state of things that provoked the war by their retrograde action." The *Dnevnik* of June 19th publishes an article by the Berlin professor, Otto Hoetsch, in which he asserts that *Serbia and Montenegro possess only an historic interest to-day.* The *Narodni Prava* (June 21st, 1916) opines that "the restoration of Serbia according to the plan of Sazonov would be fatal to the Balkans."

The deputy Kaltchoff writes in the *Narodni Prava* (June 27th, 1916) that Serbia has lost, morally, the right to exist.

"Besides, it is evident that *Germany and Austro-Hungary equally with Bulgaria have interests demanding the extinction of Serbia,* and the liberation of the Bulgars of Macedonia and the Morava. The interests and aspirations, political and economic, of Germans and Bulgars are in accord, and that is the common basis necessary to a permanent alliance."

The leader of the Liberal Party of Bavaria, Dr. Müller-Meiningen, communicates to the correspondent of the *Neue*

Zürcher Zeitung (July 21st, 1916) this general impression of the journey of the German deputies to Sofia :

"IT IS THE OPINION THROUGHOUT BULGARIA THAT SERBIA OUGHT TO BE RADICALLY EXTIRPATED, and that if even a microscopic Serbia is allowed to subsist, there will be no peace in the Balkans."

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The conviction that Serbia will never exist again has become an axiom with the Bulgars and their allies. On this assumption not only do they dream of the Hamburg-Bagdad railway and *Mittel-Europa*, but already begin to elaborate plans of practical enterprises depending on the realisation of their dreams.

In a long article on the railways to be made in the Balkans, the *Pester Lloyd* (May 26th, 1916) points out especially the Belgrade-Salonica line as the most natural boundary between the Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian spheres of interest.

The representatives of the Bulgarian Society of Agriculture, George Davailoff, University professor and deputy, and Alexander Tzankoff, professor at the University, gave a lecture on July 16th, 1916, in Buda-Pesth, at the "Central Agricultural Office for the East." Davailoff unfolded projects of new ways of communication in the conquered territories. Tzankoff spoke of agriculture, and estimated that Bulgarian territory (actually 96,346 square kilometres) would certainly be augmented by at least 67,000 square kilometres (*Pester Lloyd*, June 17th, 1916).

At the economic conference of the Central Empires, held at Munich, the Viennese professor Oelwein spoke of a fluvial route from Smederevo by the Morava and Vardar to Salonica and the Ægean Sea (*Arbeiter Zeitung*, June 20th, 1916). At the Danubian conference, held at Buda-Pesth on September 4th, 1916, a project tending to facilitate the navigation of the Iron Gates was discussed. The engineer Rossmayer suggested a canal between Brza Palanka and the point round Yutch, opposite Dogni Milenovatz. Thanks to this, the passage of the Danube would be shortened by 94 kilometres. . . . These studies have for their main object the preparation of questions of utility to be discussed at the peace conference (*Preporetz*, October 7th, 1916).

An article in the *Pesti Hírlap* (May 9th, 1916) must be classed in the same order of ideas. The Hungarian journal

insists on "the appropriation of land in occupied Serbia, which exists no longer." In its issue of April 30th the *Pesti Hirlap* had treated of the partition of enemy lands between Bulgarian and Hungarian cultivators. This time it enters into practical details :

"We ought to keep for ourselves as much as possible of the Serbian country now under our administration. Much vacant property is in our hands, and even that whose proprietors exist could be acquired at a low price. . . . As we have no colonies, nothing is more natural than that we should overflow into the conquered regions. We must take care that the soil conquered at the price of Hungarian blood becomes Hungarian."

Even in their diplomatic and legislative acts, the Bulgars treat Serbia as a country annexed, not merely occupied. In doing this they infringe an elementary rule of public law, which lays it down that the occupation of enemy territory confers no definite rights until the conclusion of peace. It constitutes a want of scruples without an example in history. This insolent contempt of fundamental usage admitted up to now by civilised nations, has been displayed on divers occasions, but above all when a demand was made by the Serbian Red Cross. The Bulgarian Red Cross refused to furnish the information required, alleging that "in consequence of the occupation of all Serbian territory by the Bulgarian and allied armies, no Serbian authority, and therefore no Serbian Red Cross, existed in that country . . ." and the *Balkanska Pochta* of September 20th, 1916, wrote :

"It has been officially intimated that Bulgaria cannot recognise the Serbian Red Cross Society, seeing that *the Serbian State exists no longer*, and that *Serbs are henceforth our subjects*."

This brutal act bore the signature of Gueshoff, as President of the Bulgarian Red Cross.

On the assumption of this same inept notion that the Serbs had become Bulgarian subjects by the sole fact of the occupation, Bulgaria instituted military commissions charged with recruiting soldiers *among her new subjects*.

We shall speak further elsewhere of these monstrous proceedings, contrary to all law.

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The renewed activity in the Balkans, the offensive of Sarraïl, and Roumanian intervention provoked the same manifestations respecting the fate of Serbia. Touching the

combats with the Serbs on the Macedonian front, the *Kambana* (August 24th, 1916) wrote :

"These are, in truth, the last attempts of criminal Serbism to maintain itself erect ; they are the last death spasms of the unhappy wretches whom the criminal dynasty of Karageorgevitch and the Entente Powers have tried to organise into an army to oppose us. The battles on our right wing will be instructive to the peaceful Serbs who live in what was formerly Serbia. These peaceable Serbs see to-day more clearly than last winter, so unfortunate for them, *that no force can save criminal Serbism.*"

The Roumanian intervention, above all, excited the bellicose fury of the Bulgars ; the *Narodni Prava* of September 1st, 1916, wrote :

"Serbia has paid very dearly for its treachery and treason to Bulgaria. The guilty now wander and beg in foreign lands. . . . *There is no place in the Balkans for brigands and perjurers.*"

Kambana, September 2nd :

"Countries like Serbia and Roumania are destined to annihilation."

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of September 12th, commenting on the interviews of Ferdinand of Coburg with Enver Pasha and the Kaiser, lays stress on :

"the probability that Bulgaria would be in agreement with Germany and Austro-Hungary on the question of the partition of Serbia."

Kambana (October 9th, 1916) :

"SERBIA EXISTS NO MORE TO-DAY, AND THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA WILL NEVER BE RESTORED."

Even when the probability of a definite military triumph had considerably diminished, when in Germany an anti-annexationist reaction had arisen, the Bulgarian press, as well as that of Austro-Hungary, continued to reiterate on every occasion the same idea, to wit, that Serbia should no longer exist or that it should be reduced to an existence deprived of the most elementary conditions of vitality.

Whence comes this Bulgarian implacability, this desire to destroy Serbia, which, however, Ferdinand of Coburg believed still in 1912, could be accorded a place in the Balkans by the side of Great Bulgaria ?

CHAPTER IV.

THE BULGARS AGAINST THE UNION OF THE YUGO-SLAVS

THE intolerance of the Bulgars towards Serbia, whatever its form and proportions, is owing to several causes.

Firstly, Bulgarian appetites have increased with success. Then, Bulgarian covetousness may be explained by the annexationist fever and the dream of *Mittel-Europa* which kept the Central Empires, Bulgaria, and Turkey in a state of intoxication until the autumn of 1916. But these reasons which arose in the course of the war are only additions to the main reason, which also led Bulgaria into the war.

Bulgaria still considered in 1912 that there was room for Serbia beside her. If she had kept this opinion, she ought to have accepted the compensations in Macedonia offered in 1915. This offer secured her the same advantages she esteemed sufficient, two years earlier, to guarantee her existence and her development by the side of Serbia. When King Ferdinand and the Russophobe Rizoff concluded the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance in 1912 they were very clear-sighted as to the security it afforded to Bulgaria. They could consent with a light heart to a certain expansion of Serbia, because even enlarged, this State had less territory than Bulgaria, and must continue to depend for its external communications on Austria and Bulgaria, long bound to each other by a close understanding. The *Neue Freie Presse* of May 4th, 1916, in its answer to Count Andrassy, develops the idea that a Serbian kingdom ought no longer to be permitted. Experience had shown that "the hindrances of customs tariffs, the throttling of its commerce, and the denial of access to the open sea, no longer sufficed to paralyse this little State"; on the contrary, these measures only increased its hatred and provoked assaults and assassinations of sovereigns; "in other words, it was no longer enough to grip Serbia by the throat through chicanery;

it was necessary to strangle her altogether." This was a precious avowal of the *Neue Freie Presse* concerning the means resorted to by Austrian policy, every time Serbia refused to serve the interests of the dual monarchy. It was a proof also of the guarantees held by Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary in the complete envelopment of Serbia.

According to the estimate of Sofia, ten years of peace would have sufficed for Bulgaria to assimilate Macedonia from the ethnographic point of view, and ensure a durable prestige in the Balkans. In the event of a European war, Serbia could not have undertaken the liberation of her brothers in the west and north, except she secured herself in the east and south by new compensations to Bulgaria. Through these new acquisitions, Bulgaria would be finally established in the centre of the Balkans, would have conquered her principal artery, and driven Serbia towards the west, whither Bulgarian ethnographers pushed her always.

By the side of a Bulgaria thus enlarged, consolidated, and containing seven million inhabitants (almost double her ethnical share), Serbia would have been able to exist with an equal population, but very much absorbed by internal organisation. That would have been the only means of establishing between very unequal forces, like the Serbian and Bulgarian, a balance in favour of Bulgaria.

The insatiable cupidity of Bulgaria in 1913 unmasked all the duplicity of her policy of understanding with Serbia. The fratricidal war ruined not only an idea so sound as that of the Serbo-Bulgarian entente, but also upset the selfish calculations the Bulgars based upon it. Coveting a larger slice than they were entitled to, the Bulgars lost in 1913 even what the Serbs did not refuse them. The concessions offered in 1915 compensated the Bulgars for their losses in 1913, but no longer responded to the hopes founded on the eventuality of a new extension of Serbia towards the west. The Bulgarian outlook had changed. Besides which, events had shown that Serbia, whether she counted $4\frac{1}{2}$ or 12 million souls, was becoming a factor in the Balkans that had to be reckoned with. For all these reasons Bulgaria, from the first day of the European war, decided to solve her problem radically.* To diminish Serbia no

* This notion of a radical solution of the Serbian question was developed in the same manner in Austria-Hungary.

In the *Neue Freie Presse* of April 23rd, 1916 (Easter number) Count Andrassy demonstrated the inconvenience of an annexation of Serbia. In its issue of May 4th the *Neue Freie Presse* "from a special source

longer seemed sufficient ; she must be destroyed, once for all ; it had become necessary to nip in the bud that organism which, until then, had displayed so much vitality that even the smallest part of it, left free, ought to be considered dangerous. All the conditions of freedom must be suppressed in Serbia, which otherwise remained, even in its smallest proportions, the natural and irresistible fulcrum of its great nation.

Even nations less numerous than the Yugo-slav cannot be annihilated, above all by nations still smaller. Bulgaria knew this well enough. She could not have regarded this absurd pretension seriously, had she not been encouraged in her criminal plan by Austria-Hungary, who had a more vital interest in the disappearance of Serbia. For Bulgaria it was only a question of Balkan hegemony, which she could not have realised in the event of the formation of a united Serbia. For Austria, the destruction of Serbia meant the suppression of the basis necessary to the creation of a Yugo-slav State in the centre and west of the Balkan peninsula. And this State would not only have caused the amputation of a large stretch of Austrian territory and obstructed its expansion in the Balkans, but it would have represented the triumph of national liberty and independence, a triumph fatal to the future of the Habsburg monarchy.

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The annexationist fury of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria

of information " (*von besonderer Seite*) referred to Andrassy's article, contending that the dangers foreseen by Count Andrassy represented " a lesser evil than *the continued existence of this little State.*"

Count Lützow, a former diplomatist, wrote in the *Neue Freie Presse* of July 26th, 1916, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Austrian ultimatum :

" The fact that *Serbia yielded* may be considered a diplomatic success, but what good purpose would it have served ? During the Balkan crisis we scored diplomatic successes, for example, *the hindering of Serbia from access to the sea* in dealing with the question of Scutari. We should be very simple to believe that Serbia would ever abide by conditions she had accepted while grinding her teeth. . . . This victory would have been probably a Pyrrhic one, that would have placed us *sooner or later under the necessity of having recourse to the ultima ratio*, to extreme measures under conditions more favourable to the adversary, who would certainly have profited by the time gained."

Speaking (after the *Russkoié Slovo*) of the new Serbian centre at Odessa, the *Pester Lloyd* of August 11th, 1916, says :

" Great Serbia is a hundred-headed hydra. We have cut off her head at Belgrade and at Nish, and behold she shoots forth poison and gall in a foreign town, Odessa. . . . The Serbian centre newly created at Odessa is a symbol. He who understands this symbol will know also why Austria-Hungary ought to have made of Serbia—*tabula rasa.*"

was stimulated, moreover, by a special circumstance. Europe, which, in the conflict of Serbs and Bulgars, contemplates, amid the carnage of the nations, this most desperate life and death struggle, does not suspect that the two peoples who exterminate each other so pitilessly in the Balkans are formed of men of the same blood and the same tongue. In the great Yugo-slav family, Serbs and Bulgars are in reality tribes of the same race, speaking dialects of the same language. From the Julian Alps and Carinthia to the Black Sea extend the undulations of the same great national wave. In the central zone, Serbs and Croats use the same dialect* ; on the two wings, the Slovenes at the extreme west, and the Bulgars at the extreme east, speak dialects which in the boundary zones melt into the central Serbo-Croat tongue. The similarity of these dialects is such, and the gradations of the transition so imperceptible, that the traveller who knows no matter which of the three can journey perfectly well from Lubiana (Laibach) to Varna without perceiving that he is in a foreign country. Serbo-Croat, Slovene, and Bulgar are so much alike that newspapers in any three indifferently can be read without preparatory study. Everywhere else, where civilisation is more deeply rooted, this similarity of speech, with other ethnic characteristics, would have been a solid basis for complete union ; only in the Balkans has it been powerless to prevent separatism. Actually, this mediæval tendency is maintained nowhere except in the Balkan east. Whilst the Yugo-slav tribe, the Slovenes, living furthest west, is the most far-seeing and full of enthusiasm for Yugo-slav union, the tribe planted at the eastern extremity, the Bulgars, fights tooth and nail to make this union impossible. Bulgarian patriotism has seen in the similitude of language, above all in the zones of transition, only a circumstance favourable to the extension of the limits of the Bulgarian tribe. Not sociable, distrustful, not yet mature enough to conceive a larger unity, the Bulgars have aimed in all their enterprises at one object, predominance, not only in material strength and territorial magnitude, but ethnically. Not only did the conquest of Serbia make the deliverance and union of the Yugo-slavs impossible for a time, but it subjected a large zone to the action of Bulgarian nationalist propaganda. This regarded henceforth as its field not only the Vardar

* The Dictionary published by the Yugo-slav Academy of Zagreb bears the title, " Dictionary of the Croat or Serbian Language."

basin, but also the whole region of the Morava, and even the plateau of Kossovo. By progressively assimilating the Serbian tribe, the Chauvinist Bulgars hoped to modify the existing ethnic proportions and thus increase their national contingent. A member of the Gueshoff party, the deputy Boris Vazoff, recommends in an article in the *Mir* (January 16th, 1916) the diffusion of the Bulgarian language :

"We must not forget that the struggle between Bulgars and Serbs and other Balkan peoples is also a STRUGGLE FOR THE PREDOMINANCE OF ONE OF TWO LANGUAGES. Our activity does not end with military victories ; victory will only be complete when the Bulgarian speech predominates in the Balkan peninsula. Bulgars do not pay sufficient attention to this. . . . In the recently conquered provinces, soldiers, officers, and functionaries endeavour to speak Serbian with the inhabitants although the people understand Bulgarian quite well. . . ."

Vazoff also accuses the Serbs of wishing to abase the Bulgarian tongue in the eyes of strangers by treating it as a corrupt dialect of Serbian :

"The distinguished Slavist Yaghitch, himself, was of opinion that the Bulgarian language had no future, that Bulgars ought to accept Serbian as a literary language. Serbian perseverance came very near to winning in an unjust cause. . . . In fact, the cause of the Bulgarian language and Bulgarianism is neglected ; we are still half illiterate. . . . I am ashamed, I avow, but it is the truth nevertheless ; we do not yet possess a clear exposition of the forms of the Bulgarian tongue, we have not a dictionary in which all the treasures of the language are collected and published."

This learned survey of the diffusion of the Bulgarian language at the expense of Serbian, published in the organ of the signatories of the Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance, was followed by other manifestations in the same sense but much coarser.

Already, before the appearance of Vazoff's article, Radoslavoff had declared to a writer in the *Az Est* :

"The majority of the population calls itself Bulgarian, and only in the younger generation are people to be found having a national Serbian conscience. The new régime will know how to put that in order also. . . ." (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 31st, 1916.)

A discussion arose in the Bulgarian Sobranié on the occasion of the vote on the law for the opening of Bulgarian schools in the occupied territory. The Socialist deputies reproached the Government with terrorising the population

and preparing a régime of denationalisation. The *Narodni Prava* (February 4th, 1916) deemed it necessary to devote an article to this debate :

"There were even deputies who spoke of denationalisation, of a régime of terror which we were about to inaugurate, because we were dominated by the Chauvinist passion which had taken hold of Bulgaria. . . . They said this in full Parliament, and at the moment of passing the Bill introduced by M. Pecheff on the schools of the liberated provinces. . . . They are thinking, perhaps, of the Serbs, of whom traces exist in the Morava. We can affirm that the Serbs—if they can be said to come into question, when we have to do with Pirot, Vrania, or Zaitchar—will not need to be denationalised, because, without that, continuing to live amid a compact mass of Bulgars, they will soon forget their Serbism."

Dr. Ivan Dimitroff, in the *Dnevnik* (February 14th, 1916) deals with "the administration of the occupied territories."

" . . . What Serbia could not do in forty years Bulgaria will finish in three or four. She will attain it by a legal régime, by national Bulgarian education on a large basis, with teachers and priests who should be good patriots and indefatigable workers, with bishops and prefects, by a large and sane culture, national and European, by an administration, enlightened and law-abiding."

The *Narodni Prava*, in a leader of March 7th, 1916, entitled "Public Instruction in the New Provinces," says that it is the duty of the Government, although the war is not yet over, to lay the foundations of Great Bulgaria, that is to say, to establish Bulgarian schools in the new provinces.

"It is for this that the Minister Pecheff has not hesitated to draft a law on the organisation of Bulgarian schools in the Morava and Macedonia. It remains now with the Bulgarian teachers in the new provinces to prepare a solid basis for Bulgarian culture. So we may hope for the day when the figure of Bulgaria will tower aloft from the Black Sea to the mountains of Albania, and from the Danube to Prespa and the Ægean."

If we recall the aim of Bulgarian policy, which is to ensure the doubling of territory by the doubling of the race, we can understand the feverish haste with which the Bulgars from the first days of their invasion have driven by main force into the Bulgarian schools the Serbian population, sick, famished, and in rags.

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Whilst arming in order to conquer and divide Serbia

with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria also organised the propaganda of her aspirations to Serbian territory. Begun since the summer of 1915 by the Government organs, this Serbophobe and megalomaniac campaign has become general, and to-day the Government holds everything at its disposal to continue it—the support of all political parties, Bulgarian literature and science. With the increase of chances of victory, came augmentation of the numbers of those who preached the crusade against Serbia. Towards the end of 1915, soon after the entrance of Bulgaria into the war, the opposition promised to support the Government, on condition that the latter should put an end to the war and conclude peace with Serbia as soon as Macedonia was conquered.* But when the conquest of Serbia was accomplished, the opposition did not hesitate long before joining those who wish to maintain Bulgarian pretensions to eastern Serbia in conformity with the Germano-Bulgarian scheme of partition. A. Ichirkoff, professor and member of the Bulgarian Academy of Science, published in the spring of 1916 a voluminous work, in which he essays to demonstrate the Bulgarian character of all the Valley of the Morava—the vital artery of Serbian lands. The savants of the University and of the Academy of Sofia discover Bulgars even in the villages of the district of Belgrade, even in the suburbs of the Serbian capital, and according to them, Bulgarian characteristics become more prominent in following the course of the Morava southwards. In certain places they are attributed to villages on the left bank of the Morava, and doubt is cast on the Serbian character of the classic home of the Serbian race—the Shoumadia. Even Kragevatz, the ancient capital of the Serbian Prince Lazar, is represented as Bulgarian. It is needless to add that Bulgarian science does not hesitate to consider Old Serbia and Macedonia as incontestably Bulgarian.

This order of ideas has been developed by the Bulgarian press with an easy carelessness truly cynical.

In an article in the *Narodni Prava* (March 29th, 1916) Nikola Mitakoff represented the partition of Serbia and the Bulgarisation of all its eastern half as a piece of good fortune for the Serbian nation.

* *La Suisse* (November 20th, 1915) reproduces a dispatch from Bucharest to the *Secolo* of Milan, according to which the Bulgarian opposition consented to a union of parties, or common policy, on condition that Bulgaria would stop the war and make peace with Serbia as soon as Macedonia was entirely occupied.

"Serbia presents a melancholy picture to-day. Its distress is the result of a series of exploits of brigands and demented diplomatists. *But the Serbian nation is saved. It is saved to begin a new and happy life.*"

And the Bulgarian writer sets himself to describe this new life of the Serbian people :

" . . . We cannot dream of reconstructing a Serbian or a Montenegrin State. They are neither necessary nor possible. So long as the world lasts, a Peter, a Nikita, a Pachitch will be impossible. The Serbs to the west of Mitrovitza and the valley of the Morava must join their brothers, the Croats, Herzegovinians, and Bosnians, instead of falling under the talons of their tyrants and suffering indefinitely. The union of these Serbs with those of Austria-Hungary will be a *real good fortune for the Serbian nation*. This nation will be thus united in the complete sense of the word, and should be far prouder of belonging to Austria-Hungary than remaining an independent unit in the hands of usurping Serbian kings. As for the Serbianised Bulgars of the Timok and the Morava, to whom Bulgaria opens her arms wide, they will not be long in feeling the beneficent rays of the sun which warms them. They will come back from their straying, and will feel the divine grace flowing as upon erring children who return to the paternal roof. . . . " *

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The Bulgarian intrigues and the guarantees demanded by the Radoslavoff Government in 1915 from the Quadruple Entente against the expansion of Serbia towards the west, go to prove that the Bulgars made war to hinder the Serbo-Croat-Slovene union. The *Narodni Prava*, Radoslavoff's organ, in an article headed "On Serbian Territory," in the issue of October 17th, 1915—that is to say during the first days of the Bulgarian invasion of Serbia—says :

"At Serajevo the Serbian people dared to assassinate the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince and his spouse, in the hope of realising a Chauvinist Utopia. The madmen who governed Serbia demanded that 15 million 'Serbian' Slavs should be incorporated in Serbia, and did not admit the idea that Serbia, on the contrary, should be annexed to those other 'Serbs.' "

According to the *Narodni Prava*, the Serbs of the free kingdom of Serbia ought, therefore, to join the subjugated Yugo-slavs and shut themselves up with them in the Austro-

* The same morality and the same reasoning are to be found in the *Beogradske Novine* (May 29th, 1916), which says that it is now that *the Serbian people will become really free*.

Hungarian cage. To bring this about and to prevent the free union of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, who, however, are Slavs like themselves, the Bulgars have embarked on a holy war in concert with Germans, Hungarians, and Turks.

From the month of November, 1915, or, more precisely, from the first Bulgarian successes against the Serbs, the *Mir* of Gueshoff prepared for its conversion. The former propagator of Yugo-slav fraternity, the *Mir*, Russophil and Slavophil, dared to maintain in its leader of November 20th that the present war is not a war of Germans against Slavs. To prove this, it pretended that the Slavs of Austria-Hungary fought "with enthusiasm" against the Russians as well as against the Italians.

In Austria-Hungary as well as in Bulgaria the Yugo-slav question began to be regarded as common to both. It became the basis of solidarity, uniting them against Serbia.

The semi-official *Bosnische Post* of Serajevo, in its leader of December 10th, 1915, sought a solution of the Serbian question :

"Austria-Hungary had no intention, at first, of annexing Serbia ; she desired only to *paralyse the action of Serbia in the Yugo-slav question, which became thenceforth an Austro-Bulgarian question*. However, seeing that Bulgaria wants to retain, besides Macedonia, the departments of Negotin and Pirot, that Albania is to take the province of Kossovo, and that Austria-Hungary, as Tisza declared before, must annex at least a band of territory along the southern banks of the Save and the Danube, *the question arises if what remains after this partition will be viable or condemned to beg in perpetuity, as Montenegro has done up to the present*. No statesman of the dual monarchy would decide with a light heart to annex Serbian territory, but the measure may be imposed by necessity. Even if this annexation were to take place, the Serbs would by no means obtain preponderance over the Croats and Mussulmans ; the task of the monarchy will consist in arriving at such a solution of the Yugo-slav question that each nation and each creed may develop freely ; their liberty will be limited, be it well understood, by the superior interests of the State. By all means *it is necessary to imbue these peoples with German culture, not only in the interests of the State, but also in their own.*"

The *Narodni Prava* (June 10th, 1916) says :

"The aim of this crime (the assassination of Serajevo) was to compass the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, and to present themselves afterwards as its legitimate successors."

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the declara-

tion of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, the Bulgarian press emits the same opinions, defending Austria and attacking Serbia and the most legitimate Serbian national aspirations.

The *Narodni Prava* (July 28th, 1916) wrote :

" Russia, abusing her giant power, sanctioned as a moral action the crime of Serajevo and the pretension of Serbia to destroy the internal life of the neighbouring monarchy. She sanctioned, above all, the right of Serbia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the Serbian Government had definitely renounced those provinces by her solemn declaration of March, 1909."

And the *Echo de Bulgarie* wrote on July 29th, 1916 :

" It was an unavoidable struggle. *The prestige and security of Austria-Hungary, even the honour of the Habsburgs, could not remain exposed to the plots of the sanguinary pan-Serbian propaganda. . . .* It was a struggle of legitimate defence. For the monarchy, the question was on all accounts grave. It was a dilemma. . . . *On the west, Austria-Hungary transformed into legal possession the occupation of Bosnian territory, thus proclaiming her will to remain where she had been domiciled for thirty years.*"

The Serbs, then, have no right either to Macedonia or to Old Serbia, or to eastern Serbia, or to Bosnia, or to other provinces of the Habsburg monarchy. On the Bulgarian side they are almost astonished that the Serbians can have the obstinacy to exist, whilst having so many opportunities of bearing other names less inconvenient . . . for Bulgarian statistics.

The articles in the Bulgarian press have little or nothing to distinguish them from those in the German newspapers of the time. Thus the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* of July 23rd, 1916, wrote to commemorate the ultimatum to Serbia :

" The regicide government of the Karageorgevitch is the instigator of a shameless propaganda openly assigning as its object the snatching from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy of the provinces inhabited by the Yugo-Slavs and uniting them to Serbia in a great Serbian kingdom. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy and its allies have destroyed the focus of the conspiracies fathered by the Karageorgevitch family, and there is every reason to hope that after this war the ancient monarchy of the Habsburgs will be able to address itself to its great civilising task in the provinces of the Serbian and Croatian languages without fear of the hostilities which have never ceased to menace it."

The Yugo-slav idea was also opposed by the deputy Stefan Petkoff, who replied to the *Temps* and M. Hervé

in the *Narodni Prava* (June 17th, 1916). The letter was dated from Zurich, June 4th :

"We could never support a policy of equilibrium having for its object the submission of Bulgarian Macedonia and the Morava valley to the Serbian yoke, and the union with the Serbian kingdom of nations under the Habsburg monarchy, such as the Slovenes, Croats, and others, who have never been Serbs and who feel the deepest aversion for everything Serbian. *For this reason the proposals of the Entente could not satisfy the aspirations of Bulgaria, who cannot remain indifferent to the expansion of a treacherous neighbour at the expense of our territory and that of others.*"

The Bulgars have never been able to forgive the Serbs for having attempted, in the course of the polemic of 1913, to moderate Bulgarian megalomania by the agreement, among others, of political equilibrium. However, the Bulgars themselves, not only in the foregoing article but in all their political plans of 1915, relied on a principle far less tenable, *that of national equilibrium*. They had built up their plans of conquest and the Bulgarisation of Macedonia, Old Serbia, and Eastern Serbia, *with the object of inverting, in their favour, the numerical proportions of the two nations by assimilating three million Serbs*. Yet so many centuries and so much political plotting in the Balkans had been powerless to alter this proportion. The same motive explainstheir renegade opposition to Yugo-slav union.

* * *

The manner in which Bulgaria has been conducting by sword and pen the campaign against Serbia proves that *the former has not let loose a struggle between two States but between two races*.

After the bitter disappointment in Macedonia where Bulgaria did not succeed in compassing her purpose, either by propaganda, or terrorism, or corruption, she could hardly expect to succeed, through the same system, in conquered Serbia, which, in consequence of a more developed civilisation, had a stronger national consciousness. It is for this reason that Bulgaria began extirpating brutally all evidence of the national character in the conquered provinces, before undertaking systematic denationalisation, which would be inevitably a long and troublesome task. The rush of barbarous hordes, in ancient times, devastated the countries invaded, but no instance is to be found of *such organised and reasoned vandalism* as that by which the Bulgars, in

penetrating Serbia, destroyed the wealth accumulated during a century of civilised life and overthrew time-honoured national monuments. They went so far even as to burn the books they rifled from private houses, *to destroy or carry off to Sofia the tombstones in the cemeteries*. Ever since the treacherous attack of October 13th, 1916, up to now, they have not ceased to work for the disappearance of everything in the country having a Serbian character, by pillage, impoverishment, and ruin. All the notables, the educated, the teaching body, and the clergy have either been massacred or interned in Bulgaria. Among the hundred thousand Serbs who are prisoners or interned, hundreds die daily, whether from cold, hunger, or disease. It is evident that they are condemned to extermination. It is over this vast cemetery of a devastated land, where nothing is heard except the sighs of old men and the despairing moans of mothers and orphans, that the Bulgars have unfolded their national flag, and it is there they hope to extend their positions and found a new cradle of Bulgarianism.

The idea of the extermination of Serbia and the Serbian race inspires the whole Bulgarian press. Even when, in a conciliatory spirit, they spoke of a compromise with the Entente, they said of the Serbs: "Since the nation no longer exists why try to revive a corpse?"* The organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the *Echo de Bulgarie*,† speaks of Serbian skeletons, and says "there is no peace in the family of civilised nations for the megalomaniacal Serbian people." The *Kambana*‡ asserts that "no power can now save criminal Serbism." The *Mir*§ says that "it was easier to cure the sick than to bring to life the dead man to-day." The description of the misery of the Serbs, who "now wander and beg in foreign lands,"|| is the same in the organ of Radoslavoff and in the poetry of the greatest Bulgarian poet, Ivan Vazoff. Whilst one glorifies the triumph of the Bulgarian glaive which has finished Serbia, the other sees in it Divine justice. But all and sundry write epitaphs on the tomb of Serbia, Serbism, and Yugo-slavia, united, free, and independent.

* *Gazette de Lausanne*, June 7th, 1916.

† *Echo de Bulgarie*, January 27th, 1916; July 29th, 1916.

‡ *Kambana*, August 24th, 1916.

§ *Mir*, April 19th, 1916.

|| *Narodni Prava*, September 1st, 1916.

CHAPTER V

BULGARIAN PEACE

ENTERING on the war in the expectancy of gaining the most possible with the least effort, it was natural that Bulgaria should manifest a desire for peace as soon as her own object was attained. In November, 1915, already the Bulgars hoped to enjoy local peace in the Balkans ere a general peace supervened. The Bulgarian leaders declared that the Bulgarian task had ended with the crushing of Serbia, and spoke of a partial demobilisation of the Bulgarian army.* The Bulgarian Minister at Vienna, Tocheff, had a very disagreeable surprise during a conversation on the subject. When he was boasting of Bulgaria having *accomplished her task* in the Balkans, one of his German colleagues congratulated him on the "fortunate beginning of the new ally. . . ." Disillusioned as to the chance of a local peace, the Bulgars redoubled their hopes of general peace. The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of December 28th, 1915, published a plan of peace, inspired by the Germans, which gave to the Bulgars the whole territory in Western Serbia occupied by the Bulgarian army. A combination not less sensational, the so-called separate peace of Montenegro, in January, 1916, deluded them with new hopes.

Their claims being satisfied, the Bulgars could not understand why Europe went on fighting. So they began to attack the Entente, which did not bend to the conditions of peace dictated by the Central Empires.

German hopes of Verdun awoke Bulgarian hopes of peace. The Prime Minister and the Generalissimo expressed these hopes openly.† The Roumanian defeat gave rise to new ones. Radoslavoff declared to the correspondent

* The *Vossische Zeitung* (November 22nd, 1915) has an interview (at Buda-Pesth) with Tontcheff, Minister of Finance, who said, "The liberation of the Bulgars in Serbia and Macedonia being accomplished, I think we are going to demobilise a part of the Bulgarian army."

† Radoslavoff, *Magyarország*, April 10th, 1916. Jostoff, *Berliner Tageblatt*, April 27th, 1916.

of the *Kölnische Zeitung* (September 7th, 1916) that he considered this to be the closing period of the war which would give final and decisive victory to the Central Alliance. The newspapers said the same. For example, the *Zarja* (October 4th, 1916) exclaimed: "The entrance of Roumania on the scene brings us near to peace." At Sofia peace was expected to come with the theatrical stratagem of the "restoration of Poland." The *Mir* of November 7th, 1916,* reports the following communication of Radoslavoff at a conference of his party: "The rumours of peace become more and more persistent. The restoration of Poland is looked upon as *the first step towards peace.*"

The second German theatrical act followed closely on the comedy of the restoration of Poland: the offer of peace in December, 1916, was acclaimed at Sofia as an act of supreme wisdom and noble magnanimity. The Government journals (all of December 13th) are so proud of it that they think they may give a lesson to the Entente. The *Echo de Bulgarie* reminds the Entente powers that "war is not a sport. Its prolongation is *a crime* against civilisation and humanity." The *Narodni Prava* faces them with the fact of "responsibility" before humanity and history "for the new victims of the war." The two opposition organs, *Mir* (Gueshoff) and *Preporetz* (Malinoff), admire in equal measure the magnificent German act. The *Preporetz* cannot admit that the Entente Powers will reject the truce and proposed peace "without even asking the conditions." In case they refuse, says the *Preporetz*, "war will be continued with redoubled energy and greater obstinacy, which will ensure us greater successes still." The *Mir* makes an apology for the German act and Germany, saying: "The peace proposals made at a moment when there is every proof of the invincibility of the allies and their immense successes, have an added meaning, inasmuch as they deny in solemn fashion all the accusations that have been made against Germany and her allies, respecting the present war. . . . It is an incontrovertible fact that the allies were forced to take up arms for the defence of their existence, and for the free development of the respective nations. The allies have the right to hope that the conditions they

* The *Vossische Zeitung*, November 11th, 1916, had a telegram from Sofia to this effect, with the paradoxical comment that the restoration of Poland (under the sceptre of a German Emperor) "would bring peace nearer, and would bring Russia nearer to the Central Empires. . . ."

will lay down—if on the other side they are ready for negotiations—will serve as a basis for the establishment of a durable peace.” The *Narod*, organ of the reformist Socialists (December 14th, 1916), declares that “without fear of being contradicted by facts, we can say that the voice of reason which gives the tone to the note of the allies cannot remain a voice crying in the wilderness.”

All the newspapers published reports of the Sobranié when the President of the Council read the declaration which contained the peace proposals. The Chamber applauded frantically. Outside the building a crowd, growing denser every minute, awaited the great news. The extreme Socialist organ, *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* (December 13th, 1916), says:

“There were many simple-minded people who expected the re-establishment of peace in the immediate future, and they were in despair when they learned the tenor of the Ministerial declaration.”

The first replies from Paris and London brought with them bitter disappointment, and excited the fury of the Bulgars against those who refused peace at the moment and under the conditions which suited them (the Bulgars).

The Bulgarian journals of December 16th, 1916, all reply to Briand. The *Narodni Prava* thunders against him: “M. Briand supposes that the Entente Powers can demand of the Central Empires, who deplore so many victims and have gained so many victories, the *status quo ante* in Europe, and he supposes that they can conclude peace without indemnities, and can return to the pre-war frontiers under the same conditions.” The *Mir* finds that “the rhetoric of Aristides Briand, instead of concealing the weakness of the Entente, emphasises it the more; that is why we must not consider that the effort towards peace has completely failed.” The *Zaria* says: “Only one thing can interest the world to-day—not who provoked the war, but *who hinders the re-establishment of peace, and why they hinder it.*” The *Preporetz* speaks of the want of confidence and sincerity among the Entente Powers, which has perhaps inspired the offer made by the Central Powers. The *Preporetz* foresees the possibility of separating the Entente Powers by this action. The Socialist reformist organ, *Narod*, says: “The temper of the English press astonishes us. It has lost its balance.” The semi-official *Echo de Bulgarie* discerns an “abyss” between the language of Briand and the real situation in

France, and thinks that "only peace can save the Republic from irretrievable ruin." The *Narodni Prava* of December 18th also menaces the refractory Entente: (For the Entente) "peace; what a frightful prospect! By it the world will be re-born; that is to say, by the destruction of English practices, Russian Tsarism, and the corrupt Parliamentarism of the French."

This cruel disillusion did not stifle all hope. The *Mir* of December 21st, for example, writes that "the Entente thinks it can demand complete guarantees, a demand which will be considered as a fashion of negotiating. It is impossible to foresee what procedure will be employed and how long this mode of negotiating will last." The *Dnevnik* of December 28th goes so far as to glorify "the great diplomatic victory obtained by the Central Powers and their allies by the peace proposals. The impression made by these proposals on neutrals as well as on the people and armies of the Entente is enormous. The path of negotiations—even direct—is open."

This renewal of hope was due to the Wilson Note, whose coincidence with that of the Kaiser gave rise to most pleasant conjectures on the part of the Bulgars. "We cannot suppose," says the *Mir* of December 23rd, "that America will be satisfied with a plea of non-acceptance of the peace proposals without discussion. Such a refusal, if it occurs, will create in America *feelings hostile to the Entente*. . . . The United States are strong enough to exercise a decisive influence on the belligerents and *oblige them to make peace*." The *Dnevnik* of December 25th finds it "difficult to admit that Wilson would have engaged the honour and dignity of the most powerful of the neutral nations to sustain a refusal, however polite." The *Zaria* of the same date is sure already that "the action of the United States will be indubitably successful. It appears that the Americans will not limit themselves to desires. The character of Wilson's Note shows that *the intervention of the United States might have very disagreeable consequences for those belligerents who attempted to hinder the establishment of peace*."*

* This impatient longing for peace began to cause disquietude at Berlin. It inspired Count Reventlow to write an article in the *Deutsche Tages Zeitung* (January 13th, 1917), in which he draws attention to the intrigues of the Entente directed to separate Bulgaria from the Central Empires. He says: "For a good many weeks past the English press has evinced a remarkably benevolent tone towards Bulgaria—King

In December, 1916, they nursed the hope at Sofia of obtaining a new accessory in the great American Republic.

If the first replies of Entente statesmen brought with them disillusion, the Note of the Entente provoked veritable rage at Sofia. The *Mir* of January 3rd, 1917, says: "The tears of the Entente shed for the fate of the small nations is a piece of hypocrisy without parallel," for England and France—according to the *Mir*—have behaved no better to Greece than Germany to Belgium, "who confronted her arms in hand." The *Dnevnik* (January 13th) says: "The refusal of the Entente breathes lies and hypocrisy. The response of the Central Powers is evidence of their strength; without fanfaronade, they state that peace is necessary for humanity, whilst declaring coldly that peace will be obtained at the point of the sword. The Entente thus receives a new blow which she will ward off only with great difficulty." According to the *Outro* of January 15th, the Bulgarian Ministers have not concealed their opinion that the conditions "are wholly lacking in seriousness." The *Zarja* (January 15th) is declamatory. "Lies and hypocrisy reign in the world. The world desires peace and justice. Those who refuse them will be eternally cursed by future generations." The next day the *Zarja* pictures "Briand and Lloyd George, clad in the shining robes of apostles of liberty, striving to conceal their appetite for conquest *at the expense of peoples who have given proof of their superiority and vital force.*"

This Bulgarian superiority was the subject of an article in the *Mir* (January 7th, 1917). The writer, the Deputy Boris Vazoff, brands the action of the Entente with the intention to deprive Bulgaria of her spoils of war, and "to destroy the results of an effort of ten centuries *on the part of a race so civilised as that of Bulgaria.*"

The civilisation of the Bulgarian race is made familiar to us at present by the way in which its soldiers make war, and the manner in which its statesmen pursue a policy. As for the results of the effort of ten centuries, they are

Ferdinand only is attacked with venomous hate. He is denounced as a monarch devoid of conscience, who has led the Bulgarian people out of the right path into a road that is leading them to their ruin. The English journals let it be understood, nevertheless, that it is not too late yet perhaps for Bulgaria to return to the true and better way."

Count Reventlow concludes his article by advising the allies to stand firm to the end. As "for the four allied States together, and for each in particular, to-day, as in the future, there is only one way to conquer: in common. Isolated, each of them would be condemned to perish."

apparent to-day in the subjugated Serbian provinces, where they bear witness to the difference in culture and race, between the oppressed and the oppressors.

* * *

So long as the illusions of a German victory intoxicated them the Bulgarians did not think there was much to say on the conditions of a Bulgarian peace. The promise of the Kaiser to leave to Bulgaria all she had received from the hands of Mackensen, constituted the whole programme. Arguments were dispensed with—political, ethnographic, economic. They resort to them now at Sofia. The Sofia press said nothing about the conditions of peace until after the discussion on the restoration of Serbia which arose out of Mr. Asquith's speech in November, 1916.

A few journals, and especially *Vorwärts* of November 11th, 1916, and the *Berliner Tageblatt* of the same date, commenting on the speeches of Asquith and the German Chancellor, spoke of the reconstitution of Serbia as of a matter of course, seeing that Austria at the beginning of the war had declared that she did not desire territorial conquests. These assertions were refuted by the Conservative press. The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* invited the two journals to consider what the restoration of Serbia would mean. They appeared to ignore the fact that the participation of Bulgaria in the war had for its main object the liberation of the Bulgars under Serbian domination. This alone made the restoration of Serbia impossible, and it seemed strange that German journals did not understand it. Mr. Asquith knew very well what he was saying when he raised the question of Serbia, and the *Vorwärts*, which was anti-Russian, ought to have perceived that a restoration of Serbia was incompatible with the needs of the alliance of the Central Empires with Bulgaria and Turkey, and the necessity of safeguarding communications between Berlin, Sofia, and Constantinople. The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* advised the writers on the *Vorwärts* to consult the map in order to be convinced that the interests of Germany and Austria demand that Bulgaria should be the predominant power in the Balkans. Moreover, Austria would have to provide for measures of security against attacks by Serbia."

The *Berliner Tageblatt* and the *Vorwärts* replied. The latter, of November 14th, under the title "The Restoration of Serbia," said:

"We are accused of having brought about a misunder-

standing among our allies, above all between Germany and Bulgaria. The restoration of Serbia, it seems, would be tantamount to the abandonment of communications with Constantinople. We are astonished to learn that the Berlin-Bagdad plans, which were conceived before the war, *imply the abolition of Serbia as an independent State and its absorption by Bulgaria. It is with no less amazement that we learn that we ought to continue the war so long as the whole of Serbia is not annexed to Bulgaria.* It is natural that they do not think of these ineptitudes at Sofia; they are thought of only at Berlin."

On the contrary, they were less thought of at Berlin than at Sofia, but at Berlin they were compelled to stage the comedy in order to stimulate the persistence and fidelity of Bulgaria. Perhaps the *Vorwärts* wished to provoke declarations from Sofia.

* * *

It turned out, however, that Sofia did not want to explain itself directly. For want of a better, it was the declaration of Radoslavoff to the correspondent of the *New York World*, Charles Wiegand, that may be regarded as the exact expression of Bulgarian policy on the subject. The opposition organ *Mir* (November 15th, 1916) reproduces it, accompanied by a significant comment:

"With respect to Balkan affairs, the German Chancellor now, as formerly, maintains silence. The Reichstag also has not bestowed attention on the Balkans, except that at the opening of the session the Socialist Haase said that 'Serbia ought not to be destroyed.' It seems that Balkan questions are left to Austrian and Bulgarian politicians. . . . This time Asquith mentions the German declaration on the subject of the restoration of Belgium, and remarks, in passing, that Germany has made no declaration concerning Serbia. Asquith and Bethmann-Hollweg spoke on the same day, so that it was impossible for them to reply to questions put on either side. But what Bethmann-Hollweg has not done has been done by the President of Council, Radoslavoff, with the necessary competence. The latter stated to the correspondent of the *New York World*, textually, the following: '*The Balkan question is already settled. What will be the ultimate fate of Serbia? What will her new frontiers be? I do not want to expatiate on this subject, but one thing is certain: Serbia will never possess Macedonia; that province now forms an integral part of Bulgaria, and it will remain Bulgarian.*' Thus Radoslavoff laid down the minimum of the Bulgarian demands. 'A war so terrible as this naturally cannot terminate without territorial changes. Those nations which occupy foreign territory and

which have gained advantage on the field of battle, have a right to secure better frontiers. Such territorial changes are absolutely legitimate, and nobody would continue the war on their account.' ”

Nevertheless, in lieu of a direct reply, the Bulgarian journals published other opinions concerning the Balkan question quite as interesting.

The *Echo de Bulgarie* of November 13th :

“ Austria-Hungary, a great power, bore with Serbian follies with untiring patience, but she could not regard the attack on her dynasty as an incident without a morrow. She was bound to defend her dignity and her existence. . . . If, at present, security is needed against the perturbers of harmony among the nations, *we must begin by extinguishing the fire whence came the spark which set Europe alight.* ”

Here is a declaration which already looks upon Bulgaria as the arbiter of the affairs of Europe :

Kambana, November 15th :

“ If Poland rises as a barrier in place of traitorous Roumania, a far more important rôle is incumbent on Bulgaria. Bulgaria is and will be one of the principal links in the chain of Central Europe. *Germany requires that the place of Italy in international politics should be occupied by Bulgaria. Her interests demand that Bulgaria should be very strong*, in order to be able to control and regulate in a distant future the political relations attaching to the object of the alliance of such and such an ally ; in other words, Bulgaria will become *the sentinel of the alliance itself*, and the confidence of our allies is so great, that when it becomes a question of a sentinel, it is the name of Bulgaria which will be pronounced. That is why *there will be no need to create around us small principalities or diminutive States* to control us ourselves. The duties of Bulgaria above mentioned constitute the corner-stone of our policy, and no question can be raised touching this order of things.”

It is also of great interest to mention the interview of the German Socialist Südekum, published on the same date in the Bulgarian Socialist organ *Narod* :

“ To the question of the Bulgarian, Socialist, Südekum replied without hesitation, ‘ *I think that Bulgaria ought to become the greatest and the central State in the Balkans.* The Balkan Peninsula is a single mass, geographically ; so, politically, it should be, as far as possible, a single country. *Tranquility will only be established in the peninsula when there is only one powerful State*, which, supported by its neighbours, will guard its destinies.”

The same tone and the same ideas prevail in the Austrian press. Thus the Vienna *Reichspost* published, - from an official source, a very interesting article from which we extract the following passages.

Reichspost, December 10th :

"Scheidemann has said : 'Not a man in Germany has entertained the opinion that German soldiers should shed their blood on the Somme, the Stochod, in the Dobrudja, or in the Carpathians in order to conquer Serbia for Austria, who declared on her first invasion of Serbia that she did not want any Serbian territory.' Try to imagine the effect of the words of the Imperial Chancellor if he said to-day, 'Yes, we want peace, but a peace that will give Serbia to Austria.' Millions of lips would have answered, 'What is Serbia to us ?' Nobody in Germany would have wished to prolong the war, even by a day, to enrich the mixture of peoples of Austria with a few million Yugo-slavs."

The *Münchener Post* wrote also :

"If the restoration of Serbia constitutes a question of honour for England, it is not at all a question of honour for Germany that Austria should obtain Serbia.

"When, in autumn 1915, under the command of Mackensen, the Austro-Hungarian and German troops penetrated Serbia on the north and north-east, whilst Bulgarian troops invaded it on the east, and the Serbian army was routed and destroyed, and its débris forced to flee into the Albanian forests, *this absolute conquest of Serbia had strategic and politico-economic consequences far more important than is generally believed.* For this victorious march removed the barrier which obstructed the joining of Central Europe with Bulgaria and Turkey ; it opened the Danube route as well as the Oriental railway through Belgrade, Nish, and Pirot, and brought into touch with each other Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, thus forming them into a single organism. The result was shown immediately in the military sense, for the Anglo-French expedition and the attack on Constantinople were condemned to a complete check. The creation of a single block of States from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf was immediately esteemed in Germany to be *the greatest military and political acquisition of the world war ;* at the same time it was invested with the greatest economic importance. Personages who rule, economists and politicians of the most competent type, as well as undivided public opinion, are agreed that the creation of the enormous economic domain, symbolised by the Hamburg-Bagdad railway, serves not only to ensure the military and economic maintenance of the European war, but that the economic war which will follow peace will

also be aided by it. All this will be as favourable to Germany as to Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

"*The essential importance of the Serbian region, through its position, to the durable realisation of the alliance of the great block of States from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf cannot be contested.* It is one of the reasons why the English consider the restoration of Serbia a question of honour. England is as much interested, and for the same reasons, in the fate of Serbia as in that of Belgium. As Belgium is necessary for her to close the British Channel to Germany and to serve England as a bridge-head on the Continent, so Serbia, in like manner, should serve to cut off the relations of Germany and Austria with the Orient, and form an Anglo-Russian advanced post guarding the great Danube way.

"By this fact, England herself gives a clear answer to the question, 'What is Serbia to us?' The destiny of Serbia will be decided in the course of the peace negotiations. The Central Powers and their allies will know then what they can and what they ought to demand; they will know then if, with the object of securing peace and economic life, they can permit the existence of an independent Serbia or not. Nevertheless, the attempt of Scheidemann and consorts to refer the Serbian question to the well-known words of Bismarck concerning 'the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier' as well as the attempt to excite opinion in Germany against Austria-Hungary, by a travesty of the true situation, ought to be frustrated from to-day. If the Central Powers decide that the State of the Karageorgevitches ought to disappear, their decision will not be inspired by the intention of conquering Serbia for Austria, neither by the desire to present Austria with several millions of Yugo-slavs, but *it will be dictated by German interests as well as by Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish interests.*"

As we see, Austrian opinion is in perfect agreement with that of Bulgarians and Germans. As for the Hungarians, they have been, at all times, partisans of any and every measure, however drastic, directed against the existence of Serbia, which they look upon as the patrimony, by some imaginary right, of their sacred crown of St. Stephen.

The *Magyar Hirnap* of November 21st says of the taking of Monastir:

"There are no longer any armies which, after twenty-eight months of war, could shake the situation established in the Balkans by the Bulgarian and German armies, which alone responds to international law and justice."

The *Budapesti Hirnap* of November 10th attacks the

Hungarian Feminine Association which sent to the leaders of political parties lithographed appeals asking them to declare by the mouths of their orators in Parliament that the monarchy would not annex Serbia. The question of peace, said the appeal, depends on such declarations. It is naïve, says the *Budapesti Hirlap*, to suppose that in order to conclude peace it only needs to reinstate that good and amiable little Serbia, who has always been a cunning enemy at our back. *Really*, that would be a master-stroke—restore Serbia, indeed!

These quotations show plainly that the question of the restoration of Serbia—the gordian knot of the Central Powers—includes both the “vital” interests of the Germans in the possession of the main artery to the East, and the basis of pretensions to Balkan imperialism of the Bulgars. The Serbian question in particular, as well as the Balkan question in general, is ear-marked as the fundamental question of the Germano-Bulgarian peace.

* *

The discussion apropos of the German offer of peace in December, 1916, brought a little distinction into the Serbo-Bulgarian question. At least the Bulgars found a formula which, whilst appearing quite admissible, cost them hardly anything. They began by saying that the fate of Serbia was indifferent to them, and that they only demanded the annexation to Bulgaria of the Serbian provinces they had snatched, or, as they called it, “national reunion.”

A fortnight after the peace offer the *Kambana* of Sofia (November 24th) published—a little belated—some extracts from the *Tageszeitung-Vorwärts* discussion, arranged and commented on in Bulgarian fashion.

“The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* has said that the Serbian question is solved in advance by the intervention of Bulgaria in the war: all the Bulgars who were under Serbian domination must return to Bulgaria, and in that case of what Serbia can one speak? The *Berliner Tageblatt* takes part in the discussion, saying that absolutely nobody in Germany denies the right of Bulgaria to complete national unification; however, if we look at the map, we can see that *something still remains for Serbia*. By that is meant that the question is reduced to the establishment of the ethnographic and historical frontiers of the nation. Our historians and ethnographers must speak plainly to the world on that.”

Impossible to realise, and unpopular at that pacifist

epoch, the annexationist policy of Bulgaria turns into one of liberation. The care of the third of Serbia is left to Austria ; at Sofia nationalist science is enlisted to prove that the *enslavement of the Serbs* in two-thirds of Serbia is in reality the *liberation and reunion of the Bulgars*.

This equivocal formula of capricious and arbitrary Bulgarian ethnography is repeated in the declaration of Radoslavoff to the Sobranié. The *Echo de Bulgarie* of December 30th, 1916, publishes the pungent approbation of the leader of the opposition, Malinoff :

" M. A. Malinoff, leader of the democratic party, remarked that the policy followed by the Government was a necessity of state, and added that it would be an act of folly to seek to mine its foundations. The question of victory, said M. Malinoff, had been solved in a brilliant fashion. The declaration of December 12th (of Radoslavoff) had been everywhere received with deep satisfaction. The conqueror will consent to concessions in favour of the vanquished. The President of the Council had declared that he desires a peace in conformity with the interests of our allies, adding that *the fate of Serbia did not interest him, that he had in view only the national unity of Bulgaria*."

This unanimity of the Bulgarian parties on the question of a Bulgarian peace was fully recognised by the President of the Council. According to the *Echo de Bulgarie* (January 3rd, 1917) Radoslavoff said in his speech in the debate on the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (December 30th, 1916) :

" I ought here to express my satisfaction with everything of import that has been said during the two days of debate on the Budget. *On December 12th I was happy to have proof that the National Representation both of the Right and Left approved of the Government policy—for no protest came from either side.*"

The President of the Sobranié, Vatcheff, confirmed the Bulgarian claims to the Morava and Macedonia—which means the whole of eastern Serbia, from the Danube to Lake Ochrida—to an editor of the *Neue Freie Presse* (January 17th, 1917).

This was a cheap way of replacing the policy of the annihilation of Serbia by the formula of "indifference" to her fate.

* * *

What they really thought at Sofia of the fate of Serbia at this period hardly differed at all from former pretensions.

The journal of the governmental Socialists, which finished with blind chauvinism, usually avoids mentioning Serbia in the list of countries having a right to live.*

And this is all the Socialist organ has to say when it speaks of Serbia :

"The rescue of the little Slav sister, Serbia, was only a pretext of Russia to take part in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Behind this, Russia dissimulated her desire to cut off the Austro-Germans from the route to the East, because their advance menaced her aspiration to seize the Bosphorus and Dardanelles." (Narod, December 25th, 1916.)

It is rather an odd way of showing indifference to Serbia, by thinking only of devising means to cripple her, and by regarding the hearth-stone of a nation only as a road along which to pass. In reality the governmental Socialists of Sofia merely paraphrase the imperialist notions of Berlin. The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* was exceedingly pleased to find at Sofia zealous propagators of its ideas. It published a letter from that capital in which it is said :

"To the declaration of certain German Socialists and Liberals, 'What is Serbia to us?' they reply: Without permanent communications through Serbia, the Quadruple Alliance would not have existed; on the contrary, it would have been led assuredly to the return of the old envelopment. Central Europe would be cut off from the south-east and the Central Powers would be strangled. That is why Serbia matters to us."

In pursuance of the same theory, Count Reventlow and the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* began at length to define more exactly how much could be left of Serbia, at need, "if anything remains of it."

In the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* Reventlow observed that the word "restoration" signified the putting of everything into the *status quo ante*. Thus the enemy understood it, as well for Serbia as for Belgium, with the intention of bringing back the anti-German situation before the war. "If

* For instance, the *Narod* (November 13th, 1916) says: "*After the restoration of Poland and the declaration concerning Belgium, the war loses all moral significance.*" The same hypocrisy comes out in the speech of Count Batthyany (of the Karolyi party) in the Hungarian Parliament—a speech intended to convince the Entente of the anti-annexation attitude of the Magyar opposition. Batthyany said: "We must protest in the most resolute way against the tendencies which would sacrifice our children and our brothers with the aim of conquest for the allies. We cannot sacrifice our children for the sake of conquests in Belgium, Russia, and France." We may believe the Hungarians when they claim that they ask for nothing in Belgium, Russia, and France . . . but what of Serbia, which they do not mention?

we and our allies wished to set up something of what had been; the edifice must be suited to our convenience."

And the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* goes on to develop more openly the arguments against the restoration to the *status quo ante* :

"Serbia must be diminished and remodelled inside and out, in a manner which, on the one hand, secures communications between Central Europe and Constantinople, and on the other, is in conformity with the interests of our Bulgarian and Austrian allies. It is precisely in what concerns Serbia that it is important to have the strongest and most durable guarantees possible. When Mr. Asquith remarked that the Imperial Chancellor had not yet spoken of the restoration of Serbia, he meant the restoration of the conditions existing before the war. The reply which Germany and her allies ought to make is simply that *there is absolutely no question of restoring Serbia.*" (*Journal de Genève*, December 5th, 1916.)

The *Narodni Prava* said on December 30th, 1916 :

"Dr. Radoslavoff has announced in his two telegrams that the whole of the Dobrudja will be annexed to Bulgaria. The year 1917 brings us the Morava, Macedonia, and the Dobrudja. Could anything be more pleasing and more grandiose than these results, and can we desire more? *From now we enter on possession of what is our own property.*"

The President of the Sobranié, Vatcheff, spoke to the *Lokal Anzeiger* as follows :

"Bulgaria is firmly decided to keep all the Dobrudja as far as the Danube, as well as the purely Bulgarian provinces of Macedonia and the Morava region. . . . The mouth of the Danube will therefore be in the hands of a nation faithful to *Mittel-Europa.*" (Reproduced by the *Münchener Nueste Nachrichten*, January 23rd, 1917.)

Mittel-Europa and Bulgarian chauvinism naturally aided each other in the campaign against the restoration of Serbia. But the Bulgars, feeling little confidence in their ethnographic argument, were fain to end by placing politics above ethnography. The *Kambana* (October 27th, 1916) said, for instance :

"We have taken half of ancient Serbia (Northern Serbia), not because we dreamed of it as our national ideal, but because, after the annihilation of Serbia, the role of its inheritors devolved upon us."

As for the national principle in these rapacious combinations, it is avowed openly in the press of Bulgaria's allies.

The Hungarian deputy Okolicsany writes on January 14th, 1917, in the *Pester Lloyd* :

"The Balkan States which have tended to expand at our expense have been beaten, and we hold with a firm hand that which will permit us to change the order of things in the Balkans. To-day the economic, political, and cultural life of these regions finds itself under the authority of the allies. We must build the future on the experience of the past, and we must not let ourselves be carried away by unjustified optimism, nor inspired by any sanctioned principle. *We have to think that the development of national culture in the Balkan countries would have corresponded with their desire for our property.* We must guard against a repetition of the past."

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Bulgarian ideas on peace only trace the limits of Great Bulgaria and *Mittel-Europa* : the proportions of that "something which remains of Serbia" are never defined. As we have seen already, it was not through indifference to the lot of Serbia that Sofia, Vienna, and Budapest were silent on the subject, but in consequence of the difficulty of the problem. All the same, something was whispered of it. It is always the old Bulgaro-Hungarian combination of January, 1916, which emerges in December, 1916 : a caricature of a State composed of little shreds of miserable country, the mountainous portion of western Serbia, with the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, a corner of Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Bulgaria is to annex all the east of Serbia, Hungary is to retain the northern portion of western Serbia. This partition would be agreeable to the views of the Central Powers. It would satisfy the Germans for the creation of *Mittel-Europa* ; the Hungarians, who would have a frontier contiguous to Bulgaria ; and Bulgaria herself, who would be mistress of two-thirds of occupied Serbia, and would establish her hegemony over the Balkan peninsula.

This formless agglomeration of crippled provinces, unfitted for a free and prosperous existence, would have as leader—as of a group of blind men—the poorest of them all, Montenegro. Behold the Austro-Bulgarian Yugoslavia !

From the first days of December we remark a change in the tone of the Austrian and Bulgarian press towards Montenegro. The *Pester Lloyd* of December 1st, 1916, published an article of Dr. Franz Ritter Ziska praising the extraordinary solicitude displayed by the military

and civil authorities with regard to Montenegro. A few days later a Slovene journal of Laibach (*Slovenitz*, December 6th) published the sensational news of a visit paid by Prince Mirko of Montenegro to the vault of the Capuchin monastery at Vienna, where he prayed before the tomb of the Emperor Francis-Joseph. This was on December 5th. Five days after, the 10th, the *Tzvetignske Novine*, the organ of the Austrian military governor of Montenegro, published a very characteristic article :

"Every Montenegrin ought to be informed on the manner in which the Entente pays its debt to him and to his sovereign. . . . At present, the Ministers of the Entente have forgotten little Montenegro. . . ."

The *Tzvetignske Novine* then attacks England, who, it seems, would not allow America to send foodstuffs to the Montenegrins.

"Even that has not sufficed. The Entente is now trying to deprive this people of its king, its existence, and its liberty. The Entente Powers wish to force King Nikola to renounce the crown of his ancestors."

On its side, the Bulgarian press, which since the beginning of the war never let escape an opportunity of making coarse jests about King Nikola, echoes the change which has come about in the plans of the Bulgarian leaders. Thus it begins to speak of Montenegro in a very special manner.

Developing the Bulgarian schemes, the *Kambana* (December 6th, 1916) says :

"We and our allies ought to remain in positions in the Russian direction, which will guarantee quiet to our countries. *The frontier should pass by the Pruth or by Focani-GalatZ-Braïla-Matchen.* This line will guarantee Bulgaria, as well as Turkey and Constantinople, and at the same time secure the freedom of the Hamburg-Bagdad route. *And if something were to be done for the Serbs, their ancient government of upper and lower Zeta, that is to say of the rocks of the Black Mountain, might be restored.* It is within the right of Austria-Hungary to do this, and she alone can pronounce on the question."

And some days later, in its issue of December 12th, the *Kambana* says :

"The little State of Montenegro breathes in the shadow of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, our ally. *We can no longer speak of Montenegro as an enemy country.*"

It is the unanimous opinion of the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian press that Serbia ought to disappear. The

Echo de Bulgarie, the Government organ *par excellence*, among other appreciations of the reply of the Entente, has the following in its leader of January 4th :

"If there is a country against which, after Roumania, we ought to be on our guard, it is Serbia, with its inordinate ambitions and its pathological psychology. For unless we wish to close our eyes deliberately to the truth, it is impossible not to perceive the evil role played by this nest of conspirators in the fomentation of the war of nations, and no expiation would be sufficient to purge its crime. . . .

"As for Montenegro, nobody envies her her mountains, nor the universal glory of her illustrious sovereign."

* *

Even in discussing the eventuality of a union of Serbia and Montenegro on another basis than that projected at Vienna and Sofia, the Bulgars do not admit of a Serbia other than the wretched country around the steepes of the Black Mountain.

The *Zarja* (March 15th, 1917) writes :

"The ancient Serbian kingdom is itself very uncertain. The Entente well knows this : whatever efforts it puts forth in the future peace negotiations, it cannot revive a State which for ten years has not ceased to provoke trouble in the Balkans. At the best, it will succeed, perhaps, IN TACKING TOGETHER A MINIATURE SERBIA WHICH, AFTER ALL THIS DEVASTATION, WOULD BE ONLY A LAY FIGURE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE BALKANS OF TO-MORROW. That is why the Entente is doing all it can to convince the inimical brothers (the Serbs of Serbia and Montenegro) that it is indispensable for them to resign themselves to a country in common."

Bulgaria playing *grand premier*, Great Bulgaria omnipotent and alone in the Balkans, or at most surrounded by diminutive States with the role of puppets : those are the lines of a *Bulgarian peace*.

This pretentious tone appears even in the most recent declarations of the head of the Bulgarian Government. In Parliament, replying to the criticism of the Opposition, Radoslavoff said : "*Bulgaria has attained her ideal. She will not abandon her present frontiers, whatever happens, and her position is secure*" (*Narodni Prava*, April 2nd, 1917).

To the editor of the *Neues Wiener Tageblatt*, Radoslavoff asserted as positive that "peace will bring with it, in any

case, a common frontier between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary." (*Neues Wiener Tageblatt*, April 22nd, 1917.)

The general situation of the Central Empires in the month of April, 1917, and the rather troubled atmosphere of the Sobranié when this declaration was made, detract from its sincerity and earnestness. But the tone shows the audacity of the adventurers of Sofia in playing high, up to the last chance.

Bulgarian longings remain ever the same—those which decided Bulgarian intervention; they are the putting of Serbia out of court, and the securing of the hegemony of Great Bulgaria in the Balkans. If these ambitious pretensions surpass even those of the famous "German peace," it is because the Bulgars believe that they alone are insured against any eventuality in the great European conflict. They are putting their stakes on a double hazard, a German victory and an indulgent Entente. That is the notion expressed by Radoslavoff in Parliament on December 30th, 1916, when, alluding to the offer of compensations in 1915, he declared *he had received also from the Entente offers guaranteeing Bulgarian interests.*

That is the idea, too, expressed by Gueshoff in an article closely following on the declaration of Radoslavoff (*Mir*, January 2nd, 1917). Counting, in case of need, on the former adhesion of the Entente Powers to the San Stefano combination, Gueshoff, with the same confidence as Radoslavoff, asks: "*Can there be any longer a question as to the frontiers of the Bulgarian people?*"

Great Bulgaria "Mittel-European," against the Entente vanquished, or the Great Bulgaria of San Stefano with the Entente cajoled: the adventurers of Sofia will play this double game, without risk or peril, to the last hour.

CHAPTER VI

ALWAYS WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

THE aims of Bulgarian policy in themselves, formulated as we have seen, have always inclined Bulgaria to an understanding with Austria-Hungary. This has been favoured, doubtless, by the German princes who have reigned over Bulgaria, but the influence of those princes could only be efficacious thanks to the agreement of the aims the two States assigned to themselves.

The reasons for the Bulgarian leaning towards Austria must be sought, chiefly, in Bulgarian distrust of Russia, and in Bulgarian designs against Serbia.

Russophobia was born in Bulgaria on the very day when the Russians were spending their blood and treasure in the Balkans to deliver a Christian and Slav people. This Russophobia was, at the outset, only a partial and temporary discontent provoked by the innumerable and inevitable discomforts inseparable from war, discomforts accentuated and extended by the abuses of functionaries and mistakes made by a new administration in a new country. The incompatibility of temper and character between liberators and liberated, and the instinctive distrust of the Bulgar for all that is foreign and more powerful than himself, also counted for much. But real Russophobia was only created when these troubles of the early days of freed Bulgaria began to be exploited by Bulgarian politicians, ambitious, greedy, and impatient to wield power, and to profit by all the honour they feared to see remaining in the hands of the Russians. The political sharpers in Bulgaria grafted on these discontents the myth of the *Russian peril*, the necessity of keeping Russia away from the Balkans, and preventing her from taking the Straits. A Bulgaria contented with its natural boundaries, friendly and united with its neighbours, had no need to distrust Russia. But for a Bulgaria ambitious and

imperialistic, seeking to become the mistress and great power of the Balkans, distrust of Russia was not a mere whim, it became a political principle.

To combat Russian influence on one hand and to create a great Bulgaria at the expense of Serbia on the other, it was necessary to side with Austria-Hungary. These two motives explain the unanimity of Bulgarian political parties as to an Austrophil policy. For if the Russophobia of some parties rendered them manifestly Austrophil, the Bulgarian tendency to encroach on Serbia forced the Russophil parties into constant collaboration with Austria-Hungary.

It was, above all, in the years immediately preceding the European war that Bulgaria drew more closely to Austria-Hungary. The *simultaneous* violations of the treaty of Berlin—the *proclamation of Bulgarian independence and the annexation of Bosnia in 1908, by an accord, avowed and demonstrative*—manifested Bulgaro-Austrian complicity in an anti-Serb and anti-Slav policy. It was the present leader of the opposition, Malinoff, who chose the moment most grievous for Serbia and most humiliating for Russia to make a Bulgarian parade with German assistance. The eighth anniversary of that Germano-Bulgarian and dynastic date is celebrated in the organ of the Bulgarian democrats and of Malinoff, who was President of the Council in 1908. The *Preporetz* profits by the opportunity to expatiate on the services rendered by its party to country, king, and the policy of *sacred egoism* void of scruples. The lines devoted to the elevation of Ferdinand of Coburg to royal dignity are very emphatic, although the *Preporetz* represents the *democrats*. Here is a passage from the article, entitled "September 22nd and October 5th, 1908," which appeared in the *Preporetz* of October 4th, 1916 :

"Eight years have passed away since in the old church of the Forty Martyrs of Tirnova the act was read by which Bulgaria was proclaimed an independent Empire. Thousands of people saluted the new Tsar with deference. And he mounted a daïs and addressed a few fitting words charged with emotion to the people. . . . Sofia was *en fête* as never before. Twenty thousand people were massed before the palace to greet the new Tsar, and the new title of the Bulgarian State.

"Eight years have elapsed since that historic date. Important events have taken place in that period, a short space in the life of a nation. Treacherous Serbia has felt our vengeance ; to the armies which have come from all the corners of the earth to aid our enemies we have shown how one defends one's country

and freedom. September 22nd was celebrated by the founders of Independence as a national effort, a result of *purely Bulgarian policy*. And the moral to be drawn from the festival of to-morrow is of the greatest value. It teaches us that every national effort, undertaken solely in view of national interests, must be always crowned with success."

The leaders of the two Russophil parties, Daneff and Gueshoff, abandoned Serbia, although she was allied with Bulgaria in the struggle with Austria on the vital question of a Serbian outlet to the sea. The political conversations of Daneff at Vienna in October, 1912, prove that even under the most Russophil régime Bulgaria never ceased to seek and to contrive that she was assured of Austrian goodwill.

The attitude of the Bulgarian press during the campaign of Austro-Hungarian newspapers against Serbia in the critical days of July, 1914, and during the first year of the Serbo-Austrian war of 1914-1915, speaks plainly enough of the latent and tacit understanding which became open and written in the treaty of 1915.

This was emphasised by the President of the Council in his declaration to the representatives of the Vienna press (*Pester Lloyd*, February 16th, 1916):

"We Bulgarians work with our allies for a common cause. We have no separate interests. . . . *Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary* are not only allies, but they *have been for long on terms of the most intimate friendship*."

Declarations in the same sense were made on both sides: the *Echo de Bulgarie* of February 8th and 9th, 1916 (article by the Vienna journalist, M. Sachs), says:

"Going back as far as the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, we find that the Austrian question was linked with the question of creating a new Bulgaria. Thirty years later the two questions came to the front again, and *the proclamations of the annexation of Bosnia and the independence of Bulgaria were launched from Vienna and Sofia almost at the same moment*, whilst the Eastern Question finished by becoming a question of Macedonia, pure and simple. Thus the force of circumstances gave birth to a pact uniting all the elements contributing to a perfect alliance, THE SAME FRIENDS, THE SAME ENEMIES, and, last of all, *the total absence of any antagonism susceptible of troubling the perfect harmony of their reciprocal interests*. What Austria-Hungary knows of the national aims of the Bulgars shows her fully that *the policy of this nation will never raise difficulties against the internal policy touching the nationalities of the monarchy*,

whilst the latter has no interest in *hindering the development* of the national programme of Bulgaria."

The visit of the King of Bulgaria to the Austrian headquarters at Vienna is commented on in the Bulgarian journals by vague generalities and remarks on the long-standing friendship which unites the dual monarchy and Bulgaria.

The *Echo de Bulgarie* (January 15th, 1916) says :

"Of all the Western Powers *Austria-Hungary has taken the liveliest and at the same time the most friendly interest in the young Balkan State since the day it was constituted.* . . . Baron Burian, who has charge of the foreign policy of the Dual Empire, in these glorious days, has been a witness to the stubborn fights the little principality has had to maintain from its beginnings to preserve its independence ; *he was also one of the sagest advisers of our politicians of that time.* His predecessors at the Ballplatz, Count Berchtold and Count Ærenthal, were also, in divers circumstances, confirmed partisans of a strong Bulgaria in the Balkans, and nowhere did our misfortunes in 1913 cause more sincere sorrow than in the dominions of the monarchy. *And nowhere more than in Bulgaria was there a firmer conviction of the necessity for the empire of the Habsburgs to defend its security and integrity against a turbulent and insatiable neighbour, who thought itself strong enough to brave the whole world.* It is in his quality as an allied sovereign, supreme chief of a victorious army, and field-marshal of the Austro-Hungarian army, who guards faithfully its traditional virtues, that the King of Bulgaria has been received at the headquarters of the Archduke Frederick. The bridge between East and West has been built upon indestructible foundations. . . ."

The *Narodni Prava* (February 18th, 1916) Government organ, enumerates the advantages Bulgaria has obtained from Austria :

"*She gave us—some thirty years ago—our beloved King, who enjoys the affection of the entire Bulgarian people. It was with the help of Austria-Hungary that, eight years ago, Bulgaria declared herself independent.* And it was Austria-Hungary who, in 1913, *first raised her voice to defend Bulgaria, humiliated and devastated.*

"When Bulgaria consented to break Turkey, in the specious hope of obtaining Macedonia, whilst really being used as an instrument for the profit of others, she did not suspect that she was digging her own grave, and that already she had one foot in it. It was then that the Austrian Minister at Sofia, Count Tarnowsky, called the attention of our statesmen to the dangers which caused him heart-pangs. In the establish-

ing of the policy of the Triple Entente in the Balkans he saw not only a menace to Bulgaria, but the ruin of Austria-Hungary. Count Tarnowsky discerned that *a great Serbia was rising in the Balkans with the definite object of undermining Bulgaria and serving as a rampart between Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side and Bulgaria on the other.* He devoted all his powers to change this situation. . . . Two years have sufficed to vanquish the policy of the Entente in the Balkans and to overthrow and destroy Serbia."

The *Mir* of Gueshoff published in its issue of March 6th, 1916, extracts from an article in the *Continental Times* of Berlin, which strove to demonstrate the necessity for Austria-Hungary to secure once for all its situation in the Adriatic and to muzzle Serbia and its Yugo-slav schemes. After extracting the pith of the article, the *Mir* concluded thus :

"The passages we have quoted define in clear and categorical fashion the interests of Austria-Hungary and the questions which our new neighbour desires to solve. *These Austro-Hungarian projects can be easily co-ordinated with ours.*"

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Anticipating the victory of the Central Empires, the National Party, of which Gueshoff is the leader, took several opportunities of calling attention to its own part in keeping up good relations between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary. Thus it turned to account the visit of the Bulgarian deputies to Vienna, which was made only by members of the Government majority. In its issue of May 4th, 1916, the organ of the National Party, the *Mir*, wrote that Austria-Hungary, through its geographical position, was "rather a Balkan State, though one having a vast world policy. For that reason its relations with the Balkans were closer than those of other States."

"When our party desired to make the first commercial treaties with the Great Powers, and thus put an end to the economic slavery that Bulgaria had to bear until then, as a vassal principality of Turkey, *it addressed itself first of all to Austria-Hungary, and concluded with her the first treaty.* . . . The national party has never ignored the importance of Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans. The favouring circumstance, *that we have nothing—as is the case with the Serbs, Roumanians, and Italians—to dispute with Austria-Hungary places us in a privileged situation with regard to the monarchy.*"

Gueshoff's journal regrets that its party, which can

invoke such Austrophil traditions, is not represented in the delegation to Vienna :

"In the relations between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary," writes the *Mir*, "we ought only to support and strengthen acts capable of drawing closer the bonds between the peoples and the States *without regard to persons and parties*. . . . If a rather marked reaction against Austria-Hungary was manifested in 1894, when Stambouloff quitted office, it was because a special character was attributed to the relations with Austria-Hungary on account of the events of 1886-1894. . . . But we make a mistake when, without necessity, we only send delegates of one party where all the nation ought to be represented."

The *Dnevnik* of May 5th, 1916, wrote on the same subject :

"In speaking of the necessity of an alliance between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary we emphasised the impossibility, apart from that alliance, of securing the principal ways of communication between Europe and Asia, the focus of those ways being at Vienna and their rays in Bulgaria. Insisting again on this circumstance, we would remark that *in Austro-Hungary as well as here people continue to be fully conscious of the necessity of a reciprocal understanding*, and everything possible is being done to come to a permanent friendship. *The great Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which has always taken into consideration our needs and interests, has every facility to prove that we also take her interests into account*. There is not, nor can there be, any room for misunderstandings, since we have succeeded, by a common effort, in suppressing the cause of Balkan disorders."

The *Neue Freie Presse* wrote on May 3rd, 1916, when the Bulgarian deputies arrived at Vienna :

"The alliance of Bulgaria with the Central Empires *has been imposed by the force of things as a natural consequence of historical evolution*. Neither Bulgaria nor Austria can frame a policy without this alliance. Bulgaria could not live by the side of perfidious Serbia, ready for any treachery ; we, too, could no longer support the sly malice, the subversive acts of treason and hatred. Bulgaria knew she could not prosper with Serbia alongside, that she could not remain free, nor breathe freely. . . . Russia also is a mortal enemy of Austria, and in the common peril is to be found the natural basis of the Austrian alliance with Bulgaria."

The *Neue Freie Presse* (June 7th, 1916) is informed that the Consul-General of Bulgaria at Vienna, Rudolf Stiasni, having spent four weeks in Bulgaria, has communicated his observations to the Vienna press. *He has stated that*

the Bulgarian feelings towards Austria-Hungary are most favourable. Owing to the concordance of interests, the old Bulgarian sympathy with the monarchy has not only been maintained but is still deeper. The alliance with Austria is dictated to the Bulgars not only by their interests but also by their sentiments. When the German deputies arrived at Sofia in June, 1916, the same manifestations of traditional friendship with the Central Empires, with Austria especially, were repeated. The former Russophiles, in opposition rather to the party which succeeded to the power they had held, than to the Government policy, could not allow to the Liberal Party the exclusive merit of friendship with Austria-Hungary. The Nationalists do not wish it to be forgotten—we have already seen that in the articles of the *Mir*—that they also, in their time, cherished friendly relations with Austria-Hungary.

Gueshoff's *Mir* wrote on June 25th, 1916 :

“ Bulgaria in this war has cast in her lot with that of the Central Empires ; it is for this that sympathy for her is great in Germany. *In the welcome given to our deputies, this sympathy was manifested with the force of the elements let loose.* Although the government majority was alone represented there, Germany's expression of feeling was addressed to the entire Bulgarian nation. Four years ago to the day we wrote in the *Mir*, when our Tsar, accompanied by the then Bulgarian Prime Minister, Ivan Gueshoff, visited the Emperor-King of Austria-Hungary at Vienna and the German Emperor at Berlin : ‘ This meeting will strengthen in us the political idea which had guided us up to the present in this short period of our freedom. We have not ceased to examine *the importance of the interests of the two empires in the Orient, and have considered that the accord of those interests with those of the small Balkan States was one of the surest guarantees of peace* and the orderly development of the nations, great and small, of the European East. *We are of opinion that the visit of our Tsar will confirm this view. . . .*’ We have proved by our past that we are in no wise a people of prejudices, a capricious people, but that we know how to calculate, persuaded that alone ‘ good reckonings make good friends.’ If the Bulgarian people had not possessed these qualities, it would not have attained, long before this war and even before the Balkan war, the enviable position which made it honoured and esteemed in London as in Berlin, in Petrograd as well as Vienna. Recalling the not distant past, when the Great Powers treated us and the other Balkan nations as minor peoples ; a witness so long to the rivalry of the Great States at the expense of the small ones—whose interests served merely as small change, and were sacrificed more than once—

the Bulgarian people has been always very distrustful in its international relations. That distrust must disappear completely."*

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The greater number of the articles treating of the natural character of Austro-Bulgar friendship explain at length in what consists the Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans.

The *Narodni Prava* of June 25th, 1916, published an article on the strength of the alliance with the Central Empires, proving the identity of Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian interests :

"The instinct of self-preservation has determined Austria-Hungary to join her interests with those of Germany on one hand, and those of Turkey and Bulgaria on the other. . . . Russia needs in the Balkans a strong and energetic advance-guard against Austria-Hungary, an advance guard which, at the decisive moment, would help her to destroy Austria-Hungary and to conquer Constantinople. To ward off Russian projects in the Balkans Austria-Hungary has striven to create as strong a counter-guard. . . . So long as it was believed that Russia wished to confide to Bulgaria the task of Russian sentinel, Austro-Hungarian sympathies inclined to Serbia. But when it became clear that Bulgaria valued her independence above everything, and considered the installation of Russia at Constantinople as dangerous, the roles were inverted. . . . Russia turned towards Serbia, whilst Austria-Hungary succeeded in gaining sympathy in Europe, so that our independence was

* The titles of Austria-Hungary to Bulgarian gratitude are enumerated at length in a political inventory drawn up by the former Bulgarian Minister in Serbia, Tchaprachikoff, which appeared in the *Neue Freie Presse* of October 15th, 1916 :

"I must acknowledge here all our gratitude to Austria-Hungary who has supported the realisation of our national ideal, and in aiding us has taken into account our feelings of independence. Understanding our tendency towards independence, she was the first of the powers to abolish her post and telegraph offices in Bulgaria. Again, she took the lead in facilitating the settlement of Bulgarian foreign questions. Austria-Hungary was the first of the great Powers to conclude a treaty of commerce with us, and to consent to a loan in 1888. Later, she granted us a loan without real security. It was Austria-Hungary who first renounced her capitulation rights in Bulgaria, without asking for compensation, notwithstanding that she had greater interests and a larger number of subjects in our country than any other foreign State. All this shows that Austria-Hungary has really superior common interests with Bulgaria. It was in 1913 that the Danubian monarchy demonstrated that she nourished a sincere friendship for Bulgaria. The Bulgars also hold in remembrance the activity of *Burian* who inaugurated the policy of agreement with Bulgaria, when the latter was—forgive the expression—still in swaddling clothes ; then already he facilitated the development of her independence."

protected from Russian anger. . . . Since that moment until now, the opposition of Bulgarian to Russian interests on the question of Constantinople and its hinterland has become more and more accentuated ; in the same way the opposition of Bulgarian interests to those of the Serbs—those spoiled children of Russia—have become more and more evident in Macedonia and on the littoral.”

On the occasion of Sazonov's resignation, and inspired by the same ideas, the *Pester Lloyd* of August 27th, 1916, interpreted the accord of the Balkan nations—the Balkan Alliance—as the work of Russia directed against Austria-Hungary and Germany :

“ In a series of articles which began to appear at the end of July, the *Novoié Vremia* deals with the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov. . . . The plan of Izvolsky and Sazonov had one aim : to direct the Balkan Alliance against Austria-Hungary. Sazonov did not think, certainly, that the Balkan Alliance would be strong enough, in itself, to attack our monarchy. When the Balkan Alliance upset Russian plans, and attacked Turkey, Sazonov hastened, through his friend Poincaré, to launch the famous formula of *statu quo*, intended to protect the Balkan peoples from the vengeance of the Turks. He believed that the former would be certainly vanquished. . . . The million Balkan bayonets, in which the Paris press saw with premature joy one of the principal factors in its plan of *revanche*, could not be irrevocably lost. But this same plan, cleverly modified, fell to pieces in 1913. Russian anger was let loose terribly against Bulgaria, who refused to discern her interests in a conflict with Austria-Hungary and in the future Russian plans. Russian fury may be justified. The world war would have turned out otherwise if the Russian scheme had succeeded. Russia is now obliged to struggle simultaneously against the Central Empires and Turkey, and the *Novoié Vremia* does not cease to display its anger, and to lament that the opportunity was let slip to conquer first the Central Empires and afterwards Turkey. . . . ”

The *Pester Lloyd* attributes an important role to the Austrian Minister at Sofia, Tarnowsky, in the work of breaking up the Balkan Alliance. It was the evil influence of Austria-Hungary in 1913—to which, according to the information in the *Pester Lloyd*, Gueshoff and Daneff themselves no longer attempted resistance—that prompted implacability towards the Serbs and brought on the war. The peace of Bucharest was the result of Bulgarian impotence and Austrian intrigue, facts which do not hinder the Bulgars from putting the blame on the shoulders of Russia.

On the occasion of Count Tarnowsky's departure from

Sofia, the *Pester Lloyd* of November 25th published the following letter from that capital :

"Five years ago Count Tarnowsky was charged with a delicate mission at Sofia. When, on February 25th, 1912, the Balkan Alliance was concluded, it was not long a secret for Tarnowsky. When the Balkan war broke out and Bulgaria sacrificed her best forces to realise her Macedonian ideal, Tarnowsky foresaw and foretold the misfortune, and begged the most competent Bulgarian circles to be more circumspect in their relations to their allies. Gueshoff and Daneff comprehended, indeed, the value of this advice, and endeavoured to get out of the trap which Russia had laid for them ; but it was too late, and the catastrophe could not be avoided. . . . In this unhappy hour the Austrian Minister sustained the broken courage of Bulgaria and raised his voice for her. With all his energy he laboured for the restoration of Bulgarian national strength, and so prepared the ground for the alliance with Bulgaria. . . .

"When the world war came there was rivalry among the diplomats in Bulgaria, to incline her this way or that. The Entente tried with all its might to become mistress of the Balkans, and neglected no means in order to succeed. . . . But the wise representative of the monarchy was at his post and toiled indefatigably for the alliance of Bulgaria with the monarchy, in which, at length, he succeeded. . . ."

It was in this sense that the President of the Council, Radoslavoff, spoke to the correspondent of the *Pester Lloyd*. The Minister of Finance, Tontcheff, reminded him at the same time of the part played by Count Tarnowsky in the conclusion of the Germano-Austro-Hungarian loan to Bulgaria, for without that financial basis the realisation of the present policy would have been difficult. The loan was, in fact, the work of Tarnowsky. . . . On the initiative of the Bulgarian Economic Society, the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Vienna, M. Pistor, gave a lecture in the hall of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Sofia on the economic relations between the Danubian monarchy and Bulgaria. Touching this lecture the *Echo de Bulgarie* of November 10th wrote:

"Speaking of the ties existing between home and foreign politics on the one hand and political economy on the other, the lecturer showed that Vienna, by its position, was the link between West and East. The Danubian monarchy, owing to its internal situation, the multiplicity of nationalities contained in it, and the problems incumbent on it in the eastern portion of its territory, has no aims at expansion. *Austria-Hungary desires the development of its allies in the Balkans on con-*

dition that neither Italy nor Russia set foot there to menace its interests."

Manifestations are repeated on every occasion. The *Echo de Bulgarie* of November 18th speaks of the "harmony of interests," the "reciprocal sympathy of the two nations," the "collaboration in which the two parties are bound each to each for life and death."

The *Mir* of October 17th emphasises the importance of the combats sustained on all her frontiers by Austria-Hungary, who has succeeded in "surviving all trials and overcoming all difficulties by her own strength and that of her allies." The *Echo de Bulgarie* of October 23rd, 1916, opines that "in the struggle she has given proof of a force and tenacity which border on the miraculous," and that "Austria-Hungary comes out of the test rejuvenated and strengthened."

* * *

We cannot terminate this chapter without mentioning also the manifestations which took place on the death of Francis-Joseph.

At the funeral the Bulgarian Government was represented by a special embassy, at the head of which were the Minister of War, General Naïdanoff, and the Minister of Public Instruction, Pecheff.

Pecheff profited by his sojourn at Vienna to make declarations to the *Neue Freie Presse* on the close and long-standing ties which united Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary. He insisted particularly on the historic meeting of the Emperor Francis-Joseph and King Ferdinand at Buda-Pesth on the eve of the declaration of Bulgarian independence and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, events followed by other acts quite as important for Austro-Bulgarian friendship.

In lamenting the death of the Austro-Hungarian sovereign, whom it called the great benefactor of the Bulgars, the Sofia press insisted on the friendship and community of interests of the two peoples.

The *Mir* of November 22nd wrote :

" . . . His reign was important above all as having represented the evolution of the federative principle. Within the limits of his Empire, and under the same central power, Germans, Tcheks, Poles, Magyars, Croats* all enjoy extensive autonomous

* The organ of the signatories of the Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance ignores the existence of millions of Serbs under the monarchy.

rights. During his reign internal questions gave occasion to constant rivalry between the diverse ethnic elements, but this rivalry did not tend to the founding of separate States, independent and hostile to each other, but to create *absolute equality, not of duties only, but also of the rights of each nationality*. . . .

"The figure of no sovereign in history presents a greater degree of abnegation, nor of elevation above personal feelings, family ties, and those of nationality. No one has better personified the type of the true statesman who aims at the well-being of all his subjects, without distinction of religion, nationality or race, than the great deceased."

The *Narodni Prava* of November 22nd wrote :

"The insatiable appetites of Russia, France, and England rose against the *pacifism of the Emperor Francis-Joseph*; the Emperor, whilst the greatest pacifist in the world, was destined to witness the extension of the scourge of war to all Europe.

"We in Bulgaria have always felt the most cordial sympathy for the Emperor Francis-Joseph, and we have always found in him a helper to defend our independence. Now the Emperor is dead, after having become the great ally of Bulgaria."

The *Kambana* of the same date wrote :

"Events have proved, during the great war above all, that the policy of Francis-Joseph knitted ties between the countries constituting the dual monarchy so strong that they will survive the white-haired monarch. . . . As we have said, Francis-Joseph always felt *friendship for Bulgaria*, and more than once in critical moments he *intervened* with his high authority in our favour."

The *Dnevnik* of November 22nd said :

"We Bulgarians have special reasons for regretting the great deceased. He was *a good friend to Bulgaria*, and every time our country had to face difficulties he lent her a helping hand."

The same journal wrote the next day :

"It is thanks to him that the question of the respective importance of Bulgaria and Serbia in the Balkans was solved in the sense that a Great Serbia with its aspirations hostile to Austria-Hungary would never become a safe ally. And an open way was found through the common work of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. It was opened on the day that it was understood that a *great Bulgaria*, like Austria-Hungary, would find her highest interest in guarding the Balkans, as one guards one's most precious possessions, in order to safeguard herself."

The *Balkanska Pochta* of November 23rd wrote :

"Endowed with extraordinary sagacity and energy, he ruled courageously and justly, but he had no personal enemies

either within or without his dominions, *for he had always been an upholder of a policy of peace.*"

The *Narodni Prava* of November 23rd wrote :

"Bulgaria, who has always had close relations with Austria-Hungary, is perfectly cognizant of the noble and humane part taken by the late Emperor in the defence of Bulgarian interests."

Lastly, a passage from the Order of the Day from King Ferdinand to the army :

"His great acts will remain bound up inseparably with our modern national history, whilst his brilliant memory will be sacred and unforgettable among the Bulgarian people, for Francis-Joseph was a close friend and *a jealous defender of our country's interests.*"

The conclusions to be drawn from all this are obvious. All the Bulgarian journals cry up the merits of Francis-Joseph. The organs of Radoslavoff extol the wisdom of the monarch who comprehended the community of Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian interests in the Balkans, and the necessity of creating a Great Bulgaria. All Bulgarian opinion looks upon the Erostratos of the European conflagration as the greatest, the most devoted apostle of peace. The organ of M. Gueshoff eulogises the monarchy of expulsions, high treason trials, and hangings, as an ideal confederation of peoples enjoying equal rights and supreme well-being, without distinction of religion or race.

The sacred egoism of the Bulgars does not hesitate in this as in other things to carry the distortion of facts to an amazing pitch of impudence.

CHAPTER VII

BULGARS AND HUNGARIANS

BULGARO-HUNGARIAN friendship holds a place apart in the alliance of Bulgaria with Austro-Hungary. Between Bulgars and Hungarians there is affinity of race, and, above all, of character. The Bulgars have a better understanding of Hungary, feudal, rustic, primitive and coarse in manners. More varied in its mixture of nationalities, more complicated in organisation, more developed also, *bourgeois* and industrial, Austria in its character is further away from Bulgaria than by its frontiers. But it is not in these affinities that we must seek the causes of the drawing together specially manifested between Bulgars and Hungarians.

This sympathy is to be explained rather by interested motives. From the beginning of the war the Bulgars understood the influential part played by the Hungarians in the dual monarchy. Moreover, both felt instinctively the need of holding together, in the rush of the great Germanic current, and endeavoured by a more intimate relation to safeguard, in the heart of the alliance which binds them to the Germans, their own particular interests. It was a measure of precaution taken tardily, but jealously adhered to both at Buda-Pesth and Sofia.

The *Neue Freie Presse* (October 31st, 1915) contains a telegraphic report of the speech of Count Apponyi at Buda-Pesth at the inauguration of a section of the Red Cross for Bulgaria. The meeting was presided over by Count Stephen Tisza, President of the Council. Apponyi said :

“ We see opening before us a vast prospect *in becoming the neighbours of States for whom the possibility of having interests conflicting with ours is absolutely excluded.* On the contrary, we feel bound to those States by common conditions of existence. *It is plain that the Bulgarian nation is menaced by the same dangers as ourselves ; the security of Bulgarian national development*

depends on the same conditions as ours. Our alliance, therefore, springs naturally from mind and heart."

The *Narodni Prava* of December 6th, 1915, published the text of the despatches exchanged between the President of the Sobranié and the President of the Hungarian Parliament and the Chamber of Magnates on the occasion of the opening of the sessions of those two assemblies. The President of the Bulgarian Sobranié, Dr. K. Vatcheff, declared :

"After mature reflection, our people has taken its place by the side of the Hungarian nation in the desperate struggle for the victory of justice and the liberty of peoples. The sentiments of the Hungarian people for us are the same as ours for the Hungarians. *These sentiments, and, above all, the common interests of the two nations, evidently constitute the principal reasons which have decided Bulgaria to become a humble ally of the Great Central Powers in the European war against calumniators and brawlers, and against their instigators and defenders."*

The *Narodni Prava* of December 6th has a leader on this exchange of despatches :

"In a quite recent past Hungary has had to defend itself constantly against all imaginable plots and crimes which the neighbouring State, although often overwhelmed with Hungarian benefits, committed unceasingly. Bulgaria also, in the recent past, has had to bear with the treachery and baseness of a neighbouring State. This perfidious and criminal neighbour of Hungary and Bulgaria was Serbia. . . . *We Bulgarians are happy to have been able, whilst defending our own interests, to help the Hungarian nation to get rid of its quarrelsome neighbour.* Now they have become next-door neighbours, Hungary and Bulgaria will create a wide gateway through which the two peoples will be able to pass into a new era of peace, prosperity, and unfettered progress."

The declaration of the President of the Sobranié, in which he explains the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers, chiefly by the affection of the Bulgar for the Hungarians, has been often quoted. It is termed "historic" by the Hungarian press. The Sobranié inaugurated its ordinary session on October 29th, 1916, by acclaiming a new Bulgaro-Hungarian fraternity.

The *Pester Lloyd* of January 1st, 1916, was informed that the President of the Sobranié, at the beginning of the session, saluted the Hungarian Parliament by a despatch which contained, among others, these words :

"The two nations have become friends, and after having

been separated by a treacherous and malignant neighbour, *they are now tracing in fire and blood a common frontier*, to unite in perpetuity their identical interests; it is a pledge of the brightest future for the two peoples."

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* (January 29th, 1916) received from Buda-Pesth the following:

"According to a despatch from Sofia, the Bulgarian Sobranié will send a delegation in a few days, charged with discussing directly with the Hungarians, questions interesting the two States, which have arisen on account of their new contiguity."

The *Magyarország* (April 10th, 1916) had the following:

"Radoslavoff declared to an editor of the *Magyarország* who paid him a visit in company with the Hungarian composer Hubay, *that he likes the Hungarians very much, and that in his affection for them he is surpassed only by the Tsar* (of Bulgaria), who openly manifests his Hungarian sympathies. . . . The Tsar never misses an opportunity of speaking Hungarian."

Andrassy wrote in the *Revue de Hongrie* (February 15th, 1917):

"The common danger has brought us together from the time when Bulgaria was made a principality until now. *It may be asserted that the sentiment of community of interests has always existed since the Berlin Congress, and has always manifested itself, at least in a certain measure, both in the policy of Austria-Hungary and in that of Bulgaria.* At the commencement of the general war, Bulgaria observed perfect neutrality, and when the Balkan question had to be settled, she took our side with all her might. The moment was admirably chosen. Like the clever politician he is, King Ferdinand came into the arena when he could gain the greatest success with the least risk."

The *Kambana* of December 21st goes into ecstasies over the reciprocal sympathy of Bulgars and Hungarians:

"We are deeply indebted to Hungarian diplomacy. Now that we are their allies, the sympathies they have for us exceeds all imagination. *They dote on everything that is Bulgarian.* The Hungarians and ourselves have the same interests in south-eastern Europe; * in the future we shall play a tremendous part in the politics of the Near East."

* Megalomania and display have always dazzled the primitive mentality of the pushful adventurers at Buda-Pesth as at Sofia. The *Alkotmány* of February 5th, 1917, describes the enthusiasm of the King of Bulgaria, Ferdinand, who was delighted with "the pomp and richness" of the Hungarian coronation. He declared he had seen four coronations: two English, those of Edward VII. and George V., and two Russian ones, those of Alexander III. and Nicholas II. None of them equalled that of Charles IV. in gorgeous pageantry.

It was during the stay of the Bulgarian deputies at Buda-Pesth that Bulgaro-Hungarian brotherhood was marked by the most enthusiastic manifestations.

The former Bulgarian Consul at Buda-Pesth, Pantché Doreff, wrote on the occasion in the *Narodni Prava* of April 27th, 1916 :

"Not a people in the world esteems us and wishes us so well as the Hungarian nation. The Hungarians alone have a disinterested esteem for us. They are our only sincere friends."

According to Doreff, Hungarian sympathy for the Bulgars can be explained by three different causes :

"First, their history, which teaches them that we Bulgars are their *brothers in blood*. . . .

"The personality of our King next. The good impression he left in Hungary when he was *lieutenant in a Hungarian Hussar regiment*, is a legend passing from mouth to mouth. Besides this, one of the great-grandfathers of his Majesty espoused the daughter of a most eminent Hungarian noble."

The third reason alleged by Doreff is "the esteem which the Bulgarian gardeners acquired in Hungary.*

"In fine," continues Doreff, "everything attaches us to the Hungarians. Leaving on one side the geographical position of the two States, our sympathy with the Magyars cannot but increase in consequence of *our future boundaries*, the direct character of our relations, the great fluvial way of the Danube, and the identity of our political and commercial interests. *History does not show another instance of such a friendship and such a community of multiple interests.*"

In its leader of April 30th, 1916, the *Pesti Hirlap* greets the Bulgarian deputies :

"The blood brotherhood which unites kindred for centuries is an immemorial custom of *the Turanian race*. Such an alliance of blood has been sealed by us and the Bulgars in the present war. Our brothers have concluded this pact by impregnating the mountains of Serbia with their blood. . . . For the Bulgarian deputies, Buda-Pesth is not only the first station on their route, it also holds *the first place in their hearts*. We have not forgotten

* We may form an idea of the hollow basis supporting the assertions concerning the former relations between Hungarians and Bulgars, if we consider the insistence, in the solemn speeches during the visit of the Bulgarian deputies, on the importance of a few thousand Bulgarian immigrants who established themselves as gardeners, here and there, in the environs of Hungarian towns. They are thinking of organising henceforward the Bulgarian colony, small though it is. The *Mir* of October 9th, 1916, referred to projects of the Bulgarian element in the Hungarian capital for building at Buda-Pesth a church, a Bulgarian school, etc.

that declaration, of historic import, in which the President of the Sobranié said that *confidence in and sympathy with the Hungarian people, above all else, drew the Bulgarian people to the side of the powers of Central Europe. . . .*

"The second link, as strong also (the first consists in the kinship of the Bulgaro-Hungarian race), between the two nations is *the Bulgarian Tsar, Ferdinand, whom all Hungarians adore to distraction, because he has been an officer of Hungarian Hussars, is a Hungarian landowner, and speaks the noble Hungarian tongue. We may be as proud of the Emperor Ferdinand as the Bulgarians themselves.*"

And the *Alkotmany* wrote in its leader of May 2nd, 1916 :

"Our relations date from the most remote times. Knitted as they were on the soil of the ancient common country in Asia, and maintained at the conquest of our present fatherland, these bonds were drawn tighter in the days of Arpad, when the Hungarian dynasty intermarried with the Assenids of Bulgaria.

" . . . We have always considered the Bulgars as specially indicated to be the rulers of the Balkans. . . . Bulgaria has become our neighbour, and we shall be able, together, to render secure our historic mission, which is to rule the Orient. We are not ignorant of the fact that Bulgarian politicians and statesmen are fully conscious of this. Have not several of them declared that the principal reason for their adhesion to the Central Powers was precisely that by so doing they were able to become neighbours of Hungary, and that, thanks to this contiguity, they could utilise the mighty ancestral energy which the two peoples have preserved in their minds and in their veins?"

The *Pesti Naplo* of May 2nd is delighted that the Bulgarian deputy, Kosta Kaltcheff, replied in Hungarian, and concludes from it that :

"In virtue of the superiority of their culture, the Hungarians are called to be the natural guides of the Yugo-slav peoples and the Turanians of the Balkans."

In speeches of welcome and in toasts, the Bulgars and Hungarians constantly speak not only of alliance and friendship but of brotherhood. Momtchiloff and Kosta Ghéorgieff thank "the brother people of Hungary." Count Apponyi talks of "fraternal love." Kosta Kaltcheff extols the Bulgaro-Hungarian community which will rear anew the ancient pillar of the Orient. It was Count Tisza who welcomed the Bulgarian guests at the banquet given on May 1st by the Hungarian Government. He assures the

Bulgars that they "have come among old and sincere friends. *The entrance of Bulgaria into the alliance of the Central Powers is a logical consequence of natural evolution, and this evolution is governed by the Bulgarian character as well as the role of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. That policy was inaugurated precisely by Hungarian statesmen. . . .* Eight years after the Berlin Congress, Bulgaria succeeded in freeing herself from the Russian yoke." (*Az Ujsag*, May 2nd, 1916.)

The Bulgarian press described with great enthusiasm the reception of the Bulgars at Buda-Pesth. *The Dnevnik* (May 3rd, 1916) declared:

"The past brought us near each other, and the present makes us brothers; as for the future, we shall build it together, on the impregnable foundations of fraternal blood. None can then separate us any more."

The *Outro* asserts that all Bulgaria is proud of Hungarian friendship. The *Balkanska Pochta* states that *the speech of Count Tisza has aroused indescribable enthusiasm at Sofia.*

"Every word uttered by Count Tisza is an historical truth which takes hold of the heart and understanding of every Bulgar. The alliance of Hungary and Bulgaria is hewn in granite. *The speech of Count Tisza has been publicly read in several places at Sofia, and hailed by loud acclamations.*"

The Hungarian Ethnographic Society of Buda-Pesth elected as honorary members the Bulgarian ethnologists, Professors Ichiroff and Arnaoudoff (*Saraïevsk List*, May 10th, 1916). Thus was rewarded the opportune science which deformed and falsified ethnography in favour of a common Bulgaro-Hungarian frontier, denying to millions of men of another nation the name by which they had called themselves for centuries. For that matter, Bulgarian science has been constantly subservient to the aims of the hour of Bulgarian policy.

The former Bulgarian Minister of Justice, K. Panaïotoff, in a conversation with Dr. Rustem Vambéry, deputy professor at the University, spoke of the similarity of juridical principles between Bulgaria and the Central Powers:

"Above all, importance must be attached to the *concordance with ancient Hungarian law*, which is certainly based on the same Turanian origin. *Doubtless Slav reminiscences exist, but it is now that we ought to apply ourselves to the work of assimilating the qualities of the Bulgarian and Hungarian peoples. . . .* We

hope that, from the point of view of civilisation, also our common origin with the Hungarians in the bosom of the Turanian tribe (whence the two peoples took the same road to their present countries) will be made manifest, thanks to intelligent collaboration." (*Pester Lloyd*, May 2nd, 1916.)*

The difficulties and the small profit accruing from the study of the two languages, as well as the exiguity of the need for them, have made impossible a Hungarian propaganda in Bulgaria on a scale so vast as that which Germany has succeeded in organising; this, however, has not hindered platonic manifestations on both sides. Courses of language have been founded in commercial schools in both countries, and the Hungarians accept a certain number of Bulgars as scholars in the technical and commercial schools of southern Hungary. Museums of commerce are being established, and the Hungarians are studying Bulgaria, and indeed the whole of the Balkans very seriously. They foresee in it a field for economic expansion, forgetting that Hungary itself is only a field of foreign expansion, and that they have proved themselves incapable of prospering to any extent, there, where they had all sorts of opportunities and privileges.

* * *

The *Magyarország*, which represents the Hungarian opposition, has insisted more than the rest on the special reasons closely uniting the Hungarians and Bulgars within the alliance of the Central Powers. According to the organ of Count Karolyi, this intimate friendship will be a guarantee for the particular interests which must be protected, besides the genuine interests of the alliance.

The members of the Committee of the Bulgarian Red Cross organised on May 23rd, in the palace of the Chamber of Magnates of Hungary, a ceremony in honour of Count Albert Apponyi, leader of the party of Kossuth, and President of the Committee of *Succour to the Bulgarian Red*

* *Az Ujsag* of January 14th, 1917, announces the arrival at Budapest of the Bulgarian Commission charged with preparing projects of law most urgently needed after the war: "The Bulgarian delegates assert that they wish to draw inspiration from Hungarian law for the legislation of their country. After the war the administrative system of Great Bulgaria will be transformed. Competent circles in Bulgaria know that economic, commercial, and industrial life in Hungary and Bulgaria will be closely related; this union could not be complete without perfect juridical reciprocity between the two countries."

Cross. Apponyi, on this occasion, uttered the following words :

"The similarity of the historic trials through which the Hungarians have passed like the Bulgars, although our migrations took place 200 years before those of the Bulgars, the same desire to ally ourselves with a great people, more powerful than ourselves, without, however, sacrificing our national individuality, must bring near to each other the two nations, Hungarian and Bulgar, and serve them as *security that they will not be lost, but, on the contrary, will distinguish themselves*, in the midst of the alliance which inspires some, perhaps, with apprehension and a certain reserve. We guarantee this for them."

In the issue of September 24th, 1916, the *Magyarország* says :

"King Ferdinand knows the Magyar people well, and Radoslavoff is perfectly aware of the reliance he can place on the tendencies of the Hungarian nation. . . . *It was the Hungarian nation of which Bulgaria had need in the first place, whilst the armed alliance with the Central Empires has been of secondary import to her.* . . . The director of the Bulgarian Statistical Bureau, Dr. Kiril Popoff, has demonstrated the thesis to us that *all well-weighed Bulgarian interests place her before all at the side of Hungary*, and not at that of the Central Powers. Bulgaria and Hungary, geographically neighbours also, must unite for the protection of their common interests. Bulgaria united to Hungary, and in armed alliance with the Central Powers, is sure of two things: indisputable victory, and the brotherly attitude of Hungary to her interests. The rallying to us of the Bulgars is not a diplomatic move: *it is the result of a fortunate coincidence of our histories, of our common origin, and of the identity of our national soul*, brought into relief by the intelligent and perspicacious foresight of Bulgarian politicians. That is what has cemented Bulgaro-Magyar fraternity."

The special reasons of reserve and precaution against the abusive predominance of the Germans on which Count Karoyi's organ insists as the chief basis of race friendship between Bulgars and Hungarians, might be regarded as negative. There are others more positive, however. The *Magyarország* itself, whilst treating the question in a purely platonic sense, infers a certain measure of reproach to the Government for being too servile towards Vienna and Berlin.

But whence would come the peril of neglecting special Bulgarian and Hungarian interests, insomuch that it was deemed necessary to protect them, within the alliance,

by a particular solidarity between Hungary and Bulgaria?

Evidently, and above all as concerns questions affecting Hungarians and Bulgarians equally and especially, it comes from Roumania and Serbia or Yugo-slavia. It is of these questions that Tisza, Karolyi, and Radoslavoff are thinking, when they talk of the basis of particular Bulgaro-Hungarian amity. So it is that facts relating to Serbia and Roumania have occasioned the most remarkable demonstrations.

The *Zeit* of September 13th, 1916, contained the following:

“On the occasion of the taking of Tutrakan and the Dobrudja victory, the President of the Hungarian Council, Tisza, congratulated the President of the Bulgarian Council, Radoslavoff, who replied: ‘The sympathy of Hungary for the Bulgarian cause always fostered the hope that a durable union would be brought about, and, indeed, this union was sealed last year by the bloodshed in common on the field of battle. With the aid of God, the Ungaro-Bulgarian effort will be crowned with success, and our base enemies, those near and those afar, will not escape Ungaro-Bulgarian revenge.’”

In a long interview, published in the *Pester Lloyd* (September 15th, 1916), Radoslavoff expressed Bulgarian sympathies with the Hungarians. The same day the same manifestations were repeated in an interview of the Minister of Finance, Tontcheff (published in the *Az Est*).

The Roumanian intervention provoked in the Hungarian Parliament a series of declarations on Ungaro-Bulgarian friendship. It was Count Tisza who insisted (September 13th, 1916) on the value of the Ungaro-Bulgarian alliance in the struggle against Roumania. Count Karplyi, at the sitting of September 14th, 1916, regretted that the opposition were not informed of the conditions of the understanding with Bulgaria. He feared that the delay in Bulgarian intervention was the result of a special understanding on the Balkan question, the Yugo-slav question, and particularly on the question as to the fate of Serbia. At the sitting of September 21st Count Andrassy, speaking on the same subject, emphasised the services rendered by his father to Bulgaro-Hungarian amity:

“Later, on divers occasions, the community of feeling between the two nations displayed itself, and when Serbia became our common enemy the alliance was inevitable.”

Even at the most critical moment of the Roumanian

invasion of Transylvania, the partisans of the Ungaro-Bulgarian alliance did not forget to insist on its *fundamental aim*: the struggle against Serbia and the *Yugo-slav world*.

On this question, opinion at Buda-Pesth and Sofia are at one, the same tendencies are exhibited, and the same difficulties in solving the problem present themselves.

The destruction of Serbia and Serbism is desired on both sides, and, at the same time, both fear the consequences of a mere partition of Serbia, which would only complicate the Yugo-slav problem in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy by the annexation of two and a half million Serbs. The Hungarians cannot bring themselves to accept the trialism which would be created at the expense of their present predominance in the monarchy and their claim to extend their public rights over the Yugo-slav provinces. The Bulgars also dread a strong Yugo-slavia which would form a buffer between Hungary and Austria, and would be an outpost of Austria in Balkan politics. For this reason the Serbian and Yugo-slav problem gives rise to the most fantastic schemes. In the opinion of the majority an amputated Serbia should be re-established which would be joined to Montenegro (from which certain points, such as Lovtchen and the coast, would be detached), and which would be condemned to vegetate, incapable of prospering and developing itself.

Other and more original combinations are put forward. One may be cited which has been noticed in the *Gazette de Lausanne* (December 6th, 1916), under the title, "The Balkans of To-morrow: Yugo-slavia or Great Bulgaria?"—

"According to certain information, it is affirmed from a trustworthy source, the taking of Bucharest by the German and Bulgarian armies, etc., will be celebrated by a political manifestation of the greatest importance.

"M. Radoslavoff, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, will announce the constitution of a Yugo-slavia, including the Croats, Dalmatians, Bosnians, Albanians, Serbs, and Montenegrins, and the creation of a Great Bulgaria exercising political control over the new Yugo-slavia, in agreement with the Central Powers. Great Bulgaria would receive Wallachia and a part of Serbia as far as Semendria on the Danube, as well as Macedonia. The rest of Serbia would be absorbed in Yugo-slavia, *dominated militarily by Bulgaria, and administered conjointly by Hungary and Bulgaria*. This will be the counterpart of autonomous Poland."

The *Gazette de Lausanne* adds :

“ Although this information has been furnished by one whose knowledge up to the present has generally been confirmed by events, we publish this only under extreme reservation. The condominium to be exercised over the future Yugo-slavia bears too great a resemblance to the administration of the Duchies by Austria and Prussia after the war of 1864, and that experiment is still too recent to warrant the probability of an arrangement which, from the morrow of its conclusion, would be a source of the gravest conflicts.”

The scheme is fantastic, impracticable, and not worth discussing. This *monstrous Yugo-slavia*, which would be placed under a *condominium of Hungarians and Bulgars*, is valuable only as delineating the precise nature of the interest taken by Bulgars and Hungarians in Yugo-slavia. The participation of Bulgars and Hungarians in the crime against Yugo-slavia is doubtless the most important motive in Bulgaro-Hungarian friendship.

CHAPTER VIII

BULGARS AND GERMANS

THE friend of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, shared both her good and ill fortune ; like the Danubian monarchy, Bulgaria had to become the slave of Germany. She was not ignorant of the part taken by Germany in Austrian-Balkan policy, the co-ordinated efforts of Germany and her "brilliant second" in the East, nor the fact that the word of command for that policy came from the capital of the two Germanies, Berlin.

But this is not the only explanation of the fanatical attachment of the Bulgars to the Germans in the great war. The Bulgars had long ago taken to themselves the surname "Prussians of the Balkans." Admiring the technical progress, the material culture, the automatic organisation of Germany, the Bulgars discerned their source only in the fierce energy which they thought to rival by the elementary and brutal power of a new and primitive race.

This respect for brute force only is explained also by the atavism of centuries of servitude. But an ethnic trait must be added to it, another atavism, that of the Slavo-tartar race.

The grandiose plan of Germany, put into execution through the great war, must have turned the head of Bulgarian megalomania. The new situation created by the war, the German hold on Austria-Hungary, decided Bulgaria to attach herself completely and blindly to the all-might of the Kaiser, the dispenser of all favours in the present and all hopes for the future.

Always clinging to the stronger, Bulgaria, in her relations with Austria-Hungary, showed her predilection for Hungary ; in the alliance with the Central Empires she accorded her preference to Germany. It must be said, also, that the breaking up of the Austrian forces in the

Carpathians and Serbia, and the passing of the initiative in the Balkans into the hands of Germany exclusively, facilitated direct relations between Bulgaria and Germany. Compliments between Vienna and Sofia continued to be exchanged, Bulgaro-Hungarian fraternity continued to be manifested, but business was concluded only between Berlin and Sofia. During the whole of last year (1916) contact between Bulgaria and Germany was direct and constant. After the development of the action on the Macedonian front and Roumanian intervention, there ensued complete union. Bulgaria and Turkey entered into the dominion of the German empire. Troubled though it was, the dream of German domination from Hamburg to Bagdad existed, nevertheless, for a certain time. Germany will be able to say that she *reigned* once from the North Sea to the banks of the Euphrates.

Bulgaro-German friendship did not want for occasions to display itself. Appeals for funds constantly addressed to Berlin from Bulgaria, the German economic capture of Sofia, excursions, propagandas of all sorts kept up continuous declarations of mutual admiration and solidarity, and proclaimed the great utility of the alliance for the two nations, for Europe, and even for humanity. The interview of the Kaiser and Coburg at Nish, the visit of King Ferdinand to the German general headquarters, the pilgrimage of Bulgarian deputies to Berlin, Dresden, and Munich, the excursion of German parliamentarians to Sofia, provoked more and more enthusiastic demonstrations of amity.

From the time when Germany began to apply the principle of unity of action and command to Bulgaria, German visits to Sofia were incessant. Taking over successively the railways, posts and telegraphs, military transport, and medical corps, or submitting them to their control, the Germans by these ceremonious visits strengthened their "peaceful penetration."

The signature of the final formalities in the Germano-Bulgarian treaty, at the beginning of September, 1915, was assigned to two delegates, Duke Johann-Albrecht of Mecklenburg, and the Chief of the Department of Eastern Affairs, Rosenberg. During the operations against Serbia, King Ferdinand met the Duke of Mecklenburg at Bela-Palanka (November 15th, 1915). The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of January 3rd, 1916, reproduced the comments of the Bulgarian press on the visit of Mackensen to Sofia. The

Narodni Prava published an article full of enthusiasm on the German military chief, calling him "the symbol of German power, discipline, and energy," and hailing cordially the *fraternity in arms* of Bulgars and Germans. The *Echo de Bulgarie* wrote :

"The Germano-Bulgarian alliance has turned out brilliantly. The Balkan war is finished : it only remains to drive General Sarraïl's army from Salonica. This task will demand new sacrifices, but the supreme genius for command of General Mackensen, and the proved valour of the allied troops, are sure guarantees of victory."

Tours of inspection of German staff officers, financiers, chiefs of sanitary service, were incessant both at Sofia and along all the Balkan front.

The Kaiser even sent one of his sons to the Macedonian front.

The journey of the Kaiser's third son called from the *Outro* (April 19th, 1916) the following :

"In remarking the friendly relations between German and Bulgarian soldiers at the front, Prince August Wilhelm was delighted, and expressed his conviction that *nowhere in the Balkans could there be found better allies, better suited to each other.*"

The interview of Wilhelm II. and King Ferdinand in January, 1916, took place amid the dazzling scenic effects with which neither of these crowned comedians ever fails to surround his acts. The German and Bulgarian illustrated papers published a series of photographs and sketches of the Kaiser and Coburg in triumphant attitudes. Behind them always appeared the profile of Mackensen, and at the foot of the picture Bulgarian and German soldiers embracing each other, radiant with enthusiasm, celebrating the "historic fête."

On January 18th, 1916, the Kaiser arrived at Nish, accompanied by his Chief of the Staff, General Falkenhayn. He was received by King Ferdinand, the Crown Prince Boris, Prince Cyril, M. Radoslavoff, the Bulgarian Generalissimo Jekoff, the Chief of the General Staff, Jostoff. The Emperor, the King, and the Crown Prince left in a motor for the fortress, where they were joined by Field-Marshal Mackensen. After the review the Emperor presented Ferdinand with the bâton of Field-Marshal of the German Army. At eight o'clock the Emperor joined his train. Dinner was served at Stalatch station. The King, the

Princes, M. Radoslavoff and the other personages who had accompanied the Emperor thus far, returned to Nish.

The *Echo de Bulgarie* (January 21st, 1916), from which we have borrowed the above account, said in its leader :

"The most powerful monarch in Europe has thought fit to manifest his friendship for Bulgaria, her sovereign, army, and people, in the very city where for long months plots were woven against the destiny of the Bulgarian race and the security of Bulgaria."

Here is an extract from the toast which the King of Bulgaria gave (in German) at the luncheon at Nish :

"Sire, this day is one of high historic significance. Two hundred and fifteen years ago to-day Your Majesty's great ancestor, Frederick I., put on with his own powerful hands the royal crown of Prussia. *On January 18th, 1871*, under the reign of Your Majesty's grandfather, was created the new German empire: William the Great *restored at Versailles the dignity of the German Emperors*. To-day, January 18th, 1916, his glorious grandson, having with his mighty word swept away all obstacles, traverses *the north-west portion of the Balkan peninsula inhabited formerly by Serbs*, and treads triumphantly the Roman fortress of Nissa. Ave Imperator, Cæsar et Rex, Victor et gloriose, ex Naissa antiqua omnes Orientis populi te salutant redemptorem ferentem oppressis prosperitatem atque salutem! Vivas!"

The Emperor William replied :

"To give an outward expression of the feelings to which these fêtes have given birth in me and in all Germany, I have begged your Majesty to accept the rank of Field-Marshal of the Prussian Army, and I am happy, with my army, that in accepting that dignity *you have become one of us in this particular sense also.*"

The *Echo de Bulgarie* (January 22nd) dedicates a leader to the two toasts, in which it says :

"Nish, the ancient Roman fortress, of which the Serbs had made a stronghold of perfidy and falsehood, has been endowed, by the meeting of the allied monarchs, with the fame of an historic city, whose name will be associated with a decisive stage in the general conflagration."

In its issue of the following day, the *Echo de Bulgarie* extols the worth of "the first Bulgarian Field-Marshal."

"The sovereigns of the oldest and most glorious armies in the world, the Emperor Francis-Joseph and the Emperor William, appreciating the merits of our King for the brilliant preparation of our army and crushing victories of the Balkan

campaign, have named him successively Austrian Field-Marshal and Prussian Field-Marshal. In the national history, Tsar Ferdinand, the Tsar liberator and the unifier of Bulgarian territory, will be the first Field-Marshal. This dignity was made for him, and so great are the services it honours, that if it had not existed it would have had to be invented. The Bulgarian army, fighting side by side with the troops of the two great powers, has entered with a stride the arena of the world struggle. It has become an international factor."

It translates the manifestations of the Austro-German press, notably an article in the *Vossische Zeitung* which says :

"As yet the Sovereign of no great power has entered Bulgaria since she became an independent State. To-day the Kaiser has gone to shake hands with the victor. *What Bulgaria has accomplished in forty years is without example in history. The territories occupied by the Bulgars are for ever incorporated in the kingdom of Bulgaria.*"

We must quote also, after the *Echo de Bulgarie* (January 25th), what other Bulgarian journals said on the same occasion.

Narodni Prava :

"The honour done by the German Emperor to the King of the Bulgars by his visit to Nish consecrates the new era of dignity and complete independence of the Kingdom of Bulgaria. The Emperor of the iron will, who incarnates the universal genius of mighty Germany, has been the guest of Bulgaria in Bulgarian Nish. This circumstance has overwhelmed with joy the Bulgarian people and their sovereign."

The *Preporetz* (Democratic opposition) :

"The Emperor of United Germany has been the guest of H.M. the King of the Bulgars, who has been called by the force of circumstances to solve a great problem, that of filling, in the interests of European peace and the welfare of nations, the gap created by the retreat of the Turks from the Danube to the Odrin-Enos line. What had been forgotten by the Tsar of Russia, what the Ministers of the Serbian Government had betrayed, was recalled with energy, the other day, at Nish, by the Emperor William. The very particular attention paid by the Kaiser to the Macedonian detachment which took part in the review was not dictated merely by considerations of courtesy. *It was due to the innate feeling of respect of every great man for great achievements.*"

From the *Voenni Izvestia :*

"At Nish the Bulgarian troops admired the energetic and powerful figure of the supreme chief of Germany, whose

genius now marks the beginning of a new era in the history of nations."

Three weeks later the same manifestations were repeated on the occasion of the visit of Coburg to the German headquarters. The *Echo de Bulgarie* (February 10th, 1916) wrote :

"It was on the soil of *vanished Serbia*, but in a Bulgarian city which is at the same time the key of Macedonia, that these reciprocal sentiments found their solemn expression for the first time ; it is at the seat of the two allied high commands that they will be renewed and confirmed."

The most essential thing that the Bulgars emphasise in the Kaiser's toast is the question of gain. The *Echo de Bulgarie* (February 12th) says :

"The Emperor William has expressed his wishes that the Bulgars, under the wise and perspicacious leadership of their sovereign, should preserve and improve what they have so painfully and gloriously won."*

The Bulgarian and German press reiterate the same order of ideas. The *Echo de Bulgarie* (February 13th, 1916) reproduces the following extracts from other newspapers.

Narodni Prava :

"In confirming the perfect harmony between the allies, the conferences which will take place at headquarters will be a new and imposing manifestation of the sincere friendship which unites the allied nations. The Bulgarian people has resorted to arms to break the fetters of slavery in Macedonia and to suppress a stirrer up of unceasing troubles in the Balkans."

Preporetz (Democratic) :

"In his toast, the Emperor William repeats and emphasises in a solemn manner the words he uttered at the historic interview at Nish: *Everything that Bulgaria has gained by arms belongs to her*. If the evolution of events imposes new sacrifices on us, our people will make them. We have always maintained that we cannot stop halfway. The great work of national unity must be achieved. *We are sure that the decisions taken at the German headquarters will fully guarantee our national acquisitions*.

Kambana (article by the deputy Dascaloff) :

"It was to our interest, then, to embrace the cause of the Central Empires. *Their enemy was also ours*."

* In fact, the Kaiser spoke only of "Bulgaria henceforth united," but Bulgarian ethnography and practical genius discovered in it what it wished for.

Deutsche Tageszeitung :

"The desire of the whole German nation is that Bulgaria should be a strong pillar for the development of the Balkans, indissolubly linked with the German Empire by common interests, military, political, and economic. . . ."

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung :

"All the efforts of our enemies cannot annul the results of this campaign. *These results are final, and consequently already belong to history.*"

Lastly, as the highest note in this chorus of admiration and enthusiasm, let us quote an article by the Gueshivist opposition deputy, Boris Vazoff, which appeared in the *Mir** :

"The Bulgarian people is in close relations with the most civilised and most disciplined people in the world, the German nation. The consequences of this relationship will be incalculable and beyond all predictions. Imitation will cause us to adopt new ideas, many things seen or heard. This event will mark the opening of a new era in our evolution, an epoch comparable only to moral regeneration and political emancipation, for it will embrace all the manifestations of political life, and will be of decisive importance."

* * *

The visit of the Bulgarian deputies to Berlin was projected from the month of December, 1915. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* published on December 18th a dispatch from Buda-Pesth which stated, "On the initiative of the Vice-President of the Bulgarian Sobranié, Dr. Momtchiloff, the members of the Sobranié propose to visit Vienna, Buda-Pesth and Berlin."

After much preparation the tour began towards the end of August, 1916.

On the eve of departure, Momtchiloff said to the correspondent of the *Reichspost* (April 28th, 1916) :

"The Bulgarian nation is unanimous in its support of the policy of Radoslavoff. . . . *Whatever happens, our fate is for ever bound up with that of the Central Powers.*"

Welcomed with enthusiasm at Buda-Pesth and Vienna, and delighted with their reception, the Bulgars continued to be so in Germany. On the way to Berlin they stayed at Dresden on Saturday, May 16th. At the banquet offered to them, the Minister of State, Witztum, insisted

* Translated in the *Echo de Bulgarie* (February 10th, 1916).

on the fact that *the same blood flowed in the veins of the sovereigns of Bulgaria and Saxony*. At Dresden, Dr. H. Ghéorgieff stated to a correspondent of the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* (May 7th, 1916), that "*not only the Government, but the entire Bulgarian people will support the Germans to the last moment. . . . Rarely have the Bulgars acted with so much enthusiasm as in concluding the alliance with the Germans.*"

All the principal Berlin newspapers of May 7th greet the Bulgarian deputies very warmly.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* wrote :

"Bulgaria is at present united with the Central Powers and Turkey by the close bonds of armed fraternity."

The *Berliner Tageblatt* said :

"The alliance which has been tested in moments of importance in world history is not only between the two armies and their chiefs, but also between the two peoples. This alliance of four nations, which extends from the North Sea to Asia Minor, becomes a lasting association. . . . There is no divergence of opinion to-day among the Bulgarian people."

The *Lokal Anzeiger* declared that :

"The greetings of Berlin to the Bulgars are the free expression of a political sentiment dating from long before the alliance. Berlin is the birthplace of the Bulgarian State. *The first sovereign which free Bulgaria elected was of German blood. . . . The monarch who has achieved Bulgarian unity belongs also to a German reigning family.* We hope that the representatives of the people who are called, *not without reason, the Prussians of the Balkans*, will feel at home in the chief town of Prussia and the German Empire."

The *Vossische Zeitung* remarked that the device over the portal of the Sobranié,

"*'L'Union fait la Force,'* has been tested three times against the express will of Russia. The Bulgars know that what has been done in Macedonia and for Macedonia *was carried out under the supreme German command. The fruits will remain with the Bulgars, and not Macedonia only, but northward of Macedonia also, a goodly portion of the former Serbian kingdom.*"

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote :

"Serbia is overthrown. Through Bulgaria, the road leads to Constantinople and Asia Minor, uniting East and West."

The Bulgars reached Berlin on Sunday afternoon, May 7th. They were loudly cheered at the railway station. Von Radowitz welcomed them in the name of the Minister

of Foreign Affairs. At the banquet offered by the Germano-Bulgarian Association, *Kosnitski* (recently named Minister of Railways) said that *the Bulgarian people felt that the task of ruling the Balkans had devolved upon them. He hailed the German Emperor as the greatest and most glorious sovereign in the world.*

On Monday, May 8th, the deputies were received by the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. He was glad, he said, to be able to greet them on what was historic ground for Bulgaria.

"It was here that she was founded in 1878. . . . If we want to trace the foundations we must go far back in history, for already in 864 the illustrious Bulgarian Emperor Boris concluded a treaty with King Ludwig of Germania. The Emperor of Germany and the Emperor of Bulgaria met at Nish ten centuries later to renew the alliance."

Momtchiloff replied :

"Bulgaria has chosen her place in the world war. . . . *The great and mighty personality of the Emperor of Germany, whose name alone suffices to make his adversaries tremble, has acquired the right to the great administration of the Bulgarian country.* At the reception at the Reichstag, which took place on the evening of the same day, the president, Kaempf, declared : 'The opinions and tendencies of the Bulgarian nation are in accord with the aims of the German Empire and with the most intimate traits of German national character.'"

Momtchiloff replied :

"Bulgaria prays to God that the triumph of Germany may equal her power."

During the reception at the Hotel de Ville, on Tuesday, May 9th, Ghéorgieff declared that the Bulgarians had come to Berlin to express solemnly their desire to remain for ever the faithful allies of the Germans.

According to the newspapers, these speeches and replies were accompanied by deafening cheers.

The *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* in its leader of May 9th gave expression to the same enthusiasm :

"Every Bulgar, possessing political intelligence, must have comprehended that the installation of Russia on the Straits would put an end to Bulgarian independence. . . . Bulgaria had no choice, if she wished to remain faithful to herself and her historic mission. As a great buttress of the old bridge which unites Europe and Asia, and which will never be dominated by the Muscovites, the veritable successors of Tamerlane,

Bulgaria has found liberty and safety truly only in the new alliance."

The Bulgars left on May 11th for Hamburg. On their return, as they passed through Cologne, the *Kölnische Zeitung* saw:

"In the union of States from Bremen to Bagdad, a 'solid block,' the pledge of a sane evolution towards peace, and the gravest danger for England, since this block renders possible an expansion which may become *fatal to the two principal arteries of England, India and Egypt*. The mission of Bulgaria is to be the intermediary between West and East, and the guarantee of stability in the Balkans."

At Frankfurt the Bulgars were the guests of the Municipality at noon, and of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in the evening.

The *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* of May 18th greets the arrival of the Bulgars at Munich with the same enthusiasm. It insists on the "*free intercourse of Bulgaria with the North Sea, and soon with the Indian Ocean*. Bulgaria is henceforward indissolubly bound to the economic system of Central Europe, and will be a free and powerful member of the community of States and peoples who will govern this new way of world communications."

At the banquet offered on May 20th by the Bavarian Parliament, the Bulgars were welcomed by the president, Orterer, who congratulated them on having chosen a line of conduct different from that of other Balkan nations, and on having joined Germany and Austria-Hungary at a *difficult and crucial moment*. Ghéorgieff replied, "Our sentiments and interests are the same." During the reception at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the evening, the Councillor of State, Lössl, emphasised the action of Bulgaria against Serbia and the opening of free communications with Turkey. The next day (May 21st) the deputies were received at the Town Hall of Munich. President Borscht saluted them with a speech hostile to Serbia; Dr. Ivan Kostoff replied. The function terminated by the sending of a telegram vibrating with enthusiasm to Ferdinand. (*Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, May 23rd, 1916.)

Returning by Vienna, Momtchiloff declared in the *Reichspost* of May 23rd, 1916, that the Bulgars were enchanted with their reception in Germany and full of admiration for their allies. On May 19th the Wolff Agency communicated to the press the statements made by the Bulgarian Minister at Berlin, Rizoff, to the editor of the *Outro* of Sofia.

Rizoff said that nobody could doubt that Germany would be victorious, that the reception given to the deputies and the speeches were a pledge of cordial relations, and continued thus in the same order of ideas and exalted tone. The *Dnevnik* of May 9th, 1916, wrote concerning the visit of the Bulgarian deputies to Germany :

“ For the first time since we have been free, we have broken resolutely with the political prejudice which would transform gratitude into a direction of policy. . . . *Our alliance with the Central Powers and Turkey was a logical consequence of our historic past*, and therefore nothing factitious or badly calculated can be found in it. This alliance does not represent a passing coincidence of interests. . . . Our economic development led us naturally to turn towards Central Europe, whose influence was increasing slowly but constantly. Austria-Hungary, and Germany too, in their advance eastward were bound to meet us sooner or later. The normal course of events has led us to a mutual understanding.”

* * *

Many things at Buda-Pesth, Vienna, and Berlin must have roused the admiration of the Balkan orientals. But the Germans must have been still more astonished by the success of their tour in Bulgaria, which was transformed—as the German deputy Müller said at the Sofia railway station—into a “ triumphal progress.” The official staging, the popular manifestations, the ovations of the young people, the pæans of the journalists out-rivalled each other.

At a preparatory sitting presided over by Radoslavoff, a special committee was elected to arrange the details of the reception of the German guests.

The *Outro* of June 21st had the following : .

“ On June 19th, the representatives of all the opposition groups in Parliament, with the exception of the Strict Socialists, held a meeting under the presidency of the President of the Sobranié, Dr. Vatcheff. From the democratic party the former Ministers, M. M. Takeff and Al. Mouchanoff, were present ; the popular party was represented by M. Iv. Gueshoff ; the Moderate Socialists by M. J. Sakazoff ; the Tsankovists by M. Daneff, and the Agrarians by the deputy, M. T. Bakaloff.

“ The central direction of the popular party (Gueshovists), owing to the fact that the party had not been invited to take part in the visit of the Bulgarian deputies to Germany and Austria-Hungary, decided on June 20th not to accept the invitation to the banquet offered by the Government. It deemed it necessary, nevertheless, to concert measures with

the competent authorities, in order that the deputies of the allied German nation should receive the most cordial welcome. It was decided at this same sitting that several members of the central direction should visit the German deputies and try to confer with them on questions relating to the war or to the future relations between Bulgaria and the Central States.

"The Broad Socialists also decided not to go to the banquet, but, notwithstanding, to *profit by every opportunity to meet the German deputies.*"

The *Outro* (June 23rd) announced that :

"The secret councils of the opposition regarding the arrival of the German deputies at Sofia have terminated. The central direction of the radical party has delegated the deputy Dr. Fadenhecht to represent the radical democratic group at the reception of the Germans and at the banquets. The direction of the democratic party has also decided, in principle, to participate in the reception. It is probable that its leader, M. Malinoff, will meet the members of the Reichstag to confer on questions arising from the war."

The *Preporetz*, the organ of the Democrats, wrote on this subject :

"Out of respect for the German Parliament and its representatives who visit our country for the first time, and not losing sight of the fact, moreover, that the most elementary politeness requires us to show them special attention, not only on account of their personal merits, but also because they are our allies, *the governing committee of the democratic party has delegated MM. Malinoff, Takeff, and Lieptcheff to go to the station to bid welcome to the German deputies.*"

The delegation from the Reichstag was composed of the deputies Baron Gamp, Massennen, Dr. von Haydebrand, Ernst Bassermann, Hermann Dietrich, Dr. Naumann, Prince Drucki-Lubecki, Dr. Ernst Müller, Dr. Wilhelm Mayer, Erzgeber, Dr. Stresseman, Dr. Pfaffier and Professor Hötsch. On its arrival on June 25th at Nish it was received by the Government Commissary, Tchaprachikoff, the Vice-President of the Sobranié, Momtchiloff, General Koutintcheff, etc.

It was Tchaprachikoff who welcomed the guests at Nish. The deputy von Haydebrand replied :

"We shall conquer ; *this country will belong to you.* Momtchileff said, 'The German artillery had to be brought to clear the Balkans. Welcome, brothers of the heroes of Verdun, of the gallant men of Brest-Litovsk and the Skagerrack, worthy representatives of the infinite German might.' . . ."

At the stations of Bela Palanka and Pirot showy manifestations were organised. But the real surprise was reserved for Sofia. The Bulgarian press went into transports :

"Sofia! '*Ja; das ist Sofia.*' The guests gazed earnestly at the new Balkan town, where the fate of the Balkans was decided. . . . Aeroplanes hovered above the train, and threw down little flags. The platform was crowded, the station gaily decorated. . . . The streets were blocked with people. *The motor cars forged slowly ahead through the mass of thousands who saluted the guests.* Flowers rained from all parts on the distinguished guests. Above all, the youth of the schools threw flowers crying 'Hoch!' and 'Hurrah!' The guests *could not respond to all the salutations.* The streets were magnificently ornamented with the allied flags and garlands of foliage. The people began to fill the streets from 3 o'clock in the afternoon. At 5 o'clock it was impossible to cross the street. A crowd of several thousand people surrounded the Hotel de Bulgarie and filled the adjacent streets. Amidst the joyous acclamations of the crowd the guests showed themselves on the balcony, greeted by *hurrahs* and *hochs*, and the school bands, which played the German National Anthem. Then the choirs of pupils sang the German hymn and some national songs. *The enthusiasm surpassed all expectations.* All the pupils of the lycées and schools defiled before the guests, singing and shouting 'Hurrah!' and 'Hoch!' The ovations before the Hotel de Bulgarie continued until late in the evening."

On the third day, June 27th, at the dinner given by the Chamber of Commerce and Industries, the president of the German colony at Sofia said in the course of his speech that "*the development of Bulgaria, commercially and industrially, can only be compared to the progress made by the United States of America.*"

At the Red Cross Hospital, the President of the Red Cross, M. Ivan Gueshoff, welcomed the guests.

At five o'clock tea was served at the offices of the Internal Macedonian Organisation. In addition to the members of the Government, there were present Dr. Ghenadieff (Stamboulovist), Fadenhecht (Radical), Rachko-Madjaroff (Democrat), Professors Chichmanoff and Miletitch, and others. Among the journalists was the editor of the *Preporetz*.

The next day the same manifestations continued in the provinces, where the German guests were cheered and welcomed by the authorities, the municipalities, the schools, and the public. Masses of people from the villages

assembled at all the stations that were passed. The deputy Müller was right in saying that the journey of the German deputies was "a triumphal march."

The press, on its part, displayed the greatest sympathy. The *Narodni Prava* of June 24th wrote :

"On October 14th last year the Bulgarian and German armies met near Brza Palanka and sealed the alliance between Germany and Bulgaria with the blood which their valiant regiments shed for the great work of the two nations. The joy in Bulgaria was indescribable. It was impossible to describe it, because it exceeded all hopes and expectations. The Bulgarian people expresses to the German deputies its satisfaction and unutterable joy at the great honour done to Bulgaria by the powerful Emperor of Germany, William II., in coming to Nish . . . in Bulgarian territory, to pay his respects to the King of Bulgaria, whom the entire Bulgarian people venerates deeply. It was at Nish that the Emperor of Germany said that Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people were near his heart."

The same journal, on June 25th, under the title of "Welcome," had the following :

"We hope the alliance between Berlin and Sofia, between Germany and Bulgaria will be perpetual. The Bulgarian people have never suffered harm from the Germans, and that is the best pledge that our hearts will always beat in harmony. . . . The present manifestation will show our common enemies that the alliance we have formed is indeed a barrier of iron, which cannot be broken or overthrown, and against which our enemies will finish by breaking their own heads. Now that the blood-stained horizons outline the silhouettes of victorious Germanism and its faithful allies, we emphasise our absolute solidarity, and our resolution to carry on the work we have undertaken to the end."

The *Dnevnik* of June 25th declared :

"The German deputies will feel the pulse of the pure cordiality of the faithful Bulgarian alliance ; they will be able to prove the fact of the *unanimity of all classes of the nation* in the wish to continue the great effort to its desired end. In the environment of all the political groups they will see the fusion of the moral and material forces of Bulgaria, and invincible faith in the victory of the alliance ; they will *observe how proud the Bulgarian nation is to be associated with the Central Powers in the task of realising the aims of the great alliance.*"

The *Outro* of June 25th wrote :

"Appreciating to the full the honour done to us by your visit, proud of the attention you bestow on our country, glad and joyful at the aid your heroic and all-powerful nation lends

to Bulgaria, we are happy to be able to say to you, 'Welcome, gentlemen, to this Bulgaria which receives you with open arms, you the worthy representatives of victorious and illustrious Germany, crowned with the laurels of an eternal glory.' "

The *Echo de Bulgarie* of June 26th :

"The reception of the members of the Reichstag will remain an event in the history of the young Bulgarian capital. It is long since a welcome so brilliant and so warm has been recorded."

In a speech of lofty eloquence at the station, in reply to the greeting of the Mayor of Sofia—a speech which impressed profoundly all who heard it—Dr. Müller said that *the journey of the delegation had been a triumphal progress* :

"In acclaiming the German guests, the population of Sofia acclaimed the German nation in the persons of its representatives ; it hailed with enthusiasm *the great allied country whose powerful aid has permitted Bulgaria to expand to her natural proportions.*

"The cunning and envious enemy to the West has been destroyed, and the valleys of the Morava and the Vardar have been reunited to the central knot of the Balkan Peninsula.

"The eminent men who represent the great political currents of the empire can be convinced by contact with our political environments that the *rapprochement of Germany and Bulgaria*, imposed by the logic of events, the community of aspirations and interests, and crowned with splendid results has become *a national conviction.*"

Voenni Izvestia (June 25th) :

"The Bulgarian capital has often received illustrious guests. But few of them have been awaited with so much pleasure. We see in the German nation a great teacher, and in *the German spirit the greatest treasury of virtues.*"

The *Narodni Prava* (June 28th) said :

"*The representatives of an ingenious, energetic military people, the German nation, are among us. We rejoice, with all our hearts, to have merited this mark of esteem, and we are encouraged by what they tell us: 'Fear nothing; we are with you.' They find with us a warm and sincere welcome, and there, where the German people perishes, the Bulgarian people will perish also. . . . The Bulgarian nation, in alliance with Germany, will advance on the way of progress with giant strides. The white bear, half stripped of his skin, is going to repair to the vast steppes, the Siberian marshes, and the icy rocks to bind up his wounds. . . .*"

With the exception of the extreme Socialists, all the opposition took part in the manifestations.

The *Mir* (June 25th) wrote :

"We have proved in the past that *we are not a prejudiced people, a people of caprice, but that we know how to calculate, persuaded that only good reckonings make good friends. If the Bulgars had not possessed these qualities Bulgaria would not have attained the enviable position in which, before this war and before the Balkan war, she won esteem and respect in London as at Berlin, at Petrograd as in Vienna.*"

The *Mir* of June 28th stated :

"The eminent member of the German national party and of the Reichstag who was among our guests, in the course of his speech, gave utterance to an idea which merits longer consideration. *He said that our German guests had come to Bulgaria to greet the whole nation, not to fortify a party.* To prove it, he reminded us that his colleagues belong to different groups (all parties are represented except the Socialists). At the 5 o'clock tea yesterday given by the Macedonian Brotherhood he developed his idea before a group of our politicians containing representatives of different tendencies (Dr. Fadenhecht, Vladimir Moloff, D. Gueurtcheff, Dr. Ivan Chichmanoff, Ivan Peieff, and others). It is a pleasure to us to state that the Germans examine and study our political life carefully, and that they wish to attach themselves (as the eminent German sociologist and writer has declared) not to one party only, but to the Bulgarian people in its entirety. . . ."

The *Preporetz* of June 25th wrote :

"The deputies of the Reichstag saluted the Bulgarian people at Berlin, and to-day they come among us to pay homage to Bulgaria. We hope they will not be disagreeably surprised here. We are a young nation—*ein Naturvolk*, as they would say, which is now elaborating the contingencies of its social life. We are waging a war which compels us to defend our country with all the energy which characterises us, even against those who called us to freedom. Wars are to-day works of necessity."

One group only refused to take part in the reception, that of the extreme Socialists, whose organ, the *Rabotnitchenski Vestnik*, of June 24th said :

"Yesterday, at the sitting of the Sofia Municipal Council, Dr. J. Dimitroff declared in the name of his group that he could not participate in the reception of the German deputies, and that he opposed any municipal expenditure with this object, for the following reasons: The German deputies about to visit Bulgaria represent the Imperialist policy which has provoked the present war, and are partisans of the prolongation of the war to the end—to the complete victory of German

Imperialism. Their journey has a purely political character, and is only a link in a long chain of measures forged in order to dominate the Balkans, especially Bulgaria, economically and perhaps politically also."

The *Narodni Prava*, in a leader (July 6th), cites a speech of the German deputy, Dr. Naumann, showing the merits of the President of the Council, Radoslavoff, in bringing about the alliance of Bulgaria and Germany :

"The policy of Dr. Radoslavoff has been crowned with success, and has become the policy not only of the Liberal party, but of the whole Bulgarian people. And that people has faith to-day in its President of the Council, whilst contemplating the results of his efforts."

The *Az Est* of July 9th spoke of the enthusiasm with which the German deputies had been received in Bulgaria :

"The German deputies have returned from Bulgaria by way of the Danube. When their boat came in sight of Belgrade a dinner was served on board. The Governor of Serbia and Tchaprachikoff were present."

Naumann stated to a correspondent of the *Az Est* :

"The Entente press has asserted more than once that King Ferdinand and Radoslavoff were leading the country into a policy which did not respond to the will of the people. The contrary is true. On our visit to Bulgaria it became evident that the people displayed the greatest cordiality beyond all expectation, and in full agreement with the decisions of the Government. We are still impressed by the strong and indomitable enthusiasm with which the people received us. . . . Nobody can say that it was an official reception, because the peasantry came spontaneously, offering us gifts. The population of the towns emptied into the streets where we happened to be. I can say without exaggeration that a tenth of the Bulgarian people took part in the welcome. The peasants invaded the towns even when our stay was only a quarter of an hour. Our presence was a symbol, and it offered to the Bulgarian people an opportunity of expressing what they felt in their hearts. We are returning home glad and grateful, certain that henceforward the adhesion of Bulgaria to Central Europe is an irrefutable fact."

Dr. Müller-Meininger, Bavarian deputy of the Liberal left, made to the correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (July 27th) the following communication :

"There was nothing prepared, nothing got up. Children came from remote villages with their teachers, and everything showed that these latter had inspired the children with sympathy for the Germans. . . . Everywhere homage was paid to German

work and honesty. . . . The officers of reserve who have been at German universities play an important part, and are the mainspring of friendship with Germans. The knowledge of the German language is widespread in Bulgaria; everywhere the young people sing German songs. *One can hear 'Deutschland über Alles' impeccably executed in every village.* THE POLICY OF THE KING, WHICH IS GERMANOPHIL, IS SUPPORTED BY THE PARLIAMENT AND THE ENTIRE COUNTRY."

The same manifestations were repeated later on every occasion. 'The Wolff telegrams of German victories, the speeches of Bethmann-Hollweg, the Roumanian intervention, the anniversary of Bulgaria entering the war, the conquest of Serbia—all these events served as pivots of a demonstration.

In the manifestations for Hungary, solidarity of interests is insisted upon; in declarations concerning the Dual monarchy as a whole, homage is rendered for services in the past; but in its enthusiasm for Germany and the Germans, the practical Bulgarian mind never forgets to renew its hope that the promises for the future will be kept. They continue exchanging compliments with Austria-Hungary, they declare their efforts and programme are at one with those of Hungary, but at every reference made to the master who is at Berlin, they expect a reward for services rendered. Bulgaria does not cease to recall the promises which caused her to intervene in the war. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, in its leader of October 28th, 1915, on the junction of the German and Bulgarian armies at Brza Palanka, wrote :

"The Germans and Bulgars have effected their junction. The day on which this took place will remain of historic importance to the world. It was operated on the Serbian front, on territory which will constitute a portion of the rewards of war which the Bulgarian people has earned by brilliant combats under the leadership of its King."

A year later, when the Bulgars celebrated the anniversary of this, to them, illustrious date, they did not forget the promises made to them before it, and repeated since. The *Narodni Prava* (October 28th, 1916) devoted an article to the great and indestructible work, the solid bridge between east and west whose boundaries were laid at Brza Palanka. When the German deputies arrived at Sofia, the *Narodni Prava* of June 26th recalled the Kaiser's visit to Nish :

"It was then that the EMPEROR OF GERMANY SAID, 'My

soldiers will fight by the side of the Bulgarian soldiers, in order that Bulgaria may occupy her forsaken Macedonia and Morava. IT IS TO BULGARIA THAT ALL THE BOOTY OF THE ANNIHILATED SERBIAN STATE WILL GO.' "

Habituated to the Germanic idea of world domination, the Bulgars wait with deference before their masters, ready with docile servility to play any part, to take up any job, but always with hand outstretched for recompense. At the prospect of gain, they are enthusiastic, transforming and adapting themselves with astonishing suppleness and celerity. The success which only one year of German domination and propaganda has obtained in Bulgaria is a veritable revelation of Bulgarian temperament and character, to those who did not know them.

CHAPTER IX

THE GERMANISATION OF BULGARIA

THE Bulgarian temperament, hard and inflexible, sullen and distrustful, adapted itself suddenly, expanded into enthusiasm for Bulgaro-German fraternity. Germany's latest ally has become the most devoted. A thousand kilometres of distance have not hindered Bulgaria from drawing nearer to Prussia than the federated States of the German Empire. Buda-Pesth, formerly quite a German town, appears less so to-day than Sofia.

The facility for adaptation of the Prussians of the Balkans and the organisation of German propaganda have aided each other mutually. It is evident, and the *Mir* remarks it, that the Germans have shown themselves good psychologists by divining in the practical Bulgarian people the sense of calculation.

Even before the formal conclusion of the alliance, the Germans had attached themselves to Bulgaria by economic and financial ties. German commercial and industrial expansion in Bulgaria is of old date, and developed rapidly. The German character of the Court of Coburg, and the education of a large number of Bulgars in German universities and schools, military, technical and commercial, largely facilitated the propaganda. Notwithstanding this, the year which has just elapsed has witnessed a great transformation.

The exercise of the supreme command of the army, and the direct administration of means of communication* have furnished the Germans with very good instruments for the rapid Germanisation of Bulgaria. The organisation of economic relations has also given to the Germans a means of considerably strengthening their influence. Bulgarian

* The Minister of Public Works, Apostoloff, declared to the Sobranié : " It is in the interests of the State that some lines of railway should be worked by our allies." (*Mir*, December 29th, 1916.)

importation and exportation in 1916 has been, in fact, monopolised by an organisation German not only financially but, to a large extent, administratively. To justify and veil this exploitation, which became an abuse before the autumn of 1916*, Germany unceasingly lulled Bulgaria by the propaganda of *Mittel-Europa* theorists, and grandiose plans which assigned her a great role in the economic community of the Central Powers, and the function of intermediary between east and west.

The "peaceful penetration" of the Germans in Bulgaria, so well organised, was effected not only by the influence of the authorities controlling the army and communications, but also by the propaganda of representatives of humanitarian institutions, by the visits and lectures of economists, writers and professors, by the propaganda of associations formed especially with this intent, by courses of lessons in German, etc.

Among practical means calculated to appeal to the Bulgarian mind, Germany made use, above all, of humanitarian institutions, of her Red Cross, and associations newly created for the purpose.

The German committee of aid for the Bulgarian Red Cross was presided over by Duke Johann Albrecht of Mecklenburg. When institutes of disinfection against malarial fever in Macedonia were established, King Ferdinand personally thanked the German mission. The Bulgarian newspapers continually congratulate and thank the missions. The collections for the Bulgarian Red Cross are made with the help of the authorities and the participation of personages of the highest rank. These German donations have amounted to large sums. The success of this act of political benevolence shows how much Germany has striven to supplant Russia among the masses. Bulgaro-German associations are founded on both sides, conferences and exhibitions are organised.

* This is one of the chief causes why Bulgaria, an agricultural country, experienced a scarcity of foodstuffs after one year of war only. After innumerable protests, complaints, and discussions, absorbing the whole of the activity of Parliament in the summer and autumn of 1916, the question was solved by the law of "public precaution," which regulated the internal consumption without checking the abuses of exploitation. In March, 1917, Bulgaria reached a shortage even of things of which indigenous production exceeded the consumption. It was then that a dictatorship was established controlling the victualling of the army and civil population, and this dictatorship was confided to an officer, Protogueroff, recently promoted to the rank of general. The Bulgarian dictator is a notorious Germanophil and a protégé of the Kaiser.

The *Vossische Zeitung* of February 16th announced that the Germano-Bulgarian Association has held a meeting in the Parliament building at Berlin under the presidency of Duke Ernst Gunther of Schleswig-Holstein. This body *will be subsidised by the State*, and has for its object the development of the intellectual and material interests of the Bulgarian and German people exclusively. According to the *Echo de Bulgarie* (February 18th) the Germano-Bulgarian Association held its first sitting on February 2nd. Professors Miletitch and Michailoff, of Sofia, were present. Rizoff was elected honorary member.

Here is the order in which the principal Bulgaro-German Societies were founded in Germany up to August, 1916 :

In 1912, at Munich, was founded "Der Donau und Balkan länder Verein." A section of this society concerned itself solely with Bulgaria. In 1913, at Berlin, was formed "Der Deutsche Balkan Verein," with the object of trading with all Balkan States. In November, 1914, was founded at Berlin "Der Deutsche-Bulgarische Verein." In autumn, 1915, Professor Gurlitt founded at Dresden "Die Deutsch-Bulgarische Vereinigung." During the winter, 1915-1916, was inaugurated at Munich "Die Deutsch-Bulgarische Gesellschaft"; afterwards "Die Hamburger Vereinigung von Freunden Bulgarien"; "Das Institut für den Wirtschaftsverkehr mit Bulgarien," and in January, 1916, was inaugurated at Berlin "Die Deutsch-Bulgarische Gesellschaft" and "Die Deutsche Levante Verband." The societies "Der Deutsche Balkan Verein," "Das Institut für den Wirtschaftsverkehr mit Bulgarien," and "Die Deutsche Levante Verband" pursue economic aims, whilst the others are devoted to strengthening moral and intellectual relations with Bulgaria. (*Echo de Bulgarie*, August 17th, 1916.)

The *Berliner Tageblatt* (February 18th) announced that at the war exhibitions to be held at Berlin the Bulgars would contribute the carriage of King Peter and several Serbian flags. The Berlin artists organised an exhibition of Bulgarian art in May, 1916. An exhibition of Bulgarian broidery, ornaments and costumes was held at Munich.

The *Zarva* of October 28th, and the *Outro* of November 4th, 1916, announced that the literary society "Die Klausse" had organised a Bulgarian soirée for October 30th. Dora Tcherman recited poetry of Hristo Boteff, I. Vazoff, Pentcho Slaveikoff, Kiril Hristoff, and Yavoreff, etc.

The *Vossische Zeitung* (November 21st) wrote :

"In conformity with a wish of the Queen of Bulgaria, the Germano-Bulgarian Association of Berlin has founded the 'Bulgarian House' in the Berlin Club of Men of Letters. Among others present we remarked 'the son of President of the Council Radoslavoff, who is attached to a regiment of the Guards at Berlin.'"

The *Dnevnik* (April 4th) announced that on the initiative of Professor Dr. Wiegand, a Bulgarian Library of Science was about to be published at Leipzig in German. The editor was Yvan Parlapanoff. The series of volumes would treat of divers questions of economics, Bulgarian literary and military* history, as well as Bulgarian history, geography and ethnology.

Bulgaro-German propaganda, wishful not to neglect any means or opportunity of action, has often resorted to very childish and trivial expedients. The same manifestations as those in June, 1916, are repeated on the occasion of every visit, and always wind up with "Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles."† The theatres and cinemas of Berlin, like those of Sofia, incessantly work upon these showy tendencies. German playwrights and musicians bring out pieces turning on Bulgarian *motifs*. The *Vossische Zeitung* (November 23rd), for example, announces that the operetta, "The Bulgarian Woman," by Hans Bodenstatt, music by H. Menecké, is inspired by two Bulgarian ballads.

* An executive committee was formed at Sofia to aid in carrying out this enterprise. The list of members included Professors Ichirkoff, Vl. Molkoff, André Protitch, and the director of the Bulgarian Press Bureau, Herbst. Professor Wiegand was named director of the periodical, and Professors Ubersberger (Vienna), Asboth (Buda-Pesth), Kassner (Berlin), and Ichirkoff (Sofia), members of the editorial committee.

A treatise by Professor Ichirkoff, "Bulgaria: Land and People," was to appear as the first issue of the library; it would be followed by "Macedonia: Land and People," by Prof. Miletitch; "Bulgarian History" (to 1492), by Prof. Zlatarski; "Bulgarian History" (from 1492 to 1914), by N. Staneff; "The Bulgarian Peasant," by Prof. Danaïloff; "Bulgarian Folk-literature," by Wiegand; "Popular Economic Development of Bulgaria" (1879-1814), by Kyril Popoff; "The Evolution of the Defensive Power of Bulgaria, and the Present Position," by Colonel Kosta Nikoloff. (*Dnevnik*, April 4th.)

† The *Berliner Tageblatt* of December 6th is informed: "At the station of the zoological gardens the Lieut.-General (*en disponibilité*) Imhof Pasha, the explorer of the Balkans, Dr. Falkschup, and Prof. D. Heck came to wish a pleasant journey to the Bulgarian students. General (*en disponibilité*) Siemens, having harangued the students, Nikola Daneff replied and ended by shouting, 'The God of Battles is with us! Good health to you! Au revoir until after victory! Long live the Kaiser! Long live the victorious German nation!' The Bulgars sang the 'Shoumi Maritza' and 'Deutschland über Alles.'"

All the cinemas in Germany have shown a Bulgarian film (film Bogdan Stimoff) with a tragic and patriotic subject, and among the actors filmed are the royal couple of Bulgaria. The *premières* of this film were given in the presence of the highest Germano-Bulgarian dignitaries, and provoked the most tumultuous manifestations of Bulgaro-German friendship. The *Berliner Tageblatt* of September 8th, and other journals, devoted entire articles to it. The welcome of the German deputies to Sofia was also filmed to serve as a stimulus to manifestations in the cinemas (*Mir*, November 4th). As for the cinemas of Sofia, they produced unceasingly well-known films of German propaganda.*

The propagators of Germano-Bulgarian fraternity judged it necessary also to found at Sofia a daily newspaper in German. Sofia had possessed for a long time a commercial journal, published in Bulgarian and German (*Bulgarisches Handelsblatt*). The new German daily *Deutsche Balkanzeitung* appeared in 1917.

The propagation of the German language is pursued without relaxation both by writing and speaking. During their stay at Vienna, the Bulgarian deputies held a conference on May 4th, 1916, with the President of the Austrian Parliament, Dr. Sylvester. The Bulgars insisted emphatically on the importance of the German language.

"*Altimirski declared that much attention is paid in Bulgaria to the study of German, and that German teachers are in great demand. It may be admitted that, even before the alliance of Bulgaria with the Central Powers in this war, about half the population was well disposed towards the Germans. Since the Bulgars, fighting side by side with the Austrian and German armies, have obtained great military successes, enthusiasm for the allies has become so intense in Bulgaria that at present the entire Bulgarian nation is on the side of the Central Powers with all its soul. Everything beautiful or useful is looked upon by the Bulgars as German.*" (*Zeit*, May 7th, 1916.)

According to the *Echo de Bulgarie* (February 8th, 1916), since the beginning of Bulgarian intervention, the *Kulturverein* at Sofia has organised special courses of Bulgarian and German. After the departure of the German deputies, the *Narodni Prava* for several consecutive days published in German at the head of its first page the speeches and

* The Prussian War Minister organised cinematograph soirées, even in the National Theatre at Sofia. (*Dnevnik*, September 30th, 1916.)

articles of all the German guests. The Sofia newspapers insert all the advertisements of German courses and lessons in German. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* (July 10th, 1916) states that the German language is gaining ground in Bulgaria day by day. The German classes overflow with pupils. In order to show to what degree Germanisation has taken hold of Bulgaria, it is of interest to quote from the German press an echo of the visit of the German deputies.

The *Kölnische Zeitung* (July 13th, 1916) wrote :

"The Bulgars take pleasure in the exaggeration, '*If you want to learn Bulgarian do not stay at Sofia, because people speak only German there.*' "

Only a whimsical sally, but it is characteristic.

* * *

The eulogy of German culture and the German tongue is a subject of which the Sofia press is never weary. In the *Mir*, the opposition organ, and one of the most intelligent and best edited journals, we have seen Boris Vazoff calling the German people "the most civilised," and writing in the expectation that its influence will produce "the moral renaissance of the Bulgars."

In an article entitled "The Common Ground of Germano-Bulgarian Culture," in the *Narodni Prava* of February 3rd, Al. Makedonski advises the Bulgars to adopt as much as possible German "Kultur." "No other civilisation," he says, "can become us so well, by its character, as German civilisation."

The *Dnevnik* (February 9th) published a leader under the heading "Abandon all Hope," in which it said :

"If the nineteenth century is marked by the seal of French civilisation and English enterprise, the twentieth century will be the century of German culture. . . . France has already given to humanity what she could ; she is now exhausted and needs repose and regeneration. It is the turn of Germany, and she will prevail, even if the Entente enlists other States in its cause."

In order to pay homage to German civilisation, the Bulgars decided to organise immediately after the tour of the politicians, a great excursion of artists and writers through Germany.*

* The *Kölnische Zeitung* announced under the date of November 20th : In the month of May of this year the best known Bulgarian writers decided, at a meeting held at Sofia, to visit the German people, and thus

The same servile spirit, which in politics has placed the Bulgars under the domination of German power, prostrated itself, with admiration, before Germanism and its most trivial manifestations.

The *Echo de Bulgarie* (July 14th, 1916), together with all the Bulgarian press, goes into ecstasies over the exploit of the German submarine *Deutschland*.

"The exploit of the *Deutschland*, coming at the same time as the great sterile offensive of the Entente, is of an import that we would designate as symbolic. Indeed, it symbolises the rare moral qualities of the German people and their invincibility. A nation which achieves marvels cannot be vanquished by a coalition of vile instincts. The passage of the Atlantic by the first mercantile submarine built in Germany has results more durable for the evolution of the war than the fourteen thousand yards gained by the English army in fifteen days, after ten months of vast preparation."

In autumn, 1916, the organ of the Democrats, the most vigorous party in the Bulgarian opposition, defends German submarine warfare as legitimate and in conformity with the law of nations.

The *Preporetz* (October 13th, 1916) says:

"Dread of travelling will have a harmful influence on the provisioning of the Entente as well as on the production of munitions of war. *Submarine warfare made in conformity with international law will not be interrupted.* It will continue as long as the war lasts."

The German declaration of submarine warfare *à outrance*,

create the first approach of intellectual Bulgaria to Germany. The German-Bulgarian Association of Berlin hastened to respond to the wish of the Bulgars. The Director of the Academy of Fine Arts accepted the presidency of the Committee of Honour. Here are the names of the Bulgarian men of letters who will visit us: the former Director of the National Library, Dr. M. Titchoff, who knows Germans extremely well, and is the best literary critic of Bulgaria; old Ivan Vazoff, the great popular poet, whose renown has spread through the universe, far beyond the frontiers of his country; the philosopher Mihailovsky; the lyric poet and great friend of Germans, Kiril Hristoff; the man most versed in knowledge of Bulgarian rustic life, and best loved by the people, Elin Pelin; A. Strachimiroff and D. Nemiroff, who have now won celebrity by their vivid stories of the life of Bulgarian soldiers. Our guests propose to visit Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Frankfort, Carlsruhe, Stuttgart, Munich, Weimar, Dresden, Leipzig, and Breslau. In each of these cities there will be a Bulgarian artistic soirée, where the German people will hear from the lips of the best Bulgarian artists of the National Opera and National Theatre of Sofia the pearls of Bulgarian literature and music."

This pilgrimage took place in February, 1917, with much display.

on February 1st, 1917, was hailed by the Bulgarian press with the same admiration and enthusiasm.

The *Narodni Prava* (February 3rd) :

"Henceforth it will be impossible for the Entente to import foreign produce, arms, and munitions. Its populations will suffer new horrors. *Exulting with joy and enthusiasm, the Bulgarian people*, as well as their Government, express once more their admiration and respect for the sublime and valorous German nation."

From the *Preporetz* (February 3rd) :

"The consequences of the new blows, directed this time against the weakest spot in the Entente, will be rapid, immediate, and very grave. The war *à outrance* which is begun *will sow confusion in the plans of the Entente, and the present superiority of the Central Powers on the fronts will be reinforced.*"

From the *Zaria* (February 4th) :

"The last struggle will be waged without mercy and without consideration. . . . The submarine war *à outrance* will be a decisive factor, whether in the annihilation of the Anglo-French domination on the sea, or the crushing of the Entente on the Continent."

From the *Narodni Prava* (February 5th) :

"Whoever hopes to cause greater sacrifices in the ranks of the Central Empires will be punished without pity. . . . We are firmly convinced that no neutral power will protest against these new measures. *If there should be a neutral country acting to the contrary, well, that country will be punished as it deserves.*"

From the Socialist *Narod* (February 5th) :

"England has finished by falling into the trap she laid for all the world. Whatever turn events may take, England will come out of this war with colossal losses."

From the *Preporetz* (February 5th) :

"The blockade declared by Germany has caused indescribable fright. Public opinion among the Entente, so far as we can judge from the press, is much excited and scared, above all in England, where the commencement of a horrible phase of the war is best understood."

From the *Mir* (February 6th) :

" . . . Germany does not possess so many battleships and cruisers as the whole of the Entente, but as a set-off she disposes of a larger number of submarines. It is by the latter that she will impose the blockade. *Can anyone maintain seriously that one means is less legal than another ?*"

From the *Kambana* (February 6th) :

"The submarine is an enemy that cannot be reached in the vast sea, and *it will have a rich harvest*, seeing that four thousand vessels a week enter and quit English waters alone ; *the submarines will throw themselves on these like wolves on a flock of sheep.*"

From the *Voenni Izvestia* (February 7th) :

"The submarine war *à outrance* frees the hands and does away with the barriers that have paralysed operations. To-day the 'U-boat pest,' as submarine warfare has been called in England, hovers around Great Britain."

From the *Preporetz* (February 7th) :

"Submarine warfare *à outrance*, without scruple, without pity. The implacable enemies of Germany do not want peace before she has been destroyed. Our ally makes appeal to another means by which to force them to make peace."

From the *Kambana* (February 8th) :

"*For life or death* is the watchword proclaimed by the Kaiser, and this watchword will triumph, in the sense that it will bring peace and life to the Central Alliance, and bring new humiliations, new misery, and catastrophe on those who lead the Entente, and their satellites."

For Bulgaria, as for Germany, the most brilliant representatives of high Germanic culture are, and have been since the beginning of the war, the Kaiser, Hindenburg, and Mackensen. Every speech and every article contains eulogies of the Kaiser : his portraits in every attitude fill the Bulgarian reviews. As an example of the trivialities with which the Bulgarian public are regaled on "the personification of German genius," it will be enough to cite an article in the *Narodni Prava* (May 31st, 1916), three columns in length, on "Kaiser William, Collegian."

Hindenburg is the idol of the Bulgarian press. The *Echo de Bulgarie* wrote on October 4th, 1916 :

"In the immense conflict which is turning Europe upside down, Germany, for more than two years, *has given proof of moral qualities and social virtues unattained hitherto by any other nation.* And in Germany, facing a world of jealousy and hatred, *Hindenburg is the typical representative of the race.*"

The *Mir* (Gueshoff) wrote :

"Whether by hazard or not, the great military leaders belong to the Central Empires ; there is a line of them rising gradually to Hindenburg. This is an indisputable fact, and it permits the Central Empires to regard the future with tran-

quillity and to look forward to final victory. The Bulgarian people is also one of these nations."

This fetishism is general in the Bulgarian press. Even the Socialist organ *Narod* is not exempt. The *Narod* enumerates the virtues of the German marshal, and recommends that he should be held up as an example to Bulgarian youth. (*Narod*, April 18th, 1916, the fiftieth anniversary of Hindenburg's entrance on the military career.)

Attracted by the tempting prospect of gain, bound more closely every day by multiple material ties, and subjected more and more to the profound influence of Germanism, the Bulgars have grown accustomed to the new part which at the beginning they hypocritically affected. In binding her destiny to that of her powerful ally, Bulgaria has become habituated to such a degree that she has started to think and feel like her. The Kaiser, Hindenburg, the *Deutschland*, the 42-centimetre guns, or the bombs dropped by Zeppelins on London, are venerated by the descendants of Tartars as the pagan gods were formerly venerated by the tribes of Asia. The monsters of force, cunning, and frightfulness strike the imagination of the impulsive, primitive "Prussians of the Balkans" even more than they do that of the Prussians of the north.

This blind worship of material brute force shows kinship of mentality between the Bulgar and the German, and contains, perhaps, the most interesting and weighty psychological explanation of the great and rapid progress of Germanism in Bulgaria. "They have found each other," as the Kaiser's son said.

CHAPTER X

THE BULGARS IN "MITTEL-EUROPA"

THE grandiose plan of the economic union of *Mittel-Europa* conceived by Frederic Naumann has been hailed with enthusiasm and approved in Bulgaria for several reasons. The first and chief of these is that *Mittel-Europa* implies the doing away with Serbia, whose territory forms an essential portion of the Hamburg-Bagdad line of route. Another reason is the prospect of vast material profits which surpass, in Bulgarian imagination, the value of the territory conquered. To these two motives based on tangible gains are added two others of a psychological nature. The primitive Bulgarian mind was dazzled by the tremendous perspective opened up by Naumann's scheme. The enviable rôle held out to Bulgaria of becoming the principal guardian of the Hamburg-Bagdad route, and the intermediary between East and West, must have flattered Bulgarian megalomania more than the compliments of the fox flattered the crow in the fable.

Numerous speeches and articles already quoted contain the idea of a union of States between the North Sea and the Persian Gulf. This idea was insisted on principally in the first months of Bulgarian intervention.

We will cite here a passage from the *Mir* (April 5th, 1916) which reproduced on its first page a translation of an article by Fischer of the *Deutsche Nachrichten* (March 26th) devoted to the importance and the rôle of Bulgaria in the Balkans :

"By the adhesion of Turkey to the Central Powers, and the occupation of Serbia, the States of Central Europe have acquired a road which they must preserve to assure their world policy and their economic prosperity. . . . *Bulgaria is not only a bridge on the road to Africa and Asia, but also an important link uniting Central Europe and the Orient.* In any case, aid to Bulgaria is indispensable, because she is an independent factor,

and has contributed to the extension of Central Europe towards the East."

The *Narodni Prava* (May 3rd, 1916) said:

"Our situation in the Alliance is much more favourable than that of its other members, thanks to our position and the wealth we possess in abundance. . . . The formation of an alliance grouping the States from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf will divide the old world into two halves, and will place a check on many immoderate desires and many adventures."

The Bulgarian chargé d'affaires at Berne told the correspondent of the *Vilag* (June 23rd, 1916) that "Bulgarian markets will never be opened to the Entente; we wish for close ties with the Hungarians and Germans."

Dr. Paul Ostwald has published a pamphlet, "*Die Kultur-politische Mission Bulgariens*," as the eighth volume of the "Library of National and Universal Economy" (Dresden-Leipzig, Globus, 1916). In it we read:

"The mission of Bulgaria consists in serving as a link between Germany and Turkey. The alliance of Bulgaria with the Central Powers and Turkey, concluded in the course of the war, corresponds with her natural political interests; that is why it will be lasting. . . . She has become a solid link in the chain of Powers which extends from the Northern and Eastern seas to the Persian Gulf. The *Hamburg-Bagdad road* will pass through Sofia, and Bulgaria is plainly indicated as the intermediary between West and East. She can now avail herself of her geographical position and thus carry out her *world mission*."

It was not, properly speaking, the propaganda of *Mittel-Europa* but a manifestation of the same range of ideas that Professor R. Vambéry, Director-General of the Association of Fraternity of Arms of Buda-Pesth, outlined in a lecture given in the hall of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Sofia, in the month of October, 1916. The *Mir* (Gueshivist) of October 12th wrote on the subject of the lecture of Professor Vambéry:

"The project of the creation of such an association must have been received with joy at Sofia by all who were present at the first meeting. The meeting charged three Bulgars to take measures for the formation of an association like that of Buda-Pesth."

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The rôle and the importance of Bulgaria in *Mittel-Europa* were formulated by the author of *Mittel-Europa* himself.

Friedrich Naumann, the famous theorist of *Mittel-*

Europa, after the visit of German deputies to Bulgaria, in which he himself took part, published a pamphlet entitled "*Bulgaria and Mittel-Europa*" (Friedrich Naumann : Bulgarien u. Mitteleuropa, Berlin, 1916). Naumann affirms that with Bulgaria and Turkey, her present allies, Germany—and consequently *Mittel-Europa*—becomes closely and eternally bound to the Balkan Peninsula. The conflicts which are taking place there render those ties enduring, and the integrity of *Mittel-Europa*, as Naumann conceives it, becomes impregnable :

"*Defeat in the Balkans would be not only the defeat of the Bulgars and Turks, but also that of Mittel-Europa.*" "THE VICTORY OF THE BULGARIAN ARMIES AND THE CREATION OF A GREAT BULGARIA ARE NEEDED IMPERATIVELY BY MITTEL-EUROPA."

Moreover, thinks Naumann, the tour of the members of the Reichstag in Bulgaria made evident the sincerity of this alliance, and the love that the Bulgars, although "timid and suspicious," feel for the Germans. The people themselves, by their spontaneous enthusiasm, showed that they approved of the "*Mittel-European*" policy of their King. One feels that Bulgaria has closed the pages of the first chapter of her new national existence, from her deliverance to the second Balkan war, from 1876 to 1914. Russophilism was the essential characteristic of that period. But, fortunately, the Princes of Bulgaria, Germans in origin—Battenberg first and Coburg afterwards, the latter above all—have shaken down that Russophilism and succeeded in bringing the Bulgars into sympathetic touch with the Germans. The psychology and character of the people were not opposed to that policy. The Bulgars, who have nothing of the Latin in them, wished to assimilate French civilisation, but were unable to do so, because it was totally foreign to them : "*they were, like the Germans, too coarse, too slow, too serious, and too upright*, not agile enough, and still great grown-up children." The Bulgars, who are still very "*Balkanic*," full of bad qualities, "*distrustful, cunning, sly*," and whose "*new morality is not yet formed*," separated from Russia under the rule of Coburg—thanks, chiefly, to political events in 1912 and 1913 and to the catastrophe of 1913 which resulted. In separating from Russia and ceasing to like her, more or less, they constituted themselves into a more independent political unit, and associated themselves irrevocably with *Mittel-Europa*.

After many diplomatic moves on the part of the Entente, as well as on that of the Central Empires, Bulgaria, the friend and ally of Turkey, took her place definitely on the side of the Central Empires. The fact that a group of Austro-Hungarian and German banks, the "Berliner Diskonto-Gesellschaft" at the head, advanced half the great Bulgarian loan of 500 million francs, delivering Bulgaria from the financial yoke of the French in 1914, contributed much, according to Naumann, to the realisation of the alliance. On another side, the need of vengeance against Serbia, the *protégé* of Russia, finally determined the decision.

That is how Bulgaria and Turkey, and with them the Balkan Peninsula, entered into affinity with *Mittel-Europa*. For a considerable time, above all during the first years of the Triple Alliance, Germany did not entertain altogether precise views on the Balkan question, on account of the uncertainty of Bulgaro-Turkish policy on the one hand, and on the other of certain divergences of Austro-Hungarian and German interests in the Balkans. But now, matters are established on a firm basis. The military alliance of the Central Empires with Bulgaria and Turkey must be transformed into a permanent alliance for efforts in times of peace as well as of war. The historical, geographical, political, and economic reasons for *Mittel-Europa* demand such an alliance.

As for Serbia, Naumann avoids speaking of her so long as she is at war with the Central Empires. All the same, from his point of view, it is indispensable to preserve *the territorial link of Austria-Hungary with Bulgaria at the expense of Serbia*. Without this territorial continuity *Mittel-Europa* is not realisable.

The German and Austro-Hungarian press has not made many comments on this pamphlet. Only the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Arbeiter Zeitung* of Vienna publish an abstract of the subject without criticism. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of October 15th, 1916, adds that Naumann's ideas are *sound and good*.

The *Vossische Zeitung* (July 7th, 1916) states with satisfaction that "Naumann's is the most read book in Bulgaria."

The Bulgarian press has accorded great praise to Naumann's book, but the economic survey has not been able to make much of the promises of *Mittel-Europa* for Bulgaria.

The most Germanophil Bulgarian journal, *Kambana*, eulogises the political section, but is obliged to make reservations on the realisation of the economic ideas of *Mittel-Europa*.

The professor of Political Economy at the University of Sofia, M. A. Tzankoff, has written an economic essay entitled "The War of Nations." The aim of the Bulgarian author is to explain through economic reasons the coalition of Entente nations against those of the Central Alliance. It is the German theory, naturally, which inspires the professor of the University of Sofia in his political considerations.

At the end of his essay he deals with the question of the Customs Union of *Mittel-Europa*, which he treats with great reserve :

"The political alliance of *Mittel-Europa* will be possible, but the customs frontiers will remain. International commercial administration will be established later by treaties of commerce. It is already very difficult to put into practice a customs union between Germany and Austria-Hungary ; such a union is still less possible between those two countries and Bulgaria, whose degree of ' culture ' is on a lower level." (*Kambana*, September 5th, 1916.)

The Bulgars are too practical not to discern the economic humbug of *Mittel-Europa* ; but its political side allures their greedy appetites.

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The Bulgarian deputy, D. Kiortcheff, wrote a series of articles in the *Echo de Bulgarie* on the ideas of Friedrich Naumann concerning the creation of a *Mittel-Europa*. Here is an abstract of the articles of the deputy Kiortcheff which appeared in the *Echo de Bulgarie* of November 23rd, 24th and 25th :

"M. Naumann has crystallised his impressions in two words, '*Es wächst*' (Bulgaria is growing). He shows by figures that, from the economic point of view, Bulgaria has remained up to the present exclusively under the influence of the Central and Western States of Europe. He says openly what he thinks. He says that all this war would be a disaster if it finished in misunderstandings between the Allies. The maintenance of peace ought to be sought in the grouping of States with similar political interests.

"M. Naumann quotes the following lines from the memoirs of Bismarck : 'If I had been an Austrian Minister I should

not have made difficulties with the Russians about the acquisition of Constantinople.' Bismarck did not take into account that if once the Russians were at Constantinople the existence itself of the monarchy would be imperilled. When Bismarck was writing those words in his journal a change occurred against which he had struggled in vain—the secret treaty between Germany and Russia, which obliged Germany to neutrality, in case Austria-Hungary should attack Russia, was not renewed. The policy of Central Europe dates from that moment.

"Little Bulgaria was prepared for the Central Alliance by her geographical position and by the rôle marked out for her in the Balkans. . . . If we compare our historical development with that of Germany we shall perceive a striking similitude in the destiny of the German and Bulgarian peoples.

"We joined the Central Powers, not only to have Macedonia, but also to assure our future. Germany menaced by England meant Austria exposed to the attack of Russia, and the fate of Central Europe hung in the balance. The crushing of Austria would suppress the rivalry of the Great Powers in the Balkans, and our 'Balkan old man' would have seen the Russian regiments once more, and they would not wish to quit again.

"The stumbling-block was the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 'The Bosnian crisis,' says M. Naumann, 'showed us that a Central European policy imposed mutual defence. Bulgaria was a factor in the crisis by the fact of proclaiming, officially, the existing political independence. The European war would have broken out then if Serbia had finally wished for war with Austria, and if she had been supported by Russia.' We have taken an active part in this trial of the political strength of the Central Alliance, and it is a success for us because Bulgaria chose the right way of political collaboration.

"'The two Central Empires,' says Naumann, 'have a great common interest in the commercial route to the East through Constantinople. Germany, especially, must see to its security, because her relations with Turkey depend on it. We know by experience what those relations would be if the Serbs retained a section of the route. For this Maekensen's army crossed the Danube. What is true for the Balkan line is true for the Hamburg-Suez route, which we must defend against all comers.'

"We discern two leading ideas in this passage: that of the destruction of Serbia, and the necessity for the army of Mackensen to cross the Danube, against us or with us. M. Naumann is, perhaps, the first German writer and politician to express his ideas on Serbia so clearly. 'Some years ago,' writes M. Naumann, 'I said to a Bulgar that good Germano-Bulgarian relations were possible only in case that route were absolutely secure. When, with the other German deputies, I was at the railway station at Nish, I said: "We and the Bulgars must destroy the enemy control of the Belgrade-Nish-Pivot line."'

“Let us remember these words.

“‘The best guarantee for the maintenance of the alliance with Bulgaria,’ says M. Naumann, ‘consists in *the final solution* of all Balkan questions. If, after peace, the old national hatreds are stirred up, the Balkan Peninsula will remain the same nest of continual disorders. The old hankering for protection of the Russians and English will persist.’

“In order to avoid this, M. Naumann proposes that the Germans, Austrians, Hungarians and Bulgars should elaborate a programme for the Balkans. *The most interested are always the Hungarians and Bulgars.* Austrian interests lean preferably towards the Adriatic coast, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Germans have scarcely any interests in those countries.” (*Echo de Bulgarie*, November 23rd, 24th, 25th.)

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Through the disposition to imitation, servility towards the stronger, an infatuation for showy German politics, and above all, through hypocrisy, the Bulgars have made a pretence of discovering in *Mittel-Europa* the political and economic elixir which will cure every ill and save from every peril, but in reality the only things they have at heart are the prospects of territorial gains, the common frontier with Hungary, and the annexation of eastern Serbia.

CHAPTER XI

THE BULGARS AGAINST THE RUSSIANS

WE have said that in order to discover the beginnings of the anti-Russian movement, it would be necessary to go back to the epoch of the Russo-Turkish war. It was then that it germinated, under the Russian military and provisional administration of the occupied Bulgarian territory. It was a consequence of personal grievances and the efforts of the first political agitators operating in the chaos of newly-formed Bulgaria. The fact that it was able to take some root among Bulgarian *intellectuals* (the mass of the people being outside all political currents and without influence on public life) can only be explained by an instinctive trait in their character, a trait on which the Bulgarians themselves insist: distrust of all who are stronger than themselves*, and the impossibility of comprehending that he who possesses the power can refrain from using it to oppress those who are weaker. It was not difficult to engraft on this instinctive feeling of suspicion towards Russia an anti-Russian trend in Bulgarian foreign policy. Anti-Russian notions may be summed up in the two following, which are essential: the danger for Bulgaria in Russian domination of the Dardanelles, and the opposition of Russian and Bulgarian views on Balkan politics in general.

In their attacks on Russia, the Bulgars have never succeeded in demonstrating clearly in what consists the danger for Bulgaria, arising from Russian control of the Straits.

To instance a well-known fact, a section of Italian public opinion is not content to possess Valona, Pola, and some other strategic points, to secure Italy's supremacy in the Adriatic, but demands also the entire eastern coast

* Declaration of Rizoff in the *Outro*, according to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of May 19th, 1916. Article in the *Mir*, June 25th, 1916.

of that sea and a broad band of hinterland as well. The great Russian Empire, with its 170 millions of inhabitants, which does not possess any sure issue to the sea, asks only to have free and secure egress from the Black Sea, through which it breathes. This is a condition so vital for Russia, a right so legitimate and just, that all Russians claim it, from the Extreme Imperialist Right to the Democratic and Socialist Extreme Left. Nevertheless, no part of Russian political opinion has ever put forth pretensions to the western coast of the Black Sea nor to the occupation of a position in the Balkans, as the anti-Russian campaign in Bulgaria supposes, in the case of the arrival of the Russians on the Straits. The Bulgarian campaign against the establishing of Russia on the Dardanelles lacks, therefore, real and serious foundations, and the interest of the whole question is diminished thereby. We shall content ourselves then, having already quoted a good many Bulgarian speeches and writings, by reproducing here only a few.

The *Narodni Prava* (March 16th and 17th, 1916) tries to prove that the whole policy of Russia tends to weaken Bulgaria in order that the Russians "may advance on Constantinople without hindrance." In its issue of April 6th, 1916, the *Narodni Prava*, although a Conservative organ, praises the anti-Russian campaign of the Roumanian Socialist leader, Rakovski*, and finishes an article headed "Our Hostility to Russian Monarchism" as follows:

"Even children know that for centuries the object of Russian policy has been to take Constantinople, or more precisely, the Straits; that for this she has waged a series of wars, and that it is for the same purpose that she is making the present war. That is the reason why we feel, we *intellectuals* above all, great hostility to Russian monarchism."

In a conversation with Lederer, correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt* (April 20th, 1916), the Bulgarian representative in Roumania, Radeff, affirmed that the chief

* An interesting polemic arose between the *Mir*, the organ of the Nationalists, and the *Rabotnitchesky Vestnik*, the organ of the Extreme Socialists, on the subject of the Roumanian Socialist, Krsta Rakovski, who is of Bulgarian origin. The *Mir* asserted that Rakovski had been arrested because, in the autumn of 1916, he gave vent to Bulgarophil sentiments, as he had done in 1912, and it attacked the Roumanian Socialists, who did not defend their comrade. Throughout the affair it is interesting to note that the *Charvinist Bulgarian Nationalists* took a more conspicuous part than the Socialists in the defence of the Roumanian Socialist, Rakovski.

reason for the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers was the necessity of keeping Russia away from the Dardanelles. He made the same statement almost in the same terms to the correspondent of the *Az Est* (April 30th, 1916).

The *Narodni Prava* of July 30th, 1916, wrote :

"The most mediocre student of history is not ignorant of the historic fact that Russia declared and waged 'the war of liberation,' not for the cause of Slavism, nor for that of Orthodoxy, nor for our freedom, but to obtain the Dardanelles. It is true, she was deceived in that war ; she was not able to take either the Dardanelles or 'liberated' Bulgaria. The Dardanelles remained Turkish, and Bulgaria has freed herself from her deliverer."

The *Kambana* of August 31st stated :

"For us Bulgarians Russia has been for centuries a dangerous bear. To remove the Russian peril, it is not enough to deliver Poland from her yoke, to take from her the Baltic provinces, to beat her in Galicia and Volhynia, *she must be forced to give up the idea of the conquest of the Straits*. She must be constrained to think no more of conquests in Europe, but of her internal troubles. It is only then that the nations from Hamburg to Bagdad can develop in quietude, and that Europe will be secured against new catastrophes."

The *Zaria* wrote on September 28th, 1916, under the heading "Russia Does Not Conceal her Desire to Take the Straits and Constantinople" :

"But the realisation of these Russian fantasies would have as a consequence the end of Turkey and a diminution of Bulgarian independence ; it would deal a HEAVY BLOW AT GERMAN ENDEAVOURS TO ENSURE FREE DEVELOPMENT TO THE CENTRAL POWERS."

The conflicts in the Dobrudja led the Bulgarian press to repeat the same opinions.

The *Narodni Prava* wrote on October 25th, 1916, in an article entitled "The Russian Defeat near Constanza" :

"Near Tutrakan, Silistria, and Dobritch, the Bulgars consciously engaged in a struggle against the greatest danger which menaces them—the Russian attempt to seize the roads to the Ægean Sea.

"The campaign in the Dobrudja is not only a conflict between Russo-Roumanian and Bulgarian armies, it is a strife between two opposing tendencies : on one side the effort of the Bulgarian nation to preserve its independence ; on the

other the Russian endeavour to obtain an outlet on the Ægean Sea, through Bulgaria, devastated and subjugated."

And the organ of Gueshoff, and the Opposition, the *Mir*, declared on October 23rd, 1916 :

" All the Dobrudja, the cradle of the first Bulgarian kingdom, will fall once more into our possession. *Besides, the defeat of our enemies in the Dobrudja drives Russia far away, perhaps for ever, from her principal object—the conquest of Constantinople and the Straits.* They will ask in Russia : Why are we fighting still ? "

And, lastly, this is what the *Preporetz* says, the organ of the Democrats, of whom Miliukov expects such marvels (November 6th, 1916) :

" To-day, not only is Russia far from the road to the realisation of her dreams, but she is much farther than she was before the signature of that convention (concerning the possession of the Straits). . . . The divulcation of the treaty concluded between England, France, and Russia will be useful. It will increase the unity of our forces, and will rouse the energy of our allies, the Turks, who will be more and more convinced that wherever they fight, in Galicia, in the Dobrudja, in Roumania or on our southern front, they are fighting for the defence of the Straits and Constantinople."*

* * *

The second reason for the anti-Russian tendency of Bulgarian policy is to be found in the Serbo-Bulgar question, the fundamental question of the Balkans.

The Bulgarian attitude on this question springs from two different motives. One is direct and positive : the discontent which Russian Balkan policy excites in Bulgaria. The other is negative and indirect : it is the Bulgarian alliance with Austria-Hungary and the Central Powers in

* The same motives for the anti-Russian policy of the Bulgars are revealed in the book written by Professor Brückner (*Die Slaven und der Weltkrieg. Lose Skizzen von Alexander Brückner, Professor an der Universität Berlin. Tübingen, 1916. Verlag J. C. Mohr*). " In the eighteenth month of the world-war," says Brückner, " taking sides with the Central Empires, the Bulgars attacked their Slav brethren, the Serbs. The action of Bulgaria signified the downfall of Serbia and the burial of Panslavism. *That which, formerly, nobody, even in Bulgaria, thought possible, that the entire Bulgarian nation would turn against its liberator and protector, became a reality.* Enmity towards Serbia, and the fear, or, more precisely, the certain prospect of being submerged as a vassal of Russia, in case the Black Sea became a Russian lake, left Bulgaria no choice. They forced her into open hostility against the grandson of her deliverer and godfather of her Crown Prince, and even drove her into an alliance with her hereditary mortal foe, Turkey."

general. This indirect motive is perhaps the more important of the two.

Bulgaria was not able to accept the Russian idea of a harmonious and equitable settlement of the Christian States in the Balkans because it did not respond to her dreams of hegemony. Nevertheless, this disagreement in aims did not hinder the conclusion of a compromise. The Bulgarians did not submit to Russian ideas, but the Russians conformed to Bulgarian ideas. Indeed, ever since the San Stefano project until quite recent years, Russia did not cease to do everything she could in order that Bulgaria might assume proportions which would assure for her, in fact, the hegemony of the Balkans.

If, in spite of the subordination of Russian Balkan policy to Bulgarian conceptions, the Serbo-Bulgar question has become the cause of conflict between Bulgaria and Russia, it is because the second motive, the indirect one, has exercised its influence: the solidarity of Bulgaria with Austria-Hungary in Balkan politics has prevailed.

In her weakness with regard to Bulgaria, Russia provided the latter with all the conditions of predominance over Serbia. But Austria-Hungary held up, not predominance only, but the prospect of the annihilation of Serbia. It was not in the nature of the Bulgarians, practical and free from romance and sentimentality, to hesitate.* From that moment the anti-Russian policy of Bulgaria took on its true dimensions and real expansion.

It is this motive—aim at the greatest gains—which is expressed exactly by the Bulgarian diplomatic representatives at Vienna and Berlin.

* It should be noted here that the Bulgarians blame Russia for the treaty of Bucharest. The history of the second Balkan war is too well known to-day for anyone to try to hide the real culprit of the catastrophe of 1913, of which the treaty of Bucharest was only the inevitable result. Even Bulgarian public opinion does not conceal from itself the influence which Count Tarnowski exercised in the spring and summer of 1913 on Bulgarian politicians, "whose eyes he opened" as to the injury inflicted on Bulgaria by the Serbian Alliance. The Bulgarians, in resenting the treaty of Bucharest, forget its history. If the offensive intentions of Bulgaria against Serbia had not existed, the Serbo-Greco-Roumanian defensive combination would not have come about. In what could Russia have been at fault? Perhaps because, before the Bulgarian attack on Serbia, she had not forced the latter to yield to the Bulgarian demands, and because, even after the issue of the attack, disastrous for the Bulgars, she did not endeavour to make the victim of the attack bear the consequences of the crime of the aggressor?

After all, could Russia have succeeded in giving a happier solution to the conflict, when Sofia was acting under the advice and instructions of Vienna?

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of January 28th reproduces the conversation of the Bulgarian Envoy Rizoff with one of the staff of the *Tägliche Rundschau*. Rizoff expresses the great gratitude of the Bulgarian people to the Emperor William for having made a present to Bulgaria of all the spoils of war taken in Serbia. He adds: "Now it may be asserted with certitude that the attitude of Bulgaria towards the Central Powers has assumed a stable character. The political relations of Bulgaria with Russia are definitely broken off, even by those parties which were formerly Russophil."

The *Mir* of June 28th, 1916, publishes an interview with the Bulgarian Minister at Vienna, Totcheff:

"As for us Bulgars, we have joined the alliance of the Central Powers, fully conscious of what we are doing, and convinced that right and justice are on their side, and that the final victory, which responds to the interests of our nation, will be on their side also."

The leader of the National Party (opposition), Gueshoff, declared to the correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung* (issue of February 13th, 1916) that his party "supported Russia solely because it believed in Russian power; but the opinion of Radoslavoff having shown itself to be more sound, it only remains to Bulgarian politicians to bow before existing conditions."

The writer Brchlian, in an article on Russo-Bulgarian relations in the *Dnevnik* of August 15th, 1916, said:

"We are bound to Russia by gratitude for our liberation, but we are separated from her by her Balkan policy. We are attached to Austria-Hungary and Germany by the common interest we have in keeping open the road to Asia Minor. The question is reduced to a simple calculation which leaves a balance against Russia."

* * *

The whole world is a witness to the ingratitude of Bulgaria towards Russia, but all the world does not know that, thanks to an astounding paradox, Bulgarian cynicism has raised that ingratitude to the altitude of a virtue. It is constantly repeated in the Bulgarian press that it would be madness to insist on Bulgaria shaping her policy on the duty of gratitude. But all do not stop at that unscrupulous materialism. Some assert that Russia freed Bulgaria.

solely in order to profit thereby. Others go so far as to deny that the liberation of Bulgaria was the work of Russia.

The *Echo de Bulgarie*, in its issue of October 17th, 1916, said :

“ Foreign nations are wrong in thinking that Bulgaria was called to autonomous life exclusively by the will of Russia. When the armies of the Czar crossed the Danube they found a nation already formed, a people fitted for independent existence. And the proof of it lies in the fact that this people has known how to defend its independence, precisely, against the invading appetites of Russia.”

And the *Narodni Prava* wrote on the same date :

“ Over Bulgaria there is neither Russia nor Slavism, but only the vital interests of the Bulgars. . . . Russia has shed her blood in order to plant her heel on the Bulgarian effort towards independence. Is that a title to gratitude ? ”

In contesting the right of Russia to Bulgarian gratitude, the Sofia press surpasses itself when it affirms that, even in designing the Great Bulgaria of San Stefano, Russia had only her own interests in view, and that it is a real piece of good fortune for Bulgaria that the realisation of the San Stefano project was hindered by the opposition of Germany. This monstrous paradox is developed in two issues of the Government organ, *Narodni Prava*.

On the occasion of the visit of King Ferdinand to Germany and Austria, the *Narodni Prava* of February 15th, 1916, published an article under the title “ Bulgaria Delivered and Free.” Here is a passage from it :

“ The real deliverance and the liberation of our country dates from the moment she became the ally of the mighty and victorious Central Empires, which at the Congress of Berlin, when Bulgaria was created, played so important a part. It was then, when Bismarck, in rejecting the project of Gortchakoff, inflicted a defeat on the Russian policy of conquest, which aimed, by the creation of the Bulgaria of San Stefano, at Constantinople and the Straits, under the pretext of delivering the Bulgars. If Russian diplomacy had succeeded in making its project accepted, Russia would have acquired the power necessary to transform the new State of Bulgaria into a Russian province. Independent Bulgaria lived again at the Congress of Berlin, thanks to the defeat inflicted by Bismarck on Russian diplomacy. It is true that Bulgaria was not restored in its integrity at the Berlin Congress, but that was because the policy which saved her from Russian strangulation required it ;

but the indispensable nucleus was formed none the less, and the detached limbs were destined to join in a near future. It was at Berlin that was posed the basis of real Bulgarian independence and autonomy."

In the issue of September 18th the *Narodni Prava* wrote:

"The creation of the Bulgaria of San Stefano was projected, not by the Bulgarophil Count Ignatieff, but by the Russian capitalist class. Space had to be found for Russian Imperialism on the back of the San Stefano Bulgaria which would have extended to the Ægean. However, at Berlin, England opposed it in the most vigorous fashion, and Russian Imperialism was fain to content itself with a province bounded by the Stara Planina (Balkan range); that was to be the first step in the invasion of the Balkans. The legend that Russia freed us, that she took thought for us, and that, in consequence, Bulgaria must not brandish her sword over her, will remain only an interesting document for future historians.

"It is fortunate for the Bulgarian people that a legend which was a serious menace for its future has been destroyed. Bulgaria can breathe freely. The nightmare which might have strangled her has disappeared."

* * *

With such arguments and such a standard of morality, the Bulgarian press has brought to bear but little tact and less scruples on the examination of other questions appertaining to the anti-Russian campaign.

In order to manifest their attachment to the Germans, their true liberators (from the "dangerous creation" of the Bulgaria of San Stefano), the Bulgars have sought diligently to demonstrate scientifically that they are not Slavs.

The Vice-President of the Sobranié, Momtchiloff, declared in an interview published by the *Vossische Zeitung* of February 13th, 1916, that "the Russians are more dangerous than the Turks from whom they have delivered Bulgaria." With such an attitude of mind, it is not astonishing that the friends of Momtchiloff, who are in power, maintain that every act against Russia is salutary, and that any aid against her, no matter whence it comes, is welcome. The same notions are entertained by the Government organ, *Narodni Prava*, of April 15th, 1915. The *Narodni Prava* is opposed not only to Russia gaining the open sea, but goes so far as to preach a regular crusade against her. It says, notably, that "the maintenance of the independence

of the Bulgarian State is possible only by sincere union and common effort with every international factor hostile to Russia."

The anti-Russian campaign reached its zenith in the well-known scandal of the re-naming of the Church of St. Alexander Newsky at Sofia. This event served as a pretext for Radoslavoff to make a speech which was paraphrased by the Government press in the same scandalous fashion.

A Hungarian journalist, Adorian, editor of the *Az Est*, admired greatly these manifestations of Bulgarian ingratitude. In the issue of April 20th, 1916, he published a long letter from Sofia explaining the proposal of Radoslavoff to re-baptise the new cathedral (dedicated in the name of Saint Alexander Newsky; it was to change this name for that of the two national Bulgarian saints, Cyril and Methodius).

"This proposal has a greater significance than appears. The church was erected, thanks, above all, to Russian subscriptions; it was built by Russian architects and decorated by Russian artists. It was intended to symbolise the bond of piety linking Bulgaria to Russia, like the monument reared to the memory of Alexander II. in front of the Sobranié. To those who essayed to defend the Russian name of the church, Radoslavoff replied in acid tones: 'We do not need to venerate this blood-stained Russian saint. . . .' In the alteration of the calendar, the discussion turned above all on the fact that Bulgaria would thus afford a new proof of her rupture with the East. Bulgarian holy days will no longer coincide with those of the Russians. This is very important."*

The manifestations of emancipation from Russia, the descriptions of the situation in the great Slav Empire, and the campaign against the last vestiges of Russian influence in Bulgaria, were always endued with unheard-of stupidity. The Minister of Public Works, Petkoff, leader of the Stambouloff party, emphasises in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of December 27th, 1915, the satisfaction of the Bulgars "at having been freed from such uncertain historical suggestions." The Bulgarian press habitually discusses Russian politics in the same fashion as the internal politics of Bulgaria; everything is reduced to personal matters. When Russia is mentioned it is only to retail the scandals of the

* The reform of the calendar was decided on in principle in January, 1916. It was put in force in April 1916.

first days of chaos which reigned in the newly born Bulgaria, and the Russian people are made responsible for the intrigues and conspiracies of those first ten years of life of the Bulgarian State, during which no name, whether Russian or Bulgarian, escaped reproach.

From such a narrow outlook, inspired by hatred and copying the most ignominious pages of the Austro-Hungarian press, the organs of the Bulgarian Government write concerning Russia. Commenting on the last great Russian offensive, the *Narodni Prava* of July 16th, 1916, reiterates "famine and death reign unchecked in the Russian Empire. It is all suffering and misery." The *Mir*, as we have seen, states that the situation in Russia is desperate, and that her renewed efforts are ridiculous, seeing that "she is finally repulsed from Constantinople."

The *Narodni Prava* exults over the Russian failure :

"Instead of occupying Constantinople, Russia has lost the whole of Poland, and instead of getting out into the Mediterranean, she is stuck fast in the Mazurian mud. . . . Russia must renounce Constantinople, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans." (July 23rd, 1916.)

The fall of Plevna is certainly one of the greatest Russo-Bulgarian events. But in celebrating the anniversary, the Mayor of Plevna could not abstain from insulting Russia in the official despatch addressed to King Ferdinand. (*Berliner Tageblatt*, December 16th, 1915.)

The *Kambana* of September 8th, 1916, does not lay aside the usual tone in gloating with wild joy over the Dobrudja victory :

"Russian soldiers under the knife of the Bulgarian heroes begged for their lives, crying: 'We are brothers; we are kindred. . . . Mercy!' The Bulgar was never so proud as when he saw on his knees before him the arrogant and cowardly 'protector' of yesterday, the criminal neighbour, the hereditary foe."

All the psychology of the *parvenu* Bulgar is displayed in this triumph of the former slave, thirsty for blood, transported with joy at being able, in his turn, to trample on someone nobler than himself.

Bulgarian hatred comes out with the same coarseness on another occasion, also in relation to the fighting in the Dobrudja. Professor M. Ghéorgieff wrote in the *Neue Freie Presse* of September 17th, 1916 :

"This victory has destroyed the greatest of all the legends

whose traces still subsist partially in Bulgaria, that of liberation by the Russians. This fable has been entirely dispersed and extinguished. Only one vestige remains, that on the square of the Sobranié, in whose corridors the question is often asked : 'What is the use here still of the monument of the Emperor Liberator?'

And the *Narodni Prava* of September 26th, 1916, as a reminder of the meeting between the Emperor Nicholas and King Charles at Constanza, proposed to erect on the spot "a monument of shame of which the pedestal would have the form of a hen's head and a bottle of vodka — symbols of Wallachian savagery and Russian sottishness."

Let it be said, moreover, that the Bulgarian journals are busied very seriously in bringing about the extirpation of the last Russian souvenirs remaining at Sofia.

The *Dnevnik* of September 4th, 1916, wrote :

"The greatest shame and insult to which we could expose national sentiment is to allow the broadest boulevards, the finest streets, and the most spacious squares of our capital to bear still the names of Dondukof, of Czar Liberator, of Ignatieff, of Stoletoff, and Parensoff. . . ."

And the *Balkanska Pochta* stated in its issue of November 1st, 1916, that portraits and other Russian pictures still existed in sundry small restaurants and hairdressers' saloons. The journal did not return to the charge. After such a warning the Sofia police must have redoubled their patriotic zeal.

The *Narodni Prava* of September 12th, 1916, reminding the clergy, too, of their duty in this clearance of Russian souvenirs, said :

"Our meaning is very clear. Every Bulgar, no matter whence he comes nor what he is, ought to forget the Russian name."

Every Russian souvenir has long been proscribed in Bulgaria. That land, strewn with Russian graves and watered with the blood of the heroes of Plevna and Shipka, was trodden more than once by renegades, and the ungrateful Bulgars take pride in having abolished with their own hands "the great Russian legend." And, notwithstanding, that old mother, that *matoushka*, crabbed, encumbering as she may have seemed, or really was at times, for her spoiled children, has she not always been the same as that evoked by Richepin in his song "La Glu" ?

To satisfy the caprices of his mistress, a youth sacrifices to her the heart of his mother. And in spite of this infamous crime, the bleeding heart addresses the matricide, lying on the ground, in these sublime words of love : " Have you hurt yourself, my child ? " The ungrateful son of Russia has done her much harm, without heeding the harm he has done himself.

CHAPTER XII

THE BULGARS AND NEW RUSSIA

To explain their distrust of Russia, the Russophobe Bulgars based their argument on the "Russian peril" or "the Imperialist tendencies of Tsarism." Although enounced by the most reactionary parties in Bulgaria, this line of reasoning for the Russophobe campaign was taken into consideration in Russia. Russian Liberals invoked it always in their criticisms of the Balkan policy of the old Russian régime.

Seeking the share of blame in Russian diplomacy for the schism between Bulgaria and her old protectress, Russian Liberals carried magnanimity to the point of entirely releasing Bulgarian responsibility. The manner in which the Bulgars—Russophils as well as Russophobes—met these generous advances showed how hypocritical were the complaints against Russia, and to what point Bulgarian Russophobia aimed—beyond her Governments—at Russia herself, the Russia of to-day as well as of yesterday.

In his speech on March 24th, 1916, Miliukoff described to the Duma the situation in the Balkans and the part played by Russian diplomacy in Bulgarian intervention. The Bulgarian press published the speech at full length, and gave it a favourable reception in so far as it acknowledged that it was mainly the fault of Russian diplomacy that Bulgaria and Russia were at war (*Mir*, April 12th, 1916) and that Sazonov and others like him were culpable (*Narodni Prava*, April 14th, 1916). The Government press, nevertheless, thought it proper to disapprove the political tendency of the speech as being quite as dangerous for Bulgaria as "the open hostility of Sazonov."

"The declarations of Miliukoff concerning reparation for the injustice done to Bulgaria," wrote the *Narodni Prava* of April 11th, 1916, "are hollow phrases which will never destroy

the fundamental tendency of the Balkan policy of Russia, which is to reach the Dardanelles and the Ægean Sea across Roumania and Bulgaria. Miliukoff himself, if he were at the helm, would drive over Bulgaria *in order that Russia might attain the open sea* which Miliukoff claims as much as the others. The difference might be that Miliukoff would act with greater cunning. He would fool Bulgaria by the acquisition of Macedonia in order to be able to take Constantinople, and afterwards, by the force of natural evolution—through which the stronger overcomes the weaker—Miliukoff would find it quite right that Russia should also lay hands on Bulgaria and Macedonia."

The Bulgarian opposition press made use of Miliukoff's speech to express more clearly the notion that Bulgaria, whilst continuing her alliance with the Central Powers, ought to reserve for herself a way to enable her to renew her relations with Russia after the war, on the basis, be it understood, of the acceptance of Bulgarian conquests in Macedonia and in the Serbian provinces of the Morava. Such an arrangement, whilst preserving for Bulgaria her booty, would bring into power the opposition parties of Gueshoff and Malinoff.

The *Mir* of April 12th, 1916, wrote :

"We do not share the opinion of those who think that Russia will always follow the same direction. . . . Still less founded is the assertion that after the war, when a stable and indispensable peace is established, we can remain allies and friends of Germany without being at daggers drawn with Russia. Who can be sure that to-morrow Germany and Russia will not shake hands and be friends? . . . And then, even if we remained in permanent alliance with Germany, we should be all the more the gainers if, parallel with that alliance, good relations were established between us and Russia. Our policy ought to endeavour always, whatever our alliances, to acquire among the States not allied the *largest number of friends*. *A multitude of friends is never a misfortune for a nation.*

"For us Bulgars Miliukoff's speech is instructive from another point of view. He stops short of the action of those who throw all the blame on Bulgaria and her leaders. The conscience of those who consider that our present relations with Russia are not natural will be quieted when they recognise that *the responsibility for the war between liberator and liberated falls chiefly on the Russians and on their diplomacy*, and that the actual state of affairs is the fruit of erroneous Russian conceptions concerning the Balkan peoples and their psychology. *The Bulgarians can but rejoice when Russia acknowledges her mistakes. The contrary would not be natural: that just at the time when the Russians acknowledge their errors there should be*

found Bulgars willing to charge Bulgaria with the responsibility for the existing relations with Russia."

The *Preporetz*, the organ of Malinoff, wrote in the same strain.

The *Narodni Prava* of April 16th, in an article entitled "The Russian Idol and its Worshipers in Bulgaria," replied at length to the article in the *Mir*. A noteworthy passage is as follows :

"Miliukoff uses his friends and admirers in Bulgaria to serve his political ends and those of his party in Russia. . . . Miliukoff wishes it to be thought that he would have taken another stand with regard to the Bulgarian demands if he had been in the place of Sazonov : he would have satisfied them, and would have directed, with the aid of Bulgaria, the course of the war in favour of Russia. This opinion appears to us both audacious and unjustified. . . . The oriental policy of Russia tends to the domination of the Balkans, the Straits, and Asia Minor. Too many people, differing widely in their individual qualities and temperament, have succeeded to the government of Bulgaria ; Russian foreign policy on its side has appeared sometimes frankly reactionary, sometimes liberal, and 'liberatrice,' according to the tastes and ideas of the principal factors, but, in its essence, it has always preserved its character of brutal conquest."

N. Mitakoff wrote in the same sense in the *Narodni Prava* of April 14th, 1916. He terminated his article by an appeal to the Bulgarian opposition :

"Rejoice at the avowal of Miliukoff that the Sazonovs are guilty of the war between Bulgaria and Russia, but conform nevertheless to the policy of Radoslavoff. 'Father' Radoslavoff will teach you that an abyss exists between Great Bulgaria and immense Russia, and that *the Bulgars henceforth have only one way to Petrograd, that which passes through Berlin.*"

The deputy D. Blagoïeff, leader of the Orthodox Socialists, published on the same topic in the *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* of April 21st an article on the "Future of the Balkans" :

"The domination of Constantinople and the Straits includes also the domination of Bulgaria. There are, however, in Bulgaria parties who imagine that if Russian policy towards Bulgaria has been bad, it is because reactionaries like Sazonov have had the direction of it ; they believe that this policy would cease to be dangerous if Professor Miliukoff, the well-known friend of the Bulgars and the leader of Russian Liberals, were to guide it. These opinions have been ventilated recently in the *Mir* and *Preporetz*. They are as dangerous as they are baseless. *Liberal and bourgeois Russia, with Miliukoff as leader,*

is yet more dangerous for the Balkans and Bulgaria than reactionary Russia."

The semi-official *Narodni Prava* published with much satisfaction the article of the Socialist deputy, which, after all, is but a repetition of the opinions already emitted by the *Narodni Prava* on the occasion of Miliukoff's speech.

Once again, on June 15th, 1916, the *Narodni Prava*, commenting on a book which appeared in Russia entitled "What Russia Hopes from this War," and containing the ideas of Miliukoff and other politicians, wrote :

"This is what Russia desires—democratic and progressive Russia. Comment is superfluous. Russia wishes to take the Straits, Constantinople, including Adrianople, and the coasts of the Black Sea, indispensable for the security of her possessions. She wishes, as the former President of the Council, Goremykine, stated publicly last year in the Duma, the Black Sea to become a Russian lake. These are also the aims of Miliukoff, that same Miliukoff who, having been persecuted by her, found with us not only asylum, but also a fraternal welcome."

Throughout the whole of this discussion between the Russophobes of the Governmental parties and the remainder of the *soi-disant* Russophiles in the opposition, not a single voice was raised in unison with that of the greatest Bulgaphil of Russia. The *Mir* approved of that portion of Miliukoff's speech which accused Russia and justified Bulgaria. The *Mir* of Gueshoff was distinguishable from the *Narodni Prava* of Radoslavoff, which preached a crusade against Russia, only by the cautious reservations it advocated in view of the future. Why, it said, should Bulgaria remain continually at enmity with Russia, even when her spoils in the East are assured to her, and although Russia should be repulsed from the Dardanelles once for all? As touching this latter question, vital to Russia amid all her Balkan compromises, the Bulgarians did not share her point of view. The friends of Miliukoff at Sofia did not defend him. When we say *friends*, we do not mean the group around the *Mir*, the Conservative organ of Gueshoff and Todoroff, whose "sympathy" for Russia only caused embarrassment to Miliukoff, and whose ideas did not coincide with his, notwithstanding the ties of personal friendship. The *Preporetz*, Democratic, and the organ of the closest personal and political friends of Miliukoff, was not more earnest than the others in the propaganda of friendship with Russia.

The *Narodni Prava* of Radoslavoff, which, in attacking French democracy, habitually made use of the barrack-room opinions of Prussian professors, often paraphrased the doctrines of the German Marxists. In the issue of May 16th, 1916, it wrote :

“ *Russia must be vanquished.* Once for all, the pillar of reaction in Europe must be uprooted. The progress of Europe and of humanity demands it. Our national interests demand it also. We must fight to the death, as Frederick Engels has said, against monarchist Russia and against her allies, whoever they may be.”

In the *Preporetz* of September 28th and 29th, Yordan Maryanpolski treats of Russian democracy. He analyses and criticises the following documents : a letter of Prince Kropotkin to Gustav Stephen, author of a book in Swedish on war and civilisation ; an article of Professor Vinogradoff in the *Times* ; the declarations of Miliukoff in the *Manchester Guardian* ; and those of Bourtzev in the organ of the Swedish Social Democratic Party.

“ The reading of these documents,” says the Bulgarian critic, “ leaves us amazed at the narrow Chauvinism which has seized on personages highly enlightened, and of deserved merit for their contributions to democratic science in Russia. These Russian authors, of whom two enjoy a great reputation as historians, *are in open conflict with truth, and judge Germany, after the manner of journalists, to be a State dangerous to European civilisation.* The war was provoked by French designs to retake Alsace-Lorraine, and those of Russia to conquer Constantinople. As for Germany’s policy of conquest, *it may be affirmed that English and French policy bears a deeper imprint of the spirit of conquest, and is, at the same time, far more barbarous.* Professor Miliukoff believes that Russia, the oppressor of so many peoples, like the Poles, the Little-Russians, the Jews, and many others, will bring happiness to the peoples of Austro-Hungary when she remodels that Empire, the only one among the Great Powers of Europe which makes allowance for the character of the small peoples, and leaves them the liberty necessary for their development. Bourtzev esteems the work of the Russian Tsar to be good, and invites revolutionaries to support him in ruining Germany, *whose sacrifices, purity of manners, material and moral well-being and development of civilisation far surpass those of France and England.* ”

Maryanpolski shows further that the Russian democratic leaders believe that if the war ends favourably for Russia, it will bring an increase of political liberties, and strengthen democracy. On the contrary, he says, only a Russian defeat

can bring democratic reforms to Russia. In conclusion, he asserts that Russian democracy, and with it the section of social democrats which supports the Government in the war, betray progressive ideas. "We Bulgarians who, through the fault of Russian governmental circles, have been led to make war on our liberators, have only one means of paying our debt of gratitude to our teachers and benefactors, and that is *to spare no effort to defeat the Russian forces on the battlefield*. Thus, not only do we render service to our own country in assuring it full liberty, but we render also a great service to the real Russian democracy, which will thus acquire strength to settle accounts with absolutism broken by defeat."

We see that Austro-Hungarian and Prussian "democratic principles" have schooled Bulgaria. The democratic party expresses itself in the same way as the Governmental *Narodni Prava*, in which Dimitri Rizoff, Bulgarian Minister at Berlin, once declared that "Russia must be beaten in her own interests."

Bulgarian democracy sees, then, the future of its country and of democracy in the downfall of Russia with all its consequences; the downfall of the liberal West, and the triumph of the "Junker" press, the Apostolic monarchy of the Habsburgs, the Turkish Sultanate and—it is also true—of the Coburg Balkan Empire. But this last result alone would have sufficed the practical Bulgarian mind, under the labels of all sorts of ideals, to subordinate morals, logic, Slavism, democracy, to the question of Bulgarian gain.



The Russian revolution has been the surest touchstone of Bulgarian Russophil and democratic sentiments.

The manifestations evoked by that event follow each other chronologically, in two stages, the first expressing opinions, the second political combinations.

The first vague news of the revolution—risings and disorder at Petrograd—provoked only the selfish thought; an enemy *hors de combat*, paralysed by internal troubles, and therefore the possibility of dealing a blow at enemies still on their feet.

This is the language of the Bulgarian press during this first period.

The Socialist *Narod* (March 15th) is the first to express this thought: "This means that Russian national defence is compromised." The *Kambana* (March 16th) repeats it:

“ The Russian revolution brings with it an internal weakening of Russia.” The *Narodni Prava* (March 16th) finds that “ everybody sees in it the approach of the end of the war. . . . The gulf between the monarchists and the revolutionaries is vast, the struggle will be carried into the ranks of the army. A few days only will reveal the attitude of France, England and Italy, menaced by the might of Germany.” The following day (March 17th) the *Narodni Prava* “ would not be astonished to learn that the Russian Army had separated into two hostile camps. . . . When once the Russian Army has laid down its arms before the outside enemy, occupied as it is with internal affairs, *the possibility will arise of dealing powerful blows at the other countries of the Entente.*” The *Narodni Prava* concluded that “ no one was any longer capable of averting the imminent destruction of Russia.” The *Dnevnik*, of the same date, states that for the moment “ one thing is, however, positive, that so long as the internal situation does not improve, Russia is out of the war as a decisive force.” The *Kambana* of March 17th said that “ the war and internal reforms are incompatible.” The *Narod*, of the same date, is of opinion that “ the revolutionaries will understand that the hope of victory is irrevocably lost, and that all that remains to do is to busy themselves with the question of peace.” The Minister Bakaloff foresees “ disorder and lack of organisation, the dissolution of government,” and opines that “ the events in Russia, as a revolutionary act, are in favour of Bulgaria and the Central Alliance.” The fact that the reactionaries have not been able to succour the Emperor shows that Russia is vanquished ” (*Kambana*, March 19th). The *Mir* (March 20th) judges that “ the Russian revolution cannot be considered as strengthening the Entente for the continuing of the war. On the contrary, the revolution is a fundamental weakening.” The *Kambana* (March 20th) places all its hopes on “ this process, which will continue.” The *Dnevnik* (March 21st) believes that “ the Russian revolution will hasten peace, even if its leaders declare against it.” The *Echo de Bulgarie* thinks that the Constantinople question has no longer any interest for the people, “ who only want bread and their sons.” The *Mir* (March 23rd) already sees “ the revolution moving towards its logical development—peace.”

The speeches in the Bulgarian Parliament only repeated the same ideas.

Before the declarations on the subject by the President of the Council, Radoslavoff—declarations published by the enemy telegraphic agencies—the Bulgarian Democratic Party desired, it seems, to manifest its feelings in a more explicit manner. The chief Democrat, Malinoff, seems to have made a great speech on March 19th at the Sobranié which the Bulgarian newspapers did not publish. Here, however, is what some of them said :

Echo de Bulgarie (March 20th) :

“ Dwelling on the events in Russia, Malinoff remarked that they would not fail to exercise a happy influence in favour of peace. The Sobranié ought to welcome with joy the triumph of parliamentarism over reaction in Russia.”

The *Mir* (March 20th) :

“ Malinoff dwelt on the Russian revolution—an internal struggle for right and justice in which we had no business to meddle—and on the relations of the United States and China with Germany. Afterwards Malinoff spoke more in detail of our relations with the allies. We ought all to see that our relations with our allies were good, because no other State policy was possible now. Everything of a nature tending to injure good relations with our allies ought to be removed.”

The cessation of disorder at Petrograd and the Provisional Government, established and beginning to give proofs of direction, recalled the Bulgars to the necessity of reckoning seriously with the new condition of affairs in Russia. Selfish and malignant joy gave place to political combinations. They continued to affirm the incapacity of revolutionary Russia to carry on the war, the incompatibility of the war aims of the old and the new Russia, and—taking a step forward in this order of ideas—they began to weigh the conditions favourable for the immediate guarantee of the vital interests of Russia “without war.”

Deceived in their hopes of seeing Russia disorganised and put out of action, they attempted to eliminate her from the struggle by specious advances.

Here are echoes of Bulgarian public opinion during this second period :

The *Narodni Prava* (March 23rd) asserts still that “the continuation of the war by Russia becomes problematic.” The former Minister, Natchavitch, expects to see the Russian Army dislocated and famished, conditions of which the result will be a *prompt peace* (*Kambana*, March 28th). The *Preporetz* (March 22nd), analysing the dissensions of parties,

foresees "struggles which will bring about complications in the interior and weakening on the front . . ." And the following day the organ of the friends of Miliukoff openly broaches the idea of a separate peace with Russia. The *Preporctz* says: "She can have the open seas without war. . . . A near future will tell us if those who now lead Russia have comprehended that, or if they are going to continue to fight for English and French aims, in spite of the exhaustion of their people." The *Kambana*, of the same date, inspired by the same sentiments, "salutes on the part of the Bulgars and their allies the *pacifist Russian revolution*."

The means are very simple. They are those that the Bulgarian Minister at Berlin, Rizoff, pointed out in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of April 4th, in which he foretells the reconciliation of the Russian and German nations.

Miliukoff's declaration affirming the will of new democratic Russia to keep her engagements as an ally in the great war against the Hohenzollern and Habsburg Empires, gave rise to disappointment and dissatisfaction at Sofia. The *Dnevnik* of April 12th expresses it thus:

"We must not shut our eyes; we have greeted democratic Russia cordially, but we ought to understand that new Russia cannot in any way be less Imperialist than old Russia. M. Miliukoff tells us so plainly."

For want of anything better to do, the Bulgars continued to discuss the declarations of the provisional Russian Government, to make a pessimistic diagnosis of the internal changes in Russia, to base the same conjectures on this hypothesis, and to present the same offers of a separate peace.

The *Kambana* of April 13th finds that "the policy of the Provisional Government is only palliative. The sick man is already on the operating table and the radical cure is in the scalpel of the revolution, which has not said its last word." The "last word" desired by the *Kambana* is the complete disintegration of a country into an anarchy which would force Russia to make a separate peace. The *Outro*, of the same date, says that "in the course of reconnoitring operations on the Stochod, the Austro-Hungarian troops had unmistakeable proofs that the *moral* of the Russian Army had sunk lower than ever." The Socialist journal, *Narod*, emphasises the incompatibility of the "two tendencies of the Russian revolution." The *Voenni*

Izvestia admits the guarantee of Bulgarian interests in the formula proclaimed by the Russian Provisional Government, but regrets that the Bulgars cannot profit by it, because "war questions cannot be detached one from another. *The Bulgarian question is the programme of our allies, as their programme is a Bulgarian question.* We have shaken hands to pursue our common work to the end."*

Neither seeing nor comprehending anything outside their narrow and selfish interests, the Bulgars could not grasp the dimensions of the Russian event. From the extreme democratic Miliukophil Left (Malinoff) to the extreme reactionary Right (Radoslavoff), amid a torrent of phrases and declamation, they were able to express only one idea, conforming word for word with the declarations of Vienna and Berlin: *separate peace with Russia.*

Thus Radoslavoff, the bitter Russophobe, the black reactionary, the blind Germanomaniac, found himself—without renouncing his old opinions—in the year of grace 1917, in the camp of worshippers of the Russian revolution, elbow to elbow with the democrat Malinoff.

In this way the Bulgarian reply to the declaration of the Provisional Russian Government, paraphrased in the *Narodni Prava* (despatch of the Bulgarian Agency of April 22nd), voiced the feelings of the two opposite groups.

The organ of Malinoff, *Preporetz*, had already made the suggestion that *Russia could have the open sea without making war.* Radoslavoff insinuated the possibility of an understanding on the same conditions. "Could we not," asks the *Narodni Prava*, "come to an understanding with men who, as martyrs for the liberty of their fatherland, found a hospitable asylum in democratic Bulgaria?" The *Narodni Prava* does not forget to add that "the Bulgars are fighting only for their national unity, *like their allies.*"

Under the title "The End of a Prejudice," the *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* attacks Russophilism in Bulgaria, which it calls a political "prejudice."

"In 1913, Russia, by creating the Balkan Alliance and profiting by the servility of the coalition of the Russophil parties, brought upon Bulgaria a real national catastrophe.

* This sophistical interpretation of the declaration which proclaimed the rights of nationalities, to the profit of the Bulgars, appeared in the same column of the *Izvestia* in which the idea of liberating the nationalities in Austria from the Habsburg yoke was flouted, and in which indignation was expressed that the occupation of the Serbian provinces should be termed usurpation.

"The Russian revolution," concludes the *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik*, "saps the foundation of the Bulgarian bourgeois parties, who imagine they are pursuing 'a great national policy' through the support of the foreigner, whilst, in reality, they are the instruments of the foreigner's plans of conquest. The overthrow of Russian despotism has cut the last strands of this 'national' policy, and thrown its agents on to the dunghill (*sic*). As to the Bulgarian and Balkan peoples, the Russian revolution opens to them brilliant prospects and broad ways, *prospects of a near peace* and a path to a democratic alliance."

Nothing more natural than this language from the Socialist organ. But it is strange to find the *Narodni Prava*, the semi-official journal of Radoslavoff, identifying itself with the Socialist doctrinaires, who alone oppose on principle the Government policy.

The *Narodni Prava* of April 25th reproduces the article of the *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik*, and adds:

"In 1913 already our Russophils, in order to save the situation and nourish our people on prejudices, spread the report that the Russian Tsar's regard for us had somewhat cooled, but that intellectual Russia was prepared to remove the misunderstanding. Miliukoff and his friends were disposed to save us. But it was only an old song sung to a new tune. What! ought we to turn again to Russia? When Miliukoff spoke of Constantinople and of Great Serbia our Russophils subsided completely. Was it for always? Oh no! It wanted only two words uttered by the new Russian régime in favour of peace for our Bulgarian Russophils to come out of their lair. . . . Still the old song for Russia. . . ."

The conclusion is plain: Autocratic or democratic, Russia remains the enemy of the Bulgars, so long as she does not renounce her pretensions to the Straits and her will to free and unite the Serbs.

* * *

Everywhere else, the Russian revolution was regarded as an historical event which might bring in its train consequences incalculable, and it was felt that its effects would be great and widespread. Bulgaria, whose interests in the direction taken by Russian politics was greater than those of any other country, and who invoked, among other motives for her intervention in the great war, her distrust of the Imperialism of the Tsars, treated it as of small consequence. Continuing the policy of distrust even towards democratic Russia, she had nothing to offer but

hypocritical phrases of sympathy and impudent advice as to the best way to go in order to avoid clashing with Germano-Bulgarian interests. Malinoff, Gueshoff, and Radoslavoff, with one voice, invited new Russia to abandon her allies and to settle the vital question of an issue to the open sea by a compromise with her enemies. What Russia and the European democracy would gain by the capitulation of revolutionary Russia to absolutist Germany, with the defeat of the Entente and German domination from Hamburg to Bagdad assured, the Russophiles of opportunity and the Democrats by adventure at Sofia do not say. But they perceive no other means of realising their hopes of a Great Bulgaria "Mittel-European" and omnipotent in the Balkans, and that is enough for them.

CHAPTER XIII

BULGARS AND SLAVS

IN witness of their boundless attachment to the Germans, the Bulgars have maintained in all things, and with all their might, their renunciation of the past. They deny gratitude to their liberators whilst finding reasons for sympathy with their age-long oppressors; they go so far as to renounce their ethnic character. They will be Slavs no longer, and they prove that they never were.

At the invitation of the Germano-Bulgarian Society of Berlin, Professor Lieutenant of Reserve Panoff gave a lecture on April 28th, 1916, in the hall of the Prussian Parliament at Berlin, in the course of which he said: "The Bulgar is the man who is not enthusiastic for abstractions, but values only what is concrete and real. So the Bulgar is not of Slav race, for the Slav is given to fantastic ideals, while the Bulgar devotes himself only to matters of reality." (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 29th, 1916.)

The organ of the Serbo-Croat coalition at Zaghreb, *Hrvatska Rietch*, of October 27th, 1916, commenting on Panoff's article in the German review *Nord und Sud*, which followed the lines of the lecture, says:

"Panoff asserts that the Bulgars are the descendants of the ancient Huns, and that the Hungarians and Finns are their only relatives in Europe.

"The Bulgars have kept until now the chief traits of the character and physical type of the Huns. The Slavs are dreamers, frank, unstable, lazy, without energy, whilst the Bulgars are cold, calm, laborious, and energetic. Up to the present three theories have been advanced concerning the ancestry of the Bulgars: (a) Slav descent; (b) Finn-Uralian; (c) Turco-tartar. It is possible that Panoff, in his comparison between Bulgars and Slavs, is right."

Allies of the Germans in the great war, descendants of Alaric, the Bulgarians thought fit to acclaim as their ancestor, Genghis-Khan. In this they had two ends in view:

the renunciation of Slavism pleased the Germans; the recognition of Turanian parentage attached them to the Hungarians and Turks. After all, this new ethnic staging only completed the repertory of comedies in which the Bulgars made the principle of nationality play the oddest roles.*

The Turanian union was manifested in the most glowing way on the occasion of the visit of Bulgarian deputies to Buda-Pesth in May, 1916. Replying to the speech of Count Apponyi, Momtchiloff said, "We may seek for the harmony of feeling in the two peoples in the historic past and the common Turanian race."

King Ferdinand, in reply to the welcome of the municipality of Buda-Pesth, spoke also of "the reciprocal sentiment of relationship which binds two peoples of the same blood" (*Az Ujsag*, of May 27th, 1916). The director of Bulgarian statistics, Kiril Popoff, spoke of the "kinship of blood" to the correspondent of the *Magyarország* (June 11th, 1916). The variations on this theme are numberless. In a report of a sitting of the "Congress of Nationalities" at Lausanne on June 29th, 1916, the *Journal de Genève* quotes the declaration of M. Antchura, who, in the name of the Tartars, pronounced a great eulogium of *the Bulgars, the most civilised of the Tartar tribes*.

The Hungarian journal *Alkotmány* of August 16th, 1916, speaks of the great rôle fallen to Bulgaria, thanks to her geographical position on the high road from west to east:

"It is thus that this Finno-tartar-nomad people, thrown from the banks of the Volga on to the coast of the Black Sea, becomes a factor in world history. . . . With its admirable realism, which distinguishes it plainly from the ardent fancy of the Serb people, it has chosen the means to carve its way to independence and the hegemony of the Balkans."

The *Berliner Tageblatt* of September 22nd, 1916, publishes a report of the thirteenth East European Soirée (Georgian-Finn-Bulgar), organised on September 21st, at Berlin. The programme included numerous lectures. Dr. von Richter, former minister, received the guests representing the three kindred nations, Georgians, Finns, and Bulgars. The

* The author has placed in evidence the arbitrary nature of all these theories of the Bulgars, who boast of their Tartar origin and at the same time base on ethnic reasons their pretensions to Macedonia, recognised as Slav of the purest and oldest origin. (See "About Bulgar Mimicry," by Dr. V. Kuhne. *Tribune de Genève*, June 30th, 1916.)

assistant director of the Bulgarian Press Bureau, Nikola Rizoff, spoke in the name of the Bulgars.*

The Turanian manifestations of the Bulgars can only be considered as one more proof of the lack of a developed and enlightened national consciousness.

But all these strayings of a people belated in its national formation, influenced by foreign ascendancy, misguided by an inauspicious policy, will not lead us into the error of regarding seriously the Turanianism of the Bulgars and their renunciation of Slavism. They are Slavs none the less. And if there is, on the Slav side, something with which to reproach them on this point, it is not so much their inept and braggart Turanianism when they deny their Slav parentage, as the selfish and mean way in which they exploit Slavism when they declare themselves Slavs of the first rank and the most noble stock. Allies of Austro-Hungary, the Bulgars have closed their eyes to the persecution of the Slavs under the monarchy. Their hypocrisy went so far as to find in the submission of the Slavs to obligatory military service in Austro-Hungary a proof of their sincere devotion to the Central Empires. They feign to know nothing of the massacres in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the persecutions of the Serbo-Croats in Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, the devastations by Magyar soldiers in Syrmia, the trials for high treason which have never ceased in the Banat and Batchka during the war, the persecutions in Slovenia, the wholesale imprisonments in Bohemia, the hecatombs of Czech regiments, the Slovak martyrs in Hungary.† They have forgotten Hindenburg's speech at Mitava, in which he repeated the words of the Kaiser, "the Slav waves will roll no more" (*Wiedenski Kurier Poljki*, August 24th, 1916). The forced participation of the Slavs with the Austro-Germans sufficed the Sofia journals to assert that Slav interests had nothing to do with the struggle between Germans and Russians.

* A passage from the report of the *Berliner Tageblatt* will give an idea of the duplicity of the Bulgars in their Turanian rôle. "Speaking of Bulgarian history, M. Rizoff stated that the Bulgarians have given the alphabet, language and literature to the Russians, Serbs, and Roumanians." On one side the denial of Slavism, on the other the pretention of this Tartar-Slav patriot of the Balkans, according to which the Bulgars have given their idiom to 130,000,000 Russians and Serbs. That is the Bulgarian: he will renounce even his race, but will not give up any of his pretensions.

† See "Those whose Martyrdom is Ignored," by Dr. V. Kuhne. (Geneva, 1917.)

The Bulgarian press went still further in representing the Germans as the standard-bearers of true Slavism. German machinations with the proclamation of the so-called independent Poland delighted the Bulgars, who appreciated it as a trump card of clever knavery. Their manifestations on the occasion of the proclamation of "independent Poland,"* under the sceptre of William II., completely denuded Bulgarian egoism of its Slav and humanitarian hypocrisy. This event had interest for the Bulgars above all from a military standpoint. Another ally, a million more combatants—this was the essential feature of the transaction. It was the culmination of the political wisdom of the Central Empires.

Here are some of the most characteristic passages from the declarations made by Bulgarian politicians to the journal *Outro* (November 7th and 8th, 1916).

Dobri Petkoff, Minister of Public Works and Leader of the National Liberal Party (Stambouloffist) :

"In the present case we cannot refuse to believe that the Polish people, clearly understanding the position it will occupy among free nations, *will put all its strength* into the common struggle, in order to show that it merits fully the freedom and independence which the Central Empires guarantee."

André Liaptcheff, former minister, a Democrat :

"Divers interpretations may be given to the resurrection of the Polish State, but what is most certain is that in it we shall have a new ally."

Grigor Natchovitch, former minister and Diplomat :

"The decision of Germany and Austro-Hungary to restore the Polish State is a glorious diplomatic victory for our allies." (Two lines obliterated by censor.) "Germany and Austro-Hungary are thus assured of the eternal gratitude of the Polish people, who are energetic in peace, and valiant in battle."

Dr. Momtchiloff, first Vice-President of Parliament (Liberal) :

"The Kingdom of Poland, newly created, with all its sons capable of bearing arms, and numbering not fewer than 800,000 or 900,000, will take their place at our side, and like our own heroic soldiers, will defend their independence."

* The *Zavřa* of July 20th wrote : "The Poles dream no longer of the restoration of the ancient kingdom. They will be content with an autonomy under the protectorate of a powerful friendly nation" (the Germans).

Dr. Radoslavoff, President of the Council :

“ We have reason to rejoice at the success of the Polish people, all the more as they will form a powerful independent State, which will follow the same policy as ourselves.”

Rachko Madjaroff, deputy, and member of the Central Bureau of the Democratic Party :

“ The restoration of the Kingdom of Poland puts an end to Slavophilism and panslavism, which were only kept alive through the pretensions of Russia to protect, after her manner and in her own interests, the various Slav peoples. By the restoration of Poland, *Germany achieves the greatest diplomatic victory over the Entente, that enemy of the Central Alliance and of the small nations.*”

Dr. Boris Vazoff, deputy, Gueshoffist, Russophil :

“ The restoration of the Polish State by the Central Powers *will have as a first and most important result the strengthening of the military power of the allies.* A population of ten millions in the Russian Poland occupied will bring into the ranks of our armies, if the war continues until spring, a million more soldiers, strong and of excellent *moral.*”

Dr. Hodjoff, deputy :

“ Restored Poland will serve as a buffer State between Germany and Austria on one side and Russia on the other. At the same time the Central Empires count on *military aid* from the Poles.”

Some extracts from the newspapers are as follows :
Echo de Bulgarie, November 6th :

“ The great battle of nations has reached its culminating point, it is not yet finished. New sacrifices are indispensable. The Poles, in order to defend the precious gift they have received, will bring into the struggle the enthusiasm of their freedom and the keen edge of their national feeling.

“ *The reinforcement of the ranks of the allies by an intrepid army is one of the immediate results of Polish independence.*”

Kambana, November 6th :

“ The Polish legions were created two years ago. We expressed our conviction then that these legions would form the embryo of the future *army of Poland.* Two months ago it was decided to transform the Polish legions into *regiments.*”

Narodni Prava, November 7th :

“ The future of the Poles is inseparable from the future of the Central Powers. The Poles know it, and *if the necessity arises of making new sacrifices on the altar of their freedom and independence, they will do so.* . . . Poland lives again, thanks

to the Central Empires. Without them it would not exist. Then let Poland glory in them and bring them aid."

Zarīa, November 8th :

"The new Polish Kingdom, with its twelve millions of inhabitants and the army which it will not delay to form, will come to *augment the ranks of the allies*. An army of a million men, which the Polish people will organise shortly, will be a factor in no wise to be slighted. The restored Polish Kingdom cannot fail to contribute to a more rapid conclusion of peace."

Echo de Bulgarie, November 9th :

"The proclamation of the Polish Kingdom is at the same time the affirmation of *our political impartiality*, which our adversaries will essay in vain to dispute. The great fact of Polish independence is a new success for the Alliance in the terrible struggle which it maintains against the formidable coalition of destructive appetites. Naturally the enemy will seek to falsify its spirit and to diminish its import."

From the first the insincerity of this act was obvious to all the world : its importance, trifling in reality, was further diminished by events as well as by the interpretations put upon it by its authors themselves. As for the Bulgars, the proclamation of the so-called independent Poland of William II. put their Slav sincerity to the hardest proof : throughout the whole transaction they put in the first line *the enrolment of the Poles in the army of the Central Empires*. They counted so much on this that they lent themselves, without reserve, to the ignoble and by no means Slav task of forcing the propaganda among the Poles when the German plan of enrolment in Poland suffered the well-known check. The Bulgarian journal *Outro* of December 10th, 1916, "learns from Government sources that one of the ministers without portfolio will be despatched shortly to Warsaw to study the conditions favourable to the strengthening of friendly relations between Bulgaria and Poland." The sorry rôle of this instrument of German propaganda in martyred, despoiled and humiliated Poland affords in itself the idea of Slavism as practised by the Bulgars at such times as they thought opportune to make it serve their own ends.

CHAPTER XIV

BULGARIA AGAINST THE QUADRUPLE ENTENTE

THE anti-Russian campaign in Bulgaria exists, in the first place, as a result of the alliance with the Central Powers—an alliance exacting a hostile attitude to Russia. It is to be accounted for also by the traditional hostility of a political party which introduced into its programme the struggle against Russia from the very first days of Bulgarian liberty. The Bulgarian press campaign against the other powers of the Quadruple Entente is to be explained only by the first of the two causes above-mentioned, by the necessity of taking sides against the enemies of its allies. This reason has sufficed to expose the powers of the Quadruple Entente to attacks from the Sofia newspapers, more violent even than those directed against Russia.

The hatred to France and England is all the more unjustified seeing that Bulgaria has never had any reason to complain of these two western powers, both traditional protectors of the small Balkan States, of Bulgaria more than any other. All the Balkan countries owe a debt of gratitude to French civilisation and French influence, towards the Republic whose political support, so disinterested and so generous, has been lavished upon them in the difficult period of their resurrection and growth. As for England, Bulgaria has always been the object of her particular attention, and her petted protégé in the Balkans.

Not content with making complaints and accusations against their former protectors and benefactors, as strong as is possible, the Bulgars give to their attacks on the English and French proportions and a tone which surpass even those of the German press.

Here are some examples :

The *Dnevnik* of January 20th, 1916, speaking of "the hypocrisy of the Quadruple Entente," calls England and

Russia "immense monsters, creators and protectors of tyranny."

The *Narodni Prava* (February 22nd, 1916) says :

"The maritime monster (England) will have to abandon the claim to dominate all the seas and peoples as it does the Hindoos and many others."

The article closes with an appeal to Bulgarian audacity :

"Lack of courage is a vice and hesitation a fault. *In keeping pace with the Prussians you are sure not to run off the rails.*"

The *Narodni Prava* (September 4th, 1916) says :

"Yes, the London lords, the Paris bankers, and the satraps of Petrograd wanted us much to shed our blood for them. Millions have been lavished, and other millions were ready to be distributed ; but the Bulgars do not become the instruments of others. The Bulgars are fortunate to have Germany and Austria-Hungary as allies. . . . They imagine that Bulgaria has no defenders worthy of her, but that they are only individuals like those bought and picked out of the slums of London and Paris, apaches, thieves, assassins."

The *Kambana* of September 5th discovers "the causes of the failure of the Entente" (the title of the article) in its moral inferiority :

"At the head of the Entente powers there are only parvenus, without any greatness of mind. Public affairs are confided in France, Italy, England, Russia, Roumania, to men who have emerged from the mud of the streets, destitute of any talent, having no moral scruples, uttering fine humanitarian phrases, whilst in their hearts seethes a diabolical aversion for humanity. . . . The actions of these statesmen of the Entente corresponds to their moral qualities. *Cynical falsehoods, intrigues, buying of consciences, baseness characterise the proceedings employed by the Entente in regard to neutrals.*

"How can battles be won by armies flung into the firing-line by men like Grey, Briand, Salandra, Sazonov, and Sturmer, the dregs of humanity and politics ?"

The *Mir* of September 25th exposes the base methods and lying of the Entente :

"The longer the war lasts the more we perceive that the declarations of the Entente are only empty phrases, and that the Entente powers, feeling themselves unequal to the task of settling accounts with their adversaries, make every effort to call neutral countries to their aid as far as possible."

And in the same issue of the *Mir* :

"Whilst the nations and armies of the Entente are being

exhausted, its press uses language full of emphasis which corresponds in no wise to the reality of the situation. Day by day this press indefatigably seizes lands belonging to others and distributes them, annihilates States, and, above all, talks of 'justice' as if justice consisted in the enslavement of foreign territories, in the destruction of States, in the throttling of Greece and all neutral countries."

It is the same Ententist speaking-trumpet of yesterday, the organ of Gueshoff, which, in its issue of September 19th, 1916, allows itself to speak of the "famished Entente":

"The desperate struggles on the French front and in Greek Macedonia, the bloody battles in the Dobrudja and the Carpathians, have as their first object the opening of ways of communication for the export of Russian and Roumanian wheat. *Torrents of blood flow because in England, France, and Italy the populations run the risk of dying of hunger.*"

In his article on the finances of the Entente in the *Kambana* of October 10th, 1916, Yonkoff-Vladikine asserts that England exploits her allies financially, but that she is herself exploited by America:

"Republican France has become bankrupt several times, squandering the money of her creditors. Russia has done the same. . . . The war demands money, and there is no more, neither at Paris nor Petrograd, where they have always been penniless and have always lived on credit. England proposes already to shut her purse. We must not forget, moreover, that the Frenchman is the most parsimonious being in the world, and now that he has become the slave of Great Britain, to the point of begging in London a trifling sum like a tramp, they have become callous at Paris. That city has become a mad-house in which every Frenchman feels more chilly than Polar ice. A terrible fever is shaking the French.

"Yes; France of the sans-culottes and demagogues; France of hateful politicians who bargain for the liberty and independence of peoples; France of hypocrites, perjurers, swindlers; France, a slave of Siberian despotism—that France has received the punishment her deeds have merited. The leading men of Paris have become wild beasts, their laws of slaughter and dividing up countries show the incapacity of these inhuman types, shut within the iron bars of a menagerie.

"In Bulgaria people believe that the laws of logic are identical with universal laws, and therefore that the wicked will receive their deserts. Before us lie the buried corpses of Serbia and Montenegro; the grave of the Roumanians is being dug, whilst the Frenchman carries in his breast a dead soul. That is enough for us."

The effrontery of the falsehoods and the outrageous character of the insults in this article are equalled by its savage and odious spite and triumphant red-skin wickedness. But it is neither the first nor the last discourse of the kind upon France and the French.

The *Narodni Prava* of December 2nd, 1916, reprints with satisfaction the parody on the "Marseillaise" by the prince among Bulgarian poets, Ivan Vazoff, published first in the *Mir*, in which the French are qualified as plunderers, despoilers and violators. The *Balkanska Pochta* of October 15th, 1916, protests against the use of the French language at Sofia. Malinoff's organ, the *Preporetz*, of July 3rd, 1916, accuses the French of vandalism and savage ferocity both at Verdun and in Macedonia. "The minds of the sons of great France are clouded ; . . . it is the spitefulness of impotence."

* *

The attacks on England, far more frequent, are couched in a tone still more violent. The rage of Germany against England, whose intervention upset the calculations of William II., is reflected in the Bulgarian press which employs the same vocabulary to express the same opinions.

It insists, above all, on pretending to demonstrate that England provoked the war. From the very first days of Bulgarian intervention the Bulgarian students at Berlin issued the password against England.

The *Berliner Tageblatt* of September 29th, 1915, publishes the speech made in German by a Bulgarian at the Anhalt Station, Berlin, on the occasion of the departure of the mobilised Bulgarian students:

" ' We are going to fight our enemy, England. Until now it has been constantly repeated that little Serbia was guilty of having caused the world war, but people forgot that behind Serbia was England, upon whom lies all the guilt. The shortest way from Germany to Egypt runs through Bulgaria. The Bulgarian nation is a small one, *but we have Germany behind us*, and we shall not rest until we have attained our ends.' . . . The speech was followed by the hymns *Choumi Maritza* and *Deutschland über Alles*."

The *Narodni Prava* of November 17th, 1915, had a leader entitled "Ed. Grey the Greatest Culprit in the World War." It abounded in most scurrilous insults to Grey and England. The same journal, writing on November 20th on Lord Kitchener's Mission in the Balkans, emphasised

the distress of England, and her fears lest the Germans and Turks should take from her Suez and Egypt, thanks to Bulgarian aid.

And further, on January 18th, 1916, in an article entitled "The Situation in England":

"England should answer for her sins before God and humanity . . . It is England who is responsible for the present situation of the nations of Europe, a situation without precedent in history. England induced Russia and France to make war under the pretence of protecting the rights of small peoples. This formula served her to mask her insatiable and selfish rapacity and her immoderate desire to dominate the world. . . . The English Government counted on the dissolution of Austria and the downfall of Germany. *What can England do now?* It only remains for her to admit that she has reached the end of the road that history has traced for her, and to return, broken, ruined, destroyed by younger nations, among which the German people figure in the first line. Such is the situation of England."

Under the title "England at War," Gueshoff's *Mir* of April 26th, 1916, wrote:

"The present world war is but the result of the attempts of England to weaken and overthrow her rival, Germany, by concluding divers agreements and understandings."

The *Narodni Prava*, of May 16th asserted:

"England has shed much blood in order to secure in the future the monopoly of the world's trade. But to her great discomfiture, and for the good fortune of the nations who are toiling and struggling for the progress of humanity, *she has been vanquished in this world war. She will have been definitely humbled so that she can no more raise her head, nor menace the peoples who refuse to follow the path she assigns to them.*"

The Anglo-German naval battle between the Skagerrack and the Hornsriff, of which the Germans have misrepresented the character by false reports, created at Sofia above all clamorous manifestations against England.

The *Narodni Prava* of June 3rd wrote:

"At sea, between the Skagerrack and Hornsriff, Asquith and Sir Ed. Grey received on May 31st a well-merited rejoinder. English battleships and cruisers have sunk to the bottom of the sea to hear no more the boasting of English statesmen. German genius has won the victory even over English sea power. . . . Skill has vanquished numerical superiority, quality has overcome quantity. *Between the Skagerrack and the Hornsriff, as at Verdun, as in the Tyrol, on the Vardar, and at Kut-el-Amara, the basis of a new world is being laid on the ruins of the*

old, which was the world of English egoism. . . . The routine is being destroyed. Such is the destiny of everything that is old and impotent. . . . All Bulgarians send a cordial greeting to the victors and founders of the future."

The *Mir* (Opposition) of June 3rd, 1916, is not less violent :

"This blow is doubtless only a beginning. . . . If the dogma of English invincibility at sea had not paralysed people's minds by extreme dread and caution, perhaps the nations would have felt themselves delivered from English oppression sooner, and the war itself might have taken another direction. . . ."

The *Echo de Bulgarie* wrote on June 5th, 1916 :

"There is in this victory—as we said two days ago—more than a triumph of arms : *there is the decline* of Britannic omnipotence and the rise of Germany as a naval power of the first rank."

And the *Voenni Izvestia* said on June 7th, 1916 :

"The naval blow is crushing. *The haughty words, ' Britannia rules the waves,' have lost all meaning."*

The *Narodni Prava* of June 9th, 1916, published the telegram sent by the Bulgarian army congratulating the German Navy. The *Outro* of June 10th noticed, among numerous felicitations, those addressed to the command of the fleet by the Bulgarian deputies then in Germany, etc.

On the news of the catastrophe which happened to the vessel which was conveying Lord Kitchener and the English military mission to Russia, the *Narodni Prava* exulted in these terms :

"After great celebrity, a death little to be envied ! How immutable are the laws of destiny ! Everyone has the end he deserves. . . . *The death of Kitchener is also the death of English maritime greatness.* He had come to be considered as the representative of supreme English egoism. The ship which carried him is at the bottom of the sea. Nobody can save England from this misfortune. So she draws near her natural end, slowly but infallibly."

In a preceding issue, the *Narodni Prava* (June 7th, 1916) made it its pleasure to write, in alluding to Kitchener : "That man must be good pasturage for the fish of the North Sea just now."

The *Echo de Bulgarie* of June 9th exaggerates the importance of the event :

"This deed, following closely on the battle of the Skager-

rack, will make the English ponder over the risks of the war, and will teach them that they are not safe from blows; their powerful adversary can reach them everywhere, even in the heart of England."

This attitude is manifested on every occasion. The utterances of English statesmen are always commented on in the same tone as at Berlin and Vienna.

Concerning the speeches of Lloyd George, for example, the *Narodni Prava* of October 3rd, 1916, wrote:

"The latest declarations of Lloyd George have only one meaning for us: they show us yet more clearly *what a crime Bulgaria would have committed if she had rallied to the Entente to fight to the last drop of blood for the triumph of England*. Lloyd George invites the world to new horrors for the sake of the greatness of England."

The *Mir* of October 2nd said:

"Among other ill-fated Ministers who sacrifice to their words the last drops of their people's blood, Lloyd George is distinguished by the sacrifice he makes of Russian blood to the last drop for English interests."

The *Zaria* of October 3rd declared:

"Can one doubt to-day that it is English egoism which for twenty-six months has caused the blood of Europe to pour in torrents, and is destroying civilisation?"

"The utterances of Lloyd George are inspired by a fury akin to bloodthirstiness. . . ."

The anger aroused in the Bulgarian press by the strength and tenacity of the English effort in the world war has led it to inconceivably monstrous utterances. In face of evidence of which it feels the weight, the Bulgarian press offers only falsehood, scurrility, and insults without parallel.

The organ of the President of the Council (*Narodni Prava*) of February 7th, 1917, says, among other things:

"The situation may be described thus: On one side there are generous giants shaking their fists, and on the other foul individuals, blood-stained, mutilated, with broken jaws, carried away by fits of rage, howling like wild beasts and crying to the giants: 'Strike then!' The giants reply: 'We have smashed your jaws, broken your teeth; you welter in your blood; you stink; you are loathsome to us. Do not force us to soil our hands and feet again with your fetid blood. Your slaver is repulsive.'

"'No,' they keep on crying; and, supporting each other, these bandits, undone by misery, say: 'Strike then!'

“ That is the frightful reality of the situation. From this war there is but one way of escape, and that lies in our strength. Do not let us deceive ourselves. The London lords will not become more reasonable. When dogs go mad, there is only one cure for them ; the lords know this and desire it. . . . Those who think, know that there remains *only one laudable act to the leaders of the Entente, and that is to point a revolver to their temples and blow out their brains.** The English cannot reason any longer. If they were capable of reasoning they would understand that if the war goes on for two years longer the German aerial monsters and submarines will reduce the lords of Great Britain to mendicity. The fate of the perjured Talmudists of the London *crèches* is terrible, but they do not perceive it. They are blind. Blind ! . . . At this moment all the peoples whom they have ruined cry with one voice : ‘ May they be accursed ! ’ And the echoes repeat, ‘ Accursed ! Accursed ! ’ ”

The *Kambana* of the same date speaks in a similar strain :

“ It will be the end of English domination on seas and oceans. It will be the breaking up of England, the loss of all her colonies ; it will mean depopulation, since the masses will quit the island, and England will have then only some ten million inhabitants. . . . Great Britain, deprived of internal unity, and hereditary enemy of national crystallisation—as well by her cold, damp, stony, miserable soil as by her artificially accumulated population ready to disperse as soon as the colonies have been taken away—Great Britain, neither as a country nor a nation, is called to play a part in the world history which will decide the fate of nations in the future. The Bagdad railway will send Great Britain to doze on the couches where the old empresses of seas and oceans—Spain, Venice, Holland, Portugal—are reposing. Deprived of India, the English will be ruined everywhere, and the catastrophe will be frightful and irrevocable.”

* *

So it is evident that public opinion is agreed on hostility to England as on other questions of Bulgarian foreign policy. England is accused of causing, more than any other power of the Quadruple Entente, the European massacre. The Bulgarian rule of repaying her greatest benefactors with bitter hatred is doubly proved. Indeed, in this same ungrateful Bulgaria, it is precisely the *Mir*, known formerly for its Anglomania, which has displayed the blackest ingratitude, in leading against England a campaign systematically uninterrupted and unscrupulous. The *Mir* is nevertheless

the organ of Gueshoff, who owes everything to the English—his career to their culture, and his life even to their generosity.

It will suffice to add here some extracts. The *Mir* of May 14th, 1916, described the terrible effects of Zeppelin raids on England :

"The editors of Reuter's Agency rack their brains in vain to concoct despatches representing the visits of Zeppelins as inoffensive. . . . What would happen if, instead of showing that they are capable of conquering space between Edinburgh and Liverpool, the Zeppelins decided to assemble over London, and to sprinkle the capital with bombs every night? English nerves would be shaken more than ever. Zeppelin attacks are not a trifle; they are not a secondary item in this war, but, indeed, an element as important as it is terrible."

The same journal wrote on July 27th, 1916 :

"According to our information from the most competent source, England has manœuvred knowingly to drag Russia and France into war against Germany. . . . If the war is prolonged to-day more than is necessary, it is, above all, thanks to the influence and under the dictation of England."

The *Mir* of October 14th, 1916, commented on the speeches of Lloyd George and Asquith as follows :

"In the words of these two Ministers there is the avowal that, if peace were to be concluded, England would be ruined, and that all which has been spoken and written is but hollow phrases uttered only to facilitate fishing in troubled waters."

Concerning the activity of submarines off the coast of America, the *Mir* of October 16th, 1916, declared :

"The activity of submarines in the ocean close to the American coast is an important turning-point in the conduct of the world war. *It is high time to take every measure to force England to renounce her menace of destruction to Germany and her allies.* It is only in this way that we can succeed in obtaining the general peace desired by all the world."

Discussing the possibility of American intervention in the interests of peace, the *Mir* of November 9th said :

"The adverse party (the Entente) is constantly asserting that it also is fighting for the triumph of the principle of nationalities, but at the same time demands the undoing of the *people most capable of existence—the German people.* It is the English who insist on this most of all."

Touching the declarations of English Ministers, the *Mir* of November 11th had the following :

"The war cannot be continued out of spite. The English

understand this situation very well, and do everything to feed the frenzy, both among themselves and their Allies, by affirming that their existence is menaced so long as Germany is not destroyed."

The same journal said on November 13th :

" We have explanations enough as to the causes of the war. It is not by fine words and blandishments that the English will impose the belief on anybody that they are not fighting for their own ends, like the others."

* * *

Of all the present enemies of Bulgaria, the Italians have been treated with the most respect by the Bulgars. It is only the ultra-Austrophil *Kambana* which attacks Italy at times with violence and uses the arguments of the Vienna press. The other journals say little about Italy ; their articles, moderate in tone, sometimes make distinct reservations and often express a hope that Italy will enter on the right way.

The *Narodni Prava* of January 29th, 1916, in an article entitled " Italy in the Balkans," examines calmly and in an impartial manner the conflict of Italian and Austrian interests in the Adriatic. It thinks Italian calculations have shown themselves to be inexact and mistaken. The article criticises the errors of Italian statesmen, " who have led Italy into a war that will exhaust and ruin her."

In the *Preporetz* of September 20th, 1916, the correspondent at the front in the environs of Bellasitz testifies to the astonishment which the Bulgarian soldier evinces at finding the Italian among his enemies : " What do they want with us, when nothing divides us, when we have had no quarrel with them ? "

The correspondent of the *Giornale d'Italia* at Bucharest interviewed a member of the Bulgarian Cabinet, who assured him that the Bulgarians would not attack Valona : " they do not wish to fight the Italians, as they desire to renew cordial relations after the war " (*Journal de Genève*, July 13th, 1916 ; despatch from Rome). The first rumours of a separate Bulgarian peace were from an Italian source. (For example, the despatch of the Stefani Agency in the Italian newspapers of August 24th, 1916, etc.)

The cautious tone towards Italy seems to have been a watchword given to the Bulgarian press, which is one of the best disciplined concerning foreign policy. The Serbo-

Italian controversy on the subject of the eastern shore of the Adriatic, made the most of by the Austro-German press for purposes of intrigue from the first days of Italian intervention, had given birth to Bulgarian hopes of a conflict which, dividing the Italians and Serbs, would give Bulgaria another ally.

This same cautious attitude decided the Bulgarians to refuse their aid against the Italian troops in Albania. A fraction, happily minute, of Italian public opinion allowed itself to be won over by the equivocal Bulgarian advances and betrayed its sympathy now and then with Bulgaria. But the arrival of Italian soldiers on the Salonica front cut short this Bulgarian game of intrigue, and Italy is now at Salonica, side by side with her Allies. The sincere friends of peace, order, and progress in the Peninsula recognise the important and enviable part which devolves on Italy in the work of Balkan restoration. This part cannot fail to be congenial on condition that it is inspired by the great ideals which freed Italy. And we ought to contemplate with pleasure the collaboration of Italy in the deliverance of Serbia and the liberation of the Yugoslavs, who will become the best and most clearly indicated allies of Italy.

The great Italian savant Ferrero wrote in the *Secolo* of November 15th, 1916, an article from which we must quote the following as a conclusion to the present chapter :

“The Central Powers have proved that they knew what they wanted in setting fire to Europe with the Serbian torch. As Poland in Eastern Europe, Serbia is the real enemy of Germany in the Balkans. If Europe wishes to raise a bulwark in the Balkans against German ambitions, that bulwark cannot be other than Serbia strengthened so as to afford sufficient resistance. The European war has proved how vain it would be to imagine other artificial solutions, such as, for example, combination with Bulgaria.

“*Bulgaria has not come out of a struggle with the Germans. She has never suffered from German authoritative power. That is why she could betray Russia so easily and with so few qualms of conscience.* Serbia and Poland, on the contrary, were born struggling against the German world. Their geographical situation forces them to be either victims or antagonists of pan-Germanism. If it is wished to keep German ambitions and appetites within just and reasonable limits, we must rebuild the Polish rampart in Eastern Europe and consolidate the Serbian rampart in the Balkans.

CHAPTER XV

BULGARIAN BALKAN POLICY

It has never been possible to discern a Bulgarian Balkan policy consistent with itself—the application of a system, of a national programme. All the ventures dictated by Bulgarian megalomania and Chauvinism display only a policy of inclinations.

The principle of this political gluttony consisted in the instinct which led the Bulgars to take the side on which they hoped for the maximum of profit. That is why their pretensions concerning Serbia became the basis of Bulgarian Balkan policy. Hostility to Serbia led fatally to junction with Central Europe, and this brought about conflict with Russia.

Bulgarian policy towards neighbouring Balkan countries—Roumania, Greece, Turkey—was the result of the new state of affairs, a result not logical, but determined rather by a concrete obligation. Even in concentrating all her interest on the enslavement of Serbia, Bulgaria was not able, however, to discipline herself, by an effort of her own will, to the point of subordinating to this unique object her numerous other pretensions. If Bulgaria has been relatively moderate towards Roumania, Greece, and Turkey, it is less through wisdom than through obedience to the Austro-Germans, who have dictated her conduct in an absolute fashion during all the past year.

Bulgaria has, besides, always put forth pretensions to neighbouring territories. There is not one of which she has not claimed at least a portion, even when such irreconcilable policy was not altogether prudent. These voracious appetites, which the Bulgarians have not always been able to dissimulate in spite of their cunning, led them to the catastrophe of 1913 and the Treaty of Bucharest, for which they throw the responsibility on everyone except themselves, the only real culprits.

In 1913 Bulgaria prolonged the war against Turkey, against the will of her allies and without need, since the war aims of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, the liberation of their racial brethren from the Turks, had been attained. And, whilst provoking dissatisfaction among her allies and putting forth immoderate pretensions which embraced eastern Thrace, Bulgaria did not appear disposed to make any concession to her fourth neighbour, Roumania, that would have gained her friendship. She ended, at the last moment, by concluding a hurried peace with the Turks, in order to defend herself from three new adversaries which she had herself created by her inordinate covetousness.

This is confirmed in an interesting fashion by the *Mir*, the organ of Gueshoff, who was at the head of the Government in the spring of 1913. On the anniversary of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance (concluded on March 13th, 1912) the *Mir*, in its issue of March 14th, 1916, tried to prove the point of view (developed in an article quoted above of April 23rd) that it was not the alliance with Serbia but Bulgarian intransigency towards Greeks and Serbs which let loose the catastrophe.

"The cause of the catastrophe," writes the *Mir*, "does not lie in disagreement concerning the contested zone of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty; the Salonica question has been the germ and cause of the catastrophe. It is to have Salonica that we have let the Greeks ally themselves with the Serbs."

We must not seek, however, in this costly experience the explanation of Bulgarian moderation towards Roumanians and Greeks in 1915 and 1916. During the two years that have elapsed since the Treaty of Bucharest, the Bulgarians have not moderated their appetites nor learnt to display tact; they have merely, from the political point of view, come under German discipline.

And even under German direction, the repression of Bulgarian inclinations was not always effected without difficulty.

Although the powerful influence of the Austro-Germans at Sofia recommended from 1913 an understanding with Greeks and Roumanians, in order that the Bulgars might have their hands free for action against Serbia, they showed a total lack of consideration for the Greeks, even in the autumn of 1915, and until the moment they entered on the war with Serbia. And it is yet another characteristic trait of the Balkan policy of the Bulgars that they *showed*

such cavalier indifference towards the projects of Venizelos, who, nevertheless, urged the renewal of the Balkan League and declared that he was ready, in the name of Greece, to sacrifice to this end a large portion of Greek territory which would be ceded to Bulgaria. But that was precisely what Bulgaria did not want. Refusing the Greek offer of compensation, she preferred that Greece should detach herself from her ally Serbia, leaving a free hand to Bulgaria for creating a new order of things in the Balkans.

According to authentic declarations made by Radoslavoff to the Sobranié some days before the Bulgarian intervention, Bulgaria did not declare war until after having received from Athens and Bucharest the assurance that she would have to encounter only one enemy—Serbia. Until this declaration the Bulgarian press did not spare either Roumania or Greece. Throughout the summer of 1915 the organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the *Echo de Bulgarie*, reserved in every issue a special space in the front page for attacks on Greece, the Hellenes, and King Constantine. This bantering of Hellenism contained more insults than the attacks directed against the Serbs.

The tone changed after the Bulgarian intervention, but the substitution of friendship for enmity was too brusque to permit of the dissimulation of the real motives and sentiments.

In the new state of affairs which they were preparing in the Balkans, the Bulgars were wanting in sincerity towards the Greeks, and reserved for them an unenviable rôle. The best proof of it is in the number of newspaper articles published during 1915 on events in Greece, which, whilst approving of the new régime and policy of King Constantine, carefully avoided examination and serious consideration of Greco-Bulgarian relations.

The *Mir* recognises this in its issue of March 18th, 1916. After reproducing an article of the *Neon Asty* of Athens, on the intrigues of the Venizelist and Ententist journals tending to embroil Greece and Bulgaria, and emphasising the assertion of the semi-official Greek journal, that Bulgaria has too many other cares to make further pretensions to Salonica, the *Mir* makes the following reflections :

“ It is doubtless only a negative basis for a Greco-Bulgarian understanding ; but as it is impossible to establish an understanding on loftier and more positive foundations, we hope that neighbouring States will know how to profit by it, notwithstanding its negative character.”

That is sufficiently clear.

Indeed, the basis of the Greco-Bulgarian compromise of the autumn of 1915 could not but be negative. On neither side was it attempted to smooth away difficulties. Only tacit concessions were made reciprocally. Bulgaria gave up the Struma valley (which had more interest for her than that of the Vardar), and Constantine renounced his alliance with Serbia (which for Greece was an interest equally vital). This tacit understanding, which resembled a criminal conspiracy in the mystery and silence which enveloped it, was not discussed, and, for that matter, did not lend itself to discussion. Without daring to look each other in the face, Bulgaria and Constantine shook hands under the advice and with the approval of Berlin. Both remained under the suggestion of new compensations of which they were allowed only a glimpse, compensations which were to make up for mutual concessions and remove existing causes of dispute.

The sorry reasoning which was employed on the rare occasions when it was essayed to present the attitude of Greece as a natural one, shows clearly how difficult is the serious discussion of the conditions of these relations and this tacit compromise.

The *Echo de Bulgarie* of January 1st, 1916, criticises the declaration of Venizelos. That journal asserts that in the spring of 1915 Venizelos had advised King Constantine to cede Cavalla to Bulgaria. If this plan had been put in execution the Bulgarian frontier would have advanced eastward to Kospoli, whilst on the west it would have included all the "uncontested zone," taking in Monastir.

"Venizelos himself was disposed to give to Bulgaria more than she has conquered up to the present. Without doubt, our troops have occupied to the west all the contested zone as far as the Albanian frontier, but to the east our frontier does not go beyond the Maritza. Moreover, what we have gained in the west does not exceed, either geographically or economically, the value of the provinces Venizelos was willing to concede to us in Thrace. If Bulgaria, after peace, were to preserve all she has conquered, she would possess less than she would have obtained by accepting the offers of Venizelos, and the Bulgarian population would not go beyond the figure of six or seven millions. The combination of Venizelos would have allowed Serbia also to obtain immense territories; then what would have become of the interests of Greece between a Serbia of fifteen million and a Bulgaria of seven million

inhabitants? The Serbo-Bulgarian question being already settled, neither Greeks nor Bulgars have reason to remain distrustful of each other." (*Berliner Tageblatt*, January 3rd, 1916.)

The ruse concealed in these lines is too simple and shallow not to betray itself. Bulgaria pretends to fear unfortunate consequences for Greece from the Venizelos project. She is troubled about the injury to Greece which concessions to Bulgaria might bring in their train, an injury which would afflict the Bulgars deeply! On this account, in order to save Greece from a Great Serbia, the Bulgarians sought compensation in systematic pillage of the greater part of Serbian territory. The expansion of Serbia, an ally of Greece nevertheless, and having no pretensions to any parcel of Greek territory, was considered by the Bulgars as dangerous to Greece. To remove this peril, they saw only one means, the crushing of Serbia and the extension of Bulgaria, of that Bulgaria which had never ceased to claim Cavalla, Salonica, and the most southerly provinces of western Macedonia.

That was the best argument Bulgaria could bring in trying to justify the compromise of Greece with the new order of things, as planned by Sofia and approved by Berlin.

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In most cases, if not all, the Bulgarian press confined itself to defending Greece and King Constantine against the Ententist and Venizelist press.

The *Mir* wrote (January 18th, 1916), under the title "The Entente and Greece":

"The Anglo-French always imagine that the Balkan peoples are at daggers-drawn with their sovereigns. For example, they expected a revolution in Bulgaria in case the Government decided for mobilisation. Events have given the measure of this error. At present the Anglo-French make the same suppositions with regard to Greece. They count much also on Greco-Bulgarian tension. But *Greco-Bulgarian enmity might be transformed into friendship*. Even if it existed, that enmity would not constitute a serious obstacle to the irruption of Bulgarian and German armies into Greek provinces occupied by Anglo-French troops."

The Bulgarian press faces the possibility of this metamorphosis—Bulgaro-Greek hostility transmuted into friendship; but it takes good care not to define the nature of the hostility nor how the miracle could be accomplished.

It will suffice to quote from a few articles on this question. Whether they speak of the Greek internal crisis or the blockade of Greece, or the proceedings of the Allies at Athens, or the irruption of Bulgarian troops into Greek territory, the Bulgarian journals repeat the same ideas to satiety.

The *Echo de Bulgarie* says (June 14th, 1916) :

"The occupation of the Rupel defile imposed by the blustering preparations of General Sarraïl has been recently the signal for an odious campaign of intrigues and falsehood against Bulgaria.

"The object of this revolting campaign is very clear: it is a question, before all, of rousing the suspicions of the Greeks, in order to trouble the good relations existing between the two neighbour nations."

The same journal, July 3rd, 1916 :

"The Greek people has not only to choose between peace and war. It must choose between liberty and vassalage, between honour and decay. It depends on its political maturity and courage to free itself from an oppressive tutelage and resume its liberty of action."

When the crisis in Greece was at its sharpest, in the last months of 1916, there appeared what follows concerning the Venizelist movement at Salonica and the events which sprang from it.

Dnevnik, September 6th, 1916 :

"There is being played at Salonica a comedy of national revolt of which the threads are to be found at the headquarters of General Sarraïl. . . . *There is but one way of saving Greece from the disaster that is being prepared for her; that is to drive her 'protectors' from Salonica, in concert with us.* It will not be difficult afterwards for her to settle accounts with her own traitors to their country."

The *Echo de Bulgarie*, September 22nd, 1916 :

"New weaknesses would be fatal to the future of the Greek race, which it is being sought to subject to Russo-Italian ambitions. Between the displeasure of the Entente, and the peril that menaces Hellenism, the choice is not difficult."

The same journal, September 29th, 1916 :

"To the conservative policy of King Constantine M. Venizelos opposes a programme of action. This programme is a direct menace to Bulgaria. Nevertheless, it is to the alliance with Bulgaria that this man owes his prestige and his political success. And if he clamours to-day against 'the hereditary enemy,' and looks to the crushing of Bulgaria as a source of greatness

for his country, it is that he desires faithfully to follow his friend Pachitch. The latter has led Serbia to Corfu. Where does M. Venizelos wish to lead Greece ? ”

The *Mir*, October 20th, 1916 :

“ The Greek people has always known how to contain itself and to keep its dignity ; it has resisted attempts at corruption as well as the menaces of the Entente. . . . It may be doubted whether Greece will allow herself to be forced by the Entente to declare war on Bulgaria. . . . ”

The *Preporetz*, October 25th, 1916 (on the supposition of a Venizelist revolution) :

“ It would be the last act of the Greek drama, after which the whole of Greece would fall into the hands of its ‘ protectors.’ We must make a reservation, however. *King Constantine has given proofs up to the present of a force of resistance* which allows for the eventuality of a surprise for the Entente at the last moment.”

Radoslavoff declared to the correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on November 15th, 1916 :

“ *So long as King Constantine remains on the throne, Greece will not march against us.* ”

To give a notion of the panegyrics which were showered on King Constantine since the month of September, 1915, when he allowed the Bulgars a free field in the Balkans, we must give a quotation from the *Echo de Bulgarie*, which, deceived by the false news of the abdication of the Greek King, made lamentation for one whom, a short time before, in 1913, it had loaded with insults.*

The *Echo de Bulgarie*, September 4th, 1916, wrote :

“ So Eleutherios Venizelos resumes the power to which he aspired with such avidity, and King Constantine vacates the throne which, three years ago, he ascended under dolorous circumstances for the Royal Family of Greece, and which he has occupied with dignity.

“ *King Constantine was a great Greek patriot, and a sovereign full of energy and perseverance ;* he acquired his popularity in collaboration with the Bulgars at first, against them afterwards, and the Greeks would commit a crime, in admitting for a single instant, that their King would have neglected the interests of Hellenism at any moment. Now that he prefers to renounce the throne rather than cringe to the foreigner, all must bow in reverence before his strength of character.

* He was called in the nationalist press “ Constantine the Bulgar-slayer,” “ the ridiculous archi-strategist,” and by epithets more insulting.

That act, chivalrous and partaking of antique grandeur, wins admiration for King Constantine from all men of spirit.

"This result is well in the traditions of Entente policy; how many times these last three years have not the French and Russian newspapers announced the abdication of a king still more inconvenient for the designs of the Entente in the East!"

It is of interest to cite some further extracts from the Bulgarian press of December, 1916, at a time when the crisis at Athens was sharpest. The Sofia journals—and with them the Bulgarian Minister back from Athens—did not conceal that at Sofia, as well as at Berlin, they expected to see Greece offer a desperate resistance to the Entente, concerted between the three sovereigns, Germanic or Germanised.

The *Mir* of December 4th, 1916, wrote:

"Venizelos essayed to utilise the hatred of the 'hereditary enemy,' but he was forced to the conviction that the hatred had disappeared from Greece and that another hatred had taken its place."

From the *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* of December 4th:

"According to the Turkish Minister, Ghalib Bey, the Greeks say: For centuries we have been grateful to the French, but now we cry openly in the streets: 'Long live the Turks and the Bulgars!'"

From the *Preporetz*, December 11th:

"However small it may be, the Royal army will seriously menace the rear of Sarrail's army. And if the Royal troops succeeded in fortifying themselves on a single point of the western shore of the Gulf of Salonica, the revictualling of Sarrail in provisions and munitions would become very uncertain."

From the *Mir* of December 26th. "Declarations of a Diplomatist":

"The events at Athens leave no doubt as to the direction of the sympathies of official Greece. *Greece has decided on firmness.* The success of the first combats, the presence of German submarines in the waters of the Archipelago and Mediterranean, the German note for peace, the blockade of the Greek coasts, and the disaster of Roumania—all is of a nature to strengthen the firm resolution of the Hellenic people to resist. . . . On the retreat of the troops, the streets of Athens resounded with the cry: 'We can hold out a month against the blockade, the Germans will soon come to help us!'"

The *Outro*, December 30th (interview with the Bulgarian Minister at Athens, Passaroff, who said) :

"Bulgaria and Greece lived in the past in 'hereditary enmity.' However, a complete change has taken place. The authorities as well as the population extend a very friendly welcome to all Bulgarians. I beg you to make known that there is no anti-Bulgarian current at present in Greece. When I left Athens the former Presidents of Council, as well as professors, students, representatives of the Court, and the people generally, expressed to me their sense of sympathy and regret."

The praise lavished on the Roumanians for their independent spirit and their high political intelligence, pronouncements on the solidarity of Bulgaro-Roumanian interests in the Balkans, equalled the most obsequious compliments to the Greeks so long as Roumania took no part in the war. A watchword silenced Bulgarian claims in the Dobrudja and the rancour of 1913.

Roumanian intervention revealed all at once the hatred which the Bulgars could hardly stifle under that forced silence until September 1st, 1916. What the Bulgarian press has written against Roumania and the Roumanian people since that date oversteps all bounds.

We will give only a few extracts in chronological order :

The *Dnevnik* of September 1st said :

"Bulgaria is quite steadfast with her allies. Blessed be the hour of settling accounts with perfidious enemies."

The *Zaria* of September 2nd wrote :

"We are glad to see Roumania pass over to the enemies and leave us a free field for action."

The *Balkanska Pochta* (September 5th) published the prophecy of the Bulgarian poet, Ivan Vazoff, predicting the annihilation of Roumania.

The *Narodni Prava* of September 5th preached the "annihilation of the infamous enemy," and proclaimed, as "the least vengeance, the cutting off of Roumania from the Black Sea, and perpetual privation of the issue through Constantinople and the Dardanelles."

The *Mir* of the same date wrote :

"All the conditions for founding a lasting friendship were combined—although, in truth, we *were never able to glance at the map without remarking that the natural frontier between the two countries could only be the Danube*. One can understand the rapid and furious advance of our army across the plain which was formerly the cradle of the Bulgarian Empire." (Dobrudja.)

The *Narodni Prava* of September 7th declared :

" We must break Roumania with all our force, without consideration and without quarter. *Death to Roumania and to her armies which come from the north ! Death to the perfidious neighbour* so that we may live ourselves. And since she tries to undo the great work of our powerful ally, Germany, in opening a free way to Asia, the latter will not abandon us, but march at our side, and will aid us to defeat this neighbour without faith or honour, led by debauchees, by the bloodthirsty, and corrupt."

The *Kambana* of September 9th said :

" By the overthrow of Serbia, the west of the Balkan Peninsula has been swept clean of Russian influence ; by the overthrow of Roumania, the east will be assured. . . ."

The *Narodni Prava* wrote on September 13th, 1916 :

" Should we not be culpable, we and our allies, in this struggle for morality and justice, *if we left intact the independence of the Roumanian bandits and brigands ?* Should we not one day be severely condemned by history for our guilty tolerance and our pity towards criminals ? It is our duty *to justify the reputation we have gained of being the champions of the ideals of humanity* and of cleansing the road from weeds and all that is rotten and corrupt. If we left vestiges of them they might corrupt humanity again and become the cause of new struggles."

The *Balkanska Pochta* declared on September 15th :

" Our present object as to the Roumanians is to take from them their arms, to purify their State, and to establish in it civilisation—true civilisation—built up of work, honour, and the virtues of a people well bred and possessed of sane ideas. The task of the Bulgarian army is to throw the garbage on the dunghill and purify afterwards. Bulgaria has shown too much patience in tolerating on the other side of the Danube a dangerous gangrene, not only for her, but for the progress of humanity."

The *Preporetz* of October 24th wrote :

" The destruction of Roumania will render the defeat of Sarraill inevitable. From this point of view it is clear that the rapid crushing of Roumania is of capital importance and absolute necessity for us and our allies."

The taking of Constanza furnished the Bulgarian press with an occasion for celebrating in the same tone the " Roumanian Downfall."

The *Voenni Izvestia* of October 25th wrote :

" The Russians can at most prolong the agony of Roumania."

The *Echo de Bulgarie* of October 28th declared :

"The strategic frontier, the famous strategic frontier, imaginary safeguard of Roumanian integrity, has been of no help to the Roumanians against Bulgarian valour. *To-morrow Roumania will be no more.* Perjured like Serbia, she will perish as the latter has perished, covered with shame and opprobrium. . . ."

The *Mir* of October 26th wrote :

"The success against Roumania, in the north and in the south, places on the order of the day the question of the prolongation of the existence of this State."

To the correspondent of the Hungarian journal *Az Est* (November 5th, 1916), Radoslavoff declared "*he had the firm hope that Roumania would cease to exist as an independent State.*"

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The falsehood, ambiguity, suspicion, hollowness which characterise the discussion of Bulgaro-Greek relations on the one hand, and the wild jubilations concerning the Roumanian downfall on the other, express one and the same mentality. In complimenting the Greek Government and King Constantine, the Bulgars have never let escape, even involuntarily, a good word for the Greek people. Their real feelings with regard to the Greek people were expressed in their attacks on Venizelos and his partisans, at the time when the latter were returned to Parliament in an imposing majority by the free will of the people, and when Venizelos exposed, with the greatest spirit of sacrifice and the broadest views, his plans for a new Balkan Entente.

The Bulgars waited for the coming of Roumania into the war to call the Dobrudja "the cradle of the Bulgarian Empire." As for Greece, they did not hesitate to call Salonica in their semi-official organ "the Bulgarian Bethlehem." They did this at the same moment when they were showering on King Constantine protestations of amity and panegyrics in honour of his wisdom and patriotism.* The reason is that Bulgarian greed has always been stronger than the promptings of tact and political caution.

Bulgarian Imperialism has always been opposed to the idea of an understanding among the Balkan nations; naturally, this opposition became more accentuated and arrogant after Roumanian intervention.

* Article in the *Narodni Prava*, May 23rd, 1916.

The *Narodni Prava* of November 1st, 1916, wrote :

"A Bulgarian statesman who would have hesitated, were it but for a moment, to wage war against Russian policy, so perilous to Bulgaria, would have been a fool ; this war became all the more imperative when conditions became favourable and the aid of powerful allies was assured. . . . Bulgaria had many and grave reasons for not accepting the plans of Balkan federation which those master idealists, Rakovsky, Levsky, and Botoff, preached. . . . How could Bulgarian statesmen want the 'Balkan Confederation' when they had to act either against the 'protectress' of the Confederation or the enemies of that protectress ?

"The Balkan alliance condemned the Balkan Confederation. *Russia had designed through this alliance to strike a blow at the Central Powers* (the best proof of this exists in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty), and then to throw the Balkans into confusion. A Confederation in the heart of which the political tendencies of the four great European States cross is an impossibility.

"The Balkan peninsula cannot become another Switzerland. . . . Bulgaria, given its numerical superiority and its natural wealth, cannot consent to be one of the members of a Confederation of which all the burden would be borne by her.

"That is why she has preferred, taking into consideration her past and her future—as Leopold von Ranke said—to take up the defence of her historic rights, of her rights to existence, and to pursue the path of her natural and historic evolution."

This article of the semi-official Bulgarian journal only repeats word for word the Austro-German complaints against the Balkan Alliance. Professor Brückner, of Berlin, had said, for instance :

"The Balkan Alliance caused the defeat and downfall of Turkey in Europe. But it had still another object : the downfall of Austria. If the Balkan Alliance had remained vigorous, the Serbian and Roumanian armies would be now at Budapesth, assuredly. It is the ability and merit of Count Berthold which has destroyed the Balkan Alliance. . . ."

It does not appear that at Sofia so much ability was required in order to combat and compromise the notion of an accord between the Balkan nations. In his pamphlet, "The Balkan States and the Confederative Principle" (Sofia, 1915), A. Schopoff affirms that "this principle is found in the programmes of some of the Bulgarian parties. Four of these—the Radical, the Agrarian, and the two Socialist parties (unified and doctrinaire)—have for a fundamental principle an understanding and a Balkan

Confederation ; the four others—the National, the Democratic, the Progressist, and the divers fractions of the Liberal Party—esteem this principle inapplicable for the moment.” Indeed, as we have seen and as we shall see later, Bulgarian pretensions on all sides, and to the detriment of all neighbours, have always excluded a serious policy in this sense.

In the chorus of Chauvinistic megalomaniacs at Sofia we have not heard a word in favour of the accord of Balkan nations since October, 1915—except some platonic and theoretical manifestations of the Extreme Socialists. In the report of a sitting of the Sobranié, the *Mir* of November 30th, 1916, says that “ the Socialists, as always, reiterate the anodyne fable of the ‘ Balkan Federation.’ ”

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The Bulgars, who regard their political *volte-face* from Russia as the casting away of a legend, have no analogous explanation for their taking sides with Turkey. The Turkish yoke, too recent, and of which the weight was so heavy, has left too many traces to permit of the hatred and distrust of the Bulgars for their oppressors to be entitled a legend : the brutal traces of that long and cruel servitude, physical as well as moral, which still weighs on the generation actually at the head of affairs, alone enable us to understand the obscure mentality which takes pleasure in falsehood, treason, inconstancy and equivocation, the manifestations of which in Bulgarian politics have amazed the world.

And this mentality, common to Bulgars and Turks, can alone explain the facility with which two hereditary enemies have been able, with the stroke of a pen, to transform their hostility into fraternity.

The long parley between Bulgaria and Turkey brought about by the Germans was soon followed by the formal alliance between the Bulgars and Austro-Germans. And it may be said even that the Bulgars, in renouncing their traditional hostility, forgot more easily than the Turks, who, after a year, had not ratified, through their Parliament, the treaty concerned with the rectification of the Turco-Bulgarian frontiers. The Turks continued to be reserved and distrustful of the disciples who had surpassed them.

All who have visited Sofia, or any other Bulgarian town, must have remarked, both in private houses and public

buildings, a multitude of engravings and images representing the sufferings of the Turkish epoch or episodes in the war of deliverance. These memorials of historic events which led to the liberation of slaves from the Turkish yoke became embarrassing after September, 1915. It is asserted that, in virtue of a confidential order, the inopportune patriotic engravings were removed from all the public buildings. Other measures were taken openly. The newspapers of October 15th, 1915, announced that a decree of the military command of Sofia forbade the sale of picture postcards published in 1912, during the Turco-Bulgarian war, "the Turks being now our allies. All those found selling such cards will be prosecuted."

Bulgaro-Turkish friendship was inaugurated at the same time as Bulgaro-German friendship. It was manifested by a brisk exchange of telegrams between Sofia and Constantinople, by visits and congratulations. Turkish emissaries passing to and from Berlin never failed to stop at Sofia on their way.

The *Magyarország* of March 11th, 1916, announced, according to the *Tanin* of Constantinople, that the Bulgarian Government had decided to erect a Turkish high school at Sofia. Turkish schools existed already in Bulgaria, but only primary schools, and only in a few small provincial towns. The Turks of Bulgaria asked for an increase in the subvention allotted to their schools, and the measure was discussed at the Sobranié in 1916.

The most tumultuous manifestations of Turco-Bulgarian amity took place on the occasion of Roumanian intervention, when Turkish troops joined Bulgarian troops in the Dobrudja. The *Dnevnik* wrote on July 25th, 1916, in an article on the resignation of Sazonov :

"Bulgaria and Turkey, whom nothing will separate henceforth, were bound infallibly to enter into partnership."

The *Kambana* of July 27th, 1916, said, on the arrival of Turkish troops on the Galician front :

"We Bulgars are proud to have at our side in this war the Turks, who are so loyal and so valiant. We greet their effort, by which they strengthen extraordinarily the bonds of mutual confidence which make our alliance yet more robust."

Touching the operations in Dobrudja, the *Echo de Bulgarie* of October 25th, 1916, wrote :

"A strong Bulgaria in the Balkans is the most solid bulwark

for Constantinople ; an emancipated and strengthened Turkey on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles is a guarantee for Bulgaria. The settling of an old quarrel has dispersed, as if by enchantment, the memory of former struggles, and the soldiers who, four years ago, met as enemies, with equal bravery on both sides, now march with the same dash against a common enemy. Turks and Bulgars know now the hurt they can do each other and the brilliant advantages which their united efforts can assure to both. To recall a similar historic event, Turkey and Bulgaria are now, after the lapse of a year, in the situation of Germany and Austria after Sadowa."

The *Narodni Prava* of November 4th, 1916, said :

" Bulgaria has not been victimised by the temptation to march with the troops of the Entente against the Ottoman capital, because Bulgaria did not wish to do any harm to her excellent neighbour who possesses all the resources necessary to her development and progress, and who, in agreement with her, will know how to defend himself. The Turks and the Bulgarians, called by history to co-operate to-day for the protection of their future, are obliged to rise above the sad past and to rear for evermore the magnificent columns of their gigantic temple, in which they will sing the songs of brotherhood in arms and the praises of those who have created their normal life, based on the patriotic motto : ' If there is a Bulgaria, there is a Turkey ; if there is a Turkey, there is a Bulgaria.' "

In speaking of Bulgaro-Turkish relations, the Austro-Hungarian and German press does not hide the fact that this strange fraternity has been brought about, thanks to the good offices of Vienna and Berlin, and that it remains under their protection and tutelage.

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of September 10th, 1916, publishes a letter from its Constantinople correspondent, " O. M.," under the title, " The Turkey Question " :

" Once freed from its Russian traditions, Bulgaria has been obliged by the force of things to modify its relations with Turkey. The Bulgaro-Russian policy would have led naturally to the loss of Turkish Constantinople, even though counter to Bulgarian interests. Russia is replaced now by Germany, who is a component of Bulgarian policy. This fact will lead to the preservation of Turkey *if Germany wishes it*. If formerly Bulgaria dreamed of possessing Constantinople—which is impossible to prove politically—she has sacrificed her dreams to the reality and utility of her alliance with Germany, affirming her sacrifice by the convention of August last year. That convention assured to Bulgaria—before the alliance with Germany forbade her to continue her policy against Turkey—a better strategic

frontier on the side of Turkey. *It is only in case of a modification of the relations between Germany and Turkey that Bulgarian policy could again be directed against Constantinople.* Balkan policy will have its source then in Turco-German relations, which are confirmed at present by a military alliance, but which in the future, however, will not remain so unilateral."

The *Budapesti Hírlap* of October 28th, 1916, said :

" Turkey has fallen into agreement with Germany and Austro-Hungary, not only on the questions of a coming peace, but also on the important problems of a peace policy in the future. In the domain of new arrangements in the Balkans we shall meet with vestiges of Turkish influence, and it is precisely that arrangement which will forge the last strong links between the East and the West."

This means that the Austro-Germans hold Turkey through Bulgaria, and Bulgaria through Turkey. They scarcely hesitate to say so openly. It is the sturdy way of the Prussians of the north, the only way which enjoys the respect of the Prussians of the Balkans, and thanks to which a measure of discipline can be imposed on Bulgarian Balkan policy."

CHAPTER XVI

POLITICAL LIFE IN BULGARIA

THE unsound and adventurous policy of Bulgaria, the cause of so many deceptions, is hard to understand if we do not know the political life of the country, and character of the people.

The fundamental error of those who entertained formerly—or even entertain now—illusions as to Bulgaria has been to consider only the labels of Bulgarian political life, instead of probing its depths. Passing from a condition of the lowest servitude to European Parliamentary life, Bulgaria has adapted this delicate political machinery to her environment and habits in a way unparalleled elsewhere. After only a few years of independence she possessed political parties ticketed in European fashion. In no more than thirty years divergences in home politics gave birth to ten organised parties—there are as many to-day. They are the three Liberal fractions of Radoslavoff, Tontcheff and Stambouloff; the popular party (Nationalist-Conservative) of Gueshoff, the Liberal Progressists (Daneff), the Democrats (Malinoff), the Radical Democrats (Neitcho Tsanoff), the Agrarians (Stamboliski and Draghieff), the Reformist Socialists, and the Orthodox or Extreme Socialists.

From the beginning the groups, having a purely personal or clannish character, displayed no divergence of principles. A party was formed in protest against the reaction, the abuse of power and the corruption of the Government Party; each new group adopted a more advanced programme, and in this manner all opinions, from the Right to the Extreme Left, were represented. Notwithstanding, every party when it came to power abused it more cynically than the one that preceded it. Having fought the old “Conservatives” (tchorbajis, or representatives of the bourgeoisie who organised the first Bulgarian Government),

the Liberals, with Stambouloff at their head, carried out the most drastic reaction known to Bulgarian history.

This is not the only paradox of Bulgarian home politics. A party more advanced than the Liberals, that of the Democrats—formed to oppose the anti-Liberalism of the Liberals—owes its celebrity in the history of new Bulgaria, above all, to its scanty respect for the liberty of elections. When it received its mandate, the number of its deputies rose from 4 to 170. The Government of Radoslavoff, which possesses the Parliamentary majority to-day, had no more when it took the reins in 1913; it disposed of only six voices in the Sobranié.

The unfortunate author of "Baya Gagno," the Bulgarian patriot Aleko Konstantinoff, treacherously assassinated for his liberalism and his incisive contribution to the study of the parliamentary morals of his country, puts into the mouth of his hero, asked if he knew how to conduct an electoral campaign, what follows :

"I should not be what I am—I should not be Gagno of the Balkans—if I did not know that trade. Send me into no matter what division at your choice, let me know the candidate you want elected; put up a donkey, if you like, and I will get him in. . . . Place at my disposal the sub-prefect and one or two thousand francs. . . . My poor friend . . . I have only to pick out of the scum frequenting all the dens, forty or fifty liberated convicts, whom I shall distribute in the drink-shops. I thrust the head of each under a pail, and cry: 'Go it! Hue! Long live Bulgaria!' Ha, ha! the little fish is caught!"

"When their nasty black eyes begin to be bloodshot, and they draw their knives from their girdles to stick them into the table, when their hoarse voices begin to bellow wild beast howlings to the sky, the terror they inspire is irresistible. . . . All you have to do is to take these monsters out for an airing in the town at night! . . . *Dare the opposition budge?* The devil himself would not have courage to face them! . . . Pass in front of an enemy's house with this band. . . . Oh! my mother! When they open their mouths you can hear them a league away. . . . You shudder, and your hair stands on end like the spines of a hedgehog. . . . Then send for the mayors and their assistants from the villages; knit your brows . . . grate your teeth . . . wither these people with your looks, and show them your band! . . . *Dare the electors budge?* You will not see the shadow of one. From each village will come exactly twelve municipal councillors with their mayor.

"Then convoke the functionaries and the employees; station gendarmes to turn the other peasants back to their

homes ; with your forty or fifty bandits lay siege to the polling-place ; resort to any tricks you like ; and throw into the urn a few sheaves of voting papers. . . . Hurrah ! *The donkey is elected deputy !* Ha ! Ha ! Ha ! ”

This abuse of power, in a country where power is looked up to as absolute by people who were yesterday the slaves of the Turks, is a constant feature of political life. Père Guérin Songeon, in his “ History of Bulgaria,” written in a spirit favourable to the Bulgars, regards the separation of the two first parties as a division into two clans. “ Each of these cliques had no other object than to win and wield power.”

Leaders of the State, recruited among tradesmen and peasants hardly able to read, a few teachers, priests, and two or three returned emigrants or students in foreign universities, improvised political organisations among an uncultured people in no wise prepared for free political life. It is possible that the odious Turkish servitude inoculated the Bulgarian with more bad qualities than those he inherited from his race ; but Bulgarian politicians made them worse, as they did all the faults of their electors.

This is what Songeon says about it :

“ 1,500,000 peasants, who had never heard of such a thing as the State, were called upon to give good governors to this State. The elections led fatally to the omnipotence of a party so soon as the party in question confided to its adherents all the important offices ; and then the administrators of the country would think no longer of the country’s interest, but of those of their clan ; they would tyrannise over their adversaries. The result was general corruption, incessant violence, disunion. . . . ”

Disillusioned, or confirmed in his instinctive distrust, the cunning Bulgarian peasant ended by seeking from politics merely material immediate personal profit through opportune deference to those who happened to be in power, and who might abuse it to his advantage or his ruin. There resulted a condition of political morals and mentality that could not be clearly perceived from outside, when one thought about Bulgarian affairs, and which has baffled the political discernment of the people best informed on the Balkan East, who, notwithstanding, paid more attention to the formulas and labels in Bulgaria than to her political and moral confusion as it really is.

To give an idea of it, we will borrow again some passages

from the work of Père Songeon in which he sets forth the story of the régime of Stambouloff, whose successors govern Bulgaria to-day. These quotations silhouette traits most typical of the race ("Portrait de Stambouloff." Guérin Songeon, p. 353):

"A little thick-set man, dark, with a big, rounded head, bold features, furtive eyes, thick lips, high cheek-bones. His physiognomy betrayed a stubborn and surly will. His person, taken altogether, inspired fear. His audacity of speech and the tones of his sharp voice discouraged all desire for resistance. Launched when he was twenty into the life of a leader of comitajis, he could only have acquired very superficial learning, and, moreover, had no taste for study. But he knew how to act, and once that he had in mind a plan clearly fixed, nothing could turn him from carrying it out, even though in order to do so he had to resort to the most arrant knavery and the most revolting cruelty. His fierce and violent nature ignored the most elementary rules of humanity and equity.

"To facilitate the task of new functionaries, one more inexperienced than the other, he proclaimed a state of siege. A numerous gendarmerie, furnished with rifles and revolvers of the latest pattern, *were charged with fashioning public opinion.*

"... He took every measure to ensure that the elections of October 10th, 1886 (Grand Sobranié), should demolish altogether the Russian clan. Obligated to govern by universal suffrage, he resolved to avoid surprises. Whoever was suspected of covenanting with Tsankoff or Kaulbars was thrown into prison and soundly flogged. A committee called 'Bulgaria for the Bulgarians' got together a body of gipsies armed with stout cudgels, and confided to them the task of keeping away from the electoral urns people of the adverse party. The gendarmes themselves distributed the voting papers of the official candidates, and took care that there were three times more votes than electors. The democratic marauders and their bludgeons acquitted themselves so well of their task that out of five hundred and twenty-two deputies there were four hundred and seventy Stamboulovists. Naturally this majority was of exemplary docility.

"This packed government, installed by a band of partisans, was obliged to favour them incessantly in order to retain them; after having rescued the country from anarchy there was risk of it falling again into worse. New dictatorial candidatures might spring up and throw Bulgaria into bloody civil strife.

"In order to forestall all rivalry, the Regent ordered arrests wholesale. In consequence of the assassination of one of his prefects in an election fight, he obtained thirty-six death

sentences—of which the greater part, it is true, were commuted.”*

Insignificant plots (like that of Panoff, 1887) served as a pretext for most brutal reprisals.

“ . . . The government took advantage of these incidents to pulverise the opposition party. Former Ministers, Tsankoff, Orackakoff, Nikiroroff, and Slaveikoff ; journalists like Kissimoff and Rizoff, imprisoned in an old mosque, were flogged with sticks and sandbags until they bled. The ex-Regent Karaveloff, nude and prone on the ground, suffered a terrible flagellation under the eyes of Major Panitza, Under-Secretary of the Minister of War.” (Guérin-Songeon, pp. 371-3.)

The political administrations of the last thirty years, less sanguinary and ferocious, have not employed much nobler means to attain the same end ; the possession of power, commencing from the supreme grace of the sovereign who issues the mandate for elections to him whom he wishes to have as Minister. For it must not be forgotten that in Bulgaria there has never been a Government which has not succeeded in obtaining a majority, nor an opposition raised to power by an election.

The possibility of such a state of affairs is evidence enough as to the place held by political principles in the policy of the Bulgarian parties. It is there we look for an explanation of the feebleness of the Opposition against the Bulgarian intervention, and its deflection and turning round soon after the first military successes of the policy it condemned as evil a month before. These successes have finished by enrolling the entire Opposition in the band which chants in chorus to-day “ Death to Serbia and Roumania,” which desires the defeat of the Entente and Russia, German victory, and, above all, Great Imperialist Bulgaria in the Balkans, by any means and at any price.

* In his book, “ Bulgaria under Prince Ferdinand,” the Bulgarian writer, Drandar, cites the following characteristic detail of the reactionary and Austrophil régime of Stambouloff and of the rôle of Austrian diplomacy at Sofia (p. 93) : “ The disappearance of Stambouloff was naturally much regretted in Austria, for when he was alive it was the Austrian diplomatic agent, Burian, who really directed the whole of Bulgarian home and foreign policy. Sometimes he passed whole days with the ex-dictator. This strange diplomatic agent instructed him how best to organise a spy system and secret police. On the death of Stambouloff the Commission of Inquiry found a list in which were inscribed about 4,000 spies, well paid, of whom 400 were for the town of Sofia alone ; the greater part of these spies were Austrian subjects.”

CHAPTER XVII

THE TEN BULGARIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

THREE parties are represented in the present Government, or rather three fractions of the old Liberals: the Radoslavists, the Tontchevists, and the Orthodox Stamboulovists.

The leader of the first group, Dr. Basil Radoslavoff, brought up in Germany, Russophobe, Serbophobe, faithful servant of King Ferdinand, has taken up the threads of the Stambouloff régime; but he does not impress upon them the same personal stamp, being far inferior to the former dictator in personal aptitudes. Notwithstanding his very modest abilities, he has found himself charged with the leading rôle at the most important moment for Bulgaria; he owes this to his position as a veteran of the party, to his docility, to his impersonality, and to his Russophobia. The perfunctory compliments of Viennese and Berlin journalists to the Prime Minister of Bulgaria bring into relief the vanity, the poverty of ideas and the vulgarity of his interviews and speeches in the Sobranié. His colleague in the Ministry, Tontcheff, formerly an advocate and actually Minister of Finance, is the leader of the Young Liberals, whom he succeeded, following on personal quarrels, in detaching from the Liberals of Radoslavoff and forming into a distinct group. Tontcheff has been, from the first day, King Ferdinand's man (he was one of the delegation which brought the Prince to Bulgaria): he is a Germanophile, suspected even of special relations with the German and Austro-Hungarian Legations, and known as a man absolutely devoid of scruples. He is regarded as indispensable in the present Government. Coburg himself interposed to reconcile Tontcheff with Radoslavoff in order to have them both in the Cabinet.

The leader of the third fraction of Liberals, the real Stamboulovists, is Ghenadieff, formerly an advocate at

Philippopolis, one of the most eloquent, intelligent and active of politicians. He enriched himself in 1903, when he formed one of the Petkoff Cabinet, and his fortune, joined to his audacity, his pliability, and his situation in the Macedonian organisation, ensured him a brilliant career. Germanophil like all his party, Ghenadieff contrived, however, to pass for a "Stamboulovist on good terms with Russia." An adventurer, supple and unscrupulous, having the appearance of a man of the world, but with an understanding more shallow and a weaker character than Stambouloff, Ghenadieff is, after the latter, one of the most interesting political figures of Bulgaria. These two men personify two epochs in Bulgarian politics.

In forming the new Cabinet, King Ferdinand could not pass over Ghenadieff, who was his man, whose influence in the Macedonian organisation he utilised for special ends—Ghenadieff, who was one of the signatories of the letter addressed to the King by the members of the Opposition on June 23rd, 1913, urging a change of foreign policy. Nevertheless, Ghenadieff had soon to resign his portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs, for Radoslavoff could endure his influence no longer, and the King himself judged it prudent to keep at a distance, in critical and decisive moments, a man so ambitious and turbulent. His political tour in Europe (in 1915), which the Sofia Government refused to recognise, and the fact of having been discarded from the new Liberal régime, cooled his Germanophil sentiments, which, after Goëtz and the Bulgarian intervention, compromised him with his own party. A split occurred, and the majority chose as leader his rival, the extreme Russophobe, Dobri Petkoff. Ghenadieff's journal was suspended, and, suffering the lot of most Bulgarian ministers, Ghenadieff was haled before the tribunal on account of the Desclausières affair and condemned to ten years' penal servitude. He had not, however, broken off relations with the Court.

Such are the audacious adventurers, mixed up in scandalous affairs, condemned for abuses, exploiters of the Macedonian propaganda, agents of the Court, professional Russophobes and Germanophiles, who govern Bulgaria at this moment.

This band came to power in 1913, not only by will of the King and the approval of Vienna and Berlin, but also with the aid of the Democratic Party of Alexander Malinoff, a party which contributed to the abolition of the adminis-

tration which gave birth to the Balkan Alliance, and which, moreover, encouraged Ferdinand to follow the path pointed out by Count Tarnowsky.

* * *

The Democratic Party came into existence, thanks to a split among the Liberals. After the death of Karaveloff, this party was an insignificant fraction, led by Malinoff, a lawyer at Sofia.* Malinoff is seconded by Andrew Liaptcheff, a strong Turcophil, and defender of the principle enounced in a very trivial fashion by Karaveloff: "We must milk the cow which gives the most milk." He has also with him a provincial lawyer Michael Takeff, a man of little education and narrow ideas. The democratic label of this party did not hinder it, at the elections of 1908, from putting such pressure on the electors that the number of its deputies rose from 4 to 170, nor from entrusting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a confidant of the King, General Paprikoff; Malinoff, though a "Democrat," is in marked favour with King Ferdinand.

The foreign policy of the Democratic Party was most clearly shown in 1908: it was Malinoff's Government which proclaimed Bulgarian independence, with the support of Austria-Hungary, at the precise moment when the latter annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. When Russia reproached Bulgaria with having facilitated an act of Austrian conquest directed against the Slavs, and with having made herself a party to it, Malinoff replied by declaring to the Sobranié that Bulgarian polity was inspired solely by Bulgarian interests.

Although he contributed to the overthrow of the administration of Gueshoff and Daneff, Malinoff did not succeed them. It was Radoslavoff who formed the new Cabinet. After the second Balkan war, Malinoff declared himself a partisan of the Quadruple Entente, and formed part of the Opposition. However, he was unable to resist the enthusiasm provoked by the crushing of Serbia, and was one of the first to go over to Radoslavoff and to place himself at his service.

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 13th, 1915, remarks the joyous manifestations which took place at Sofia on the occasion of the taking of Monastir by the

* Malinoff, born in Bessarabia, married a Russian Jewess, who was established as a dentist at Odessa.

Bulgars, and cites an article in the Democratic organ, *Preporetz*, as follows :

" Bulgaria will not make peace until she is assured by guarantees that she will keep all she has conquered up to the present, and all she may still conquer. The others may stop half-way ; Bulgaria, no. Our nation does its duty to itself and its allies. Bulgaria is firmly convinced that its allies will not sign a peace before the enemy has recognised Great Bulgaria and the union of the Bulgarian people. We must not pay attention to futile vapourings about peace, but, on the contrary, go on winning victories."

And in its issue of January 3rd, 1916, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* published the following telegram from Sofia :

" Liaptcheff has declared to the Sobranié, in the name of the Democrats : ' We cannot go back, and any sort of armistice is impossible henceforth. We are bound to continue the work we have undertaken. None of us must create any difficulty for the Government ; on the contrary, we must support it with all our strength. We must carry to a successful end the work we have begun.' "

The *Vossische Zeitung* wrote on February 1st, 1916 :

" The Democratic Party, which had Russophil leanings, is now working out its new programme. Its leader, Malinoff, is to go to Buda-Pesth, Vienna, and Berlin very shortly, to concert with the leading politicians."

The *Vossische Zeitung* is mistaken in thinking that the Democratic Party is changing its programme, since the Democratic Party showed long ago that it was capable of adapting itself, as regards its foreign policy, to all combinations and every tendency. The various declarations of the Democrats called forth by the important events of 1916*, in which they outbid the most Chauvinistic opinions of Sofia, suffice to characterise the attitude of the Democratic Party. From this point of view, the Democrats have adopted a course purely Bulgarian. Without relinquishing in principle their opposition to the Government and its policy, they always display satisfaction with the slightest success, brought off no matter where and how. But in their enthusiasm, instead of congratulating the Government, they attribute all the merit to the army.

The *Preporetz* of August 25th, 1916, wrote :

" We ought to win and we shall win ; every day marks for us a new stage towards victory. In order to be convinced of

* They have been referred to in previous chapters.

it, it is enough to know how to read between the lines of the communiqués of the high command, that our dear army is slowly but surely drawing tighter its lines round Salonica and its environs, where our malevolent and envious enemies are nesting."

The same journal said on September 30th :

"The words of the Chancellor of mighty Germany are menacing for England. . . . *The Chancellor says we shall conquer.* Briand has made a similar declaration ; but the latter is far from having produced the same impression as that of the Chancellor of Germany, the country which, in the course of these two years, has shown in a striking manner that it can and knows how to conquer."

* * *

The second party in opposition, the Popular Party, known also as the National Party (the "Narodniaks"), which disputed the first place with the Democrats, has undergone, since August, 1915, a complete and rapid conversion.

Being the oldest of the Bulgarian parties, the National Party had the opportunity of bringing together in a very short time the most remarkable men in the country, and of being led by the most cultured Bulgars. The National Party was regarded as the strongest political organisation of new Bulgaria. Having at its head Ivan Gueshoff, the successor of Stoiloff, the party, from Conservative, became a constitutional National Party, and took the name of the *Popular* Party. Placed at the head of the Government at the most decisive periods of the years 1912 and 1913, Gueshoff, by his personal qualities, his political experience, and his tact, combined the best conditions for a reasonable solution of the Serbo-Bulgarian problem. Unfortunately, that was not enough. Gueshoff did not possess the magic potency to mould to his will the political character of the Bulgars, nor to rescue from clandestine influences of the most arbitrary character, decisions of the greatest moment to the fate of the country. Not only was he unable to withstand the terrorism exercised by professional patriots, but he did not succeed in putting down intrigues and defections among his own immediate following. Having lacked strength to give the right direction from the beginning to the cause of the Serbo-Bulgarian entente, he abandoned it on the eve of the catastrophe.

On May 30th, 1913, Gueshoff resigned, as he says

openly,* because there was "disagreement between the Crown and himself," leaving to the Government the coalition of his party and the Liberal-Progressist Party, with Daneff as chief, that is to say he unburdened himself of responsibility in a scarcely honourable way. Nevertheless, Gueshoff knew of the danger!

Gueshoff's party was the first to evince this same cowardice, and in the most pitiable fashion, in 1915, from the first days of the going over of the Bulgars to Germany, in a war against which it had thundered for a whole year. Since the month of October, 1915, we have had the spectacle of the Popular Party of Gueshoff, through its organ the *Mir*, as well as the declarations of its representatives in Parliament, identifying itself with the policy of the Stamboulovist Government, collaborating with it and even lending it aid at the most critical moments.

Reproducing the comments which the taking of Monastir had called forth in the Bulgarian press, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 9th, 1915, does not hide its satisfaction at being able to quote the following from the *Mir*:

"We possess actually nearly everything which should be ours. Who dare contest our right to it henceforward? The English or the French? They also are taking flight!"

Gueshoff himself wrote on January 14th, 1916:

"I am witnessing my seventh war in the Balkans. This is distinct from the preceding ones, inasmuch as our armed nation writes in it with a pen of steel new pages of history, not Balkan alone, but world history. If it had not paid with its blood and contributed its effort, the transformations which have surprised us during the last three months of 1915 would not have come about. Instrument of mundane destinies, the Bulgarian people is helping to determine the approaching destiny of the whole world.

"... We must be careful to avoid repeating the mistakes which led to the catastrophe of 1913. The Government in the first place, and the nation in the second, must not permit the dissolution of *the union to which we owe the miracles accomplished by the Bulgarian people in arms in 1912 and 1915.*

"An American hero of the last century said: 'Our country! God grant that it may be always just in its relations with foreign nations. *But just or not—what matters? It is our country.*'

* "My policy, which aimed at an understanding without bloodshed, at not letting the Balkan Alliance be broken, at having recourse to arbitration both with Serbia and Greece, was not approved." (Iv. Gueshoff, "L'Alliance balkanique," p. 156. Paris: Hachette. 1915.)

“ ‘Our country’ is, with us also, the unanimous cry. Our country has risen and is become great, thanks to the unanimity, the sacrifices, and the sufferings of her sons. Let us continue to aid her, in order that the sacrifices and sufferings endured until now do not remain unrewarded, and that the work undertaken may be carried to a happy conclusion. Let us aid her by our valour in the trenches, by our abnegation at home, and by our wisdom everywhere. And may our country, thus united and enlarged by territories of which she has need for her future, be illumined by the blessings of an honourable and lasting peace.”

We have shown how the Gueshoff party defended its policy of an understanding with Serbia. In the spring of 1916, its defection increased with the hopes of a Bulgaro-German triumph. The extracts from the *Mir* given above have made it clear to us that the evolution of the Popular Party in foreign policy had ended in the adoption of Stamboulovist plans. The Popular Party has endeavoured to explain its new attitude again and again, not only by articles in the *Mir*, but also by the declarations of its leaders.

In reply to Roumanian comments, the *Mir* of August 21st, 1916, protested in the following terms against the condemnation of Bulgaria pronounced by a Petrograd Association, the “Slavianska Vzaïmnost”:

“It looks as though there were in Petrograd interested persons, surely agents of Serbia, who comprehend that *the rights of Bulgaria over the provinces she has just taken from Serbia are solid enough not to be contested, even by the Entente, if ever it were victorious*. Therefore, can the Bulgarian people be accused for having taken up the defence of its rights with such unanimity and ardour? Those who, before the war, were of opinion that it would be better to choose other means, never dreamed of renouncing this right of their nation. But once the means has been chosen, they cannot refuse their collaboration in carrying on the work to the end.”

That is as much as to say that the signatories of the entente with Serbia, those who had adjudged her right by treaty to the half of Macedonia, are now in accord with the Stamboulovists, maddest of Germanophiles, in proclaiming *the rights of Bulgaria over the greater part of Serbia*, and consider it a patriotic duty to collaborate, without reserve and with all their might, in the fell task that Bulgaria has undertaken against Serbia, Russia, and the Quadruple Entente, and against her old friends and benefactors.

Gueshoff and Radoslavoff, the moment it is a question of defining the task and its justice, are in full accord. There was formerly divergence between them only as regards the *means to be taken*.

The article in the *Mir* only repeats the opinions proclaimed by its leaders in Parliament. In the course of the debate on the budget, in which the Popular Party saved the Government, Todoroff, the second in command of the party, declared the following (*Mir*, July 20th, 1916) :

" . . . The Government has come to an understanding with certain States. In doing so, it has not only pledged itself, but also the responsibility of the entire Bulgarian nation. We must all see to it that the work begun is carried through to a successful end. When our carriage comes to a stream, we are free to decide by what ford it may best be crossed. But when once the vehicle has entered the ford, and is in the middle of the stream, we must put forth all our strength to reach the opposite bank. . . . "

The metaphor is apt : it has even distinction, and might deceive those who do not know that the Popular Party did not content itself with loyally fulfilling its civic and patriotic duties, but, in the new direction of policy, desired to rival in ardour those whom in 1915 it regarded as harmful adventurers.

As for Todoroff, he did not put the question in its true bearings.

When the carriage is in mid-stream it is certainly much more important to get it across to the bank than to ask by what ford one can do so. But above the question, *By what ford?* there is the question, *To which bank?* If Gueshoff and Todoroff propose the same objects in national policy as Radoslavoff, it is comprehensible that they should agree quickly enough as to the means of attaining them. *There was, indeed, only one ford, that chosen by Radoslavoff.*

And the Popular Party took it without hesitation and without scruples.

It was not patriotic duty which dictated the glorification of the Austro-Germans that appeared in the *Mir*, nor the attacks of that journal on the Quadruple Entente, and above all on England—which has lavished her favours on Gueshoff personally, as on his party, and on Bulgaria generally. It was not through patriotism that the *Mir* showered invective on Serbia, even after the catastrophe,

nor that it carried on a violent campaign against Russia, under whose auspices the Popular Party was founded. All these vile and brutal renunciations of opinions professed only yesterday by these same men cannot have been dictated by a sentiment of patriotic duty. They are but a witness to the low morality and lack of conviction in a political organisation which, by the names of its leaders and the number of educated men in its ranks, represents the best that present-day Bulgaria has to show.

* *

Among the parties in opposition, we have still to speak of the Progressist-Liberals, the Radical-Democrats—or Radicals, in brief—the Agrarians, and the two Socialist groups: these, both by their authority and their numerical importance, play a much less considerable part in the political life of Bulgaria than those of which we have spoken above.

The *Liberal Progressist Party*, formerly Tsankovist, had always followed a Russophil policy. Its whole-hearted faith in Russia was expressed in the famous utterance of Daneff at the Sobranié: "With Russia we have no politics." However, the party, dismayed by the catastrophe of 1913, lost its courage and also its leadership. Daneff, through his errors and the attacks of his political adversaries, was made to bear the responsibility for the disaster. He made the mistake, among many others, of remaining, in May, 1913, in the Cabinet from which Gueshoff had retired. The infatuation, the lack of sincerity, and the weakness which he displayed from the first in that equivocal situation, have thrown discredit on him and his party, in so far as concerns any rôle at all serious, for a long time to come. The party has no longer its organ, *Bulgarie*, which ceased to appear more than a year ago. On the rare occasions when Daneff speaks, his party only justifies the fact of its irrevocable fall.

The *Berliner Tageblatt* of June 20th, 1916, published a declaration of the Russophil Daneff, arising from the capitulation and the separate peace of Montenegro, a capitulation considered at Sofia, and at Vienna too, as the *coup de grace* to Russia in the Balkans. Daneff said of it:

"The capitulation of Montenegro is a notable success for the Central Powers. The Montenegrin peace shows the way

for all the little Slav nations to the cross-roads where Bulgaria has been able to choose her new path."

According to the information of the *Berliner Tageblatt* of March 3rd, Daneff asked, in his speech in the Sobranié during the debate on the Budget, "*not to speak of the past any more, but to turn to the future. . . . Russian friendship exists no longer, and all parties are in agreement.*"

The little group of *Radical Democrats* (Neitcho Tsanoff), which was formed by a split in the Democratic Party, is more consistent in its ideas, and manifests wider and more advanced views on Balkan politics, but as it counts only three or four representatives in the Sobranié, it has no influence on the policy of the country.

The *Agrarian group* has no relation to the political and economic organisations bearing the same name in Europe. It is a particular expression of the demagogues among the Danube peasants, and has formed no opinion on foreign policy. The noisy rôle assumed by its leader, Stamboliski, in his interview with the King on the eve of Bulgarian intervention, disclosed only theoretical pacificism and the leader's ambition as a tribune. The menaces addressed to Ferdinand by Stamboliski, rendering the King responsible for the war, did not hinder the Agrarian deputy, Dimitroff, from declaring later in the *Outro*, after conferring with Radoslavoff :

"Since the destinies of the country are staked on a map, and the Bulgarian people is at the front, the Agrarian Party will do its duty in approving all the war credits, convinced that it allots them, not to the government, but to the country." (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, December 19th, 1915.)

That is the attitude of the Agrarians since the war. A group of them, moreover, has joined the Government majority in the Sobranié.

* *

The group of *Broad Socialists* ("Chiroke"), under the leaders Sakasoff and Pastoukoff, supports the Government policy unreservedly. Its representatives in the Sobranié have voted for all the war credits ; in home politics they have been in agreement, even when other Opposition parties were in sharp conflict with the Government (as, for example, concerning the Committee of Public Precaution). They are interested, above all, in forming a Bulgaria prepared for a long resistance, and with this object they work out plans

of "industrial mobilisation" and control of imports and exports. The articles on foreign policy in their organ the *Narod* habitually bear such titles as "Albion Unmasked," or contain assertions of this sort :

"In the storm which has burst upon the world, Bulgaria has bound her destiny to that of her allies. Her people in arms have put forth a marvellous effort in the common cause ; and if, until now, they have been able to support the burden of war, it is thanks to their strength of will and resistance rather than in virtue of their modest resources." (*Narod*, April 27th, 1916.)

In an article headed "New Cares," the *Narod* of May 4th, 1916, advises an understanding with Roumania and Greece, by which to insure the retention of booty realised :

"Much will have been done for our national union and the general peace if our diplomacy succeeds in assuring the results acquired with a minimum of sacrifice. Particular attention should be devoted to relations with neighbouring Balkan States which are still neutral, but which, either of their own initiative or through the counsels of others, will to-morrow put forth their efforts on one side or the other."

On May 11th the *Narod* lauded to the skies Count Apponyi's speech when the Bulgarian deputies arrived at Buda-Pesth. He had already gained a reputation for Chauvinism in passing the schools law of denationalisation in Hungary. He stated in his speech that Hungarian and Bulgarian history displayed a common anxiety, the struggle for national independence. Iliia Yanouloff wrote on this in the *Narod* :

"This statement is so exact from the historical point of view that the comparison of Count Apponyi derives from it a lustre destined to shine even in the future. . . ."

Yanouloff afterwards extolled the political wisdom, the combativity and the character of Apponyi :

"It is long experience which speaks by the mouth of Count Apponyi. His candour is therefore characteristic ; his thought is instructive ; his watchword of complete national independence is another bridge for the drawing together of the Bulgarian and Hungarian peoples."

The collaboration of Scheidemann with the Chancellor naturally serves as a model to Bulgarian Socialists. The *Narod* of October 18th, 1916 writes :

"It is indisputable that of all Socialist parties the German one is the most strongly organised and the richest in ideas. . . ."

In the soundness of its views and the dignity of its character it may be compared to the greatest parties in history. . . . The two orators interpret two different worlds. The Chancellor interprets the past, Scheidemann the future. If the distance between the Chancellor and Scheidemann is no longer so great as was formerly that between the Chancellor and Bebel, it is because things have changed in the official policy of Germany. Conservative Germany has been obliged to enter on the path of concessions to Socialism. It is a beginning from which we must expect results of capital importance which will be as useful to the progress of Socialism as to political evolution generally.”*

In its next issue the *Narod* continued to develop the German thesis :

“ The great Russian politician, Miliukoff, in his declarations to the Norwegian *Social-Demokratt*, manifested the firm resolution of Russia to occupy the Dardanelles in order to have an issue to an open sea free from ice. That is equivalent to cutting off Germany from Asia Minor, which Germany would not permit in any case. Events will lead to a compromise, and Germany has taken the first step. . . . *The declarations made to the Reichstag show what a great advance has been made towards peace.* . . . The utterances of Scheidemann and Spahn constitute a peace programme already. . . . When military operations in the Balkans and Roumania have terminated, the Entente can be convinced that the isolation of the Central Powers is a vain chimera.”

And on October 23rd, the *Narod* stated that “ the struggle against the hegemony of England is undoubtedly founded on a basis of justice.”

The following day, the Moderate Bulgarian Socialists endeavoured to justify their opportunism from the point of view of principles, anathematising the internationalism of the Extreme Socialists :†

“ We understand how it is that the most eminent statesmen and politicians succeed in justifying their attitude towards the enemy, and call upon the masses to carry on the struggle to the end ; they do so with the object of preserving the nation from devastation by the enemy, of *rounding off their States from a national standpoint, of destroying the military power of*

* The *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* (organ of the Extreme Socialists) of September 28th, 1916, remarks with irony the parity of ideas in the dithyrambs addressed to the German Government Socialists by the organ of the Stamboulovist Government *Narodni Prava*, the Nationalist Opposition journal *Mir*, and the Socialist sheet *Narod*.

† The Broad Socialists are not less annexationists than the reactionary Chauvinists ; they do not hesitate to support the Bulgarian claims to the occupied Serbian provinces. (*Narod*, February 19th, 1917.)

adversaries, and of insuring to all the freedom of the seas, which until now have been dominated only by certain States. Recognising the importance of these reasons, we cannot follow our Extreme Socialists when they imagine they are all the more Socialists and pacifists the more they regard with indifference the fate of the country and the solution of the various problems in close relation with the war, a solution that is indispensable to the re-establishment of peace in Europe."

On November 9th the *Narod* places on the index the anarchism of the Extreme Socialists :

" . . . The anarchism of our Extreme Socialists plays the part of an epidemic germ incontestably. *It poisons not only the atmosphere of our working classes, but that of the whole of our political and social life.*"

We must not be astonished to find the organ of the Bulgarian Moderate Socialists propagating " national rounding off " of Bulgaria and the German " freedom of the seas." But it has gone further : it deemed it useful, on the occasion of Hindenburg's jubilee, to hold him up as an example to Bulgarian youth.

The second fraction of Bulgarian Socialists, the doctrinaires and irreconcilables, called *Narrow Socialists* (" tesni " ; leader, Blagoïeff), is in principle against war, but its opposition is limited to demonstrating theoretically that the war has been brought about by capitalism and imperialism. Its organ, *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik*, dare not touch German militarism and may only write on " English Imperialism " and " The Policy of Russian Conquest." As a result, the Government organs are afforded every facility for reproducing these articles, often, with lively satisfaction, as a proof of the impeccability of Radoslavoff's policy, which has had to ally itself with Germany precisely because of " English imperialism " and the " Russian danger." (See, for instance, the *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* of April 21st, and the *Narodni Prava* of April 22nd, 1916.)

During the visit of the Bulgarian Governmental deputies to the capitals of the Central States, the *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* of May 12th, 1916, published a very interesting article on the relations between Bulgaria and the Central Powers :

" *Bulgaria already enjoyed the sympathy of Austria-Hungary and Germany, especially since the revolution of 1886 until 1895, when she broke off her relations with Russia and became openly hostile to the latter. . . . The Balkan Alliance of 1912,*

founded on the initiative and under the auspices of Russia, was calculated to sway the European balance in favour of the Entente. . . . But *events, controlled by the principal factor of the present Bulgarian policy*, took, in consequence of the war between the allies, such a direction that the Balkan Alliance was broken, and Bulgaria, disabused and disillusioned as to Russia, sought powerful protection elsewhere, and found it in the Central Powers: The actual Bulgarian policy has led at length to open alliance with the Central Powers, and to the great military victories which have raised Bulgaria to the rank of the first Balkan State, and have terminated brilliantly, for the moment at least, the action of the Central Powers in the Balkans."

The article ends with a platonic wish for a federal democratic Balkan Republic.

Russophobia has brought together the Bulgarian Extreme Socialists and the reactionaries (Stamboulovists) into the same line of endeavour.

On June 26th, 1916, the organ of the Extreme Socialists asserts that "the Russophil coalition which ruled Bulgaria in 1912 had created an artificial movement of Serbo-Bulgarian *rapprochement*, "and that Tsarism, triumphant, rubbed its hands with satisfaction when Bulgaria was precipitated into the catastrophe of 1913."

The *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* of August 30th, 1916, is certain, like the *Narodni Prava*, that the dispute touching the revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty was revived by the Russian Government, which did not wish to create a Great Bulgaria that might be an obstacle to its plans of conquest on the Bosphorus.

On November 6th, 1916, the *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* wrote under the heading "The Russian Danger":

"The Russian peril menaces to-day the liberty and independence of the Balkan peoples. They must awaken to the danger, Bulgaria above all. Russia is breaking down with her own hands the idols of Russophilism that her agents had set up in Bulgaria. The Balkan peoples cannot breathe freely until they see at their feet the idol overthrown, and their independence protected by a wall against Russia."

It is thus that the only one of the ten Bulgarian parties which had remained in irreconcilable opposition to the Government found means to render service to the actual régime in the most delicate of questions—that of action against Russia.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FAILURE OF THEORIES

THE Bulgarian parties of opposition have taken up various attitudes. Either they have abandoned their old standpoint and adhered to the policy of the Government, or else they have thought fit to remain undecided, wavering, and to drop out of the struggle ; or, again, they have been content, like the Extreme Socialists, to maintain a theoretical and platonic opposition. But it is abundantly evident that, from the very beginning, the Bulgarian Opposition allowed Ferdinand's Government full and entire freedom of movement, from every point of view. Government circles have proved and recognised this repeatedly. According to the *Vossische Zeitung* of November 22nd, 1915, the Minister of Finance, Tontcheff, declared on the subject of the internal condition of Bulgaria :

"Parties, with us, were divided before the war. There were partisans of the Entente. After the victories of the Bulgarian Army in Serbia and Macedonia, such enthusiasm took hold of all parties, without exception, that now they all unreservedly approve of the policy of the Bulgarian Government and the King. There exists in Bulgaria to-day only one political programme—National Union."

In an interview published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of January 8th, 1916, the Minister of Finance, Tontcheff, declared :

"All parties are agreed to persevere along the road already taken until they have attained the end, which is the union of the nation. The leaders of the Opposition have declared themselves ready to support the Government until this object is realised. Russophil policy is done with. Even the politicians who were fervent partisans of Russia now acknowledge that there can be no turning back. The Extreme Socialists alone remain faithful to their pacifist principles. Such criticism as there has been has not aimed in any way at the general trend of the policy. The Opposition sought only to prepare the ground for the party propaganda which will take place later. . . ."

According to a despatch from Sofia which appeared in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 30th, 1915, General Boiadjieff said to a writer in the *Mir* :

"When I was Minister of War, I heard vehement speeches in the Sobranié in which members of different parties attacked each other violently. It is no longer the case. At present there are no longer *traitors* and *patriots* ; all are patriots."

The *Mir* of March 30th, 1916, wrote on the closing of the session of the Sobranié :

"The Opposition has already sufficiently proved to the Government that it is more than ever disposed to support it to the utmost, so long as exceptional circumstances exist. The Government should profit by these good resolutions in submitting for debate several bills, having for their object the satisfaction of national and general needs."

To show how little the real state of things responded to these illusions, it will be sufficient to take the issue of the Parliamentary struggle which took place in the Sobranié in June, 1916, and which has served as a pretext for so many legends. The Bulgarian Government submitted its Budget to the Sobranié on July 7th, 1916. The Opposition groups discussed it for several days ; the debate, indeed, was reduced to a political tourney on home questions arising in the Order of the Day, and ended in a duel between the two greatest parties of the Opposition, the Popular Party (Gueshoff) and the Democratic Party (Malinoff). They began by discussing if they should grant to the Government only a single twelfth, provisionally, or several twelfths, and in the middle of the debate the Democratic group posed as a condition that before the Budget the Government should pass the bill for public precaution. This demagogic manœuvre of the Democrats was foiled by the Popular Party, which voted for the Budget unconditionally.

Here are the comments of the press thereupon :

The *Mir* of July 20th, 1916, wrote (after having drawn the famous comparison between Bulgaria and the carriage at the ford in mid-stream) :

"I confess I am not satisfied with the home policy of the Government ; nevertheless, we ought to abstain from petty criticism, from condemning the authors of such and such an act, for there is danger in doing so at this juncture. To-day it is our desire that the Government should maintain the necessary prestige, so long as the situation created by the war exists. *We do not demand the removal of the Government.* At present

we must not talk of majority and minority. The Government ought to seek the co-operation of the Opposition for useful work in the Sobranié. We have need of *complete unanimity* to assure the triumph of *law and morality, and to prepare a happy future for our fatherland.*"

The *Preporetz* of July 30th said :

"Thus ended a Parliamentary struggle conducted with such great interest, and followed with such profound attention by public opinion. Those who had voted for it, like the Popular Party (the Narodniaks), abandoned it at the most critical moment. The Government is now freed from Parliamentary pressure. And it is the Narodniaks who have freed it."

The *Narod* of July 21st (Reformist Socialist) declared :

"M. Teodoroff refused to discuss the foreign policy which to-day is no longer the policy of *M. Radoslavoff*, but of the whole Bulgarian nation ; this policy must be carried through successfully, supported by all. . . . Teodoroff quitted the Parliamentary tribune in triumph, acclaimed by his party, by the governmental deputies, and by the Ministers themselves."

The *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* of July 20th (Orthodox Socialist) said :

"The Ghenadieff group, arraigned before the tribunal on account of the Desclausières affair, is endeavouring to exert strong pressure on the Government to quash the judicial proceedings against this group. Ghenadieff believes he will attain his object by going over to the Opposition and diminishing the Government majority. *This situation, created by Ghenadieff, is exploited by the Democratic Party in order to obtain two or three portfolios in the Cabinet.* Indeed, the action of the cabals might have brought about a Ministerial crisis if the Narodniaks had not come in to aid in saving the situation."

The *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* of July 22nd wrote :

"M. Teodoroff declared that he had no wish to speak of foreign policy. Nevertheless, *by the aid he has lent the Government, allied with the Central Powers, he has done much more for the foreign policy than the Democrats have done.* The leaders of the Democrats have put forth superhuman efforts in order to win favour in high quarters at Sofia ; with this object they went even to Berlin, and do not hesitate to barter the 'Russo-phil' label of their foreign policy for that of 'Germanophil.' *Their schemes were frustrated by their intense desire to gain a few Ministerial offices.* It was not the Democrats but the Narodniaks who won foreign sympathy in the Central Empires. Teodoroff vanquished his adversaries in home as in foreign politics, and, leaping over the Democrats, reached, at a bound,

the place which the latter failed to attain in spite of efforts maintained for months."

In an article of the *Rabotnitcheski Vestnik* of August 20th the Socialist leader, Blagoïeff, hits the nail on the head by repeating that "the cause which the Bulgarian parties in opposition were ready to support was that of *the Government policy*." He pours scorn on the pitiable posture of the Opposition in the Sobranié and all the sophisms employed to present this cause as not depending on the Government, under the pretext that it belongs to Bulgaria.

Let us conclude with this article from the *Narodni Prava* of August 15th, 1916 :

"All the parliamentary groups voted unanimously for the clauses of the law upon public precaution. By this vote Parliament demonstrated the accord existing between it, the Government and the people, as to the accomplishing of great national tasks. *There is no discord among the Bulgarian people, as the enemies of Bulgaria falsely maintain.* On the contrary, there is a reign of union and general and mutual understanding."

* * *

The failure of Bulgarian political theories was not limited to sophisms and to the pitiable attitude of the bourgeois parties. Bulgarian Socialists furnished worse examples, as we have already shown.

The Stockholm Socialist Conference (called "the conference of commercial travellers of the Central Empires," by Adler *fils*, who attempted the life of Count Sturgkh) provided the Bulgarian Socialists with an opportunity for proving their fidelity to principles, justice and truth.

It needs not be said that the admirers of Scheidemann and Hindenburg placed themselves at the service of the Germano-Bulgarian cause at Stockholm on the first appeal of the Government of Coburg. Before leaving, the leader of the Governmental Socialists, Yanko Sakazoff, "is conferring with the President of the Council, Radoslavoff" (*Balkanska Pochta*, April 25th). The Socialist collaborators of the reactionary government proposed to "make a tour of the neutral countries, to inform the international Socialist organisations on the rights of Bulgaria, and declare to them that *peace without annexations does not signify that the Bulgarians should abandon the Serbian and Roumanian regions actually occupied by their troops.*" (*Balkanska Pochta*, April 25th.)

Their organ, *Narod*, wrote on April 23rd, "once for all the Balkans must be set in order by a reasonable interpretation of the formula, peace without annexation." According to the *Outro* of April 26th, "the deputy Yanouloff has declared that *the form of peace without annexation* recently accepted by Russian and German Socialists *must be submitted to correction, as applied to Bulgaria*." The *Kambana* of April 27th formulates this idea, concluding :

"It follows that when we speak of the renunciation of all annexation on the part of the Central Powers, it does not mean that we think of leaving Macedonia, Dobrudja, and the Morava under the talons of their old tyrannies."

The *Zaria* of April 28th announces the final composition of the delegation of Broad Socialists (reformists) in which are Sakazoff, Djidroff, Sakaroff, Pastoukoff, Tsankoff and Yanouloff, and the *Balkanska Pochta* of the same date says, "the doctrinaire Socialists (Narrow) will not take part in the Stockholm Conference, seeing that they do not consider it a Socialist Conference."*

As for the Broad Socialists, they surpassed the bourgeois party in Chauvinism. In the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* of May 2nd, Count Reventlow is enthusiastic over the attitude of the Bulgarian Socialists.

"The Bulgarian Socialist," says Reventlow, "is not corrupted by internationalism. . . . *The Bulgarians ask for a Bulgarian peace only, in order to attain a Balkan peace.* Let it be said, by the way," concludes Reventlow, "that we hope German Socialists may be inspired by the same political sense and the same national instinct as the Bulgarian Socialists."

As they were about to enter the train on their way to Berlin and Stockholm, the Bulgarian Socialist delegates declared to the editor of the *Outro* :

"Although far from Bulgaria, we are firmly resolved never to forget that we represent the Bulgarian people. We shall declare that the right of Bulgaria must be recognised to rule

* The question of the Stockholm Conference provoked a vehement polemic between the two Socialist groups. The doctrinaires styled the reformists, agents of the government policy (*Rabotnitchesky Vestnik*), and the reformists retorted by calling the doctrinaires "agents provocateurs." The doctrinaires decided, all the same, to take part in the Conference by delegating their two representatives, Kirkoff and Kolaroff. The activity of the latter in conferences with German Socialists at Berlin, as at Stockholm, is known only through the denunciatory despatches of their enemies, the reformists, who overwhelm them with coarse insults, thus allowing us to guess that the doctrinaire group did not consent to lend itself, without reservations, to the rôle of governmental agents,

in Macedonia, Dobrudja, and generally in the countries she has conquered at the price of such heavy sacrifices." (*Outro*, May 3rd, 1917.)

The *Narod* (Socialist Reformist organ) of May 12th publishes a despatch from Berlin, in which the Bulgarian Socialist delegates speak of conferences held in the precincts of the Reichstag with the central committee of the German Social-Democratic Party. "The Bulgarian delegates stated their case in detail; it was received with approbation," says the despatch.

The *Narod* of May 21st publishes a letter from its friends at Stockholm in which they remark with satisfaction that the Berlin comrades do not consider the Bulgarian territorial pretensions as annexations. The leader of the group, the deputy Dr. Nikola Sakaroff, declares in the *Dages Nyheter* (telegram to the *Berliner Tageblatt*, May 25th) that the Bulgarian Socialists demand the Dobrudja and Macedonia.

"As in the Timok valley, the Socialists will not make it a *sine qua non*. But they demand, absolutely, in the environs of Orsova and Palanka, therefore in the Negotin-Tekija angle, a corridor in order to have direct communication with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy."

The Bulgarian Socialists consent with the same magnanimity as the Germano-Bulgarian Government of Sofia, to the patching up of Serbia with the remnants of her mangled body and of Montenegro.

In this plan of the Bulgarian Socialists we can only perceive the realisation of the war aims of the most implacable Chauvinists of the reactionary parties, that is to say :

The Bulgarian people, ethnically the least numerous in the Balkans, masters of the peninsula ;

The Serbian people, the most numerous, enslaved, three-quarters of them to Germans, Hungarians, and Bulgars, the remaining quarter constituted into the semblance of a State, "which would be only a dummy" in the political life of the Balkans. (See *Zarja*, March 15th, 1917) ;

And, in fine, the realisation of the scheme of "Mittel-European" unity.

With such a fashion of professing Socialism, it was not difficult for the Bulgarian Socialists to win the confidence of Coburg and to merit the compliments of Count Reventlow.

"Liberals" ruling by the cudgel, traditional Russophiles transforming themselves, in a twinkling, into Germanophiles, Democrats kneeling before Coburg, Socialists annexationists and admirers of Hindenburg—there you have the Bulgarian parties. Elections which have never given a majority except to those who hold power; the play of personal ambitions and cabals; facings-round and sudden changes; all party activity concentrated in the seeking of stratagems apt to gain for them power, no matter how, or to hinder, at all cost, the rival party from attaining it—there you have parliamentarism. The same absence of principles—the lack of faith in a national idea, always arbitrary, improvised, and subject to occasional fluctuations of policy—going, at need, as far as the disavowal of the character of the race—there you have the national conscience.

This chaos of public life has found its faithful portrait in the Bulgarian press, noisy, cynical, intriguing, low in tone and worse in style, of shady morality, a press whose leading articles are based on scandalous tittle-tattle, which treats policy as a personal affair, and which is at the service of everything—and everybody—rather than at the service of truth.

In his pamphlet, *Die Kulturpolitische Mission Bulgariens* (1916), the friend of the Bulgars, Dr. Paul Ostwald, writes:

"From a political standpoint the Bulgarian people generally is not yet mature. . . . Political parties serve the selfish ends of their chiefs, who retail to the masses anything which comes into their heads. The great masses have not sufficient civic education to form independent opinions. But time will do what is necessary as education penetrates the masses. The Bulgarian press, which has been up to the present entirely dependent and venal, will be reformed also."

This opinion on the venality of the Bulgarian press is confirmed by a letter of the Bulgarian publicist, Leon Savadjian, in the *Genevois* of October 3rd, 1916. Speaking from expert knowledge, the Bulgarian writer asserts that the press of his country, from the reactionary organs to those of the Extreme Left, has allowed itself to be bought by foreigners. "Thus," he says, "the *Kambana* is subsidised for a sum of 15,000 marks, and an attaché of the German Legation is on the staff in the position of censor." Savadjian gives details quite as compromising about the journals *Balkanska Pochta*, *Dnevnik*, *Outro* and others, which are at

the service of Berlin or Vienna. The organ of the Russian Cadets, *Rietch* of Petrograd, has drawn up a series of accusations of the same nature against the Popular Party of Gueshoff and its organ the *Mir*. (Letters of the correspondent Yazwitzky in the *Rietch* of May 8th and 15th, 1916.)

These illustrations and vivid portraits need no further comment. Public life in Bulgaria, the character of political parties, and the small esteem in which they hold their theoretical labels, enable us to rate at its true value the possibility of those reforms in which certain circles still continue to believe.

CHAPTER XIX

FERDINAND OF COBURG

IN speaking of Bulgaria, we always begin by naming Ferdinand of Coburg. Yet the King's personality scarcely suffices to furnish material for a special chapter. In this, as in other things, the legend is not in agreement with the reality.

Without even taking into consideration genealogical data on its sovereigns, the Bulgarian story is plain to those who have discerned, in our series of Bulgarian self-drawn portraits, the fundamental traits of character and temperament of this nation—traits recognised in all its acts, all its tendencies and all its passions. Nevertheless, if these fugitive words outline a silhouette resembling Ferdinand of Coburg, it can only be by an eventual and inevitable agreement. Under another sovereign, Bulgaria would have been perhaps less Bulgarian than she is, but if she has become what she is actually, the merit or the blame falls on Coburg in so far only as the concordance of character between sovereign and people has permitted both to manifest themselves fully.

Elected on July 7th, 1887, Ferdinand of Coburg found himself on the 10th of that month at Roustchouk on Bulgarian territory, to the stupefaction of all the Great Powers, who anticipated a much slower procedure in consequence of the opposition of Russia. The young lieutenant of hussars threw himself boldly into the adventure. And in the midst of the chaos that his banished predecessor, the Prince of Battenberg, had left behind him, Ferdinand continued the adventurous policy of Stambouloff, the policy of violence within and the support of Austria-Hungary without.

Both were the expression of the same tendencies: emancipation from all rivalry and all tradition. In home politics, the lieutenant of Hungarian Hussars was pleased

to keep a tight rein; in foreign policy, the ambitions of the founder of the new branch of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha were cramped by the boundaries, restricted beforehand, of a Bulgaria limited to its national domain in harmony with the great Slav family and Russia. As his complacent biographer, the Rev. Père Guérin Songeon says: "He was devoured by a splendid desire to serve while reigning and to make history.* To satisfy this he had only to take advantage of the passions of the country and to profit by the experience of the policy of cudgels and flagellation. "Stambouloff was indispensable to him. The greatness and terror of the name of this Warwick of the Balkans constituted a precious safeguard for the crown. . . . So Ferdinand found himself constrained to endure intimacy with this odious but useful man,"† says the historian, not neglecting to correct this attenuation of facts on the following page in which he praises the cleverness of Coburg: "Possessing in the highest degree the sense of utility, he sought patiently the best means of using, for the good of the principality, political passions and individual appetites."‡

What this diligence in exploiting public passions and individual appetites comprises, what means this utilitarianism of the Stambouloff school employs, and what share it has in the formation of public morals in Bulgaria, we will explain briefly.

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Thrown into a primitive environment of provincial bourgeois, rude, uncultured, distrustful and unsociable, Coburg set himself the task, from the first day, of hastening the education of Bulgarian society, at least of that of Sofia. It appeared to him really necessary, at least in such measure as would give his Court an *entourage* and Sofia the aspect of a capital. And he undertook this education in accordance with the ideas he imported to Bulgaria along with his uniform of a Hungarian hussar.

The same feverish haste with which they set to work pulling down the kiosks of the Turkish country town of yesterday to make room for avenues and boulevards lined with modern edifices, possessed the Court in improvising as swiftly as possible the high life of Sofia. In order to do

* "Histoire de la Bulgarie," p. 377.

† *Ibid.*, p. 378.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 380.

so, it became necessary not only to hurry the emancipation of patriarchal Bulgarian society, by the rules of which the wives and daughters of Coburg's highest dignitaries remained all day shut up in their houses—their heads wrapped in the shamia (Turkish, kerchief) and their feet thrust into babooshes (heel-less slippers)—but to expedite transformations in the economic habits of the Bulgar, parsimonious by nature. To attain this object and to attach people to himself, Ferdinand facilitated the rapid enrichment of his courtiers by every means.*

Money accruing from the State could alone accomplish this revolution in life and manners, this sudden leap from patriarchal simplicity to worldly display, from austere economy to imposing luxury. And, indeed, in a few years only, Sofia was transformed and decked with palaces of citizens grown rich through Government contracts, with villas of ministers and generals, penniless hitherto, who had blossomed into millionaires in a day. Wealthy, thanks to the Court, this new society, although divided into various political parties, was in its entirety devoted to the Court, the source of good and ill fortune. We must remember this, if we seek to define Bulgarian political motives. The fact, however, that there does not exist in the Balkans (if we except Constantinople) a similar example, even in like circumstances, shows that it is not due to one man, but to the coming together of two identical inclinations. The beginning of this systematic corruption is to be sought for in the first seven years of Ferdinand's reign, under the Government of Stambouloff (1887–1894). That period brought to Bulgaria the generation of the most immoral *intellectuals*, to the Bulgarian people the most corrupt functionaries, to the Court a crowd of courtiers from all grades of society, docile agents, fitted for every employ, from that of Minister to that of spy, and to Bulgarian public life temperaments and a mentality from which political organisations, even those most advanced in the matter of principles, have not yet been able to free themselves.

In order to modernise and attenuate the methods of Stambouloff, Ferdinand has replaced his brutal and audacious violence by a vast network of Court influence and intrigue.

* It is of interest to compare the Coburg régime with that of the last Obrenevitches in Serbia, King Milan and King Alexander, whose Ministers and dignitaries, whilst having enjoyed the favour of the Court, and having devoted their career to the service of its policy, remained poor.

To render these ties more solid, the Court takes advantage of all patriotic movements, principally of the Macedonian organisation, which is kept going, naturally, at the expense of the State. By its secret patronage of this organ of revolutionary terror, which has been used in recent years much more in home politics than for the Macedonian question, the Court has contrived to extend by terrorism the corrupting influence it already exercised by favours. Everyone in Bulgaria knows that several notorious crimes have been committed under the same auspices as those under which certain rapid and sensational fortunes have been made.

The compromising of politicians is also among the noble methods used in Bulgarian politics. It is permitted to rob but not to conceal the robbery. Sooner or later the abuse is made public, the culprits are tried and sometimes convicted; but they never expiate their crime. Ferdinand always intervenes just in time to save his man, whose conscience he thus enchains for ever.

Who, in Bulgaria, has not been suspected, accused and tried?

The President of the Council, Radoslavoff, was impeached for having enriched himself illegally during his tenure of office. Coburg restored him to liberty before the trial ended. The leader of the second fraction of the Liberals, the present Minister of Finance, Tontcheff, was mixed up in the famous case of the purchase of defective railway waggons. He was accused, convicted, and pardoned by the grace of Ferdinand. Ghenadieff, long before the Desclausières affair, which procured him ten years' penal servitude, was placed in the dock for embezzlement. This served as an apparent pretext for Ferdinand and Radoslavoff to have him removed from the present Cabinet. Dr. Goudeff, who succeeded Petkoff as President of the Council, ended (as well as all the members of his Cabinet, including Ghenadieff) by being arraigned for theft. The Minister Ivantcheff, a friend of Tontcheff, was prosecuted, with his brother, for illegal gains. General Ratcho Petroff, of whom it was said on all sides that "he could not have contrived to amass the half of his fortune, even if he had been born with a general's pay and had lived 150 years without spending a farthing," was also accused, and then, like so many others, liberated before the end of the trial. General Savoff, too, was prosecuted for fraudulently-acquired

wealth. The leader of the National Party, Gueshoff, was suspected, without doubt wrongly, of misuse of benevolent funds, and the leader of the Progressists, Daneff, remains still under the threat of judicial proceedings for the catastrophe of 1913, for which the real culprits seek to make him responsible. The former Democratic Minister, Liaptcheff, has been accused of misappropriation, etc., etc. As we have said already, to pass from the ministerial bench to the dock is the rule, and every Government discovers some implication to muzzle at least a portion of the opposition. The principle of government in Bulgaria would appear to be: "Divide and expose in order to govern."

The great Bulgarian patriot and writer, Anton Drandar, says on this subject in his jubilee book, "Bulgaria under Prince Ferdinand, 1887-1908" (Brussels, 1909), page 123:

"On the death of the former Prime Minister, Théodore Ivantchoff,* the Stamboulovist Minister then in power decreed a national funeral for the deceased, as though to reward him for his misdeeds. Such an honour is only due, and ought only to be accorded, to men who have really deserved well of their country, and not to those who have thought solely of their personal interests. Thus, in Bulgaria, are rewarded men who have been tried and convicted by their peers. With such a system, we must not be astonished to see one day the colleagues of the deceased Minister Ivantchoff return to power. If such a scandal occurs, Bulgaria, which pretends to a royal crown, will have the right only to an imperial crown of degradation and political corruption."

Well, Bulgaria has put on that imperial crown of degradation and corruption, and it is precisely the colleagues of Ivantchoff in the Ministry and in the dock—Radoslavoff and Tontcheff—who are to-day its two brightest jewels.

* *

The organisation, the etiquette, and the customs of the Coburg Court—a combination of the little, pretentious Courts of Germany and the mysterious seraglios of Sultans—betrayed from the first the notion with which Coburg had come to Sofia, and for the realisation of which he had found, it must be admitted, the most suitable of soils. The pretentious Court of Sofia imitates at once the pompous ceremony of the Habsburgs and the oriental ostentation of a rajah. Decorations, sleeve-links, scarf-pins, gold snuff-

* Ivantchoff died at Mentone (France), and was buried at Sofia.

boxes with the initials of Ferdinand have been scattered all over Europe.

The Civil and Military Cabinet of the King was a nursery of soldiers and diplomats, who, after serving there under the eye of Coburg, passed from the Court to other confidential posts—continuing, in fact, the same service.* The Court extends and ramifies outwards in a sort of larger camarilla, thanks to which it can spread its vast network of influence, intrigue, corruption and espionage over Sofia and the whole country.

In this camarilla, in the broad sense of the word, the first place is occupied by the imitators of the old group of Stambouloff, the leaders and soldiers of the present Liberal régime, presided over by Radoslavoff, Tontcheff and Petkoff (formerly by Ghenadieff). Mention must be made, too, of the phalanx of the King's men of confidence, occupying all ranks in diplomacy, from the oldest to the youngest, and among them the old Natchevitch, Dr. Stantchoff, Simeon Radeff, Tchaprachikoff, General Markoff, Ratcho Petroff, Paprikoff, Nikolaïeff, Tantiloff, Savoff, the representatives of patriotic organisations, as formerly Ghenadieff, Matthias Gheroff, General Protogeroff, the Chauvinist professor Miletitch, the Director of Posts, Stoïanovitch ; a German Jew representing Krupp, and an honorary citizen of Sofia, Kaufmann ; an Austrian Jew, Chief of the Press Bureau, Herbst, etc., etc.

This wire entanglement of personal politics is inseparable from another in which are intermingled the wires of party policy, quite as capricious, and sometimes as personal, treacherous, corrupting and narrow. All this is but the expression of the same environment and the same habits. The same men often serve the two policies. One might suppose that a wise monarch of simpler manners and saner ideas would have used nobler means to attract people to him, and that in choosing men he would have had loftier objects in view. However, one can accuse Ferdinand of Coburg only of having nourished, whilst drawing advantage from them, the weakness and error which already existed. His rôle consisted in "turning passions and individual appetites to the public good," such as he conceived it, and according to the ideas he had brought from the Habsburg

* The chief of the King's Cabinet, and the factotum of the Court for the last twenty years, is Dobrovitch, a Levantine, brought up at Constantinople, and married to a German.

monarchy. He has served public interests in Bulgaria as they were served before him.

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Ferdinand of Coburg has introduced nothing new into the means nor into the aims of Bulgarian policy since he has directed it. An ex-lieutenant of hussars under Francis Joseph, he has certainly been a devoted and grateful champion of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and of Pan-Germanism in the East; but the Austro-Germanophil current in Bulgarian policy not only preceded the election of Coburg, but was a determining cause of it. In remaining Austrophil, Ferdinand of Coburg has been faithful to the opinions of his electors, who doubtless saw in his Austrophil sentiments his chief title to become prince of Bulgaria.

Austrians and Germans have never omitted to lay stress on the important rôle of King Ferdinand, who served as a tie between the Central Powers and Bulgaria.* It is indisputable that this tie was strong, but it was not the only one. When he arrived in Bulgaria, Coburg perceived with satisfaction that there was a current of ideas which it was his duty as a German to utilise and strengthen, but that there existed opinions which could not but encourage his dreams as an ambitious sovereign.

We have had occasion to remark already that events in foreign politics had provoked temporary divergences in foreign policy. The Russophobe tendency, which in itself was bound to become Austrophil, was also a tendency of inordinate pretensions. It must not be forgotten that those who exploited national Chauvinism and propagated Bulgarian imperialism were at the same time the foremost Germanophiles. One of the principal champions of Great Bulgaria, the former revolutionary Rizoff, is to-day the confidential agent of Ferdinand of Coburg at Berlin, where he maintains two ideas, parallel, and for that matter, inseparable, Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans and eternal friendship with the Austro-Germans.

* The *Pesti Hírlap* of April 30th, 1916, emphasises the fact that Ferdinand had been an officer of Hungarian hussars, that he is a Hungarian landowner, and that he speaks Hungarian. The former Bulgarian Consul Pantché Doreff speaks also with emphasis of the souvenirs left by Lieutenant Ferdinand of Coburg in his regiment as "a legend which passes from mouth to mouth." The *Lokal Anzeiger* of May 7th, 1916, insists on the fact that the Bulgarian sovereign belongs to a princely German house, etc.

CHAPTER XX

BULGARIAN MEGALOMANIA

THE explanation of politics and temperament must also be sought in the character of a people. In the case under our consideration, the analysis is very complicated.

It must be understood, first of all, that even when we leave out of the question Bulgarian subjects belonging to other nationalities, the Bulgarian people, properly speaking, is the least homogeneous of the Balkan national entities. From the beginning, the fusion in unequal proportions of the Tartar and Slav elements, alien immigration, perturbations of all kinds, produced in the various regions of the country great ethnic diversity, and even varieties of anthropological types. Then the long enslavement under the Turks, commencing brusquely at the most critical moment of the development of the Bulgarian people, cut short the process of formation of a *nation* in the higher sense of the word. Last of all, it was not by the spontaneous effort of an organised conscious national will that it was freed from the Turkish yoke. The new Bulgarian State was not constituted; it was created artificially.

Whilst this rudimentary creation of a nation was still in progress, one element detached itself from the rest: a so-called educated class was improvised. We may judge of the differences between the popular mass and the educated class from a portrait recently drawn by a Bulgar.

In the *Kambana* (November 9th, 1916), a journal habitually tinged with the purest Chauvinism, an old diplomatist admires "the miraculous transformation of the Bulgar, whom the Roumanian and the Serb despised, formerly, as an inferior being, uncultured and unfitted for an independent existence."

"Every springtime Bulgars came to Constantinople. They were shepherds, labourers, robust but rude, dressed in skins, the squealing bagpipes slung over their shoulders, on their

heads the sheepskin bonnet which they threw on the ground, danced, and asked *baksheesh* of passers-by. The 'Bulgar' gardeners were a little superior.

"Thus were the Bulgars described, and the stranger formed his opinion of that people from those he met with at Constantinople.

"Before the liberation the Bulgar represented nothing. He was unknown, forgotten; his rights were characterised by the debasing term, 'Turkish *rayah*,' which designated his servitude.

"It is pretended that the age of miracles has long passed away. It is not true, for they still happen. Bulgaria to-day is the latest and greatest miracle in the world."

The "enlightened" class, in reality uncultured, and barely educated, constituted in haste to satisfy the needs of the administration of a young State—what could it do in so short a time with this primitive people, uncivilised, and totally destitute of a national conscience? The power of corruption and the prestige of the stick, which have made this people vote for the official candidates, even under the most democratic governments, show that the Bulgarian people is far from occupying the fourth place in Europe, from the standpoint of education (as Bulgarian statistics maintain*), and that it possesses no political perception.

Ferocious brutality, selfishness, cupidity, boastfulness in success, cruelty in victory, cowardice in defeat, clannish intolerance, distrust, hypocrisy, trickery and cunning—these characteristics are a heritage of the Tartar race, as well as a relic of slavery, or even vestiges of the primitive characteristics of the race.

Those who speak in its name to-day and represent public opinion are no longer clad in skins, no longer carry the squealing bagpipes on their shoulders, nor the sheepskin bonnet on their heads; but, even after thirty years, they manifest the same traits of character, developed into vices.

And the present stormy period has more than ever brought them into relief.

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Among Bulgarian failings megalomania holds the first place. Unceasingly augmenting, ever since the intoxicating

* Dr. Ostwald, in his pamphlet *Die Kulturpolitische Mission Bulgariens*, 1916, quotes Bulgarian statistics giving 2 per cent. of illiterates in Bulgaria. The author of the present work, a surgeon in a hospital during the Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1913, found in a whole ward full of Bulgarian wounded only one man who knew how to read and write.

dream of San Stefano, this folly degenerated into madness after the successes brought off, thanks to the alliance with Germany. According to the Bulgarian press, Bulgaria has given proof of the highest qualities in this world war.

The rôle of Bulgaria in the European war would seem to be of the utmost importance: "The intervention of Bulgaria," writes the *Narodni Prava* of December 5th, 1915, "caused Asquith and Grey to lose their heads: there remains nothing of the grand airs they gave themselves formerly. Their ideas are confused." The Bulgarian minister Petkoff wrote in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of January 8th, 1916: "By her intervention, Bulgaria has hastened the end of this terrible war and decided the victory of the Central Powers." The *Dnevnik* of September 9th, 1916, calls attention to the fundamental rôle of Bulgaria in the European war.

Bulgarian military successes would appear to have been of decisive import. After the Bulgarian counter-offensive of August, 1916, the Sofia journals announced the fall of the Briand Ministry as imminent (*Outro*, August 24th, 1916). The *Narodni Prava* of October 24th, 1916, wrote that the taking of Constanza presaged the approaching end of the war, because the Quadruple Entente had lost all hope of success. Two days later, the *Dnevnik* saw in the battles of Dobrudja "the beginning of the end of the European war," and the *Narodni Prava* exclaimed: "The war has been won finally in the Dobrudja."

To this high estimate of the part played by Bulgaria corresponds an over-estimate of her power. The Vice-President of the Sobranié, Momtchiloff, declared in the *Neues Wiener Journal* (January 5th, 1916) that "*the Bulgarian Army, in consequence of the recent victories, has become so powerful that the Entente would need two million soldiers to vanquish it.*" Replying to a speech from the throne, the Sobranié states (February 15th, 1916) that the Bulgarian armies "burst like a mighty hurricane on the enemy and forced him into disorderly flight." The Bulgarian chargé d'affaires at Berne, Keremektchieff, declared to a correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt* (November 7th, 1916) that the Bulgarian forces were inexhaustible: "As for us Bulgars we could carry on the war for another hundred years." The *Voenni Izvestia* (August 30th, 1916), speaking of the Roumanian intervention, was not afraid to assert that the Bulgarian armies "would break the head of all

enemies more easily than a hammer of iron," and that they were going to use "German method and Bulgarian ardour to beat down the many-headed hydra."

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Nowhere did Bulgarian bragging show itself to greater effect than in the celebration of the successes against Serbia. Setting aside certain mistakes occasioned by calculations based on data whose falsity has since been demonstrated, without in any way implicating the responsibility of the Serbs, we cannot refuse to render homage to the Serbian Army which has striven to resist an enemy twice its strength and in very unfavourable conditions. The Austrians, insatiate enemies of the Serbs, have rendered them this homage against their will, the Germans have done so without hesitation.

The *Neue Freie Presse* of October 13th, 1915, recognised in Serbia a courageous enemy in the military sense, whose gallantry surpassed the valour of many others. "The Serbian soldier is endowed with high intelligence, and above all with a fanatical love for his country." The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of October 17th, 1915, said "the Serbs have been in all battles a stout and powerful enemy." The *Berliner Tageblatt* of October 18th insisted on "the ardour, the resistance, and the intrepidity of the Serbian soldiers." The *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Vossische Zeitung* of October 18th, 1915, published articles on the Balkan battles in which the Serbs had no longer any chance, since the Entente was powerless to come to their aid with three or four hundred thousand soldiers, which were indispensable. Major Moraht spoke in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of October 19th of the "immense difficulties" met with in the Balkan expedition in consequence of "Serbian resistance, which was almost insurmountable." The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of October 24th insisted, in a dispatch sent to the Bulgarian Headquarters, on the fact that the Serbs were in a very difficult position near Negotine, where several fires had broken out. "The Serbs in that place seem to lack munitions; they are fighting, notwithstanding, with desperate courage." The *Vossische Zeitung* of November 19th, 1915, published a letter from Collin Ross: "Serbia has been seized by the throat in three places. The Serbian Army has behind it inaccessible mountains. It is like an animal hemmed in on all sides. Of what use are courage and the

spirit of sacrifice in such conditions? . . . The struggle against the Serbs has not been easy. Much blood has been shed. They have defended themselves to the last breath." Major Moraht, analysing, in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of November 29th, 1915, the military operations on all fronts, asserts that, on the west, the Germans would have preferred to occupy Paris rather than to halt before the capital; that they would rather have renewed their Sedan exploit against the Russians than merely rectified the eastern frontier, and that they would have liked to capture the remains of the Serbian Army instead of letting them retire to Albania. "We must pay homage to Serbian valour. The Serbian Staff has accomplished its task as perfectly as the numerical superiority of the enemy on the north as well as on the east permitted." Colonel Gaedke wrote in the *Vorwärts* of December 3rd, 1915: "A part of the Serbian troops succeeded in escaping the enveloping movement of Mackensen and the Bulgars. We must acknowledge that, under the circumstances, it was a *cléver manœuvre* of the Serbian Commander-in-Chief, Putnik, who had already given proof of his capacity in the wars of 1912, 1913, and 1914. The Serbian soldiers fought gallantly against an enemy greatly superior in numbers, and it appears that even in the last combats near Prishtina they showed great tenacity." Major Moraht praises, in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of December 4th, "the resistance of the Serbs in the environs of Monastir, a resistance that was superb in spite of destitution and cold." The *Vossische Zeitung* of January 3rd, 1916, publishes the text of an order of the day of King Louis of Bavaria to his army. In it we read "in the course of our tireless advance in the Balkans we have mastered a courageous enemy." The *Nepszava* of Buda-Pesth (Socialist) wrote on January 30th, 1916: "The Serbian people succeeded in repulsing powerful armies and in defending themselves for month after month before being beaten by Great Powers possessing a highly-developed industry and indisputable numerical superiority."

In the course of this unequal struggle, which could bring no glory to the victor, the Bulgars alone saw in the advance of the three armies against Serbia, only a triumph of Bulgarian heroism.

The Minister Tontcheff exulted in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of November 28th, 1915:

"I told you that we should have finished with Serbia in three weeks, and we have done so. Serbia is crushed."

Radoslavoff said to a correspondent of the *Az Est* :

"The Serbian resistance was overcome sooner than was hoped for, and sooner than our enemies themselves expected." (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, December 3rd, 1915.)

The Sobranié, also, in replying to the speech from the throne, of February 15th, boasts of the "lightning rapidity with which the perfidious enemy has been crushed."*

The *Narodni Prava* of December 1st, 1915, wrote :

"An end has been made of Serbia and her army in about forty days. One of our enemies is beaten, and the Balkans are freed from the scourge which has oppressed them for so many years. . . . We have strangled once for all a miserable instrument of the Entente."

The Mayor of Sofia, Radeff, greeted by telegraph the Head of the Municipality of Vienna, Weiss Kirchner, on the occasion of the capture of Monastir :

"I hasten to salute in your person the Viennese population, and to brand the cowardice of the Serbs, who have been punished in exemplary fashion for their atrocious crimes against the Austro-Hungarian crown." (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, December 8th.)

Even in circles generally sympathetic towards the Germans protest was made against these repulsive exultations over Serbia, meanly overthrown. An organ of German-speaking Switzerland, the *Basler Nachrichten* (December 2nd, 1915) attacked the President of the German Reichsrath because he extolled, in the downfall of Serbia, punishment for the crime of Serajevo :

"These phrases are really out of place, since the small Serbian State has only been beaten finally by two great powers supported by Bulgaria. These conclusions are, moreover, unjust. The Serbian people which suffers now is in no wise guilty of murder. . . . We are persuaded that, even to Germans, who have sacrificed all they hold most precious for their Fatherland, it is repugnant to hear the Mayor of Berlin—raised by a chance to the dignity of President of the Reichsrath—affirm

* The Bulgarian Colonel Asmanoff showed the correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung* (December 22nd, 1915) the office of the Serbian President of the Council at Nish, the coffee-cup of Pashitch ; in exhibiting these trophies he glorified the conquest of Nish by the Bulgarian troops "numerically inferior to the Serbian troops, who offered a stubborn resistance." The desperate situation of the Serbs when Nish was abandoned shows, however, the want of foundation as well as the bad taste of this boast. Asmanoff and also General Boiadjief (the same who was defeated in 1916 near Monastir) considered "the second phase of the Balkan campaign finished."

that the war has for its object the avenging of such and such an Austrian prince."

* * *

The Bulgars consider themselves not only the strongest, they lay claim to still other superiorities. Replying to an attack of Leonid Andreyev, who termed them "hucksters in the Slav Temple," they declared that it is to them that Andreyev owes it that he is not illiterate.* (*Narodni Prava*, May 25th, 1916.)

It was with extreme pleasure that Sofia welcomed the German flattery that "from a commercial and industrial standpoint the progress of the United States of America alone is worth comparing with that of Bulgaria" (*Narodni Prava*, May 28th, 1916). The *Mir* (November 3rd, 1916) publishes a report of a lecture by Pistor, Secretary of the Vienna Chamber of Commerce, asserting that "Bulgaria occupies by the number of its literates the *fourth place in Europe, immediately after England, Belgium and Germany.*" There is nothing astonishing, after this, to find that the *Preporetz* regards the taking of Tutrakan as "*a victory of Bulgarian culture,*" and that the *Balkanska Pochta* of November 15th, 1916, attributes to Bulgaria "the mission of disarming, purifying and civilising Roumania."

Replying to attacks in the English press, the *Narodni Prava* of June 5th, 1916, does not hesitate to declare that Bulgaria is a country where liberty, law, and justice are better secured than in England. The Bulgarian Minister at Berne, Passaroff, has drawn up quite a list of the superior qualifications of the Bulgarian people and policy:

"We are a people eminently democratic. We have universal suffrage established on the proportional system, which is in France the ideal of the most advanced circles. We have full ministerial responsibility to Parliament, much more extended than in other democratic countries. Twice already our Ministers have been condemned to prison. Our King has never dared to neglect Parliamentary procedure as President Wilson did a few weeks ago. The Bulgarian King cannot bestow the title

* The *Kambana* of December 6th, 1916, places Bulgaria far above Russia, saying: "There is nothing more offensive, no scoff more painful to a Bulgar, than to be regarded as a brother of that illiterate mass, that herd of slaves and despairing peasants, which make up Russian regiments." The deputy Daskaloff wrote in the same journal a year before (December 12th, 1915): "The tough Bulgar has given a lesson to the western Latins, who have always despised him, *believing themselves superior to him.*"

of lord on wealthy industrials." (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 20th, 1917.)

These affirmations, of an audacity which borders on cynicism, may nevertheless contain a morsel of truth: the Bulgarian king, indeed, does not stop at trifles. Why should he "neglect Parliamentary procedure," like President Wilson? He resorts to a procedure more radical, and simply dissolves Parliaments one after another, whenever they inconvenience him.

Bulgaria is the only country in Europe where a party in power can *always* transform a minority of six deputies into a crushing majority of one hundred and sixty, and the only country in the world where Parliamentary reports have registered such incidents as those contained in Drandar's book, "Bulgaria under Prince Ferdinand" (p. 152):

"The home policy of Petkoff was provocative, reactionary and violent; his language was constantly menacing. 'I will have you hanged in the precincts of the National Assembly itself,' he shouted; or again: '*If I wish*, neither you, M. Petcheff,* nor they,' said he, pointing to the members of the Opposition, 'will return here as deputies; if I wished to *destroy you*, I should only have to go out from here for a few minutes, and you would all disappear without mercy and without amnesty.'" (*Nov. Vek.*, 1904, No. 813.)

This sinister episode of Bulgarian parliamentarism belongs precisely to the régime of the *Narodni Prava* party, called "the party of grip."

The *Outro* of November 21st, 1916, published information according to which numerous English and French prisoners who, being invalided, were free to return to their country, had declared that they preferred to remain in Bulgaria.

The *Kambana* of October 27th, 1916, contains the following reflections of an eminent personage, on the Bulgarian effort in the war:

"No other people in this stormy period has made better use of its time than the Bulgarian.

"In 1912 it achieved its object in two months. In 1915 two months sufficed it to rid Serbia of the Serbs. In 1916 the

* By this allusion M. Petkoff meant to convey to M. Petcheff, the ex-Minister, that his friends Ivantchoff, Tontcheff, Radoslavoff, etc., had been amnestied only through his intervention, without which they would have been permanently excluded from the Chamber, having been sentenced by the Court of the State to prison and the loss of their civic and political rights. (Note by Drandar.)

same lapse of time served it to drive the Roumanians and Russians out of the Dobrudja. The time fixed for the definite annihilation of Roumania may be easily determined. This annihilation will certainly contribute greatly to the peace desired by all. It forms part of the Bulgarian programme."

The *Kambana* often published these megalomaniac "Bulgarian programmes." For instance, in an article headed "Great Bulgaria" (September 13th), it wrote :

"The time has come for Bulgaria to appear on the stage of history as an important factor in civilisation and progress. Bulgaria is rising day by day, *and she is outgrowing her neighbours*. Everything Italy has lost as a military power, everything Roumania has lost by refusing alliance with the great powers, *passes to Bulgaria*. Serbia destroyed and Roumania partitioned means for Bulgaria not only doubled territory, but complete liberation from outside restraint. It means also that *Bulgaria takes her place among independent powers whose voice must be heard in shaping the destiny of the world*."

Could it be otherwise with a country which, like her German ally, possesses all moral and physical superiority, and even has God at the service of her pretensions ?

Indeed, the *Kambana* of September 8th, 1916, saw already in the Bulgarian successes a manifestation of "the higher ordering of events." The *Mir* of December 20th, 1916, considered the Roumanian defeat "a chastisement sent by God."

The *Narodni Prava* of November 15th, 1916, formulated a dogma of "the hand of God" and exclaimed :

"One cannot imagine a situation more terrible than that in which the States who have offended the good heart of Bulgaria and her King now find themselves. These countries exist no longer, or those which do live in terror."

A decisive part in the world war ; the force of a hurricane ; means to carry on the war for a hundred years ; economic rivalry with the United States ; moral and cultural superiority ; Parliamentary perfection ; ideal democracy ; a place in the rank of world powers ; and a divine nationality—all this constitutes, in the matter of pretensions, a list which might be regarded as complete. However, the *Mir* finds something to add, in lamenting the excess of a Bulgarian virtue, the last jewel of this crown—modesty. In its issue of March 22nd, 1916, speaking of conditions after the war, it says :

"It is of the highest importance that we should all recognise

the new situation of Bulgaria, and should get rid of certain habits, the heritage of our recent past. These find expression in our sentiments of submission and docility, of yielding and conciliation, in our inclination to abdicate our rights, even when acknowledged or on the point of being so."

With "modesty" the picture of Bulgarian virtue and superiority is complete.

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The great rôle allotted to advertisement and propaganda in foreign countries is only a part of this boastfulness. Every means and all the factors of public life must minister to it. Before the intervention of Bulgaria, the two warring camps of Europe were besieged by Bulgarian emissaries of all sorts. However, even after her entrance into the war on the side of the Central Empires, Bulgaria contrived to have representatives in countries against which she was fighting. Thus, a former Bulgarian diplomatist has unceasingly carried on a propaganda and kept alive erroneous notions concerning his country, in an Entente capital, until quite recent times.

The Bulgarian writer, A. Kiproff, was delegated to Switzerland when he published at Berne, in 1915, the pamphlet, "The Truth about Bulgaria." On his return to Sofia, Kiproff was received by Radoslavoff, who declared himself "satisfied with the results of the mission." However, this agent of Radoslavoff, whose task it was to work for the anti-Russian, anti-Entente policy of Coburg, belonged to the Progressist Party (Tsankovists) of Daneff, and was even formerly a deputy and secretary of an office in Parliament. The immorality of this case roused the Tsankovist Party from its lethargy, and it disavowed Kiproff and his opinions in the *Mir* of May 8th. Kiproff retorted, and the scandal was crowned by a paragraph in the *Outro* of May 10th, 1916, as follows*:

"The well-known former Tsankovist deputy, Alexander Kiproff, will be appointed chief of the new department of succour for war orphans which will be established shortly."

"The Truth about Bulgaria," which these agents of Bulgarian propaganda abroad promised to their readers, is made manifest by these facts in a striking way.

* The same number of the *Outro* announces: "The Bulgarian Consul, Dr. S. Tahanoff, and the Chief of Bureau at the Sobranié, G. Kostoff, are sent abroad. The Democratic deputy, G. Vasilieff, has also gone to Germany.

"Truths" of this kind have been supplied to the world by the Bulgars by every sort of means and of all shades.

Having taken advantage of the benevolence of foreign Bulgarophiles, in the first place that of the Slavists of German and Austrian Universities,* the Bulgars push their propaganda, even in Esperanto, in the Esperantist review published at Berlin.† As for Coburg, he has not hesitated, in his character as a comedian, to play a part with all his family on a Chauvinist film, glorifying Bulgarian successes in Serbia. The film was frantically applauded throughout Germany.‡ Bulgarian advertisement refuses nothing.

In the Odyssey of his hero across Europe, the author of "Baya Gagno" has two characteristic episodes :

"Taken by his Prague friends to an art museum, Baya Gagno was bored, deigning to show some little interest in the visitors' book alone. To reach the table where it lay, he elbowed his way through the visitors, treading on the toes of one, hustling a second, and, snatching a pen from a third, he covered the register with blots, and, as a finishing stroke, with his sticky, bristly hand, decorated the page with the brilliant words :

'GAGNO OF THE BALKANS.'

Another time, at Vienna, in summer, he went to a public bathing establishment. Entering the bath with a bound, he indulged in wild feats, splashing the other bathers unmercifully. Then, satisfied with the effect he believed he had produced, without taking into account the annoyance he had caused, persuaded that he read on every countenance intense admiration for his skill, he ran nimbly up the stairs, stuck out his chest, poised himself proudly on straddled legs, casting a proud look around and below, and slapping his hairy chest with heroic gesture, shouted triumphantly : 'It is Bulgarian, that ; it is Bulgarian.' "

Yes ; it was the Bulgar !

* Order given by the Sofia Academy of Science for a new edition of the "History of Bulgaria," by Iretchek (*Dnevnik*, May 15th, 1916). Arrival at Sofia of Yensen (*Mir*, May 30th), etc. The great Slavist Yagitch has been coarsely attacked for not adhering to the Bulgarian theory on the origin of the Slav alphabet—miscalled by the Bulgars the Bulgarian alphabet. (*Dnevnik*, June 21st, 1916).

† "Internace Bulteno." (*Dnevnik*, May 17th, 1916.)

‡ *Berliner Tageblatt* and *Kölnische Zeitung*, September 8th, 1916 (Film Bogdan Stirnoff.)

CHAPTER XXI

BULGARIAN CHAUVINISM

THE frantic Chauvinism of the Bulgars is but another expression of the bragging of the *parvenu* clown, of his selfish cupidity, and his clannish intolerance. A great Bulgaria needs a great number of Bulgarians, and Bulgarian policy, science, propaganda, and the Bulgarian Army recruit them everywhere and by every means. Everything is Bulgarian in the Balkans, from Greek Olympus to the Roumanian Carpathians :

The *Kambana* of October 27th, 1916, wrote :

"The English say : 'Scratch a Russian, and you find a Tartar.' This may be applied with far more justice to Roumanians and Greeks. Both are a mixture of diverse ingredients and, above all, of the Bulgarian element. If we set ourselves to find out the origin of the Roumanians and Greeks, we should discover that in seventy-five per cent of them it was Bulgarian."

In the *Preporetz* (October 26th, 1916) protest is made against the Roumanian names given to Roumanian towns, like Preadal, for instance, which, according to the patriots of the Bulgarian Democratic organ, should be spelt Predel, a name which testifies to the ancient Bulgarian culture of all that Roumanian region. And since Bulgarians live there it should be included within the frontiers of Bulgaria.

According to the *Dnevnik* of January 31st, 1917 : "*It would be doing violence to common sense and political logic if we recognised the right of the Roumanian people to dispose of itself, from the national point of view. . . .*" The Bulgarian journal fears the recognition of the right of every people to dispose of itself. "It would create," says the *Dnevnik*, "incredible difficulties," above all if we were not to take into consideration "the degree of civilisation indispensable to enable nations to constitute themselves into a State."

The notion of the Bulgarian organ is clear : in the

Balkans only the Bulgarian people possess the "degree of civilisation indispensable." On another occasion the *Dnevnik* is of opinion that Monastir is "the centre of Bulgarianism." This conception, in fact, offers the only means, in radiating from *the centre*, of reaching the Adriatic littoral, and, consequently, the "third Bulgarian sea." The *Narodni Prava* of May 23rd, 1916, calls Salonica "the Bulgarian Bethlehem." The *Mir* of September 5th, 1916, designates the Dobrudja as "the cradle of the ancient Bulgarian Empire." In the Bulgarian press, as also in the despatches of foreign journals (*Pesther Lloyd*, October 28th, 1916) they rejoice at the notion of the "coming liberation of the old Bulgarian town of Tulcea," at the mouth of the Danube.

The arbitrary nature of Bulgarian pretensions to Serbian provinces is shown by the influence exercised on them by military successes, which causes them to vary constantly. The *Mir*, which up to September, 1915, limited Bulgarian aims to Monastir, from the first Germano-Austro-Bulgarian victories, extended them not only to Dibar, Skoplia and Koumanovo, classic spots of Old Serbia, but to Leskovatz, Nish, Pirot, and Zayetchar, situated in the very heart of actual Serbia.

These Serbian provinces on the right bank of the Morava have been the principal object of the pretensions and propaganda of the Bulgars, above all since the day when German *Mittel-Europa* schemes affirmed the necessity of snatching the Morava lands from Serbian possession. Already in November, 1915, Bulgaria proclaimed openly and officially the expansion of its aspirations beyond the limits of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912, and even to the valley of the Morava.*

* *

Nish was coveted by Bulgarian Chauvinism with especial ardour. The correspondent of the *Narodni Prava*, a Bulgarian schoolmaster in the military administration of Nish, publishes a series of articles on Nish (*Narodni Prava*, February 5th to 8th, 1916), in which he insists on the necessity of weaning the population, in as short a time as possible, from the use of the Serb tongue, which was imposed on them by force. He protests against the promulgation of orders by municipal agents in the Serbian language. "The

* Declaration of Kaloucheff, Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople, published in the *Tasfir-i-Efshiar*. (*Vorwärts*, November 21st, 1915.)

population," he says, "must be obliged to learn the Bulgarian language rapidly." Accosted by someone before the Municipality, who asked him to explain an order on a poster affixed to the wall, *he obliged him to decipher it without the aid of anyone, and forbade him to ask, henceforth, no matter whom, to translate Bulgarian orders.* Thus, he says, must we deal with the population "which still hopes for the return of Serbian domination." He demands also, as an urgent measure, that "*all Serbian books should be taken away from private houses and replaced by books in Bulgarian*"—which has been done, by the way. It is interesting to quote one of the letters from Nish addressed to the *Narodni Prava* (February 16th, 1916) by "the special delegate of the direction of the Bulgarian press." The delegate relates that he has had a discussion with a young Serbian tradesman in the latter's shop :

"I wanted to buy something. Milan showed me an assortment of goods, and as I was the only customer for the moment, he began to talk. His voice was calm and sad, he bridled up from time to time, and one felt then a bad and hostile note in his speech. He deplored the ruin of Serbia and the Serbs ; even Belgium, which all the world pitied, could not be compared to them. Might not the Bulgars have abstained from intervening ? . . . There are undoubted Serbian memories in Macedonia, that of Marko Kralievitch, for example. . . . *I saw before me the everlasting Serb*, profoundly infected by Chauvinism and delusion. I began to laugh, and told him how ugly and disgraceful his behaviour seemed to me, for an intelligent man. . . . Certainly we must have made an interesting group. From the beginning of the conversation, Milan's old father drew near to us ; later, another Serb joined our group. Their countenances were strained and gloomy, and when Milan spoke their calm expression changed into an odd grimace of satisfaction and hope."

The *Echo de Bulgarie* of February 6th, 1916, asserts that "the evil work of Serbian Chauvinism during thirty-seven years has left very profound traces in that country. . . ."

"For that matter," adds the *Echo de Bulgarie*, "the proverbial tolerance of the Bulgars is a sufficient shelter either for real Serbs or those tainted with Serbism."

The care of political objects to be pursued in the occupied provinces fell to Tchaprachikoff, former Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade and Nish, who, after the occupation, was nominated special Commissary to the military authorities in the latter place. During the first months of the occupa-

tion, the royal Commissary expressed "the hope that Bulgarisation would not meet with great difficulties" (*Vossische Zeitung*, December 4th, 1915). Ten months later, Tchaprachikoff, interviewed by the correspondent of the same *Vossische Zeitung* (September 19th, 1916), said:

"German readers will learn with interest how I fashion the Serbian people without resorting to strong measures. Up to 1876, moreover, Nish was a Bulgarian town. The Serbs succeeded in 'Serbising' a thin layer. . . . Authority has contrived to Bulgarise anew, in a relatively short time, the whole town of Nish and the neighbouring villages. Thanks to the priests as well as to wise administrative measures, we have succeeded in regaining this ancient Bulgaria entirely, and at the same time in conquering the Serb regions by culture.* As we are firmly resolved to keep the country we have conquered, our attitude towards the native population is one of friendly prudence. . . . Only those among the Old Bulgars (?) who have fought against the Bulgars are interned."

It is not easy to seize this very subtle distinction, which is inspired only by the impossibility of being clear. But we know that all valid men were deported from the first days of the occupation. All the schoolmasters, all the priests, even the bishop of Nish were sent into concentration camps where they were subjected to a terrible régime. Half of them died of privations or disease. The Serbian notables of the whole Pomoravlíe (valley of the Morava) were made to clean the streets of Sofia daily.

The assertion that it is easy to Bulgarise the valleys of the Nishava and the Morava is contradicted by Bulgarian documents themselves. Among these, it may be well to quote an article of the *Narodni Prava*, of January 22nd, 1916, attacking Serbian nationalism in the occupied provinces:

"On January 20th, between the stations of Sitchevo and Sveta Petka, in the territory of the former kingdom of Serbia,

* It is difficult to reconcile affirmations of the magical success of Bulgarisation with the doubts expressed, a few months before, by Sofia Chauvinists concerning the department of Trn, to wit, if that department of western Bulgaria ought to be regarded as effectively Bulgarian. Indeed, it presented a grave question, formulated in July, 1914, by a journal friendly to Tchaprachikoff, the *Kambana*, which accused the population of the department of entertaining Serbian leanings, and demanded their transplantation into the interior of Bulgaria. The revelations made by the journal on the Serbophil state of mind of the population became compromising to such an extent that the Bulgarian schoolmasters, at their annual assembly in August, 1914, were asked to counteract this by a declaration fitted to calm misled public opinion.

malefactors, unknown, fired on the Berlin-Sofia-Constantinople train. This can only be the impotent spitefulness of *dying Serbian Chauvinism*. It would be well, nevertheless, to take severe measures against the Serbian population, and in order not to allow fanatics the possibility of fomenting troubles in the new territories, *let us be less tolerant and more severe.*"

They know how then, all the same, to find Serbs in the occupied Serbian provinces—the moment it becomes a question of persecuting them.

The Bulgars have confirmed it in basing on the principle "no tolerance, but severity," a régime of terror unexampled. In January and February, 1917, the Bulgarian journals no longer speak of schools in the occupied territory, but of new prisons.

The *Dnevnik* of January 31st, 1917, announces "the project of the Ministry to establish *sixteen more prisons* in the occupied country." The ensuing month all the activity of the Bulgarian Sobranié was absorbed in the discussion of the special law concerning "the extermination of brigands" in the occupied territory. The brigands were "those incorrigible Serbian Chauvinists" who refused to join the Bulgarian Army to fight their brothers, fathers, and sons serving in the Serbian Army on the Macedonian front. And whilst in the Sobranié they were framing the law of terror against the oppressed Serbian people, which delayed to acknowledge itself Bulgarian, the Germano-Bulgarian regiments, in this same month of March, 1917, strangled the vast insurrection in the southern provinces of the Morava (Prokuplié, Kourshumlia, and the environs of Leskovatz and Vronia). Levelling the villages of several districts, German artillery and Bulgarian bayonets completed the work of Bulgarian propaganda begun by the ethnologists of Sofia and the Bulgarian schools in occupied Serbia.

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We may judge from these tendencies of character how sparing in delicacy and tolerance was the Bulgarian propaganda through schools and books. The *Mir* of January 26th, 1916, wrote :

"The school is, without doubt, one of the means by which the population of the new provinces may become the blood of our blood."

The *Narodni Prava* of March 20th, 1916, said of the school laws in the occupied Serbian provinces :

"The Bulgarian people in arms has finished its task. It is the turn now of Bulgarian schoolmasters in the liberated provinces to prepare a solid basis for the extension of Bulgarian culture. It is thus that the figure of Bulgaria could dominate from the Black Sea to the Albanian mountains, from the Danube to Prespa and the Ægean Sea."

On March 12th, 1916, a conference of schoolmasters was held at Skoplia. The inspector of primary schools, S. P. Petroff, profited by the occasion to press upon the teachers the duty of "correcting the language of the pupils, corrupted by the Serbs . . . and ridding the parents, especially the more influential ones, of the very inferior Serbian culture" (*Narodni Prava*, March, 1916).

The Minister of Public Instruction, Pecheff, stated to one of the staff of the *Outro* (April 14th, 1916) that :

"In three months only, elementary schools had been opened in all the towns of the liberated provinces, except Prilep, and that, in some, high-school classes had been established ; that schools had been opened even in the villages so far as circumstances permitted. . . . The results had surpassed all expectations."

It is true that Bulgarian schools were opened everywhere, even in places situated at the extreme limits of the occupied provinces, even at Pojarevatz ; but in spite of all the violent means employed, success was so small that the Bulgars themselves ended by no longer counting on the schools.

The *Outro* of August 22nd, 1916, was informed that "the Ministry of Public Instruction had decided to *open high schools at Nish and Skoplia only in case pupils presented themselves in sufficient numbers*. Failing this, only classes for which there were pupils would be established." This proves that in the two largest towns of occupied Serbia, Nish and Skoplia, whose Serbian high schools had overflowed with pupils to such a degree that many classes had to be duplicated, there was not the minimum of pupils required when it became a question of opening Bulgarian high schools. Some newspapers complained from time to time that parents did not allow their children to attend Bulgarian schools, whilst others exulted in observing the immense success of "culture" and "Bulgarisation." A self-satisfied communiqué explained everything :

"The incomplete high schools in the Morava and Mace-

donia, like those at Nish, Skoplia (Uskub), and Chtip (Istib), *notwithstanding the insufficient number of pupils*, are working normally. The teaching staff is sufficient." (*Outro*, September 24th, 1916.)

Information in the Hungarian journal *Vilag* of September 19th, 1916, contradicts the boasts made about the so-called success of Bulgarian schools in Serbia :

"It is semi-officially announced from Sofia : Since the fall of Tutrakan a change of opinion among the Chauvinist Serbs has been remarked. Before that event it was impossible to force the Serbian population to send their children to Bulgarian schools ; but after the fall of Tutrakan, we learn that a large number of Serbs are applying to the authorities for the admission of their children to the Bulgarian schools opened in the conquered territory."

This propaganda by school is supplemented by the organisation of Bulgarian libraries in the territories occupied. A special Commission was appointed to deal with the purchase and authorisation of books for the libraries in occupied Serbia. (*Narodni Prava*, February 20th, 1916.)

A whole literature of propaganda was subventioned. One of the members of the Commission, nominated chief of the propaganda at the Ministry of Public Instruction, published in March, 1916, a book in which the legendary Serbian hero, Kralievitch Marko, protagonist of the most glorious cycles of the Serbian epic, is represented as a Bulgarian (*Narodni Prava*, April 13th, 1916). The poet Vazoff also wrote verses lauding as a Bulgar the Serbian hero of the Revolution of 1804, Haidouk Velko* (*Mir*, December 17th, 1916).

But the victims of Bulgarian Chauvinism were not let off with these tortures of conscience : the old admirers of the Pashas and of Stambouloff reserved for them one still more humiliating : the obligation of expressing joy at their servitude. The Austro-Germans subjugate, oppress, and despoil without troubling about the sentiments of their victims ; the Bulgarians impose on them forced manifestations of gratitude and enthusiasm.

Indeed, the semi-official *Narodni Prava* published despatches daily from the communes of Serbia congratu-

* This Chauvinism inspired a Sofia journal (*Kambana*, August 22nd, 1916) with the idea of lamenting that the Bulgarian authorities had stopped short at exhuming from the cathedral of Sofia, to bury them elsewhere, the remains of the Serbian King Milatine, called "the saintly" and by the *Kambana* "the unworthy."

lating themselves on the joys of servitude. The families of Serbian soldiers fighting against the Bulgars on the Macedonian front and in the Dobrudja were obliged at Nish and Pirot to attend thanksgiving services in the churches and festivals elsewhere, celebrating Bulgarian victories (*Dnevnik*, September 9th and 12th, 1916). The wives, children, and aged parents of combatants at the front or those interned in Bulgaria were forced to take part in the manifestations on the anniversary of the taking of Zaitchar by the Bulgarian Army (*Narodni Prava*, November 3rd, 1916). The *Outro* of Sofia went so far as to boast of the display of enthusiasm for Bulgarian victories at Belgrade itself (*Outro*, September 3rd, 1916).

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These outrages and Chauvinist excesses, added to grave abuses in the administration, provoked even a debate in the Sobranié, thanks to criticism of the corrupt régime in the new provinces, a criticism maintained by the Socialists (sitting of the Sobranié, January 13th, 1916). The Democrats (Malinoff), who had spoken previously of the disagreement between the military and civil authorities (they took the part of the former), seized this opportunity for raising a question as to the general policy of the Radoslavoff Government concerning the new territories.

In the course of the debate, which became more and more ardent, Malinoff stated that a military commander at Nish "had decided, if they continued to send him functionaries like the prefect and the sub-prefects, to pack them off again to Sofia." And he added that an "influential Macedonian revolutionary had arrived at Sofia to declare that the state of things in Macedonia had become intolerable in consequence of the misdeeds of functionaries."

The *Narodni Prava* (February 4th, 1916) expressed indignation at the fact that deputies could be found, during the debate on the education law, to speak of *denationalisation and terrorism* in the new provinces. In replying to the attacks, Radoslavoff denied the statement that the new provinces had been treated otherwise than Bulgaria. "If there have been abuses and corruption," he said, "it is not astonishing: even Russia and England are not exempt from abuses and corruption" (*Narodni Prava*, February 21st, 1916).

The *Narodni Prava* of March 2nd, 1916, in an article

headed "The Inconsistency of the Foreigner," considered it scandalous that Malinoff should have "dared to calumniate the country in the person of the Government by *talking of pretended violence to the population of the new provinces*. . . . In speaking of public order and legality in the new countries, he (Malinoff) seeks to demonstrate that the Government has created anarchy and corruption."

It is interesting to note, as characteristic of Bulgarian political temperaments, that the second great party in opposition (National Party) observed an almost complete indifference in its organ, the *Mir*, to these debates in the Sobranié. According to Brchlian, editor of the *Dnevnik*, Boris Vazoff recommended in the *Mir* a policy inspired by the principles of "a reasoned Chauvinism."

The Bulgarian press remarked that the essential question in all these debates was not the suppression of violence and corruption, but rather the *necessity of a better organised propaganda* of the Bulgarian language; and culture in the new provinces. Beginning by citing misdeeds of the police, the discussion ended in the phrases of philologists. Afterwards the question was only superficially skimmed from time to time in the Socialist organs.

In his notes of travel from Skoplia, Assen Tsankoff wrote on June 2nd, 1916, in the organ of the Reformist Socialists (Governmental) :

"Bulgaria has broken away from its bed and overflowed far and wide. Like every element unfolding itself on new ground, it brings with it many undesirable things which must be eliminated methodically. . . ."

Important debates took place again in the second session of the Sobranié, July, 1916.

Veltcheff, in the *Preporetz* of July 6th, 1916, demonstrated the need of good administration and good schools in the new provinces. Todoroff, in the same number, complained of the bad quality of the administrative staff in the occupied country, whilst acknowledging that there were exceptions. He hesitated to publish details on the life and work of the various administrators, but compared the actual régime with that of Serbia, who had sent into these regions her best functionaries. This debate in the Sobranié had been provoked also indirectly by revelations on the conflict between the civil and military authorities in the new provinces. The criticism of the Sobranié

decided the Government to inspect the work of functionaries there (*Outro*, July 10th, 1916).

At the second reading of the Budget, Radoslavoff acknowledged that there might be some truth in the observation that "the choice of functionaries for the new provinces had been unfortunate." By themselves, the deeds, indicated by the Opposition, which had been committed at Prishtina and Prizren, were more than sufficient to prove it (*Narodni Prava*, July 14th, 1916). The discussion shifted from the Sobranié to the press. In his reply to the *Narodni Prava*, which had called him "the demagogue unmasked" (August 5th, 1916), the ex-Minister and deputy, Takeff, asserted :

"I have insisted, above all, on the truth that such conflicts arose principally from the fact that the authorities had placed there as functionaries of police mere criminals fresh from the cells. *To prove what I said, I threw in the face of the Minister of the Interior photographs of some of these characters, photographs bearing their numbers in the prison registers. Such are the persons who exercise administrative functions to-day in unhappy Macedonia.*" (*Preporetz*, August 11th, 1916.)

Unhappy Macedonia! The Bulgars, however, even after such edifying revelations of violence committed in the new provinces, and on the corruption that reigns there, still declare that they made war only to make Macedonia happy.

CHAPTER XXII

BRUTALITY AND BASENESS

"THE world belongs only to the strong and daring," said "a Bulgarian political personage" in the *Outro* of September 12th, 1916. Force, almighty and brutal, is the Bulgarian god, the supreme principle, the regulator of life and morals. They make it respected, if they possess it; if they do not, they respect it in others. The two forms of worship of force—brutality or baseness—lead by the same roads to the same ends.

Both are met with in the public morals of Bulgaria. It is not enough for the most eminent representatives of Bulgaria to be brutal in ideas and language; they are so even in gesture.

Narrating his interview with General Tontcheff, commanding the Bulgarian troops in the Dobrudja, the correspondent of the *Pester Lloyd* (September 27th, 1916) says:

"To my question as to his immediate aims, he did not reply by words, but by a gesture. *He struck the table violently with his fist to tell me what he was going to do with Roumania. . . . We must crush the Roumanians!*"

Such is also the language of a Bulgarian prelate, the Metropolitan of Stara Zagora, M. Methodius, who sent to King Ferdinand, when Tutrakan was taken, a despatch in which he found it pleasant to play with the point of the Bulgarian bayonet:

"The Holy Spirit is with us. That is why the Serbs, the English, and the Italians will perish by the sword of our soldiers. The Russian mother, the '*matoushka*,' has also felt its edge! But she will be grateful, notwithstanding. She has proved the quality of our steel, and is convinced that her pupils have become remarkable masters. . . ." (*Narodni Prava*, September 15th, 1916.)

In reply to Russian attacks, in which Bulgaria was called "the Balkan Shylock," the great Bulgarian poet,

Vazoff, shouted "Long live the sacred grip!" (*Mir*, February 15th, 1916). The "blow of the fist" of his Excellency, the "sacred grip" of the prince of Bulgarian poets, the knife of the Most Reverend are not gestures much more noble than that of the brutal Bulgarian soldiery, whose cruelties have revolted the world. The allies of the Bulgars are themselves horrified to-day.

The *Berliner Tageblatt* of December 29th, 1916, publishes a correspondence from Negotine (a town in the north-east of Serbia), dating from the first days of the Bulgarian irruption into that town:

"The town is devastated. In the cellars, stoved-in casks float in wine and brandy. Merchandise is thrown here and there, furniture is destroyed. . . . The Germans and Austrians are already far away; only Bulgarian soldiers are to be seen. On the roadside lies a Serb, killed. He was an officer. He lies on his back, his arms spread out. A Bulgarian column passes. The Bulgarian comitajis look at him. *Fists are clenched at him who sleeps the eternal sleep.* It is hatred. . . ."

It is the hideous and ferocious hatred howling against the enemy of yesterday or to-day, against all who hinder or thwart Bulgarian pretensions; the vile hatred that inspires even the highest debates on foreign policy. Indignant at the attempt of Adler on the life of Count Stürgkh, the *Echo de Bulgarie* concludes its leading article by exhorting the judges to severity. "The blood of the brave which trickles on the Alps and Carpathians, and all the theatres of war, claims a pitiless chastisement."

Of the same character is the boasting of the Bulgarian churl when he launches gross menaces "to all who are at the service of English lords, French bankers, and sanguinary Russian monarchism" (*Narodni Prava*, September 16th, 1916); or rejoices in the hope (not realised) of the loss of the Serbian Crown Prince in a critical situation on the Golesh mountain (General Boïadjieff in the *Az Est*, November, 1915). The tone is given here by His Ministerial and Diplomatic Excellency Radoslavoff, who was the first to insult old King Peter, and jeered coarsely at his tragic exodus from his country (*Berliner Tageblatt*, January 30th, 1916).

The same nature reveals itself in the base jesting of which the Bulgars have given proof in using such expressions as "drunken country" in speaking of Russia (*Narodni Prava*, May 13th, 1916), and of "a meal for fishes of the North Sea" in referring to Lord Kitchener (*Narodni Prava*,

June 7th, 1916). It is this trivial spirit again which inspires King Ferdinand when he grants a decoration to the composer of a vulgar march, popular in the *café-concerts* of Sofia, entitled "Brigand Allies," etc.

It is gross and voracious greed which speaks through the lips of Bulgarian statesmen when they brag of war booty or a "rich peace" (General Jostoff, in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, April 27th, 1916); it is churlishness, even in diplomatic procedure, which does not allow foreign ministers to leave Sofia before the arrival of Bulgarian ministers*; it is always the exclusive respect for omnipotent force which inspires Gueshoff, the leader of the Popular Party, to explain his facing-round by "his disappointment as to the strength of Russia." The brutality of this egoist materialism has engendered shameless meanness. As we have said already: they are two aspects of the same character.

* *

In circumstances under which the Bulgar cannot use his strength, he fights by falsehood, hypocrisy, cunning, calumny and trickery. When he complains, his noisy lamentations mount towards heaven, and when he fears anyone, he abases himself. He is prepared for any treason, and is proud of his guile. Sofia holds the record for lying. To cite one instance only, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of August 24th, 1916, published, through a despatch from Budapesth, the following:

"According to information from Sofia, the news of the Serbian defeat produced a veritable panic at Salonica. The débris of the defeated Serbian troops, most of them disarmed, rushed to Salonica. The population of the city, and above all the English soldiers, were in the greatest terror. Everybody ran to take refuge on board the ships."

And in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of September 22nd the former Minister at Bucharest, Simeon Radeff, imagined quite a tale of adventures of which the hero would seem to have been "one of the secretaries." The Bucharest police, according to him, extracted from this secretary ten thousand francs in ready money, etc.†

* It relates to the Serbian Minister in 1915, and the Roumanian Minister in 1916. This discourtesy is due to the fact that the Bulgarians—like the Germans, for that matter—ignoring respect for the law of nations, do not feel any confidence in it.

† During a walk on the eve of Roumanian intervention, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, Czernin, said to his Bulgarian colleague: "We shall never be good diplomats, you and I. I never know how to lie, and you never know how to tell the truth." (*Le Figaro*, September, 1916.)

The figures quoted by the Sofia newspapers are as fantastic as those of Bulgarian statistics, which have dared to place unlettered Bulgaria fourth in rank among European States for the number of its literates. The *Narodni Prava* of June 22nd, 1916, discusses a letter addressed to Pashitch by the former Russian Minister at Belgrade, Hartwig, in which the latter counsels Serbia to hold herself in check; the conciliatory tendency of the letter did not hinder the semi-official journal from attributing to it a provocative character, and to distort the meaning of a document that was clear and precise. The Sofia journals published, designedly, veritable romances concerning the fire at Tatoi, and narrated how plots were laid against King Constantine (*Narodni Prava*, September 25th, 1916, etc.).

The greatest Bulgarian poet, Ivan Vazoff, lent himself to the interpretation of these displays of Chauvinism, coarseness, falsity, and boorishness. During these last two years, Vazoff's verses have appeared in the place of honour in the *Mir* almost daily. They are a rhymed chronicle of Bulgaria, echoing all the tones of public opinion.

The Béranger of Bulgaria has allowed himself, too often, to be carried away by the blindest passion, most ferocious hatred, and a most vulgar spirit.

The *Narodni Prava* of November 19th, 1915, published with manifest pleasure Vazoff's "Parody on the 'Marseillaise,'" crammed with insults addressed to the French. In the *Mir* of December 5th, 1915, Vazoff had an extremely vulgar poem entitled, "The Monologue of King Peter." Elsewhere Vazoff calls the aged sovereign "the King Errant," and compares him to Cain and Macbeth. Paraphrasing the official communiqués at the time when Scheide-mann made his declarations on the restoration of Serbia, the poet exhorts the world, in a piece entitled "The Fire," never to forget that it was Serbia who set fire to Europe. (*Mir*, November 13th, 1916.)

But it is in his verses on the Roumanians that Vazoff has given the full measure of the nobility and loftiness of his inspiration. In the poem entitled "The Spirit of Ovid" (*Mir*, October 13th, 1916) Vazoff parodies the salutation of Deschanel to Roumania:

"You are Roman putrefaction—cast away into far lands—eternal Rome is cleansed of the stench—in ridding herself of you. . . . You are like your ancestors: crapulous, thieves, assassins, slaves."

In another poem, which appeared, under the title "Pogrom," in the *Mir* of November 1st, 1916, Vazoff asks for vengeance without pity on Roumania :

"Let us make the ' pogrom ' against the empire of debauchery, envy and hatred, against the hot-bed of vice and monstrous morals. . . . Pogrom ! and let a terrible blow be dealt on the repulsive hyæna ! O Fatherland ! art thou avenged enough ? "

In the verses, "God has Heard Us," Vazoff praises divine justice which has descended on "guilty Serbia—the Slav Sodom"; on "old Nikita roaming like a beggar"; on "Greece, rotting like a corpse"; and on "the overthrown Wallach. . . ."

It is because God has heard the Bulgarian cry—God, whom the Bulgars, as well as the Kaiser, consider to be their ally.*

* *

In their greatest humanitarian manifestations, as in the verse of their most illustrious poets, the Bulgars have always obeyed the basest motives, in which brutality and meanness exercise an influence by turns.

It is not pure hazard which has caused the Bulgars to be known all over the world, both by their lamentations over the violence they have suffered and the atrocities which they have committed themselves. It is only now that we have learnt, for example, of the cruelties inflicted by Bulgarian terrorism in Macedonia, cruelties executed at the very moment when Bulgarian Macedonian Committees were bombarding public opinion in Europe and America with complaints of the sufferings "of their subjugated brethren."

After their intervention in 1915, the Bulgars employed the same tactics. They established a reign of terror in the conquered Serbian provinces, whilst complaining unceasingly of atrocities committed, according to them, by the English and French soldiers in Macedonia.

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 18th, 1915, reproduces Bulgarian protests against the use of dum-dum

* His political opponents avow publicly that Vazoff, by his attitude, has succeeded in augmenting his popularity. The *Narodni Prava* frequently reproduces his verses, whilst congratulating and complimenting the author. The Government decided to purchase a large number of volumes of his works (*Balkanska Pochta* of July 2nd, 1916, "Purchase of Vazoff's Books for Soldiers and Reading-rooms in Macedonia"). The Minister of Education addressed to Vazoff a very flattering letter of thanks, published *in extenso* in the *Narodni Prava* of January 8th, 1916.

bullets. The *Vossische Zeitung* of February 3rd, 1916, publishes news from Sofia, according to which churches had been pillaged and profaned. The *Mir*, the *Dnevnik*, the *Preporetz* of August 5th publish amazing stories about the atrocities of the Allies in Macedonia. The *Narodni Prava* always calls the French and English "civilised savages." The *Kambana* of July 19th, 21st, and 28th, 1916, published a veritable "scandalous chronicle" on the morals of the Allied army on the Macedonian front.

Under the heading, "Civilised Barbarians," the *Kambana* of October 3rd, 1916, had, from its correspondent at the front, "complaints of atrocities committed by the army of the Entente." The details of this despatch have the savour of melodrama :

"Under divers pretexts men appear to have been exterminated in all sorts of ways ; they were burnt alive, or mutilated, or hanged ; young women seem to have been dishonoured in the most barbarous and cynical manner, to satisfy perverted instincts," etc., etc. "The greatest barbarian of them all, Sarraïl, forbade, under a penalty of three years' imprisonment, that food should be given to the inhabitants, etc."

The true meaning of this manœuvre became plain when the Bulgars began to complain of the Roumanians, immediately after Roumania took part in the war. As though at a word of command, the Bulgarian press applied itself to only one question : the savage atrocities committed by the Roumanians. At Sofia street agitations were even organised.

On September 11th, 1916, the pupils of all the high schools met in front of the Presidency of the Council, when Radoslavoff, coming out on the balcony, made them aware of the Roumanian crimes, and promised that they should be avenged. (*Mir*, September 11th.)

The *Kambana* terminated its article of November 12th thus :

"It is a people base and cowardly, false and lying, debauched and violent ; it is not right that it should dwell on the earth, nor that it should enjoy the sunshine of heaven—the lot of the Roumanians ought to be death and annihilation ! In Roumania there is no regular army, there are only bands of brigands, and our war with Roumania should be turned into a 'Straafexpedition.' The ferocious animals in human form which constitute the Roumanian army must be exterminated in the name of humanity."

The *Preporetz* of September 12th :

" The Bulgarian people, in whose soul was stored up already terrible hatred for its felonious neighbour, will now be seized with an inexpressible nausea and unbounded indignation. The cry for pitiless vengeance will rise from the whole country and harden the tender hearts of our soldiers."

The Vice-president of the Sobranié, Momtchiloff, exclaims in the *Outro* of September 17th, 1916 :

" Eye for eye, it was said in the Holy Scriptures. For the descendants of the Roman bandits this measure no longer suffices. When they are in question, we must apply the maxim : *for one eye—a hundred ; for one tooth—a thousand ; for one Bulgarian village burned—ten Roumanian villages.*"

The *Kambana* of October 26th, 1916, said :

" EXTERMINATION ! EXTERMINATION ROOT AND BRANCH ! . . . This dastardly nation does not deserve vengeance, but annihilation. Not on account of its past and present sins, but in order to secure for humanity a tranquil future, and the normal development of history. *This people ought to disappear from the surface of the earth, like gangrene from the body.* WE MUST BRANDISH AGAIN THE BLADE OF ATTILA AND TAMERLANE TO CLEANSE THE PLAIN OF THE DANUBE *from these heirs of the Roman Catullus, become loathsome.* Extermination ! Has not Christ Himself said that at the proper time we must burn the weeds of the field, so that later they may not choke and destroy the ears of corn ? "

Complaints, quite as insidious and calculated, against the Serbian troops in the Dobrudja arose in the same journal, and from the same pen (*Kambana* of October 21st, letter from the front, signed "Bobochevski").

The author asks if, after all that has happened, the Bulgarians ought to continue to act so humanely towards the Serbs and their families in the conquered region—people who are so ungrateful for the benefits conferred on them ?

However, it was easy to comprehend, immediately after these accusations, what purpose these protestations against Roumanian ferocity and appeals for vengeance were intended to serve. Bulgaria, in the Dobrudja, set about the "cleansing" proclaimed in the Sofia journals ever since Bulgarian intervention, as the mission of the Bulgars in Roumania. Besides, the fighting which took place on the Dobrudja front assumed the character of extermination. The *Kambana* of September 7th, 1916, gave some episodes of the battle near Dobritch :

" The battlefield was strewn with corpses. *Alone, a Russian*

Lieut.-Colonel, wounded when commanding a regiment, was taken prisoner with his orderly. When the Russian soldiers cried for mercy, the Bulgars replied by redoubling their blows."

The Bulgarian tactics are plain; they cry out against the violence of others to stifle complaints against their own; and they redouble their cries when they need a pretext for new crimes.

Here again brutality and meanness are partners.

* * *

The Bulgars, who refuse themselves no virtue, do not trouble to defend themselves against the Byzantinism with which they are reproached. As in primitive times, they still appreciate cunning as a quality of the same value as force in the struggle for life.

The Bulgarian satirical author, Aleko Konstantinoff, writes :

"Whilst everywhere else the epithet 'sly' brings with it the humiliating synonym of trickery, even of perjury, with us it confers on him who is so designated the right to be proud, as though it were a flattering compliment; they say here: 'What cunning that fellow has! May God grant him long life! He has taken us all in, and we have never had the chance of doing the same to him. Bravo!' " ("Baya Gagno.")

This special morality of Bulgarian politics has been defined in an interesting fashion by their friend and ally, Count Tisza, in his organ, *Az Ujsag* (September 9th, 1916), where he makes an apology for Bulgarian deceit :

"Bulgaria has been crafty. For four days she hesitated to declare war, with the intention of gaining time for military preparations. Bulgarian diplomacy may thus boast of its duplicity. For we must not judge diplomacy by its acts, but by the results which ensue; success has justified these tactics of the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"In foreign policy there is neither morality, nor faith, nor word of honour. If war is only, in short, a more brutal continuation of foreign policy, the latter, in its turn, is only an introduction to war by milder means. *Not only is everything permitted in war time, but it is our duty to put into action every means susceptible of securing victory. It is permitted to suspect, to feign, to mislead.* Naturally, it is not the business of gentlemen; but he who wishes only to remain a gentleman had better eschew diplomacy."

If diplomacy is merely rascality, the Bulgars are past masters of the art in all respects.

XXIII

A PECULIAR MENTALITY

THE coarse materialism of Bulgarian politics is known under the name of "realist policy." Bulgarophiles have named it so in order to explain and excuse it so much as to turn it to account. The present Allies of the Bulgars, the Germans, who have profited by it in the past, give it the same designation to keep in mind the ventures of to-morrow.

The *Vossische Zeitung* of January 7th, 1917, published a letter from its correspondent at Sofia, which said :

" . . . To count blindly on the fact that Bulgaria will always be, in all circumstances, good and evil, and for a long series of years, closely united to the Central Powers (because the alliance has enabled her to realise national unity, and with it, for the time at least, her political 'saturation') would be equivalent to the mistake made by Russia, who, at a given moment, lost all her former popularity, and separated Bulgaria from the Entente powers.

" During recent years, and on the eve of the present war, Bulgarian statesmen have taken several occasions to declare that Bulgaria, with her ardent patriotism, is susceptible to no sentiment, and that she pursues only a realistic policy. A great Bulgarian politician, comparing Vienna and Petrograd, expressed himself thus : ' For us, the good aunt is the one who gives us the largest cake.' This truth has not been modified in any way since. After the war it will be seen more clearly that *Bulgaria is only made for practical politics and does not shackle herself with sentimentality.*"

It is brutal, but it is plain and simple. If Bulgarian policy were limited to that, the definition would suffice to explain and comprise everything. But, with the Bulgarians, the satisfaction of their desires, not depending only on their facility in passing from treason to treason, necessity has imposed on this frank and direct materialism more tortuous and underhand ways. And it is this that

has evolved that Bulgarian mentality, strange and incomprehensible to European morals and logic.

It is the mentality of the peasant, bounded by a few simple and inconsequent notions, dominated by a fixed idea which annihilates all others, or puts them in a false light. We cannot arrive at a just estimate of this mentality if we have not had occasion to verify it in a discussion, losing an hour without understanding and without making ourselves understood.

Bulgarian political mentality, we have said, is dominated by a fixed idea, the creation of a Great Bulgaria, principal factor in the East, and mistress in the Balkans. The only means of satisfying this adventurous ambition was to ally it to that of the Germans.

Indeed, Bulgaria took part in the game, but she never made up her mind to accept its risks.

The *Kambana* of September 22nd, 1916, wrote :

"Who constrained the Russians to make war against us? We went to war with Serbia : what need had the Russians to attack us? That we are neighbours is not a sufficient reason for fighting us."

General Tontcheff insists on the same idea in the *Pester Lloyd* of September 27th :

"It is not we who attacked the Russians, it is they who marched against us."

So, whilst fighting all the time in the German ranks, the Bulgars are astonished to be treated as enemies by those against whom they declare they never went to war.

The *Mir* of September 15th, 1916, is astonished that the Greeks are accused of treason because "they did not wish to march to their ruin in order to save the Serbs. . . ." "Bulgaria was right in acting as she did. . . ." "And when the Russians come to the Balkans to fight against us," concludes the *Mir*, "we cannot do otherwise than defend ourselves. It is not treason, but defence." In the *Dnevnik* of September 7th, and the *Mir* of September 14th (harangue of Mme. Karaveloff to the crowd in front of the Ministry), it is always the same argument : treason is on the Russian side only. A year before, during the first days of the intervention, the deputy of the Popular Party (Gueshovist) Boris Vazoff, denounced the Russian "crime," the bombardment of Varna. (*Berliner Tageblatt*, October 30th, 1915.)

Here are two most interesting documents bearing witness to the same mentality.

In the article by Professor Rossier, which appeared in the *Gazette de Lausanne* of May 17th, 1916, we read :

"The Bulgarian contention is characteristic. It has been stated to me by a man of high intelligence and perfect urbanity. The famous surprise attack of 1913 was wrong, he said. Even the recent offensive against the Serbs is not perhaps absolutely correct. *But politics are made up of realities.* The strength of Serbia is broken. Even the nation exists no longer : the half of it had perished by hunger, when it returned to its devastated homes and fields, after following the retreat of the soldiers at too great a distance. That being so, why persist in trying to revive a corpse ? why dispute the possession by Bulgaria of Macedonia, which belongs to her by right and by deed ? *why this menace of Salonica which obliges the Government to tighten its bonds with Germany ?*"

The *Mir* of September 7th, 1916, develops the same thesis more amply :

"Bulgaria had before her two roads, and each had something to be said for it. Each party was convinced that the road chosen by it was the best and the only safe one. But, naturally, *the two roads could not be utilised at the same time*, and once one was chosen, we could no longer turn back and follow another. That is how the road we chose has brought us into conflict, not only with the Serbs, but also with the Great Powers, against whom we never wished to battle ; but, on the contrary, from whom we have always expected encouragement in our task.

"Bulgaria has succeeded in conquering, at the price of great sacrifices, *the countries of which she has dreamed so long.* But we cannot expect that England, France, and Russia will shout, 'Bravo, Bulgars !' . . . However, *we have the right to ask ourselves : Do not they know that their fate depends, not on what is going to happen in the Balkans, but on what happens on the great fronts between the forces of the Great Powers there ?*

"Then, *why do not they leave us alone ? Why have they done their utmost to extend the front even to us ?*

"We should not have dared to oppose our small forces to the English, French, and Russians if they had not left their own fronts and their proper zones to come into our regions in order to seek more facile successes. *No, it is not we who raise our hands against them, it is they who raise their hands against us.*"

The moral of these arguments of the *Mir* is very simple : "Since all our parties, say the Bulgars, *were agreed on the object—already realised—Bulgaria cannot be chided for not having quibbled much over ways and means.* We were and

are the accomplices of the great malefactors whom we have aided, and who have aided us to knock down and rob a small neighbour, doing him the greatest harm possible. But we do not understand why the big friends of this small neighbour persist in interfering, and in *trying to do us harm now, when we ask them only to leave us to the tranquil enjoyment of our booty*. We were their enemies so long as we had not realised our aspirations. We remain united with our actual allies in virtue of our pact with them. But, *since we are asking nothing more of anyone, why not leave us alone?* If the service rendered by us to the Central Powers has the importance we attribute to it on every occasion,* it is possible that the struggle in which twenty million men are engaged may be prolonged for a few months, and cost the Entente some hundreds of thousands more victims. But, for the evil which, by an unfortunate but profitable necessity, we have done to others, why make us suffer an evil which at present would be almost useless? . . . We Bulgarians never make others suffer unless there is something to be made out of it. It is because we are realists: we do not love for the sake of sentiment, we hate only by necessity, and we reckon on our own interests only, setting aside all conventional rules of reason, morality, or justice."

It is a mentality apart. If it is difficult to understand it, we should require a peculiar mentality to excuse it.

* *

In order to comprehend this peculiar mentality, we must follow the fluctuations of opinion and utilitarian logic in varying times and circumstances.

After the first successes on the Roumanian front, which dissipated anxiety and reserve, this same *Mir*, in the same month of September, only sixteen days later, paraphrases the base article of September 7th with haughty audacity:

"The efforts of all tended to bring about the greatest success in the only direction which had been adopted. After another year we can be more than satisfied. . . . Among the great armies, the examination passed by the German Army on the battlefields confers on its people the right to rank at the head of the great nations. Among the small armies, that of Bulgaria passed its examination most brilliantly; among the small

* The *Mir* said on April 17th, 1916: "The case of Bulgaria proves the truth of the Bulgarian saying that 'the pebble can overturn the carriage'; the intervention of Bulgaria has produced the greatest change."

nations it is therefore to us Bulgarians that belongs the place which is held by the Germans among the great ones. We are not to blame for the sanguinary encounters with the English, French, and Russians; we did not seek them; *we did not go to their own fronts to add a blow the more to those they received from our allies.* . . . For here they have met with, and will meet with again, a double or triple resistance, having against them the united forces of the Central Alliance. . . . A close brotherhood of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish armies, fighting shoulder to shoulder, will contribute enormously to the cementing of the alliance between their respective nations; their political leaders can say with reason: every evil has its good side." (*Mir*, September 23rd.)

If forecasts prove mistaken, the tone changes; but the mentality continues its fluctuations.

When peace was under discussion, apropos of the German offers and the Wilson note, the Bulgarians counted on the acceptance of Bulgarian claims by both belligerents.

During the debates on the Budget, Radoslavoff declared:

"It is we who can the most easily lay down our conditions, for they are fixed, and both sides acknowledge their justice; I have declarations thereon from the Entente also." (*Echo de Bulgarie*, January 3rd, 1917.)

This equivocal and sensational insinuation excited the curiosity of the simple; it caused uneasiness for a moment even at Berlin. The allies of the Bulgars were the first to express their astonishment at these strange political explanations.

Count Reventlow hastened to dissipate the misunderstanding in the *Tageszeitung*. The *Pester Lloyd* did the same, with laughter. And the *Berliner Tageblatt* (January 2nd, 1917) clenched the matter by this comment:

"At the session of the Bulgarian Parliament on December 30th the President of the Bulgarian Council, Radoslavoff, finished his speech as follows: 'I have documents which attest that our enemies acknowledge the justice of what we demand.' In certain circles it is sought to conclude from these words that the Entente Powers have made new offers to Bulgaria. This is untrue. M. Radoslavoff only spoke of *proposals by which the Entente Powers sought to rally Bulgaria to their side before she intervened in the war*. At that time the Entente Powers declared, as is well known, through their representatives at Sofia, that they were in a position to obtain from Serbia the cession of Serbian Macedonia to Bulgaria."

But the sally of the Minister-President Radoslavoff

was not a piece of fireworks ; it contained a reservation from the rich store of Bulgarian arguments, arbitrary, elastic, and adapted to all needs and situations. The leader of the Opposition, Gueshoff (Popular Party), formulated it in the *Mir* of January 2nd more explicitly. After tracing the story of the Great Bulgaria of San Stefano, Gueshoff added :

“ In recalling these facts, we have the right to ask ourselves : Can there still be a question as to the frontiers of our nation ? *Recognised by the powers which to-day form the Entente and the Alliance*, consecrated by Bulgarian blood, how could the rights of the Bulgarian people be misjudged at the conclusion of peace ? ”

This is the only belligerent in the great world war which arrogates to itself the right to put such a question.

Bulgarian mentality in its entirety is contained in this logic and this moral code : embark on any adventure without accepting any risk, gamble for no matter what stakes without paying any, arrogate to oneself the sovereign right of gaining at all costs and in every case. There is only one logic and one moral code : *those which will finish by building up either the great Middle-European Bulgaria by the brute force of our friends, or the Great Bulgaria of San Stefano by the imprudent sentimentality of our enemies.*

This mentality is illustrated clearly by the following conclusion of an article recently published by the *Preporetz* (April 24th, 1917) entitled “ *Væ Victis !* ” :

“ *All means are justified, provided that we are not beaten.* ”

CHAPTER XXIV

IN DEROGATION OF ALL RULES AND CONVENTIONS

HAVING set at naught all moral obligations, the Bulgars showed themselves to be equally anarchical with regard to all dictates of justice. Whoever, in the great war, has had to do with Bulgarian laws, and with the magistrates charged with their interpretation, is perfectly well aware of this.

If, generally speaking, the lot of a conquered country is a sad one, that of a country subjugated by an enemy so evilly disposed is doubly lamentable. We may imagine the condition of Serbia after two years passed under the domination of an enemy such as that whose singular code of morals, and quite special mentality, we have examined in the preceding pages.

It is reasonable to suppose that the Bulgarian conquerors have shown in their administration of the occupied Serbian provinces the same absence of scruples that they have manifested in so many other matters, and that they have evinced as little respect for the international usages admitted by civilised nations as for the most elementary principles of justice and morality in general.

Nevertheless, the boldest suppositions as to the arbitrary conduct of Bulgarian authorities and their violation of justice do not come up to the reality. Never, at any period of history, was the population of an occupied territory put to such a degree outside the pale of the most fundamental laws and regulations respected until now, at all epochs and in all countries.

From the outset of the occupation of a great part of the Serbian provinces, the Bulgarians decided to consider the occupation as permanent, whereas during the whole period of the war it could only be regarded as provisional. They treated Serbian territory as definitely annexed, and to give an appearance of reason to their point of view they gave themselves out to be "liberators."

The Bulgars have their own way of working out the liberation of a people, as in everything else. *The régime of oppression began by denationalisation.* They proceeded systematically to the destruction of all national emblems, objects and signs. Schoolmasters and priests, schools, colleges and books might have sustained the Serbs efficaciously in the defence of their nationality; so the Bulgarian authorities hastened to banish professors, priests, and teachers, to close schools and burn books.

The deportations took place *en masse*.

The *Narodni Prava* of January 28th, 1916, said:

"A new convoy of 500 deported Serbs has been sent from Macedonia to Sofia. *Among them is a large number of priests.*"

Dr. Kallistratos wrote in the *Nea Hemera*:

"Immediately after the entry of the Bulgars into Monastir order was given to transport to Sofia all the Serbs, above all, the priests and schoolmasters, no matter from what part of Serbia they came. And the deported priests and teachers were replaced by Bulgarian priests and teachers."

The *Chronos* of May 18th, 1916, quoted the *Zarja*, according to which the Holy Synod had already delegated eighty Bulgarian priests to Macedonian parishes.

The *Outro* of April 29th, 1916, wrote:

"The Bulgarian Synod intends to open next year two seminaries in the occupied Serbian provinces."

The closed Serbian schools were reopened as Bulgarian schools. The feverish haste with which the Bulgarian authorities established their schools is well explained in a declaration of the Minister Petcheff, published by the *Outro* of July 1st, 1916:

"The rôle of the schools will be the most important here. The schools will be the torches to enlighten the understanding of our kindred, and to prepare the way for future enterprises. It is on this account I have applied myself from this year to the organisation of the schools in the new provinces."

According to the *Balkanska Pochta* of November 24th, the Budget for the new provinces provided for 270 elementary schools, with 450 teachers and 309 professors of colleges.

The *Dnevnik* of August 23rd, 1916, said, "Colleges have been established at Pojarevatz, Svilaynatz and Veliko Gradishta," that is to say, towns in the centre of the kingdom, in classic regions of Serbian territory.

The Serbs, for that matter, were not only forced to allow

their children to be Bulgarised, but condemned to deprive themselves of every book written in the national language, of every picture, of every object which might remind them of their nationality. Serbian books, rifled from every house, were burnt on the spot or sent to Bulgaria.

A Serb, escaped from Vrania, Mitar Petrovitch, made at the Serbian Ministry of the Interior the following deposition :

“ The Bulgars took away all Serbian books, manuscripts, maps, and engravings. All the inhabitants of Vrania were obliged to deliver to the military commandant all the Serbian books they possessed. The books were then burnt.” (Serbian Blue Book, No. 158.)

And the *Outro* of April 26th, 1916, wrote :

“ The Ministry of Commerce has just decreed that the books collected in the new provinces shall be handed to the National Printing Office in place of being simply destroyed. They will be utilised as raw material for the manufacture of paper and valued at 15 centimes a kilo.”

In the place of the destroyed Serbian books and journals, Bulgarian books were distributed far and wide. The inhabitants, who could not deny themselves reading entirely, were thus obliged to learn Bulgarian. Reading rooms were established everywhere. The Ministry of Education busied itself with the forwarding and diffusion of Bulgarian books throughout the invaded regions. According to the *Zavřia* of August 3rd, 1916, 100,000 levs (francs) were devoted to the purchase of books for the reading-rooms.

The results of this intense and systematic Bulgarisation have been exceedingly small, however. The “ Bulgarian population, liberated from the Serbian yoke,” has obstinately determined to preserve intact its Serbian culture and nationality. The Bulgarians were forced to acknowledge, in the autumn of 1916, that the reluctance of the people to send their children to the Bulgarian schools necessitated the closing of those institutions, or at least a reduction in the number of classes, for want of a sufficient number of pupils. (See Chapter IV.)

The population of the occupied Serbian territory was so far from being Bulgarian that the “ liberators ” did not hesitate to pillage and ruin the country they pretended to liberate. If they had sincerely regarded the region occupied as Bulgarian, they would certainly have brought to bear a little prudence on the systematic devastation. On

the contrary, pillage obtained to a degree beyond conception, and surpassed anything perpetrated elsewhere. It was not carried on only with the advance of the troops, but was proceeded with methodically by the civil and military authorities charged with organising and administering the country once it was occupied. They began by requisitioning everything : produce, furniture, means of transport, cattle. The *Outro* (March 9th) wrote :

“ The Ministry of Agriculture has ordered the cattle requisitioned in the Morava district *to be sent to Bulgaria and distributed among the farmers* of the older regions of the kingdom, in order to improve the native breeds. Cattle from Bulgaria will be sent into the Morava.”

So the poor Bulgarian cattle replaced the Serbian stock. The *Narodni Prava* of April 20th, 1917, announces that they are gathering in the wool : the manufacturers *will pay for it in Bulgaria*, whilst it *will be requisitioned in Macedonia and the Morava*. They took from the inhabitants everything they had. And after despoiling them completely, they demanded taxes from them. According to Art. 48 of The Hague regulations, the taxes were to be collected according to the rules of the cess and the incidence fixed by Serbian laws. The Bulgarians, thinking these laws too clement, ignored them and applied a special system of assessment and collection.

The *Preporetz* of November 20th, 1916, publishes the regulations on the distribution of direct taxation of September 23rd, promulgated on October 17th. It reproaches the Government with not having thought of it sooner. The *Outro* of October 7th, 1916, is informed that “ the Ministry of Finance has already given orders to its functionaries in the Morava to begin the collection of direct taxes.”

After extracting from the inhabitants their goods, furniture, stores, and leased cattle, the Bulgars remembered that they must have on them a certain quantity of Serbian money. This money was still current at its full value. To accelerate the ruin of the country if was necessary to depreciate it. So, on October 27th, 1916, the *Mir* announced :

“ By order of the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank has instructed its branches and agencies to change dinars (Serbian francs) for Bulgarian money, counting the dinar at 50 centimes. *Serbian banknotes have no value, and can be exported*. The administrative authorities and others have been ordered not to permit the exportation of Serbian silver

coins. Smugglers of Serbian silver will be brought before military tribunals. After December 31st of the present year, *any person found in possession of Serbian silver money will be prosecuted as a receiver of contraband.*"

On the one hand they declare banknotes of no value, on the other they depreciate the value of silver by 50 per cent.; and as a climax, the National Bank of Bulgaria has made arrangements with the civil and military authorities to collect all the gold in the possession of the inhabitants of the occupied provinces. The picture is complete.

* * *

The implacable system of Bulgarian pillage was applied, above all, to the property of absent owners. All who were absent, those who had fled before the enemy invasion, like those who, as Serbian soldiers, were obliged to retreat with the army, *those even who had been taken away from their village and interned by the Bulgars*, were despoiled of everything. Their property was declared *ownerless*. By a monstrous procedure, the Bulgars drove away the owners to legitimise the presumption of their non-existence !

They even took away the tombs from the graveyards. The *Dnevnik* of February 24th wrote :

"A wagon loaded with tombstones has arrived at the Sofia station. We think the best way of utilising these monuments would be to place them on the graves of our national workmen, whose tombs are now in a sad state."

The spoliation of the property-owners of the occupied Serbian provinces was decided on, and put in execution by the authorities from the beginning of the occupation. The measure was soon sanctioned by the Government :

"The King has confirmed the decision, taken by Government for the fourth time, to hand over to the State the property of those who, having abandoned their country, have not yet returned." (*Dnevnik*, March 17th, 1916.)

And, finally, the Sobranié, in its turn, at the sitting of November 3rd, 1916, sanctioned all the measures of spoliation by passing the law on the employ of trophies of war, including vacant property. Two orators only spoke against the bill, Kirkoff (Extreme Socialist) and Saderoff (Radical). All the others approved, and the bill was passed.

Divers uses were made of the property seized. The

furniture was, first of all, amassed in Bulgaria. The *Dnevnik* of February 12th, 1916, said :

"Every day wagons full of household goods arrive at the Sofia station. They are being sold by auction as they are brought in."

The *Outro* of April 19th, 1916, wrote :

"The Ministry of Agriculture and Public Domains has nominated a chief inspector for the ownerless goods coming from Serbia. They will be sold very shortly by public auction."

And the *Dnevnik* of April 30th announced :

"The Ministry of Agriculture and Public Domains has ordered a new sale by public auction of vacant property in the provinces of the Morava. If the number of bidders is insufficient, or if bids are too low, a commission will be designated to deal with the property otherwise than by auction. The fiscal authorities of Monastir have commenced to sell by auction every Thursday the shops, houses, and mills remaining without owners."

The *Dnevnik* of May 20th, 1916, wrote :

"The Ministry of Agriculture and Public Domains has appointed a commission, which will proceed to sell publicly, every Monday, Wednesday, Friday and Saturday, goods without owners."

We read in the *Narodni Prava* of June 16th :

"There should arrive shortly 1,000 kilos of wool, *not belonging to anyone* ; it will be sold, as well as 17,000 kilos of coffee. The sale will consist of small lots up to 500 kilos, in order that small tradesmen may lay in a stock of these articles."

The *Outro* wrote on October 14th :

"The working season being near, the Minister of Agriculture has commanded the sale by auction, in the shortest delay, to those who have need of it, of all property 'without owners.'"

Soldiers and functionaries also profited by this rapine. The *Balkanska Pochta* of September 13th, 1916, wrote :

"Tobacco without owners will be granted to the army. It is estimated to consist of more than a million kilograms."

The *Mir* of October 10th said :

"All articles without owners, such as shoes, clothing, etc., seized in the new provinces, will be distributed among the families of those who are mobilised, and among the poor, by order of the Minister of Agriculture, and through the intermediary of the Minister of War."

The *Outro* of November 20th, 1916, announced that

“ authority has been given to grant to local functionaries in the new provinces furniture without owners. The grant is provisional.”

All agricultural implements were seized. The *Dnevnik* of February 1st, 1916, wrote :

“ All agricultural machinery seized as booty of the State in the Morava region has been collected at the Sofia arsenal to be repaired. It will be devoted afterwards to the needs of our farmers. . . .”

The *Preporetz* of October 6th, 1916, mentioned it also :

“ The Council of Ministers has decided to grant all agricultural implements ‘ without owners ’ to the Bulgarian National Bank, which will repair them and sell them to the agricultural population.”

No scruple of any sort has ever restrained the Bulgars in their depredations, and they have carried their rage for pillage as far as sacrilege. The sacking of the monastery of Detchani is a typical episode of this nature.

Detchani, a rare gem of old national Serbian architecture, a place of pilgrimage, and a sanctuary where for long centuries precious stones and metals, jewels, banners, manuscripts, all the inestimable relics witnessing to the national and religious life of Serbia, have been accumulating,—Detchani, declared inviolable by the firmans even of Turkish Sultans, and always respected by the Ottomans,—Detchani, the Medina of the Serbs, was treated by the Bulgars as a rich *bric-à-brac* shop would be by burglars—as a fine place to plunder.

The *Tribune de Genève* of September 8th, 1916, narrating the deed under the signature of the author of this book, concluded thus :

“ The story is worth telling with some detail, for it has given rise to a violent polemic between Austrians, Magyars, and Bulgars. In the *Narodni Prava* of July 31st, a Bulgarian ethnologist, Dr. Stoïloff, states that as member of a commission of five persons, under the presidency of a general, he went to Detchani immediately after its capture by Bulgarian troops.

“ He found there all the treasure and precious objects catalogued in Serbian publications, classified them, and sent them to the Minister of Education at Sofia. To reassure public opinion, I declare—writes Dr. Stoïloff—that all the objects of historical value, as well as those of less importance, are at Sofia, and the Minister of Education alone knows about them.

“ Everything was not discovered, for the honveds and

Magyar territorials unearthed still more treasures, which archaeologists from Vienna and Budapesth are engaged in examining and determining their value. But these opulent spoils have become an apple of discord between the two capitals of the monarchy—Vienna lays claim to them, and Pesth, unwilling to give them up, vehemently maintains her prior rights. The *Pesti Hirlap* of August 4th writes thus about the matter: ‘The Magyar honveds, intensely interested in the monastery of Detchani, were obliged even to make bayonet charges in order to capture it. Are not Magyar savants anxious to know what is contained in this Serbian Czystohowa? For several centuries our destiny was bound up in that of the Serbian State, and we can imagine how many documents there are yonder which have not been scanned by us. Why should the *Hofmuseum* have more right than the National Magyar Museum to the possession of these treasures?’

“However, in the mountains amid which stands the ancient monastery, a legend still survives which attributes to the sacred spot the virtue of protecting the region against harm. Whoever touches Detchani is condemned to certain death. And nobody has ever dared to touch it. . . .”

The provisions of The Hague Congress which have been most frequently violated in the course of the present war are, without doubt, those relating to the rights of private property; Article 23g forbids the seizure or distribution of enemy properties; Article 46 says textually that “private property must be respected”; Article 47 says “pillage is formally forbidden”; Article 53, “the army which occupies a territory can seize only moneys, funds, and chargeable values belonging strictly to the State.” But if the violations committed by the Germans and Austrians have been, in the majority of cases, the acts of soldiers, in such sort that responsibility rests solely on the commanders and their subalterns, those committed by the Bulgars are distinguished by a general and systematic mode of procedure. It is the Bulgars who have developed the theory of the lapse of the rights of property in virtue of the absence of the owner, an absurd theory, but which, approved openly, *decreed even, by the Government*, has served as a basis for the systematic ruin of the country. It is the first time in the history of the world that pillage has been regulated and legalised by a public act. The honour belongs to the Bulgars.

* * *

The impoverishment, the calculated ruin of the occupied country may be explained first by hatred towards the Serbian

element, and afterwards by the hope of having at its mercy and handling more easily a population reduced to indigence. But that was not enough. It was necessary to get rid of every person of influence, however small, of all who by their education or social position might have encouraged the people to defend their nationality. Therefore recourse was had to deportation.

As a prelude to this "cleansing," assassinations were committed, in Macedonia chiefly, and proof is to be found in the Serbian Blue Book of 1916.*

Other crimes are narrated in the Appendices 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36 of the Blue Book, and how many remain unknown!

The *Temps* of May 10th, 1917, publishes the following on the Bulgarian régime in Serbia:

"It appears from the depositions of the latest Bulgarian deserters that the terror inaugurated by the Sofia Government in conquered Serbia is at its height. To the massacre of the population which protested against forced enrolment of Serbian citizens under the Bulgarian flag, has just been added executions of the notables of several Serbian towns. Thus, two priests of the town of Leskovatz, in Southern Serbia, the arch-priest Komnenovitch, and the priest Kotsich, were shot not long ago. Further south, in the town of Vrania, all the Serbian priests,

* "I know positively that they killed eight Serbs in the department of Ghevgheli. I can only give the names of two victims: Dango Georgevitch, schoolmaster, and Athansius Yovanovitch, both of Stoyakovo." (Deposition of George Diaskis, Blue Book Appendix, No. 17.)

"The Bulgars have assassinated all those who had been indicated to them as partisans or friends of the Serbs under the Ottoman régime. Every morning the banks of the Vardar were strewn with numerous Serbian corpses." (Blue Book, Appendix No. 19.)

"The Bulgars commit atrocities impossible to describe. They have burnt down a number of villages; they set fire to them at night, and when the affrighted inhabitants rush out of their homes the Bulgars shoot them like game. . . . At Koumanovo the Bulgars tied together eighty Serbs, stabbed them to death with knives, and threw them into the river in a mass." (Blue Book, Appendix No. 20.)

"When the Bulgarian Army entered Veles, two comitajis, Todè Haji-Jorko and Temelko Karpouz, made up a list of the proscribed. Just after the Serbian retreat on Babuna, two Bulgarian companies and one squadron ransacked the villages in search of the men inscribed on the list. Many of them were taken and killed on the spot." (Blue Book, Appendix No. 22.)

"At Koumanovo they assassinated Danilo Tsokitch, schoolmaster; Orde Dragomanovitch, merchant; Denko Tchuma, and twelve other influential citizens. At Stari Petritchani they assassinated Blajo Smilian-ski. In the environs of Koumanovo they killed Stevan Georgevitch, priest of Tchelopek; Blajo N. of Mladi Nagoritchani; Canon Vladimir, monk of the convent of Saint-Prohor of Ptchinia; the priest Stevan of the same convent, and another priest whose name I know not." (Blue Book, Appendix No. 26.)

to the number of six, were executed. Besides, the Bulgars shot several notables of the same place. Among the victims were: Milkovitch, Mayor, and George Tsoupara, Municipal Councillor; Djourdjevitch, President of the Tribunal; Mikitch, judge at the tribunal; Vakirovitch, manufacturer, all former deputies; Vlakovitch, advocate; Djokitch, industrial; and Pantazievitch, banker."

The work of the comitajis accomplished, they proceeded to the deportations.

"Tetovo has become a desert. Many citizens have been deported and interned in Bulgaria. As striking examples may be named Yastro Tinovitch, contractor; Sima Miritch, hairdresser; Spira Georgevitch, merchant; Mitcha Autitch, shoemaker. (Blue Book, Appendix No. 25.) A score of influential men of Resan and the two brothers Srezovitch (Krsta and Sava) have been taken to Sofia. (Blue Book, Appendix No. 31.)

"The priests, schoolmasters, all the influential citizens, as well as a large number of functionaries have been deported to Bulgaria. The camps of the deported are at Sofia, Philippopolis, Roustchouk, and Adrianople. (Blue Book, Appendix No. 34.)

And so on. They left in the country only the women and children (and not all of them) and some few men deemed harmless. Every influential and educated person was interned in the concentration camps in Bulgaria. It must be acknowledged that this practice, absolutely contrary to the rules of international law, is not a Bulgarian speciality. Their allies, the Germans, as well as the Austrians, have applied it also, on a vast scale. But the Bulgarians have found the means of surpassing their allies in the violation of the principles of justice. They differ from the Austrians and Germans *in refusing to give the least indication as to the deported*. They have forbidden them all correspondence. Not only could no lists of the deported be obtained, but it was impossible for their families to get the slightest information about them. The Serbian Government, the Bureau of Information instituted according to Article 14 of The Hague regulations, encountered the systematic refusal of the Bulgarian authorities to furnish lists of the deported and of prisoners of war, or to afford information concerning them.

On what did the Bulgarian authorities base their action? On a conception radically false, contradicting juridical ruling and the evidence of fact; on the *presumption that the Serbian State no longer existed*: that consequently the

Serbian Red Cross and the Serbian Bureau of Information, instituted in accordance with Article 14 of The Hague regulations, had ceased to exist ; that Serbian territory had become Bulgarian, and that its inhabitants and all former Serbian subjects made prisoners or deported to Bulgaria were *ipso facto Bulgarian subjects*. The deported and prisoners being Bulgarian subjects, Bulgaria was not accountable for them to anyone. Even supposing them to be Bulgarians, the Bulgarian State, by a strange contradiction, kept them in the condition of deported and prisoners. And this theory was approved by the Bulgarian Red Cross, which, forgetting its humanitarian duties, made itself subservient to the political aims of its Government.

“ On account of the occupation of all Serbian territory by the Bulgarian and Allied Armies, no Serbian authority, and in consequence the Serbian Red Cross Society, any longer exists in the country.” (Circular of the Bulgarian Red Cross, published in all Bulgarian journals. Cf. *Balkanska Pochta*, September 20th, 1916.)

By this ridiculous conception of the *jus belli*, the Bulgars have violated not only the positive rules of international conventions signed and ratified by Bulgaria, but also principles admitted for centuries in the relations between States. The undisputed principle, not only in theory but in practice, was that occupation was not sufficient to confer sovereignty on the occupier, and the rights appertaining to it. In order that a conqueror might annex territory and dispose of it as a master, it was necessary that the dispossessed State should have ceased to exist, or should sign a treaty creating the legal title required for the definite establishment of the right of conquest. So long as the treaty of peace or the disappearance of the conquered State is not accomplished, the occupier must consider the occupied territory as still under its old sovereignty, and its inhabitants as subjects of the enemy State. To maintain that the Serbs had become Bulgarian subjects, Bulgaria declared that Serbia no longer existed as a State, the totality of its territory being occupied. It was false in principle, because occupation, even of the whole territory, does not suffice if the State has preserved all its other attributions and if the war continues ; and such was the case here. Serbia, doubtless, had seen all her territory occupied, but she had preserved her army, which is the best sign of existence in a State at war. The Serbian Army existed and fought against these same Bulgarians.

As for the Red Cross, it is clearly evident, from the text and spirit of the Geneva Convention of 1906, and the acts regulating the organisation of these societies, *that the Red Cross is not attached to the territory but to the army*. By its object in itself, the Red Cross should aid the service of the military medical staff ; so long as a Serbian Army exists, a Serbian Red Cross must exist, and its place is where the army is. The question of territory has nothing to do with it.

Bulgaria refused also to recognise the Bureau of Information established by Serbia in virtue of Article 14 of The Hague regulations. This bureau, however, continued to perform its functions and maintained all the reasons for its existence. In the retreat of 1915 the Serbian Army took its prisoners with it. The Bureau of Information, charged with the affairs of prisoners, followed them naturally. Serbia, having lost her territory for the time being, interned her prisoners on allied territory ; after the reconstitution of her army she resumed hostilities in 1916 and made new prisoners. All these prisoners, old and new, were always assembled in a special group and confided to Serbian administration ; the Bureau of Information, which remained the same as before the occupation of Serbia, continued to establish the status of each individual prisoner, and to send all information and all correspondence of the prisoners to the enemy States. Its existence was legitimate, and it retained all its prerogatives. So long as Serbia continued to hold prisoners she must have her Bureau of Information. That bureau ought to be, not in occupied Serbia, but in proximity to the prisoners. That is logical. And the bureau, in virtue of reciprocity, and basing itself on the rules laid down at The Hague Convention of 1907, was right in requiring to be supplied with all information concerning the Serbian prisoners and interned persons in Bulgaria.

To this legitimate right, to this absolutely well-founded claim, Bulgaria responded by a refusal.

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But it is in the question of recruiting that Bulgaria has drawn the most monstrous conclusions from her pretension to consider the Serbian State as non-existing. After violating the most sacred rights of humanity, in breaking up families, in plundering estates, in forbidding all manifestation of nationality, Bulgaria perceived that she had omitted

to inflict a last cruelty. She applied herself to repair the negligence: she began to organise *recruiting in the occupied provinces*, thus obliging the inhabitants to fight against their country and against their own army. On the subject of recruiting, the Serbian Blue Book of 1916 furnished some peremptory documents. In the first place the deposition of a neutral subject to the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Appendix No. 45): "They recruit for the army all men from 18 to 60 years of age." An extract from an official report supports this (Appendix No. 48). "They have recruited for the army all those who, in the part of Serbia occupied by the Bulgars, have been recognised as fit for military service." Extracts from private letters are quoted also (Appendices 46, 47, 49, 50). Since the publication of the Blue Book, Bulgarian journals themselves have confirmed this information. The *Preporetz* of September 26th, 1916, writes: "A military commission began work on September 16th in the town of Resan. In all parts of the liberated Bulgarian countries young men fit for military service hurry to the commissions of recruitment. By their entry into the barracks the forces of Bulgaria increase, and with them the earnest of a brilliant future."

The semi-official *Narodni Prava* of October 16th, 1916, said:

"The departmental commission of recruits at Kavadar informs us that the verification of 18 to 19 and 37 to 50 years is prolonged to the 25th of the present month. The commission will operate in the chief town of the department on the 18th and 19th for the division of Ghevgheli, the 20th and 21st for that of Doïran, and the 22nd to the 25th for that of Nego-tine."

The *Outro* of October 31st, 1916:

"In the newly-liberated regions the recruits have everywhere joined their units with great enthusiasm. Some days ago the recruits of Dabar (Dibra) left also."

The *Zaṽa* of December 9th, 1916:

"All the Turks and Albanians of Katchanik from 20 to 40 years old, whether or no they have served in the Turkish Army, are ordered to present themselves to the regional command at Uskub to be enrolled."

So far it has been a question of the provinces of Serbian Macedonia only. But the measure was extended to other parts of occupied Serbia, and applied to the totality.

The *Preporetz*, the *Narodni Prava*, the *Mir* of February 14th, 1917, published the following notice :

"Military commissions for the medical inspection of men aged from 18 to 40 years will sit : at Nish from March 20th to 27th ; at Kurshumlia, February 21st and 22nd ; at Prtchilovitza (named town of Dr. Radoslavoff), from March 11th to 15th ; and at Veliko Gradishta, from March 19th to 22nd."

The *Narodni Prava* of February 15th, 1917, wrote :

"All persons from 19 to 40 years of age are notified to present themselves before the recruiting commissions, which will sit from March 13th to 18th at Tchoupria, from March 2nd to the 5th at Jubara, from March 20th to 23rd at Slivainatz, and from February 20th to 23rd at Dogni Milanovatz."

The *Balkanska Pochta* of February 20th, 1917, said :

"Following on telegraphic orders to the prefects of the towns of "Dr. Radoslavoff," Kurshumlia, Nish, Tchoupria, Jubara, Slivainatz, Veliko Gradishta, and Dogni Milanovatz, it is notified to the public that :

"All inhabitants, aged from 19 to 40 years, of the town of Dr. Radoslavoff (Prtchilovitza) and its environs, are ordered to present themselves before the military commission, which will sit in that town from March 11th to the 15th inclusive ; of Kurshumlia, February 20th and 21st ; of Nish and its environs, from February 21st to March 27th ; of Veliko Gradishta, from March 12th to the 22nd ; of Tchoupria and its environs, from March 13th to the 18th ; of Jubara and its environs, March 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th ; of Slivainatz and environs, from February 20th to 23rd ; and of Dogni Milanovatz, from February 20th to 23rd. *Those who do not appear will be brought before the military tribunal and dealt with as recalcitrant.*"

All the towns mentioned are in the ancient region of Serbia. Kurshumlia is in the department of Prokuplié, south-west of Nish ; Prtchilovitza (or "town of Dr. Radoslavoff") is north-east of Nish. Veliko Gradishta is on the Danube ; and with Jubara, in the Pojarevatz department ; Tchoupria and Slivainatz are on the Morava, in the centre of Serbia. Dogni Milanovatz is on the Danube, in the department of Vrania. Their names suffice to prove that no part of Serbia has been exempted from the recruiting zone.

To excuse this arbitrary measure, and in reply to the semi-official Serbian protests, the Bulgars maintained (communiqué of the Bulgarian Legation at Berne) that the two provinces (Macedonia and Morava) being pure Bulgarian,

ethnically, the levy of recruits only responded to the profoundly patriotic feeling of the local population. They cited Martens (Treatise on International Law, Vol. III., page 252), according to whom, in a war of liberation, the occupying liberator has a right to levy troops and to use them against the oppressor. The best answer to their impudent assertions has been furnished by the populations themselves. The unfortunate inhabitants of the Morava and Macedonia were not of opinion that recruitment "responded to their profoundly patriotic feelings," but, on the contrary, the cup was full, this cruelty surpassed all others, and instead of answering the call of the authorities, by an act of despair rose against them.

* *

Since the month of December, 1916, the Bulgars had perceived a certain effervescence among the oppressed population. Above all, in the departments of Nish, Vrania, Leskovatz and Prokuplié the people were ready to throw off the enemy yoke by a general rising. The beginning of April, 1917, was agreed on as the time for action.

In February, the Bulgarian authorities, feeling some apprehensions, in order to nip the movement in the bud, ordered a new internment of the male population. This measure, carried out with much cruelty, like the attempted forced recruiting, forced the Serbian revolutionary organisation to precipitate matters.

The insurrection began in the department of Prokuplié. It was in the town of Kurshumlia that the revolt broke out with most vigour, under the leadership of a certain Kosta Petchanatz. The insurgents took Prokuplié, where there were 300 Bulgarian soldiers, whom they disarmed, conveyed to the environs of Vrania and there released them, with the words: "We do not wish to harm anybody. We wish only to free ourselves."

The Serbian revolutionaries took possession of the arms deposited by the Bulgars in the military magazines. Their number augmented hourly. They occupied Prokuplié, Kurshumlia and Lebané, as well as the greater part of the district of Leskovatz. They established Serbian authority in these localities and the movement extended more and more.

The Bulgars, seeing the movement taking a menacing turn, brought up numerous troops in haste. The repression

was terrible. Bulgarian vengeance took the shape of a craving for pitiless massacre. A large number of villages were completely destroyed and *the entire population put to the sword. Only children under seven years of age were spared.*

The Bulgarian authorities ordered an immediate deportation of the whole population from 17 to 70 years. An eye-witness was present when the wretched files passed through Nish in the first half of the month of April. Hundreds left every day. The streets of Nish were full of Serbs of all ages on the way to Sofia. The witness heard it said that they were to be taken through Bulgaria to Asia Minor.

To put the world on the wrong scent, the Bulgars compelled a few individuals inhabiting the occupied towns to present addresses of loyalty to the occupying authorities.

Precisely at the moment when the movement of revolt murmured in Serbia, the Bulgarian Government laid before the Sobranié a bill of urgency "for the pursuit and destruction of brigandage." On March 3rd the President of the Council, Radoslavoff, declared from his seat in Parliament, in reply to the Socialists, that the latter "did not know what was happening in the new territories."

Things were happening as dreadful for the Serbian people as they were shameful for the untoward "liberators." The Bulgarian press alluded to them only in an indirect and roundabout manner, in articles demanding the application of the "régime of grip." It was the *Dnevnik* of March 7th—at the moment when the Bulgarian and German divisions were stifling the insurrection at Kurshumlia—which sanctioned violence by the following argument :

"In abnormal circumstances, through which the action of certain laws is suspended and several portions of the country are governed by laws of emergency, moral responsibility outweighs legal responsibility. At present, *moral responsibility is determined by the war aims we are pursuing.* We are fighting for our existence, which means that *every act which impedes us, whatever its source, must be punished.* . . .

"During these exceptional times, *the only principle which, even from the standpoint of ordinary justice, has its raison d'être, is that of submission, without conditions.*

"Much has been said about 'tolerance,' which some approve and others condemn. *The principles of State discipline come before everything.* Every policy which does not respond to these principles should be *punished.* All action on the part of individuals, of a nature to enfeeble the State, directly or indirectly, should be *stamped out.* We have only one point of

view: The country is in danger, and only one watchword: The country before all."

The Bulgarian telegraphic agency, speaking of a communiqué of the Serbian Press Bureau at Corfu, relative to the insurrection in Serbia, whilst denying the fact of an insurrection, was fain to avow that "a band of comitajis" had appeared in occupied Serbia, but took care not to mention the *number* of those composing the band. But what the Bulgars did not tell, the Austrians declared officially. In the *Beogradski Novine*, No. 111, of April 24th, 1917, was a proclamation addressed to the Serbians living on occupied territory, from which we give a few extracts textually:

"The story of the last attempt at insurrection—sad as it is for that small portion of the Serbian people led to certain suicide by paid leaders—has clearly foreshown the fate reserved for all similar enterprises of unscrupulous English agents, who, pretending interest in the freedom of small nations, work rather for their destruction.*

"Every attempt made by enthusiasts incapable of learning wisdom to provoke revolt against the actual authorities *will be pitilessly stifled from the first. All disorder will be repressed immediately, and order will be restored at the cost and to the detriment of the Serbian people exclusively.*

"The military Government General in Serbia declares that it will proceed, according to the law of necessities of war, for participation in revolt against any person who shall have aided an English or French agent, or any other foreign agent, in no matter what way, by giving him shelter, by not denouncing him spontaneously to the authorities or in favouring his plans in any way."

The proclamation finishes by promising different pecuniary rewards (2,000 and 1,000 crowns) to informers, etc.

The Serbian insurgent forces, seeking to avoid the Bulgarian repression, had also to pass into the mountains which rise above the Morava Valley, and which form the boundary between the part of Serbia occupied by the Austrians and that held by the Bulgars. The proclamation aimed equally at Serbs who, struggling against the Bulgars, might have crossed the Bulgaro-Austrian frontier, and at

* The *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, of Saraëvo, of April 27th, reproducing this proclamation from Belgrade, adds the following remark: "The proclamation alludes to the recent insurrection in the part of Serbia administered by the Bulgarians at Kurshumlia; a movement which doubtless had for its object the support of Sarrai's offensive, by cutting railway communications, has been rapidly stamped out, without causing any damage to the authorities, whilst the people have endured woful sufferings."

those who might have given them shelter, or who, aware of their presence in the region, did not denounce them to the Austrian authorities. The draconian measures of the Austrian administration at Belgrade seem to be modelled on those, more brutal and ferocious still, taken by the Bulgars. The two oppressors on this occasion, as on all others, aided each other mutually, in the war of annihilation waged against the down-trodden Serbian people.

* *

Such is the atrocious régime of ruin and extermination which the Bulgars have exercised over the occupied Serbian provinces. Not only have they trampled underfoot all the accepted rules and most elementary principles of the law of nations, but they have constantly and systematically violated the most natural and fundamental rights of humanity. They began by throwing in the face of the world the lie that, ethnically, the occupied regions were not Serbian, but Bulgarian., and during the occupation they set themselves the task of attenuating the lie by exterminating the population and destroying everything that had a national, and therefore Serbian, character. Such are they who claim to be fourth in rank among European States, in the matter of education ; who affirm that society is better organised in Bulgaria than in western Europe ; who declare that they invade neighbouring countries with the sole object of civilising them.

* *

We could not put a better finishing touch to this Bulgarian self-drawn portrait than by a few lines borrowed once more from the painful satire of "Baya Gagno" :

"The behaviour of Baya Gagno, I am quite well aware, was insolent ; he appeared to me repugnant, miserly, selfish, untruthful and scheming ; I held him to be a hypocritical sharper, a creature coarse and brutish to the marrow . . . and, in spite of all, I pitied him. . . .

"Do not despise this poor wretch, corroded, cunning, and thievish ; he is the produce of his rude environment ; the victim of his brutal educators ; it is not in him alone that latent evil exists, but also in the surroundings that have influenced him. Baya Gagno is energetic, intelligent, sharp—above all, sharp. Subject him to the discipline of a good education and you will see what fine actions he is capable of performing. Up to the present, Baya Gagno has only displayed his external

strength, but he bears within him rich potentiality of spiritual strength which only awaits a moral incentive to transform itself into a living force."

Let us hope so ! If this change were to come about, it would be for the happiness of the Bulgarian people, as well as for that of their neighbours, who, for centuries, have suffered so much, while waiting for it.

Let us conclude, with the author of "Baya Gagno," by the last words he addresses to his hero :

"Pardon me, Baya Gagno ! I take Heaven to witness that none but good feelings inspired me in writing your story. My pen was not guided by any intention of detraction, scorn, or raillery. . . . I believe, Baya Gagno, that you have brothers who do not resemble your portrait, but they are still in obscurity ; scarcely are they beginning to emerge from it. But you—you are in full daylight ; your spirit is on the wing and troubles the whole of society ; it leaves its impress on politics, parties, the press. . . . I hope that a day will come when, having read this little work, you will betake yourself to reflection, you will sigh and say : '*We are Europeans . . . but not yet quite !*' "

No, Baya Gagno, you are not a European, and during this severe test your instincts have shown it only too well.

Let us hope for the realisation of all the conditions necessary to the developing and elevating of your brutal and rudimentary strength ; and let us trust, at the same time, that it will be made impossible for you to injure your neighbours until the moment when, become really a European, you will have recognised this truth—that we cannot do harm to those around us without harming ourselves.

APPENDIX

NARRATIVES OF
MR. ARCHIBALD FORBES
AND
MR. DAVID CHRISTIE MURRAY

NOTE

THE opinions contained in the following extracts have all the more value as coming from those who, far from being prejudiced against the Bulgars, had every reason, through influences and environment, to lean the other way. Mr. Archibald Forbes, who represented the *Daily News* with the Russian army in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, speaks for himself in his article in the *Nineteenth Century*, written whilst the war was still in progress. Mr. David Christie Murray, the special correspondent of the *Times* and the *Scotsman*, whose brilliant letters to the latter journal may be within the recollection of some, was a strong partisan of Mr. Gladstone in his great campaign for Bulgaria, as anyone who met him in Turkey, in 1877, will testify. Both Mr. Forbes and Mr. Murray set out on their missions inevitably prepossessed in favour of the Bulgars, and if either were inclined to indulge in polemic, it would have been a grateful task could they have done so on behalf of a people who had their sympathies. It was certainly detrimental to their own interests to say anything against the Bulgars. Mr. Forbes lays stress on this, as will be seen—but they were honest men, and felt bound to speak the truth which had been forced upon them by the overwhelming evidence of personal experience.

. Z. D. F.

APPENDIX

By way of a corollary to the following narratives, it may not be inopportune to recall the fact that in 1877, at Shumla, north of the Balkans, a group of correspondents, among whom were the representatives of the *Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Scotsman*, signed a protest calling attention to the outrages committed by Bulgars on the unarmed Moslem peasantry, notably on women and children.

In 1913, before the outbreak of the second Balkan war, similar action was taken by some representatives of the leading European newspapers and news agencies then at Salonica. Here is the gist of a document drawn up and presented to the President of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* :—

“ Now that war seems inevitable, European opinion ought to be informed as to the conduct of the different Allies, and the responsibility should be fixed with regard to certain especially odious acts and excesses of all sorts which have been committed by the Bulgarians in the regions occupied by them. The European press has maintained a silence, almost systematic. Nevertheless, reports reach us daily of terrible atrocities, and these are confirmed by thousands of refugees. Greeks and Turks are equally sufferers. In the interests of justice and humanity there ought to be an impartial inquiry in order that the facts may be known, for such deeds are a reproach to the twentieth century, and, in our opinion, they call for a public protest.”

The signatories of this were the *Times* correspondent, Mr. Crawford Price ; Reuter's Agent, Mr. P. Donaldson ; the special correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, Capt. Trappman ; the correspondent of the *Temps*, M. Emile

Thomas; the correspondent of *Le Journal*, M. Tiano; the correspondent of the *Secolo*, M. Luciano Magrini; the representative of the *Agence Havas*, M. Turbé; the correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Herr Grohmann; and the correspondent of the *Zeit*, M. Besantché. It did not have much effect at the time, but was more than justified by what was revealed afterwards. Then came the Bulgarian attack, its repulse, and the retreat. The attack was characterised by M. Francis Charmes in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* as "a perfidious aggression, prepared beforehand, carefully calculated, and boldly executed." The retreat was red with massacre. The conspiracy of silence could no longer be maintained. The evidence was too strong. The first stirrings of public opinion in Europe were indicated by the despatch of the Consuls-General of Austria and Italy at Salonica to the interior on a mission of inquiry. This was followed by a special Commission sent by the French Government, consisting of M. du Halgouët and Colonel Lepidi. Both inquiries confirmed and established the accusations. The *Daily Telegraph*, the *New York Herald* and the *Temps*, through both its correspondents, M. René Puaux and M. de Jessen, bore witness to the dread happenings. Among a multitude of eye-witnesses were three Protestant pastors, and Père Gustave Michel, of Kilkis, a French mission priest, and the sisters of the French Convent. "I curse the day," said the aged priest, "that made me a witness to so hideous a scene." The horrors will not be described here. Capt. Cardale, R.N., in a letter to a friend about the atrocities at Doxato, said: "I might, perhaps, give you more details, but there are some things one cannot bring oneself to speak about." Mr. J. W. Ozanne, in the *Nineteenth Century* for August, 1913, says: "The Bulgarian attack on the districts occupied by Greeks and Serbians was attended by scenes of unheard-of savagery, beside

which the atrocities of Batak, which at the time sent a thrill of horror through the civilised world, pale into insignificance. . . . The subjects of King Ferdinand have established a record."

M. Puaux wrote in *Le Temps*, a journal which at the outset championed the cause of Bulgaria :

" The Bulgarian Army has put itself outside the pale of the laws of war, for it has massacred the civil population everywhere. A Bulgarian officer avowed that the order to kill women and children was formal, in order to eliminate any ulterior claims to property in the territory conquered."

M. Luciano Magrini, who made painstaking research lasting for several months, wrote in the *Secolo* of July 18th, 1913 :

" Personal inquiry allows me to affirm that about 200,000 Mussulmans, unarmed men, women, and children, were killed by the Bulgarians during the first months of the Balkan war. The whole of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace were sacked and terrorised. The silence maintained by the Great Powers touching the massacres of Mussulmans encouraged the Bulgarians to continue, and led to the present massacre and pillage of the Greek population."

NARRATIVE OF MR. ARCHIBALD FORBES

From an article in the *Nineteenth Century* for November, 1877 :

“ During the last three months I have traversed Bulgarian territory and entered Bulgarian villages in advance of any Russian troops. I have lived with, talked with, and dealt with the Bulgarian population, and taken great and persistent pains to ascertain their real and true character.

“ I believe I came to the work as completely a *tabula rasa*, in the matter of prejudices, as it is well possible to conceive. . . . Of politics, either home or foreign, I know shamefully little, and for them, I ought to blush to own, I have cared still less. I ask to be regarded as an accurate witness, limiting myself to the sphere of my own personal observation, and finally I would ask to be regarded as an honest witness, in virtue of the fact that what I am now doing must be greatly to my own detriment. In obeying the compulsion to fulfil a duty, I must offend many whose goodwill I would fain cherish, and must let go many friendships which I value very dearly.

“ An outspoken Russian of my acquaintance, with a large campaigning experience in Bulgaria, gave it out as his belief regarding the North Balkan Bulgarians that they must either be the result of a temporary lapse in creative vigilance or accepted as a refutation of the Darwinian theory of the survival of the fittest. . . . My experience of the Bulgarians, indeed, is that they have fewer attributes calculated to kindle sympathetic regard and beget genial interest than any other race of whose character I have had an opportunity of judging. . . .

“ It tells, doubtless, in favour of the Bulgarian that he is nominally a Christian ; although his evidences of Christianity, so far as I have cognizance of them, consist chiefly in his piously crossing himself, in starting to drive a vehicle for the hire of which he has charged double a reasonably liberal sum, after having profusely invoked the name of the Saviour to corroborate his asseverations that the price he asks is ruinously low. He cannot be denied a certain candour, which sometimes has a cynical flavour in it, as when he coolly tells a Russian, who

in the character of his 'deliverer' is remonstrating against his withholding of supplies or his extortionate charge for them, that 'the Turk was good enough for him,' and that he did not want deliverance. The Bulgarian is singularly adaptive. He realised his 'deliverance' with extreme promptitude of perception, resulting in bumptious arrogance. He drove his ox-cart with nonchalant obstinacy in the only possible rut, and grinned affably when your carriage springs were broken in trying to scramble out to pass him. In the towns he held the crown of the causeway. In the country regions, near the forepost lines, he sees it to be expedient to pursue the career of a double spy and a double traitor.

"If ever one race owed a deep obligation to another, the Bulgarians did to the Turks, for the forbearance of the latter in leaving them and theirs unmolested in the evacuation before the advancing Russians in the last days of June, and in July. In all my wayfarings from the Lom to near to the Vid, from the Danube to the Balkans, I could neither hear of nor find a human being who had suffered; and I am sure I inquired sedulously enough. Last year's straw stack stands in the farm-yard of every Bulgarian cottager; the colour of its thatch proves that his habitation is not an erection of yesterday. The two-year-old colt trots on the lea along with the dam and the foal. His buffaloes are mature in their ugliness; his wife's white metal water-pails are pitted with the dints of years. Of the vines, whose fruit-clusters dangle on the brown fronts of Drenova's old oaken houses, the gnarled stems are as thick as my wrist. Pretty Maritza of Tirnova shows you proudly her blooming balsams, and her mother displays the yet remaining large stock of her last autumn's preservings.

"And, by the way, it was of this same mother that the tale was written in England how the Pasha had informed her he would hang her, and indeed had even fixed the day for the operation, on the charge of concealing some obnoxious personage. I was given to understand, indeed, that some unpleasant communications had passed between the Pasha and the good lady, but how much, or how little, she was perturbed thereby may be gathered from the fact that she did not desist from her placid preparation of paprika paste—no, not on the very day named, or reported to have been named, for disqualifying her from the further enjoyment of that dainty. . . . The Turkish soldiers evacuated Sistova, without so much as breaking a twig on the

front of a Bulgarian house. Disorganized bands of soldiers fell back through the rural villages without so much as filching a Bulgarian goose or requisitioning a Bulgarian egg. A Turkish army abode for days around Biela, without a jot of injury wrought on the townsfolk or their property. All along the Turkish retreat from the Jantra to the Lom, the Bulgarian experienced the same immunity. . . . How was this forbearance required? The moment the last Turk was gone from Sistova—not before, for your Bulgarian is not fond of chancing contingencies—the Bulgarians betook themselves to the sack, plunder, and destruction of the dwellings vacated by the Turks. I have seen few dismaller spectacles than that presented by the Turkish quarter of Sistova, when I visited it, two days after the crossing. To me, as representing a journal whose goodwill the Bulgarians cherished, the Bulgarian *patres conscripti* of Sistova strove to mitigate the disgrace. It had been wrought while as yet order had not succeeded to anarchy—the Cossacks had had a hand in it, which was a lie. . . . But stern measures had been taken to arrest any further devastation (there was little left to wreck).

“ I went out and, ascending the minaret of a mosque which had been wrecked and defiled, saw from the summit Bulgarian youths pursuing unchecked the wanton work of destruction. In every town and village, whence the Turkish inhabitants fled, their houses were at once wrecked. Colonel Lennox and Lord Melgund must be able to testify with how great order the Turks evacuated Biela. I can speak to the unharmed state of the place when I entered it, while as yet the Turkish irregulars were not yet out of sight. I can speak also to the zest with which its Bulgarian inhabitants began to wreak their spite on the houses of the Turks, as soon as they believed that the presence of Arnoldi's dragoons, on the heights above the place, deprived the work of any risk. . . . I neither praise anyone nor blame anyone. But this I say, that all the Turks are reported as having done is, on credible evidence, not one whit more barbarous than was the conduct of the Bulgarians towards the Turks. . . . It is not given to barbarians to accept with Christian resignation or civilised phlegm the spectacle of their dwellings wantonly razed, their crops stolen and sold, their little garden patches obliterated. They know that the miserables they find unaccountably remaining in the villages, deprived of Russian protection, were the culprits. They know

that these welcomed the enemy of the Turk, acted as his guides, served him as spies, and found in him a customer for the Turkish crops. They know that these hung on the rear of the hapless retreating Turkish villagers in July, and slew them, ruthlessly—men, women, and children—when the safe chance offered. So the ‘unspeakable’ Turk lets the rough edge of his barbarism come uppermost again, and perpetrates atrocities—inflicts reprisals? Bah! what matters it about a form of words?

“ . . . And I sincerely believe, on the evidence of my own eyes and ears, that the Turks—the dominant race in virtue of those characteristics which, until the millennium, will ever continue to insure the dominance of a race—allowed the Bulgarians—the subject race in virtue of those characteristics which, while they exist, will always make a race subject to someone or other—to have by no means a bad time of it. But just cast a hasty glance at the conduct of the barbarian Turks during the past two years. The period opens with the Bulgarians, subject indeed to the Turks, taxed heavily and arbitrarily, annoyed occasionally by a zaptieh, who must have been nearly as bad as the omnipotent ‘agent’ of an Irish absentee landlord—but withal prospering mightily. . . . To judge by the manner in which the Bulgarian civic functionaries appointed by Prince Tcherkasky are presently fulfilling their duties, from the principal councillor, who is making haste to be rich by pillaging alike casual Russian and resident countrymen, to the street policeman of Tirnova or Gabrova, who, clothed in a little brief authority, whacks about him indiscriminately with his rattan, it may be questioned whether the general progress of the world was seriously retarded by the enforced abstention of the Bulgarians from a share in the management of public affairs.

“ It was no doubt a sad thing that the stalwart manhood of the Bulgarians was debarred from proving in the defence of the country that it had a heart in keeping with its thews and sinews, although circumstances may inspire a doubt whether the iron of this prohibition ate deeply into the Bulgarian soul. I do not mean to say that it was all smooth and pleasant for the Bulgarians, or, indeed, for any of the races of which Turkey in Europe is made up; but their lot, from all I have been able to learn, was tolerable enough. It seems to have been a lot for which the practical British philanthropist would gladly see a considerable section of his fellow country-people exchange

their own wretched, sodden, hopeless plight. The life of the Bulgarian was eminently preferable to that of the miserable victims of the 'sweater.' I think Devonshire Giles, with his nine shillings a week and his few mugs of cider, would cheerfully have put up with the zaptieh, exclusion from a share in the management of public affairs—although his home share in that privilege is so large and so highly prized—and would even have been resigned under the dispensation of debarment from military service, for the sake of the rich acres of pasture and barley land, the cattle and the brood-mares of the rural Bulgarian. I know that the Russian peasant soldier who has crossed the Danube as the 'deliverer' of the Bulgarian from 'oppression' feels with a stolid bewildered envy that, to use a slang phrase, he would be glad indeed 'to have half his complaint.'

"I never had but one occasion to appeal to an official Bulgarian, and the result was not encouraging. I had bought a pony from a Bulgarian citizen of Sistova. As I was not prepared for the moment to take the animal away, I handed to the vendor, in the presence of witnesses, half the purchase money, and a trifle to keep the pony well till I should send for it in a couple of days. The transaction occurred in the man's own house; he was no horse-coper, but everything around him indicated that he was a respectable citizen. Two days later I sent my servant for the pony. On his way he met the citizen riding the beast. My servant hailed him, whereupon he immediately wheeled about and galloped off to parts unknown. My servant, and subsequently myself, visited his residence, where his sister, who was his housekeeper, smiled blandly upon us, and declared herself ignorant whither he had gone and when he would return. I made a formal complaint in writing to a Bulgarian official in the police office, indicated as the right man to whom to complain, but never again saw either citizen, pony, or money. The complaint died a natural death.

"Apologists for the proven barbarity of the Bulgarians—men who acknowledge that they saw them driven away with horror by Russian officers from their work of slaughtering Turkish wounded over whom a Russian column had passed—advance the plea *ad culpam minuendam*, that the Bulgarians have at least not ravished. There is told a different tale in the sad spectacle of the four Jewish ladies, sisters, now forlornly

resident in the house of a merchant banker in Bucharest, of their own faith—outraged by God knows what ruffianism of uncounted Bulgarians in sight of their own father as he lay dying, murdered, in his own house in Carlovo.”

NARRATIVE OF MR. DAVID CHRISTIE MURRAY

The following extract relates to the year 1877, when the author was special correspondent of the *Times* and the *Scotsman* in the Russo-Turkish war. The narrative occurs on pp. 167-176 of his volume of “Recollections:” *

“In Philippopolis I was introduced to the Gueshoffs, a Bulgarian mercantile family, who had been established there for some generations. The two sons had been educated at Owen’s College, Manchester, and might easily have passed anywhere as Englishmen. One of them was Deputy Vice-Consul for Great Britain, and the other held a similar office for the United States. I dined with them, and spent a very pleasant evening, and I am sure that no visible shadow of mischance was then hanging over the household. But a fortnight later I was amazed to learn that the father and the two sons had alike been arrested on a charge of treason, that they had all three been tried before the military tribunal and condemned to death, whilst the whole of their possessions had been sequestered by the commandant of the city, Ibrahim Pasha. This was in no special degree an affair of mine, but as soon as I heard the news I hastened back to Philippopolis, and in the course of a hurried interview with Mr. Calvert, the British Vice-Consul, the conclusion was arrived at that the official position of the two younger men was of a character to afford them some protection against proceedings of so summary a nature. It became entirely obvious, as a result of a mere surface inquiry, that the charge against the Gueshoffs had been trumped up by the military authorities simply and purely because they were wealthy people, and the commandant saw his way to a handsome windfall.

“Armed with such scanty proofs as I could gather, I set

* “Recollections.” By David Christie Murray. 1905.

out for Constantinople, and, arriving there in two days, I laid my case before Sir Austin Henry Layard, who was then our Ambassador to the Porte, and the Hon. Horace Maynard, who was Minister for the United States. Sir A. H. Layard was a pronounced philo-Turk, and would not, for a moment, believe that any such abominable intrigue as I suggested could have occurred to the mind of any Turkish official. He received me with marked coldness, and I felt from the first that I could make no headway with him. Mr. Horace Maynard met me in another spirit. 'One of these men,' he told me, 'is under the protection of the American flag; in his case, I shall insist on a new trial, and in the meantime the execution shall be suspended.' A fortunate chance threw me into communication with Lady Layard, who was less violently prepossessed in favour of the Turkish Government than her husband. She promised me her most cordial assistance, but for three days I hung about Constantinople in a fever of apprehension, waiting for the Imperial *firman*, by virtue of which I trusted to secure an arrest of sentence. The execution of the three Bulgarian merchants was fixed for eight o'clock on the morning of the ensuing Saturday, and late on Wednesday night the longed-for document came into my hands. I attempted at once to telegraph the news to Philippopolis, but the wires were cut in a score of places, and communication was impossible. The next train up-country started at seven o'clock in the morning, and it seemed as if I had ample time before me; but somewhere in the neighbourhood of Adrianople a culvert had been blown up by the Bulgarian insurgents, and we were brought to a decisive standstill. There was nothing for it but to complete the journey on horseback, and here I was heavily handicapped by the fact that I had mastered but a scattered phrase or two of the language, and had the greatest difficulty in making my wants known. At length, by good hap, I encountered a Bulgarian who spoke a little French, and by his aid I contrived to get a mount. The moon was about at the full, and it was impossible to miss the road. I set out upon my journey with a better heart than I should have had if I had known what I learnt afterwards. The whole district between Adrianople and Philippopolis had been overrun by the irregulars, who were carrying everything before them with fire and sword. Luckily for me, they shunned the high road and devoted their attention to the outlying villages. Anything at once more

dreary and more exasperating than that ride I cannot recall. I was badly mounted from the first, and at each succeeding stage, when, after an infinitude of difficulty and misunderstanding, I had secured an exchange, it seemed to be always for the worse. Some two months before, at Kara Bounar, I had been affected by a touch of dysentery, and this assailing me when I was only half through, made progress dreadfully difficult. But in the failing light of Friday evening, the great rock on which Philippopolis is built came into sight, and I could afford to make the last stage of my journey at a foot-pace, with the certainty that I held a good nine hours in hand. I rode to the Roumelia Khan, the hostelry at which I had left my interpreter, and thence, after a hurried meal, he and I set out in search of the commandant, who, with his staff, had taken possession of the mansion of some Bulgarian notable. I produced the *firman* duly signed and sealed, and demanded that, in accordance with its provisions, the prisoners should be removed under safe escort for re-trial at the port of Varna. The Pasha—a little man with a close-cropped beard which looked like black varnished wire—glanced at the document and angrily pronounced it an impudent forgery. I have not often seen a man so inspired by rage; the hand in which he held the official document was apparently as steady as a rock, but all the while he talked to us the stiff paper rustled noisily. He declared that the execution should proceed, and he threatened to hang me with the others. It was not at all impossible that, in the existing state of the country, he might have ventured on that course, but I saw fit to remind him that I was, for the moment, the authorised representative of Great Britain and the United States, and that if he did violence to me in that capacity, Turkey would be wiped off the map of Europe in a fortnight. The little commandant spoke French, and he surprised me greatly when I spoke of *Les Etats Unis* by interjecting in a tone of incredulous scorn: '*Les Etats Unis! Où sont les Etats Unis?*' My interpreter broke in volubly with the statement that the *Etats Unis* were twenty times the size and had twice the power of Great Britain, and he and the little Pasha were both shouting together when, as Providence would have it, Mr. Fawcett, the British Consul-General, was announced. His presence calmed the storm at once, and he sternly bade Ibrahim obey the *firman* on peril of his own head. The Gueshoffs were duly deported, were re-tried and acquitted, and were allowed, I believe, to

retire to Odessa until the close of the campaign. After that they returned to Philippopolis, and, according to the latest news I had of them, were prospering exceedingly. I had many other things to see to for months to come, but it surprised me somewhat to find that no communication reached me from them after they were known to be in safety. I had a notion that the salvation of three lives, at some personal risk and trouble and expense, was worth at least a 'thank you'; but years went on, and the whole thing had almost faded out of mind, when it was brought back suddenly by my encounter with another Bulgarian merchant, Melikoff by name, whom I met one fine summer's day at the Strand end of Waterloo Bridge. I had met him at the Gueshoffs' table, and I asked for news of them. Such intelligence as he had to give was wholly favourable; they were all well and prosperous. I suggested to him that I thought it at least a little odd that no one of them had ever thought it worth while to send me a line. 'Well,' he answered, in some embarrassment, 'they found it impossible to recover a very large part of their property when they got back to Philippopolis, and for some time, I can assure you, they were in considerable straits.' I answered that they could scarcely have been in such straits as not to be able to buy a postage stamp, but the upshot of the matter was simply this. At the time at which I had been able to be of service to them I was the representative of the *Scotsman* and the *Times*, and was supposed to be something of a personage. It was impossible at the time for them to have offered what they would have thought would be a fitting recognition of my services, and, on the whole, it seems that they had thought it best to let sleeping dogs lie, and to say nothing at all about the matter. I might, it appeared, have made some kind of claim against them, which, though I could not have enforced it legally, they would have been bound in honour to recognise. I told him that this did not quite accord with British ideas of gratitude, but he appeared to think that he had offered a perfectly satisfactory explanation. It was quite obviously beyond him to conceive that I could have extracted any satisfaction from a mere acknowledgment of service rendered, or that such an acknowledgment would not have been used as the foundation for some more substantial claim.

"As Edmund Burke said years ago, 'It is impossible to indict a nation,' but my experience does not lead me to believe

that the Bulgarians are a grateful people. In Kalofer, for example, I was introduced, under circumstances of dramatic secrecy, to a refugee who was hiding for his life, and who had been concealed for days in a dark cupboard with a sliding panel. I shall never forget the face of the haggard and fear-stricken wretch who crawled out of that hiding-place into the light of a solitary candle, or the enthusiastic protestations of gratitude on the part of his wife when I proposed that he should disguise himself as a farm labourer, and should take a place among the men who were driving down for me a set of empty arabas to Philippopolis. The simple plan succeeded, and the fugitive got over the frontier. The wife was very eager to show how much she felt beholden to me. Her husband had been a rose-grower, and she had for sale a quantity of the precious attar which she was willing to dispose of to me, and to me only, for a mere song. She would have given it gladly, but she had to join her husband, and some small amount of ready money was essential. I bought from her five very small phials, each containing perhaps a teaspoonful and a half of the liquid. She assured me the essence was absolutely pure, and that I could hardly have secured its like for love or money elsewhere. I was not the best pleased man in the world when I discovered that she had palmed off on me a perfumed olive oil, which by the time I examined it at Constantinople had turned rancid.

“When I was engaged in the administration of the Turkish Benevolent Fund, the raising of which was mainly due to the late Baroness Burdett Coutts, the fact that I was bound on an errand of mercy, and that I was instructed not to spare relief by any consideration of religion or race, enabled me to penetrate into parts of the disturbed districts into which I should not otherwise have dared to venture. In the course of my journey I came to Kalofer, where I found a singularly intelligent and attractive little Bulgarian boy whom I resolved to rescue from the almost certain starvation which lay before him. His father had been the Vakeel of the place, and the child had of course been decently reared. He was pinched and pallid with hunger, and he had but a single garment, a pair of the baggy knickerbockers worn by the peasants of the district, which enveloped him from heel to shoulders. I got him decently attired, and in a while managed to place him in the care of a colleague at Constantinople, and when I left the country my brother-in-law, Captain William Thompson, who was engaged

in the Levant shipping trade, gave him a free passage to Liverpool, where for the space of some months he lived with my sisters, the younger of whom turned schoolmistress for his advantage, and began to teach him English. Mr. Crummles used to wonder how things got into the papers, though perhaps he was under some slight suspicion of having contributed to their circulation. How the news of the young Bulgarian's arrival in England got there I do not know, but there was a considerable journalistic fuss about him, and the result was that a wealthy Bulgarian family, resident in Manchester, made overtures to my sister, and with my free consent formally adopted the child. Before this happened he paid them a preliminary visit, during which he was presented with a pony, and a male domestic servant was told off specially to his service. When his adoption was finally decided on, he went back to my sisters' house at Liverpool to gather up his belongings and to say good-bye. The little ingrate refused to say one word of farewell to either of them. 'I not English any longer,' he declared. 'I Bulgar again.' And, Bulgar, through and through, he was, to my thinking, sure enough.

"It is quite true that you can't indict a nation, but I shall need some persuasion before I go out of my way again to be of use to any member of that particular section of the human family."

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